

Granting Forgiveness: Moral Blackmail, or a Free Gift?

Questions to the Epilogue
of Paul Ricoeur's «Memory, History, Forgetting»

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This article discusses three recent treatments of Paul Ricoeur's concept of forgiveness. Together with recognition, it is distinguished from reciprocal interaction and established as a gift. Part I seeks to show against Burkhard Liebsch's critique of Ricoeur's argumentation that forgiveness is an initiative that must remain free, as distinct from a moral expectation that victims may find hard to refuse. Part II examines the status, scope and meaning of forgiveness in the Epilogue of Memory, History, Forgetting, as analysed by Christopher Lauer and by Olivier Abel. Only if it remains voluntary and contingent, rather than an actionable demand, can it unfold its liberating character for human agency.

The category of the gift has enjoyed a renaissance in philosophical, theological and ethical analyses to such an extent that the boundaries between phenomenology and theology, features of givenness in human existence and the different, namely historical givenness of God's self-revelation, have seemed to melt into each other.¹ While the resonance which this concept has found is encouraging, it also calls for a clear delineation of its contents. The sociologist Hans Joas explores its heuristic power for elucidating the principle of human dignity which he interprets as a «sacralisation» of the human person, and distinguishes sharply between two types, one universalistic, the other private and self-centered:

«It is of central importance for a contemporary understanding of universal human dignity ... whether we succeed to formulate the idea of our life as a gift under current conditions in such a way that it also becomes clear to the friends of 'reason-led argumentation'; this task includes 'distinguishing a universalistic sacralisation of the person, that is, of all persons, from a self-sacralization of the private individual, that is, of one's own person'».²

¹ Perceptive critiques can be found in V. Holzer and F. Bousquet, in N. HINTERSTEINER (ed.), *Naming and Thinking God in Europe Today. Theology in Global Dialogue*, Amsterdam - New York 2007, pp. 265-274; e.g. F. BOUSQUET, *Thirty-years' Worth of Studies and Publications on the Subject of God*, pp. 131-146.

² H. JOAS, *Die Sakralität der Person. Eine neue Genealogie der Menschenrechte*, Frankfurt a.M. 2011, p. 234 (my translation).

The concept of «gift» is credited with forming a critical barrier to such self-elevation, as well as to current «tendencies towards a comprehensive monetarisation and commodification».³

Yet despite this endorsement of the need for renewed reflection on the role that the category of the gift could play in one's self-understanding, also from the perspective of interpretive sociology, we know from Paul Ricoeur's 1990 acceptance speech of the Leopold Lucas Prize in Tübingen that a logic of the gift and a logic of justice as reciprocity do not stand in a mutually exclusive but in a dialectical relationship. Taken on its own, an «economy of the gift» can lead to «hypermoral» positions, which would undermine the abiding element of «justice» that is not to be cancelled out but preserved in «love».⁴ Thus, there can be no replacing of justice by charity; each of them keeps its own role and they are not to be amalgamated, lifted, or spiritualized into a sphere of pure one-sided willingness to give. This is a timely reminder twenty years before the current Pope's reflections on *caritas*.

Recently, however, in the context of the political and personal question of memory and forgiveness, the relationship between justice and generosity, namely between entitlement and gift has been cast into doubt from a different angle. One of the main accusations directed by the philosopher Burkhard Liebsch at Ricoeur's *Memory, History, Forgetting* (French original 2000) is that it visits a kind of moral blackmail on the victims of historical atrocities; they are put under moral pressure to forgive the perpetrators of crimes against them. What appears as the generous possibility of lifting the burden of guilt, in Liebsch's view actually compels victims to forgive despite their true outrage. For the Leipzig philosopher, this perspective of forgiveness is untenable and betrays the real history of people's suffering and violent death.

In Part I, I shall investigate his argument, and examine its objection that Ricoeur succumbs to a Hegelian sublation of suffering. Here, the position Ricoeur expounded in an article of 1985, «Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and Theology», will be instructive.⁵ Having dealt with the critique that forgiveness would be a gift which invalidates suffering and betrays historical truth, I shall compare two other authors on different aspects of the gift in Part II: Christopher Lauer on «States of Peace: Ricoeur on Recognition and the Gift», and Olivier Abel on «The Unsurpassable Dissensus: The Ethics of Forgiveness in Paul Ricoeur's Work».⁶

³ *Ibidem*, p. 234.

⁴ P. RICOEUR, *Love and Justice*, in M.I. WALLACE (ed.), *Figuring the Sacred*, Minneapolis (MN) 1995, pp. 315-329.

⁵ In M.I. WALLACE (ed.), *Figuring the Sacred*, pp. 249-261.

⁶ T.S. MEI - D. LEWIN (eds), *From Ricoeur to Action: The Socio-political Significance of Ricoeur's Thinking*, London - New York 2012.

I. THE GIFT OF FORGIVENESS – A BETRAYAL OF THE TRUTH OF HISTORY?

The perspective of forgiveness with which the Epilogue of *Memory, History, Forgetting* concludes has provoked the objection that Ricoeur is offering a Hegelian solution to historical suffering, impervious to the insight that the 20th century was forced to make, namely, that the trust in a «firm moral footing» and the foundations of a social philosophy have been irretrievably damaged.⁷ Liebsch accuses the French philosopher of proposing a way of coping with the harrowing memories of the Holocaust that turns its back on the victims in order to fulfil the desire for a present and a future «happy» or «pacified memory». The title of the special volume of the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* edited by Liebsch in 2010 is chosen accordingly, posing the «testimony to the past» as an alternative to a reconciling forgetting: «Bezeugte Vergangenheit oder versöhnendes Vergessen?» The attitude to the past taken in Ricoeur's late work on the historical condition is deemed to be conciliatory and Hegelian in its quest for sublating negativity into a synthesis. The desire motivating it is traced back to an undue concern with oneself, identified in the Heideggerian term *Sorge*, care.⁸ It is seen to be at risk of placing the blame on the victims who are allegedly being accused of cultivating an excessive emphasis on their history of suffering, and appear to be placing obstacles to the happy memory aspired to if they refuse to forgive. A response given by Ricoeur in his nineties during a visit to Jerusalem claiming that an orientation towards forgiveness is his personal conviction, motivated by an option of faith, is taken by Liebsch to indicate that it has no validity beyond his personal view.⁹

This controversy is of great significance both for the determination of practical reason in the public sphere and for the question of whether a religiously motivated hope which is argued for in terms of Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* is more than private. In view of these severe critiques addressed to the final phase of Ricoeur's work, the exact meaning of the limit concept of a «happy memory» would have to be determined by placing it into his theory of action, into the architec-

⁷ B. LIEBSCH, *Vorwort*, in B. LIEBSCH (ed.), *Bezeugte Vergangenheit oder Versöhnendes Vergessen? Geschichts-theorie nach Paul Ricoeur* (Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie. Sonderband, 24), Berlin 2010, p. 27.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 50.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 20: «Without a doubt: Ricoeur's conviction which from the beginning resisted any despair is that one must set all one's hope in a reconciled forgetting. But is this eschatologically inspired conviction not condemned to be limited to a personal confession?»; Fn. 37 specifies: Ricoeur himself insinuated this at an advanced age; cf. his Jerusalem *Comments on Philosophy, Religion and Forgiveness*, in «Naharaim», I (2008), pp. 43-46. Liebsch concludes: «It should not be converted, as stated, into a politics of forgetting which could dispose of our memory». Cf. p. 269: «What may be convincing as the expression of a personal confession, however, cannot simply be taken as a general task of collective memory or of critical history writing. What Ricoeur seeks to make attractive as 'happy forgetting', becomes suspicious in the eyes of others as an unacceptable, euphemistic presentation (*Beschönigung*) of historical experience which can only be controversial».

ture of his ethics, and into his hermeneutics of the self – a task which is impossible to complete in the space of this short article. Equally, the fact that the forgiveness which makes such a peaceful memory possible is only thinkable through the symbolic resources transmitted in religious texts would have to be analysed further. What can be examined here is the adequacy of interpreting the «serenity» envisaged as a limit perspective for memory in the *Epilogue of Memory, History, Forgetting* in Hegelian, rather than in biblical terms. The answer to the question concerning the possible entailment of «reconciliation» requires a comparison of reconstructions of «evil» (1) before possibilities for agency can again be envisaged (2).

1. *Evil as negativity, or as inflicting suffering? A comparison of the analyses of Hegel and Kant*

In response to Liebsch's reading, it is necessary to include Ricoeur's argumentation prior to *Memory, History, Forgetting*, in one of his earlier treatments of the problem of evil in which he compares, among others, the answers of Hegel and Kant. In «Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and Theology», after criticizing Augustine's and Leibniz's theodicies, Ricoeur shows Hegel's proposal of a theoretical reconciliation in its failure and refutes it in the clearest possible terms: it has lost all its creditability by betraying the victims. On the basis of the assumptions made by Kant, Ricoeur then goes on to propose two levels of a response: the plane of action where suffering in the present and in the future can be fought against, and that of a renewed task of reflection, arising at a deeper level: the persisting theoretical problem, not faced by Hegel, of why humans make other humans suffer.

Kant's answer is threefold: evil is inscrutable («unerforschbar») in its radicality; yet, it is not foundational at the level of a predisposition («Anlage»), but secondary as a penchant («Hang»); the role and the capacity of religion is to restore the actual power to act according to the good principle in each human being. This assessment of Kant's also gives a role to the churches as a «channel» for such action independent of the state.

Already in this article, first published in 1985, Ricoeur expressly dismisses a reconciliation bought at the price of marginalizing the victims. Yet he moves beyond the concrete historical level where an absolute alternative between the positions of the sufferer and of the agent of evil can be stated, to the foundational level of the possibility to act as the original location of the problems of evil and of guilt. He first summarizes, then questions the «rational hubris» of Hegel's «painful but victorious 'work of the negative'»:

«On every level, negativity is what constrains each figure of the Spirit to invert itself into its contrary and to engender a new figure that both surpasses and preserves the preceding one, in the twofold sense of the Hegelian concept of *Aufhebung*. This conclusive dialectic makes the tragic and the logical coincide at every stage. Some-

thing must die so that something greater may be born. In this sense, misfortune is everywhere, but everywhere it is surpassed, to the extent that reconciliation always wins out over what is torn apart.

The question is whether this triumphant dialectic does not reconstitute, with logical resources unavailable to Leibniz, another form of optimism issuing from the same audacity, with perhaps an even greater rational hubris. Indeed, what fate is reserved for the suffering of victims in a worldview where the pan-tragic is constantly covered over by a pan-logicism? We may say that the scandal of suffering is overlooked in two ways. First, it is diluted and defused by the very expansion of negativity beyond the human predicament. Second, it is silenced by the substitution of reconciliation (of contradictions) for consolation addressed to human beings as victims. The famous motto of the 'cunning of reason' in the introduction to the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* is the well-known stumbling block of this post-Kantian theodicy». ¹⁰

He completes his analysis with both an internal critique of a philosophical system that seeks to ensure meaning by giving up on the hope for happiness, and a clear conclusion from the history of the twentieth century:

«The irony of the Hegelian philosophy of history lies in the fact that, assuming that it does give a meaning to the great currents of history, ... it does so to the extent that it abolishes the question of happiness and unhappiness ... But if the great actors in history are frustrated as concerns happiness by history, which makes use of them, what are we to say about its anonymous victims? For us who read Hegel after the catastrophes and the great sufferings of our century, that dissociation that his philosophy of history brings about between consolation and reconciliation has become – to say the least – a source of great perplexity. The more the system flourishes, the more its victims are marginalized. The success of the system is its failure. Suffering, as what is expressed by the voices of lamentation, is what the system excludes». ¹¹

It is exactly because the Hegelian strategy of sidelining those suffering at the hands of the makers of history is ruled out, that the question of how the ability to act can be restored becomes inescapable. It is here that the category of «gift» becomes relevant: for Kant in the shape of a horizon of hope, for Ricoeur as the availability of a new start for the agent who is no longer tied to the legacy of her acts.

2. *Reopening the sources of goodness*

Moving away from Hegel's solution, Ricoeur turns to Kant's designation of religion as a force capable of reopening the sources of goodness in his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Such a reflection has to begin with the self as the individual center of perspective, initiative and responsiveness to the expectation of the other. It is not, as Liebsch insinuates, self-indulgence in *Sorge* about one's own isolated existence that seeks to expel troubling memories and replace them with a 'reconciled'

¹⁰ P. RICOEUR, *Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and Theology*, in M.J. WALLACE (ed.), *Figuring the Sacred*, pp. 249-261, 256.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 256-257.

one. The Epilogue of *Memory, History, Forgetting* rather explores the conditions for being able to live with the memory of the past as a basis for renewed agency after having become guilty. Thus, the final phase of his work – which is the one Liebsch engages with – specifies the role of hope that Kant accords to religion as one of opening up a horizon of forgiveness that the victim and the perpetrator can avail themselves of. Instead of seeking a future happiness at the price of actively ejecting any thought of the victims from memory – an intention Ricoeur would also consider impossible to carry out –, he places memory into the faculty of practical reason with its mandate of recognition.

Before dealing with two other treatments of this connection, I would like to summarize my analysis of Liebsch's critique in three points:

- 1) Ricoeur focuses on the need of reopening the sources of good agency after having become guilty. Since the self-understanding of a person is the relay point to action, it has to be freed from the paralysis of being fixed on the misdeeds one has committed which block a prospective new self-definition. Liebsch does not see the practical ethical urgency of the need of renewing the sources of action, of rekindling trust in the power to act in a beneficial way. He separates victims from offenders as an absolute, unquestionable distinction. There is no way back for perpetrators.
- 2) History is seen as closed, as defined once and for all by what has been done. By contrast, Ricoeur insists that one has to go back to the point when history was still open, when different choices were still possible, rather than «fatalistically» accept what has happened. He keeps a place for the contingency of events, against the near-necessity they acquire in Liebsch's look back on a history of catastrophic sequences. For Ricoeur, both what happened and what did not come to pass belong to history, and to its legacy for contemporary citizens.
- 3) In Liebsch's view of history, the gift of forgiveness thus appears as a betrayal of the truth of suffering. In addition, it is suspected of attempting a short-cut, trampling on the memories of the victims, in order to reach the goal of a cheap, self-serving reconciliation. The «gift» of forgiveness is not a spontaneous self-initiative, but a weighty expectation imposed on the sufferers in addition to what has already been done to them.

The question to Liebsch is whether his final plea for a «better future» remains a weak and empty call since he does not specify the resources from which this power to resist evil and to begin anew stems. When he tries to insist with great moral emphasis that victims and perpetrators have nothing in common, is he not failing to distinguish the level of historical agency – of those who committed crimes and those who suffered and perished under them – from the level of a fundamental reflection on the human capacity for good and evil? And is his clear rejection of a Kantian

understanding of morality as a capacity of the human will, rather than as an event or call from outside the self («Widerfahrnis») not a sign that he systematically underestimates the forces ‘within’ the person both to reflect on her past misdeeds and seek forgiveness, and, on the side of the victim, of the free spontaneity of granting it? And is this refusal to give a conceptual philosophical standing to the act of forgiving not an insult to the humanity of the victims, whose intention is not a Hegelian type of reconciliation of opposites but an act of liberating the perpetrator to a new understanding of self, that she is «worth more than her actions»?¹²

II. RECOGNITION AND FORGIVENESS AS GIFTS?

The discussion with Liebsch has shown how important it is to defend the voluntary, unconstrained nature of the act of forgiving. But if its self-willed character is so decisive, does it follow that this is a natural part of human agency? We have seen that the goal of forgiveness, that is to open up again the sources of agency towards the good, does not fit into Liebsch’s reconstruction of moral consciousness which in his view can only be set into motion from the outside: it befalls («widerfährt») a person. With this extrinsicism of morality, it is hard to see what capacity corresponds to its call within the receiving self. By contrast, Ricoeur reconstructs morality as an evident level which appears in the phenomenological analysis of the self’s agency. Yet also his reflections leave us in a dilemma: on the one hand, the voluntary nature of forgiving is crucial; on the other, this option is only possible because forgiveness ‘is there’ already, prior to the individual act.¹³ How does forgiveness differ from recognition then, and how is this ordinary level of human interaction characterized?

Here, the interpretations offered by Christopher Lauer and by Olivier Abel are elucidating. Ricoeur’s critique of Axel Honneth, which Lauer treats, shows a concern to avoid any automatic reciprocity; a concern that is similar to Liebsch’s objection that the addressee is forced to forgive in order not to leave the offender miserable, and a «happy memory» as inachievable. Already at the level of recognition, Ricoeur distances himself from any reconstruction that would portray it as a morally imposed concession. In order to highlight its voluntary, self-determined and innovative origin, he moves recognition away from strict reciprocity, situating it closer to the category of the gift:

«Ricoeur contends that this impulse to call for recognition because it is badly needed is a kind of trap that forestalls the possibility of any genuine mutual recognition. To

¹² P. RICOEUR, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, p. 493: «You are better than your actions» is the English translation of «Tu vaud mieux que tes actes»; *La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli*, Paris 2000, p. 642.

¹³ The different status of the act of forgiving to the act of promising is elaborated against Hannah Arendt’s position in P. RICOEUR, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, pp. 486-493.

say that gift-giving is only intelligible as a response to a command (whether of the *hau* or sociological necessity) or that recognition ought to be given to ensure others a minimal chance at a fulfilling life is to seek to replace the contingency of any genuinely mutual relation with the security of a unilateral directive. In Ricoeur's language, it is an attempt to replace a logic of superabundance with a logic of exchange. Rather than giving *because* creation itself has been superabundantly generous, such a logic gives recognition *in order that* recognition be given in return.¹⁴

Ricoeur characterizes the attitude or self-understanding that makes such action possible as the «insouciance» of *agape*, a lack of worry about return, or cost, or non-restitution, or being left at a loss.¹⁵ Lauer makes an observation on the structure of the *agape* identified by Ricoeur as the motivation behind such anticipatory, creative action: its structure is exactly this lack of balance, it is to be one-sided:

«Ricoeur readily admits that *agape* is an odd passion to prioritize in a treatise on mutual recognition, since it is structured precisely by its lack of reciprocity. By giving without limits and without any expectation of return, agapic love announces its indifference to just treatment at the hands of the other».¹⁶

Interrupting the desire for recognition that gets caught in an endless struggle, Ricoeur conceives of «clearings» or «states of peace» that «reopen spaces for mutual recognition».¹⁷

What links recognition and forgiveness, one can conclude, is the element of *agape*, of risking a one-sided advance. The difference of forgiveness is that it relates to a past that cannot be undone, which makes it unlike promising. The «states of peace» that offer respite in the struggle for recognition are reflected in the concept of a «pacified» memory. The initiative to forgive is made possible by a trust similar to the one that opts out of continuing the struggle, that our self-understanding is already granted and no longer in need of defence. For the theologian Olivier Abel, forgiveness is the outstanding example of a gift; yet he firmly resists an understanding of the Epilogue of *Memory, History, Forgetting* that sees forgiveness as the ultimate destination of the analyses of memory and of the historical condition carried out in the previous nine tenths of the book (589 pages in French, 456 in English, 698 in German).¹⁸ Instead, it

¹⁴ C. LAUER, *States of Peace: Ricoeur on Recognition and the Gift*, in T. MEI - D. LEWIN (eds), *From Ricoeur to Action*, pp. 175-194, here p. 189, with reference to P. RICOEUR, *Ethical and Theological Considerations of the Golden Rule*, in M.J. WALLACE, *Figuring the Sacred*, pp. 293-302, here p. 300.

¹⁵ He quotes P. RICOEUR, *The Course of Recognition*, Cambridge (MA) 2005, p. 221: «The insouciance of *agape* is what allows it to suspend a dispute, even in cases of justice» (C. LAUER, *States of Peace*, p. 179).

¹⁶ C. LAUER, *States of Peace*, p. 179.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 176.

¹⁸ O. ABEL, *The Unsurpassable Dissensus: The Ethics of Forgiveness in Paul Ricoeur's Work*, in T. MEI - D. LEWIN (eds), *From Ricoeur to Action*, pp. 211-228, here p. 212: «As 'a question that in its principle' remains distinct from Ricoeur's entire undertaking in the book, forgiveness is a theme tangential to the major questions of the representation of the absent past and a just policy concerning memory and forgetting».

heralds «incompletion», a «de-totalizing» of agency.¹⁹ In Abel's reading, it takes two forms: «forgiveness oscillates between a radical figure of love of the neighbor and an ordinary figure of practical wisdom looking more for minor, situational adjustments rather than for total solutions».²⁰

Also in this interpretation its character as a gift adds what an ethics of reciprocity lacks: the dimension of an open, uncolonized, unbespoken space beyond compulsion and distrust. Against Liebsch's fear that the offender's request for forgiveness puts a binding expectation on the victim to reciprocate, Abel highlights the fiduciary character of such openings: «judgment, memory, and testimony cannot be constrained, compelled, commanded, or enforced, and their very credibility and communicability, fragile as they are, depend upon the manner in which they confide in their recipients».²¹

This is neither a space for coercion, nor for a guaranteed happy outcome. Abel points out the parallel to Kant's limit concept of hope: «Ricoeur's epilogue construes forgiveness as a limit which makes it a very Kantian notion similar to the question, 'For what may I hope?'».²² Contrary to Liebsch's presentation, Ricoeur's outlook is not to a triumphant pacified memory, but to a difficult process and to an *eschaton* that remains so ambivalent that this is where theological questioning should start. As Abel quotes, «But this approximation of the *eschaton* guarantees no happy ending for our enterprise as a whole: this is why it will be a question only of a difficult forgiveness (epilogue)».²³ Abel summarizes:

«I would say that Ricoeur does not conceive at all of forgiveness as the crowning achievement or theological reconciliation of history, but as an *eschaton*, a constitutive limit. . . The *eschaton* is not the last judgment, a meaning of the term which Ricoeur distrusts enormously. Rather, it is for him a contradictory notion; even here, there is no absolute or final proof, and the odyssey of forgiveness never reaches the Promised Land».²⁴

Quoting from the Epilogue, Abel interprets forgiveness in terms of tragic wisdom: «If forgiveness sets the tone for the epilogue, it is rather as a figure of tragic wisdom:

«This is the tone of an eschatology of the representation of the past. Forgiveness – if it has a sense, and if it exists – constitutes the horizon common to memory, history, and forgetting. Always in retreat, this horizon slips away from any grasp. It makes forgiving difficult: not easy but not impossible. It places a seal of incompleteness on the entire enterprise».²⁵

¹⁹ «I oppose here any interpretation that would tend to suggest that the whole strategy of *Memory, History, and Forgetting* is meant to lead to forgiveness, to compel us in some way towards it, as if offering the only outlet to the *aporia* of memory and forgetting. In the last analysis, we shall see how the theme of forgiveness is more a matter of a discrowning, or at the very least, a de-totalization and incompleteness» (O. ABEL, *The Unsurpassable Dissensus*, p. 215).

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 217.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 226.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 225.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 225, with reference to P. RICOEUR, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, p. 457.

From a theological perspective one has to ask: Is this the best a pacified memory can reach – a self-understanding in which the worried self-concern of *Sorge* is superseded by a sense of being allowed to be, as much as and more than the lilies of the field and the birds of Jesus's parable commented on by Kierkegaard?²⁶ Or would theologians argue for an understanding of «gift» that is more encompassing, such as an anticipatory trust in God's ability to rescue the victims and to heal all wounds?

Ethicists, both philosophical and theological, should be grateful for Ricoeur's continued efforts in the face of historical experiences to argue philosophically for renewed trust in human agency. They also benefit from the mediations he has forged and the clarifications he has provided just when theology was ready for it.²⁷ Ethical analyses need to ensure that contemporary philosophy and theology keep up to the level of his questions.

²⁶ P. RICOEUR, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, p. 505.

²⁷ D. Mieth mentions as examples the problem of evil, the reception of structuralism within hermeneutics, narrative ethics, the concepts of conviction and experience in his contribution to the Roundtable Discussion in M. JUNKER-KENNY - P. KENNY (eds), *Memory, Narrativity, Self and the Challenge to Think God. The Reception within Theology of the Recent Work of Paul Ricoeur*, Münster 2004, pp. 206-207.