Narrating War

Early Modern and Contemporary Perspectives

edited by
Marco Mondini / Massimo Rospocher



Società editrice il Mulino
Bologna

Duncker & Humblot
Berlin

Fondazione Bruno Kessler

Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento
Jahrbuch des italienisch-deutschen historischen Instituts in Trient

Contributi/Beiträge 28

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FBK - Istituto storico italo-germanico

NARRATING
war : early modern and contemporary perspectives / edited by Marco Mondini, Massimo Rospocher. - Bologna : Il mulino ; Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2013. - 277 p., [11] c. di tav. : ill. ; 24 cm. - (Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento. Contributi ; 28 = Jahrbuch des italienisch-deutschen historischen Instituts in Trient. Beiträge ; 28)
Scritti di vari. - Nell'occh. : Fondazione Bruno Kessler
ISBN 978-88-15-24763-6 - ISBN 978-3-428-14211-8
1. Guerra - Rappresentazione - Sec.XVI 2. Guerra - Rappresentazione - Sec.XX 3. Guerra - Storiografia I. Mondini, Marco II. Rospocher, Massimo

303.660 9 (DDC 22.ed.)

Composizione e impaginazione: FBK - Editoria
Scheda bibliografica: FBK - Biblioteca

ISBN 978-88-15-24763-6
ISBN 978-3-428-14211-8

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Preface

One of the most significant aspects of the recent historiography on war is the attention dedicated to the genesis of war's cultural image. The representation of wars in literature and the arts, in collective rituals and the media, has been at the center of much research, above all in the last twenty years, both in early modern and modern history. What seems to unite this heterogeneous collection of studies on war is the recognition that the various channels of communication through which the image of a conflict is constructed and disseminated (from painting to cinema, from novels to monuments, from political rhetoric to religious preaching, from popular poetry to historiographical accounts, from the narratives of civilians to diplomatic reports) contribute in different measures to shaping a general discourse about war. What are the motives and what is the ultimate point of fighting and (above all) dying in war? How to legitimate the sacrifice required for victory (or even for defeat)? Why, and on what terms, must the subjects, the faithful Christians, and the citizens risk their lives on the battlefield, if the pope, or the king, or the *patria* require it? These are only some of the questions to which the narration of war responds, in its various forms and with solutions that may appear extremely different, according to the period and the political and geographic contexts.

The problem of *caesurae* is fundamental for scholars who reflect on how war has been recounted—imagined, justified, legitimated or condemned—even if only in the limited field of analysis that is European history. In what way and until when can one speak, for example, of the persistence of rhetorical formulae and images of an idealized and just war? The «horrendous» Italian Wars of the 16th century seem to signal a turning point not only in the practice of battle, but also on the terrain of the pitiless conduct towards defenseless civilians, a change that should rid us of any residual illusion of an age of chivalric courtesy. And yet, in 1557, Titian imagined the Emperor Charles V triumphant at the Battle of Mühlberg, composed and imperturbable on his black stallion, invested with the traditional accouterments of the Christian knight and

armed with the lance of St. George. As Erwin Panofsky has underlined, this was a perfect symbolic synthesis of the *miles Christi*, of the wise sovereign and of the courageous gentleman, and an effective testimony to the autonomy of the cultural representation of the warrior from the social, political and diplomatic reality. Until when did this polyvalent masculine ideal—at once social, religious, and political—survive?

It is evidently difficult to respond to questions like these when one deals only with the brief periods of modern history. Even for no other reason than that, as the most recent studies on the culture of war between 1914 and 1945 have demonstrated, the narrative of conflict feeds on literary and visual archetypes with century-old roots. A German postcard of the First World War represents the brave fallen soldier, being watched over by his faithful steed, following iconographic codes not dissimilar to those in Renaissance painting; the British aviator of 1940 is the heir of a long tradition of heroic epics, which harks back directly to the stereotypes of the medieval chivalric romance. As such, the best way to find satisfactory answers seemed to us to be to enable a discussion between scholars of different disciplines (from social history to the history of art) and specializing in two crucial periods in the history of war, the 16th and 20th centuries.

The result of this interdisciplinary and diachronic perspective was the conference «Narrating War. Words and Images of War from Street Singers to the Internet» held at the Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento on the 24th and 25th of May 2012. At this event, European and North American scholars compared views on the narration of war, giving rise to a rich discussion of which this volume aims to represent a synthesis and, hopefully, a point of departure for wider debates.

Several speakers and attendees at the conference are not represented here, but all contributed significantly to making it a valuable forum for the discussion of the themes and ideas pertinent to the essays included in this book and more general related issues. We wish particularly to thank: Alberto Banti and Piero Del Negro, discussants of two panels, Heather Jones and Joëlle Beurier, who enriched the sessions «Words and Media» and «The Visual Representation of War» with their papers. We are grateful to the director of the Institute, Paolo Pombeni, for supporting this project, and this gratitude is extended to the staff, Elisabetta Lopane and Antonella Vecchio, and to the publications of-

fice of the Fondazione Bruno Kessler, in particular Friederike Oursin, for the care which they have taken in the publication of this volume.

Marco Mondini and *Massimo Rospocher*

Narrated Wars

Literary and Iconographic Stereotypes in Historical Accounts of Armed Conflict

by *Marco Mondini*

1. *«Discourse of war» and «reality of war»*

In a volume on iconic «scenes of war» in French history, Hervé Drevillon has addressed the narratives of battle as «aspects of an ideological system». Medieval verse chronicles celebrating feats of arms, the Napoleonic memoirs on Marengo, and the account of the battle at Solferino in Louis Noir's *Souvenirs d'un Zouave* were not primarily concerned with the disclosure of true facts as witnessed by the author: their chief aim was rearranging past events within a comprehensible and reassuring framework to transform repulsive outbreaks of brutal chaos into acceptable historical events[1]. In the anonymous 14th century poem *The Combat of the Thirty*, the 1351 clash of thirty Bretons and thirty Englishmen, a minor episode of the Hundred Years War, was extolled as a paragon of chivalric courtesy. On that occasion, the chaotic clash of armies had been replaced with a courtly joust in which victory must fall on the bravest and most valiant, according to the rules of the duel. It goes without saying that this revival of past models was purely delusional: from a military point of view, that episode was virtually irrelevant (among other things, the joust degenerated into a brawl). Still, the (spurious) memory of that episode was presented as proof that the warlike utopia of the elegant fight, well organized and disciplined, could indeed survive the disorderly and wicked violence of modern warfare[2]. Even more crucially, narration filtered out and rectified ideologically inacceptable realities. On the one hand, the in-

Translation by Francesco Peri

[1] H. Drévillon, *Batailles. Scènes de guerre de la Table Ronde aux Tranchées*, Paris 2007, pp. 14-15.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

herent depravity of the fray as seen by aristocratic mounted knights, who feared and loathed the arbitrary prospect of an anonymous and inglorious death at the hands of plebeian infantrymen wielding dangerous firearms; on the other hand, the shame of the material realities of war, consisting of petty skirmishes, ambushes, sieges, pillaging and acts of violence against defenseless civilians, all of which was irreconcilable with chivalric codes and ideals[3].

In the first case, we are confronted with one of the major recurrent nightmares in the history of cultural representations of war in Europe: the demise of the mounted armored knight (an aesthetically accomplished and extremely expensive professional of arms) at the hands of a mere infantryman. One such occurrence would have been much more traumatic than the massacres at Crecy or Azincourt. The 1525 debacle at Pavia, when the *gendarmerie* was decimated by the Spanish harquebusiers, lived on in infamy as an insult to the warlike mythology of dueling. The triumph of modern weaponry was an omen of social subversions to come, a threat to the existing order: soon there would be no more call for the Arthurian archetypes that had hitherto served as a model for the dominant élites, as embodied by the knight par excellence, Pierre de Bayard[4]. The defeat of 1525, although moderately damaging in purely strategic terms, dealt a devastating imaginary blow. The mounted knight contrived to survive the breakthrough of firearms, but only by altering his weaponry and tactics: in his later incarnations, he would continue to ride on the battlefields, and in many cases to dominate them, until the introduction of rifled barrels and breech-loading guns in the 19th century[5]. At the same time, the literary evolution of the canonical narratives of war, presenting the (mounted) knight as the true protagonist of battle, was much slower: battle, presented as a well-organized and orderly contest, continued to be perceived as a stage for valor and gallantry; the mounted chieftain was unvaryingly described in terms of a narrative canon that placed an emphasis on the attainment of superior ethical virtues, rather than military efficacy *per*

[3] A. SETTIA, *Rapine, assedi, battaglie. La guerra nel Medioevo*, Roma - Bari 2002.

[4] M. MALLET, *Mercenaries and Their Masters*, London 1974; J. HALE, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe*, Baltimore MD 1991. On the survival of chivalric models in Italy's «horrende guerre» see M. ROSPOCHER's essay in this volume.

[5] F. CARDINI, *Quell'antica festa crudele. Guerra e cultura dall'età feudale alla Grande Rivoluzione*, Milano 1988[2].

se. The modern age held on to these increasingly outdated tropes. The myth of war as it had been, or war as it ought to be (but ordinarily no longer was), seemed to obsess the authors of epic poems and romances and the professionals of the battlefield who have left written accounts of their experience. As Huizinga has observed, the reality of war, with its amorphous, sprawling, and utterly anti-heroic qualities, was literally unacceptable for both groups, who balanced it out by producing narratives that rearranged facts into a *joyeuse guerre* after the courtly model[6]. Well into the age of military revolution, when the outcome of battles was largely determined by infantry squares and cannons, the ideal model of the warrior in arms was the gallant Christian knight: a lone hero fighting for glory in a highly ritualized ethic and aesthetic framework, or alternatively a member of a selected community of sworn brothers. Even military treatises continued to perpetuate this ideological and unrealistic approach to the profession of arms[7].

This glaring discrepancy was intimately connected with the ideological functions of the «discourse of war». For centuries, it had served to legitimize a dominant warrior élite (or later a caste of state-educated military professionals) whose prestige and social capital were predicated on their alleged ability to foresee, plan, manage, and of course win armed conflicts. At another level, the «discourse of war» played a crucial role in building social consensus by filtering, denying, or altering the most repugnant aspects of the «reality of war»[8]. The most popular example of the hegemony of traditional figures in early modern narratives of combat were the fairy-tale figments of the epic-chivalric poem in verse, which culminated between the 15th and the 16th century in such masterpieces as Boiardo's *Orlando innamorato* and Ariosto's *Orlando furioso*. Both are classic examples of the glorification of chivalric virtues as a paradigm for the good warrior. To be sure, the harsh reality of war was not entirely absent: the destruction wrought by Italian Wars and the brutalities of Charles VIII's troops were occasionally

6 J. HUIZINGA, *Autunno del Medioevo*, Milano 1995 (Haarlem 1919[1]), p. 87.

7 On the military revolution see G. PARKER, *The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West*, Cambridge 1988; on the unrealistic approach of military treatises between the 15th and the 16th centuries see P. DEL NEGRO, *Guerre ed eserciti da Machiavelli a Napoleone*, Roma - Bari 2001, pp. 14 and following.

8 J. LYNN, *Battle. A History of Combat and Culture. From Ancient Greece to Modern America*, Boulder CO 2003, pp. XIX-XXII.

alluded to, and Ariosto famously condemned the implicit cowardice of firearms in the IX canto of his poem, in which anti-hero Cimosco shot Orlando down with a harquebus, this «abominable contraption». (The paladin would later set scores with his cowardly foe and throw the infernal device, «forged ... by the hand of Beelzebub», into the sea.) The triumph of Orlando's traditional *habitus* (the code of conduct of «the knights of old») was a sort of exorcism, an apotropaic gesture, but also an obvious anachronism: on the one hand, the only way for modern weaponry to find a place in the chivalric poems that celebrated the ideal type of the true warrior were its disparagement and destruction; on the other hand, actual warfare in Italy was increasingly reliant on those modern weapons[9].

War could occasionally (or predominantly, in some cases) be narrated in a visual medium: well into the 20th century, paintings, engravings, and sculptures displayed a remarkably stable array of formulas and themes, regardless of the immediate function of the image. Pictures served to celebrate the military valor of a king, or to rearrange the chaos of battle in view of a collected contemplation of war as dominated by the will and valor of the winners[10]. A long tradition ranging from Charles VIII to Henry IV, and culminating with François I, the «warrior king» *par excellence*, equated the ideal attributes of the prince with those of the accomplished knight and *miles Christi*. After Marignano (and in spite of the critical role of artillery in this battle) the icon of the triumphant king on horseback merged into that of the brave paladin riding against the chaotic arrays of the enemy. In Pierre Bontemps's bas-relief for the tomb of the French king (1547), François I was charging into a crowd of Swiss pikemen; one has to look hard to spot the outlines of a cannon (the «coward's weapon of choice») in the far background[11]. This is not to say that art never adapted to the evolving patterns of military

[9] L. BOLZONI, *«O maledetto o abominoso ordigno»: la rappresentazione della guerra nel poema epico-cavalleresco*, in W. BARBERIS (ed.), *Storia d'Italia. Annali*, vol. 18: *Guerra e pace*, Torino 2002, pp. 201-250. Now see also J.-L. FOURNEL, *Narrating the Italian Wars (1494-1540). Contamination, Models, and Knowledge*, in this volume.

[10] P. BURKE, *Eyewitnessing. The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence*, London 2001, particularly chap. 8.

[11] N. GHERMANI, *Du roi en la bataille à la bataille sans héros: les représentations de la guerre dans la France du XVIe siècle*, in P. BUTON (ed.), *La guerre imaginée*, Paris 2002, pp. 67-80.

leadership. If Louis XIV was still consistently represented as a «warrior king», his person now dominated the battlefield from above, without actually taking part in the fight, like triumphant Napoleon I contemplating victory among his generals and powerless enemies in Antoine-Jean Gros's *Battle of Eylau*[12]. This transition from a heroic leadership style (the commander was challenging death 'among' his men) to a non-heroic mode (the commander was maneuvering his troops from a remote vantage point) is one of the hallmarks of modern warfare. Inevitably, this shift was incorporated into the textual and visual narratives of war. This is not to say that this adjustment brought «discourse» any closer to «reality»[13]. As of old, narrated battles were governed by the military genius of the commanders; chaos was rationalized into an orderly and meaningful sequence of events; the fight was presented as a test of valor; death was either the utmost self-sacrifice for the Motherland or a well-deserved punishment dealt to the hero's foes. The centerpiece of these narratives, steering clear of the technicalities of combat, were the political dimension of war (including praise of the powers that had declared and possibly won it) and the emotions of the community that had taken part in the fight or re-enacted the founding myth of its collective identity by evoking a great battle of the past[14].

Of course, not all authors passively adhered to this traditional canon. In the 1660s, for example, Grimmelshausen's picaresque novel *Simplizissimus* expatiated at length on the havoc wrought by the pillaging hordes that were scourging Germany, prostrated by the Thirty Years War. A century and a half later, Francisco Goya exposed the horrors of Napoleonic invasion and 'guerrilla' warfare, while in Stendhal's finely crafted parody, *La Chartreuse de Parme* (1839), young Fabrizio del Dongo, a would-be romantic hero inebriated by epic poems and martial lore, ended up losing his bearings in the middle of an incomprehensible and dismal battle at Waterloo[15].

[12] On Luigi XIV see J. CORNETTE, *Le Roi de guerre*, Paris 2000²; on the iconography of Napoleon see C. PRENDERGAST, *Napoleon and History Painting*, Oxford 1997.

[13] J. KEEGAN, *The Mask of Command*, London 1988.

[14] P. PARET, *Imagined Battles. Reflections of War in European Art*, Chapel Hill NC 1997, pp. 7-9.

[15] H.J. GRIMMELSHAUSEN, *Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch*, München 2001. On the so-called «Stendhal paradox» see A. SCURATI, *Guerra. Narrazioni e culture nella tradizione occidentale*, Roma 2000, pp. 190 ff.

By and large, however, the heroic code of narration continued to prevail well after the crisis of 1815, ultimately feeding into the 19th-century cultural construct that George Mosse has famously termed the «myth of the war experience»: a process of distillation that reworked shared memories of the Great War into «a meaningful and even sacred event» and masked reality by presenting the ordeals of that war as the sublime adventure of a generation of youthful heroes[16]. The trauma of «mandatory mass conscription» during the French revolution and the Napoleonic campaigns—radically altering the patterns of mobilization of the nation in arms, particularly in Germany and Italy—had triggered a long-period «militarization of masculinity». In 19th-century Europe, the task of preparing for war (verbally, if not in actual practice) was construed as a universal duty for male citizens-subjects: mandatory conscription (or private training for gentlemen) established the wielding of arms as a familiar practice; uniforms and military life became routine ingredients of daily life and standard fixtures of the urban landscape[17]. To be sure, national nuances need to be taken into account. The myth of the «nation in arms», instrumental to the rise of mass armies, did not produce the same outcomes everywhere (even not counting that Great Britain, for one, was always reluctant to embrace it): the French model, rooted in democratic ideals, was radically different from the royalist Prussian paradigm of the *Volk in Waffen*[18]. At the same time, the forms of cultural militarization were surprisingly homogeneous throughout continental Europe and beyond. Once a combination of a hermetic caste of professionals (the officer corps) and a refuge for social outcasts (the rank-and-file), the army evolved, at least in theory, into a national school of virility. The new dominant paradigm of masculinity stipulated that every gentleman (not just the aristocrats) must be ready to defend his honor (and the honor of his woman-family-motherland) in an armed duel, and every citizen in uniform

[16] G. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World War*, Oxford 1991, p. 7.

[17] S. Dudnik - K. Hagemann - J. Tosh (eds), *Masculinities in Politics and War*, Manchester 2004. On the myth of mass conscription see D. Moran - A. Waldron (eds), *The People in Arms. Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution*, Cambridge 2003.

[18] T. Hippler, *Soldat et citoyen. Naissance du service militaire en France et en Prusse*, Paris 2006.

must sacrifice his life on the battlefield with courage and defiance: this was a *sine qua non* condition of social respectability[19]. Literary culture and artistic representations were steeped in *esprit militaire*. Romantic attitudes, and a characteristic cult of national heroes as role models, contributed to establish an equation between virility and martial valor. This general pattern admitted national variations. Ettore Fieramosca was defending the honor of an as yet unborn country; Ivanhoe was fighting to reconcile the heterogeneous ethnic components of what was to be England; Arminius was struggling to free Germany from its chains. These three characters were reflections of one and the same dominant type, whose emphatically martial connotations were inseparable from male gender[20]. Decades past the heyday of Romanticism, such values as pride and courage in battle were still rife in the memoirs and accounts of the survivors of the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava. In the visual narrative of Alphonse de Neuville's *Les dernières cartouches*, a depiction of «heroic defeat», the good *citoyen* embraced sacrifice to become worthy of his Republic's gratitude[21]. In the early 20th century, when the «age of militarization» was at its ripest, such attributes as weapons, warfare, honor, and valor were no longer a privilege of the royal courts (that is, of the last surviving strands of a ruling aristocracy and the élites in uniform) but permeated the entire mental landscape of Europe[22].

[19] G. MOSSE, *The Image of Man*, Oxford 1996; U. FREVERT, *Men of Honour. A Social and Cultural History of Duel*, New York 1995; M. DOMENICHELLI, *Cavaliere e gentiluomo. Saggio sulla cultura aristocratica in Europa*, Roma 2002.

[20] See in particular A.M. BANTI, *L'onore della nazione. Identità sessuali e violenza nel nazionalismo europeo*, Torino 2005.

[21] On the memory of Balaclava see R.B. EDGERTON, *Death or Glory. The Legacy of the Crimean War*, particularly pp. 101-137; on the culture of sacrifice see Ch. BENOIT et al. (eds), *Le sacrifice du soldat. Corps martyrisé, corps mithifié*, Paris 2009.

[22] See J. GILLIS (ed.), *The Militarization of the Western Word*, Chapel Hill NC 1989; U. FREVERT (ed.), *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart 1996; M. MONDINI, *Militarismo e militarizzazione. Modelli nazionali nel rapporto tra armi e politica nell'Europa contemporanea*, in M. MONDINI (ed.), *Armi e politica. Esercito e società nell'Europa contemporanea*, in «Memoria e ricerca», special issue, 28, 2008, pp. 9-25.

2. *The weight of the past. Literary and visual stereotypes in the narratives of the two World Wars*

In more than one sense, both World Wars were the utmost expression of a century-old contradiction between «discourse» and «reality», even if an epoch-making break with the past took place during the conflict of 1914-1918.

The Great War was a colossal disillusion: on the one hand, military headquarters consistently failed to anticipate its developments; on the other hand, the glorious expectations that had been induced in various segments of the intellectual world by a widespread impatience (or desire) for war were brutally crushed. As for the first aspect, specialized literature has long since exposed the appalling incompetence of the professionals of war, unable to react to overwhelming evidence of an ongoing evolution of warfare that contradicted a decades-old tradition of military doctrine and illusions, beginning with the myth of a short war that could be won through great pitched battles[23]. Surprisingly, the most realistic anticipations of modern warfare at the end of the 19th century are found in two subgenres of popular literature: pacifist treatises and science fiction novels. In the fictional scenarios that Gerd Krumeich has termed «representations of future war», pacifist writers such as Ivan Bloch (*La guerre future*, 1899) and Norman Angell (*The Great Illusion*, 1909) or mid-cult novelists such as Albert Robida (*La Guerre au vingtième siècle*, 1887), described a devastating «future war» whose outbreak would be «inevitable», proving better prophets of industrialized warfare than many so-called «military experts»[24]. The intellectual field at the beginning of the new century lacked this extraordinary perception and ability to predict the consequences of a mass conflict, but many shared the sensation that a *great war* would soon break out. War was perceived as either 'inevitable' (it was intrinsic to human nature and human societies as described by social scientists, among which Gustave Le Bon), 'desirable' (particularly as an invigorating antidote

[23] See J.-J. BECKER, *Prévisions des états-majors et effondrement des plans*, in S. AUDOIN-ROUZEAU - J.-J. BECKER (eds), *Encyclopédie de la Grande Guerre. 1914-1918*, Paris 2004, pp. 235-247; J. KEEGAN, *The First World War*, London 1998, particularly chap. 2.

[24] G. KRUMEICH, *Vorstellungen vom Krieg vor 1914*, in S. NEITZEL (ed.), *1900: Zukunftsvisionen der Großmächte*, Paderborn 2000, pp. 173-186; see also F. CLARKE, *The Tale of the Next Great War*, Syracuse NY 1995.

to the decadence of the race in late bourgeois societies, as assessed by certain segments of the cultural avant-garde), or *attractive* (in the eyes of those who believed that the international balance of power required some adjusting)[25]. War was evoked, meditated, and courted by virtually everybody. The revolutionary fury of Italian futurists (who famously celebrated war as the «one and only hygiene of the world» in their 1909 manifesto) and the generational longing for a trial by fire among French and British students were only extreme expressions of a widely shared attitude. Robert Musil, a good example of an intellectual who believed that war would cement the social cohesion of ailing socie-ties, imagined a «beautiful and fraternal war»[26]. The «flowers in the gun barrels» and the popular enthusiasm for the mobilization of the armies in a cheerful atmosphere of *union sacrée* in Paris, Berlin or London were certainly a myth, but these overemphatic images were indicative of the special fascination that the adventure of war exerted on many intellectuals, and expressed their readiness to embrace a cultural mobilization that would transform them into agents of popular consensus[27].

One of the most striking features of the narratives of the Great War (in literary as well as visual media) was the survival of seemingly obsolete stereotypes. British war memoirs are probably the best-known example. The use of ostensibly incongruous sources (from Greek-Roman literature to the poems of chivalry) was one of the ways in which authors and diarists attempted to reconcile the shocking experience of life in the trenches, under the fire of heavy artillery and the menace of chemical weapons, with the grandiose heroic scenarios of national history, from Blenheim to Waterloo[28]. The reuse of familiar imagery from the

[25] See D. PICK, *War Machine. The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age*, New Haven CT - London 1993; see also W. J. MOMMSEN (ed.), *Kultur und Krieg. Die Rolle der Intellektuellen, Künstler und Schriftsteller im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Oldenburg 1996; C. PROCHASSON - A. RASMUSSEN, *Au nom de la Patrie. Les intellectuels et la Première Guerre mondiale 1910-1919*, Paris 1996; V. CALÌ - G. CORNI - G. FERRANDI (eds), *Gli intellettuali e la Grande Guerra* (Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento. Quaderni, 54), Bologna 2000.

[26] See R. WOHL, *The Generation of 1914*, London 1980; P. PARKER, *The Old Lie. The Great War and the Public School Ethos*, London 1987. Musil is quoted from E. KOESTER, *Literatur und Weltkriegsideologie*, Kronberg 1977, p. 135.

[27] On the categories of «cultural mobilisation» and «consensus» see in particular S. AUDOIN-ROUZEAU - A. BECKER, *14-18, retrouver la Guerre*, Paris 2000.

[28] P. FUSSEL, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, Oxford 1975, particularly chap. 5.

educational canon (or pre-war best sellers, such as the ever-popular novels of chivalry, propagating the courtly atmospheres and icons of «medievalism») guaranteed the psychological survival of fighters and powerfully contributed to building and sustaining social consensus[29]. Recalling the horrors of life at the front at Passchendaele, the British poet Edmund Blunden gratefully quoted Edward Young's *Night-Thoughts*, in which he had found some repose from the atrocities of industrial carnage[30]. At the same time, translating the anonymous and random death in the trenches into a language that suggested the fundamentals of the heroic canon, the beauty of martial comradeship (reminiscent of the chivalric *comitatus*), and the carefree levity of war as a playful activity served to convey reassuring illusions to families and friends at home: the process that Mosse has called a «trivialization» of war was founded on a discursive practice that displaced the dismal realities of modern warfare and sought refuge in a world of reassuring phrases[31].

The linguistic repertoires and narrative conventions of the past were just as essential to French or German «eyewitness accounts», particularly when the soldier-writer's status as an eyewitness was most ambiguous. Jean Norton Cru's monumental *Témoins*, published in 1929, has established a taxonomy of war narratives that appears to defy any attempts at criticism: the eyewitnesses who had taken up the pen to describe what they had seen, in the exact terms in which they had experienced it, were considered the only reliable sources. That approach suffered from numerous shortcomings. To begin with, the emotional content of most soldiers' letters from the front (an overwhelming documentation that can be considered one of the earliest «narratives of war» aimed at contemporary readers) was purposefully adulterated for consolatory purposes. The priority of letters home was hardly to provide first-hand accounts of horror (if that had been at all possible)[32]. Even the most

[29] On the relevance of chivalric stereotypes in the narratives of the Great War see M. GIROUARD, *The Return to Camelot*, New Haven CT 1981; S. GOEBEL, *The Great War and Medieval Memory. War Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany*, Cambridge 2007.

[30] E. BLUNDEN, *Undertones of War*, London 2000 (1928[1]).

[31] G. MOSSE, *Fallen Soldiers*, pp. 126-158.

[32] See C. PROCHASSON, *14-18. Retours d'expériences*, Paris 2008, particularly pp. 167-240.

celebrated *témoins*, those who made a name for themselves as authors at the end of the war, were not always interested in providing truthful accounts of their individual experience: more often than not, their writings functioned as ideological devices for the celebration of one's personal suffering, the expression of gratitude to dead companions, the vilification of the enemy, and the promotion of an anti-war discourse condemning the horrors of armed combat. Early examples of this literature, whose rise was made possible by the post-war literary market, no longer subjected to censorship, were Henri Barbusse's *Le Feu* (1916) and Roland Rogelés's *Les Croix de Bois* (1919)[33]. Neither of these two champions of antimilitarist literature was immune to the temptation of narrative manipulation, and in the end, they compromised the objectivity of their literary efforts by expunging selected details, rearranging episodes, and reusing imagery from the fictional canon of the novel. More often than not, literary transpositions sacrificed the impassionate description of facts to the rules of the craft, even when their authors were actual eyewitnesses[34]. In a sense, the continuing influence of past literary traditions can be best appreciated in the great variety of national narrative responses to an experience of war that was, at least on the Western front, comparatively homogeneous. For example, narratives in an «ironic style», sublimating reality through metaphors of daily life and bourgeois leisure, were typical of the British tradition. Describing a bloody battle as a «bloody game», as Sassoon did in one occasion, did not change the staggering reality of the carnage, but colloquial language, evoking familiar spaces and sensations, might contribute to attenuate the trauma[35]. It is true that the corpus of reminiscences and poems produced by the British «lost generation» expressed a precocious rejection of the canonical perceptions of heroic sacrifice in battle. In Britain, much earlier and quicker than elsewhere, glory as a conceptual framework and an emotionally

[33] C. TREVISAN, *Les fables du deuil. La Grande Guerre: mort et écriture*, Paris 2001, pp. 149-173; N. BEAUPRÉ, *Écrire en guerre, écrire la guerre. France Allemagne 1914-1920*, Paris 2006.

[34] P. SCHOENTJES, *Les véritables écrivains de guerre ont-ils «rarement dépeint ce qu'ils avaient vu»?*, in P. SCHOENTJES (ed.), *La Grande Guerre. Un siècle de fictions romanesque*, Genève 2008, pp. 17-45.

[35] J. WINTER, *Remembering War. The Great War between Memory and History*, New Haven CT 2006, pp. 118-134.

charged catchword had ceased to be a reference in the range of available literary options[36].

The visual narratives of war, which included the expressions of organized propaganda (military and civil) as well as the products of the cultural mobilization of the nation in arms, were generally more homogeneous. Individual national contexts had very little influence on the visual language employed. Illustrated publications for civilians and trench magazines for soldiers, comic books, mass-produced postcards, and institutional posters followed the same fundamental patterns: all references to the cruder realities of war were carefully expunged; death was marginalized (if not expunged); the iconography was obsessively heroic, at times even unwittingly ironic in its reliance on romantic and chivalric templates. (One of the icons of this fundamentally unrealistic approach to visual propaganda was a famous German postcard that represented a dead armored knight lying on the ground while his steed stood guard nearby.) Constant emphasis was placed on the sanctity of the war effort and the nobility of sacrifice[37]. Photographic documents (as reproduced on the pages of popular bourgeois magazines or in official volumes edited by the army leadership) described war as a string of heroic deeds and picturesque sequences in which death and the obscenity of maimed corpses had no place whatsoever. The only admissible exceptions to this rule were the dead body of the martyr, peaceful and collected, and the mortal remains of the enemy, serving as an example and admonition[38]. Even cinema, the newest weapon in the arsenal of mass communication, obediently followed the implicit rules of this moralizing and consolatory imagery. Filmed during the conflict by the cinematographic crews that were becoming an increasingly important component of national armies, documentaries served to narrate

[36] J. WINTER, *Beyond Glory? Writing War*, in this volume.

[37] The literature on this subject is unfathomable. In addition to already cited works see M. CONNELLY - D. WELCH (eds), *War and the Media. Reportage and Propaganda*, London 2005; P. JAMES (ed.), *Picture This. World War I Posters and Visual Culture*, Lincoln NE 2009; M. MONDINI, *Parole come armi. La propaganda verso il nemico nell'Italia della Grande Guerra*, Rovereto 2009.

[38] I. ABOUT - J. BEURIER - L. TOMASSINI (eds), *Fotografia e violenza. Visioni della brutalità dalla Grande Guerra ad oggi*, in «Memoria e Ricerca», special issue, 20, 2005, pp. 5-132; J. BEURIER, *Images et violence 1914-1918*, Paris 2007; P. KAENEL - F. VALLOTTON (eds), *Les images en guerre*, Lausanne 2008.

a certain kind of war, in which massacres and suffering had no place, not to represent war as it was. Unofficial and fictional cinema was no different. At first, patriotic motion pictures failed to develop an original cinematographic language (the earliest features were a montage of still frames and theatrical poses), but in due time directors developed a specific code, governed by such norms as absence and distance: like the photographers and cameramen who were shooting at the front, commercial film directors carefully expunged death and horror from their works. More often than not, the material was filmed in a safe location at some remove from the front, in a pathetic and grotesque landscape populated by elegant, picturesque, and aesthetically pleasant fighters[39]. After the war, the languages of sacrifice underwent an ideological dissociation: visual arts, particularly cinema, gradually moved away from the constraints of official and heroic perceptions of war. (Abel Gance's *J'Accuse*, 1919, is a good *terminus post quem* for the rise of a no longer glorious cinematic outlook on death on the battlefield.) At the same time, the visual code that dominated the extraordinarily intense production of monuments to the fallen in the aftermath of the conflict (mostly financed by national institutions or local administrations) was literally steeped in traditional visual tropes of the classical warrior, the valiant citizen-soldier, and the martyr of (national) faith[40].

The notion that 1918 has introduced a clear-cut discontinuity in the history of European culture, triggering the decline of heroic languages, «romantic notions about war» (Winter), and traditional patriotism, needs to be carefully reconsidered in the light of Pierre Bourdieu's observations on the plurality of the «rules of art» (that is, the variety of possible outcomes generated by given narrative and visual codes according to national contexts)[41]. In fact, continuities and breaks coexisted in complex, inextricable patterns. In fascist Italy and National-Socialist Germany, for one, the rigid disciplining of the cultural marked at the hands of powerful political agencies all but stifled the expression of

[39] L. VERAY, *La Grande Guerre au cinéma*, Paris 2008.

[40] Among the fundamentals, see A. BECKER, *Les monuments aux morts: patrimoine et mémoire de la Grande Guerre*, Paris 1988; J. WINTER, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History*, Cambridge 1995; A. KING, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain*, Oxford 1998.

[41] J. WINTER, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, p. 8.

critical, antimilitarist, and pacifist positions[42]. However, a democratic cultural field was no guarantee of a clear-cut break with the *topoi* of glory, heroism, and patriotic sacrifice. The refrains about the martyrdom of a generation of young heroes «im Felde unbesiegt» (undefeated in battle), complementing the infamous «Dolchstoßlegende», and thereby feeding a culture of the «glorious defeat», were one of the most popular discursive practices in Weimar Germany. Throughout the 1920s, visual narratives were steeped in an atmosphere of diffuse patriotism that was more a cause than a consequence of the rise of National Socialism[43]. Again, the case of Germany is a particularly useful example of the persistence of such motifs after 1945. A well-established historiographic paradigm has associated the end of the Second World War with a radical overthrow of the «myth of the war experience»: the barbarous German occupation in Eastern Europe, the holocaust, the excesses of aerial warfare, and the use of atomic weapons have been presented as indications of an irreversible decline of the «heroic paradigm», superseded by a «paradigm of the victim»[44]. There can be no doubt that the insistence on passive and innocent casualties (women, children, the inmates of concentration camps etc.) had become a dominant option for the representation of war: among other things, post-war cinema all but ignored the figure of the man in arms, that is the active protagonist of combat, and chose to focus instead on women and children, pictured as either helpless victims or as surrogates of men, caught in a mostly tragic struggle with war[45]. Still, the 1950s witnessed a revival of canonical themes of war culture. In Federal Germany, a democratic country that had been purged of its Nazi past (at least in theory), an extremely

[42] On cinema see for example C. GAUTHIER - D. LESCOT - L. VERAY (eds), *Une guerre qui n'en finit pas*, Toulouse 2008; R. ROTHER - K. HERBST (eds), *Der erste Weltkrieg im Film*, München 2009.

[43] W. SCHIVELBUSCH, *Die Kultur der Niederlage*, Berlin 2001.

[44] One of the earliest discussions of this issue was J. WINTER - E. SIVAN (eds), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge 1999; a good historiographic and conceptual summary on the centrality of the concept of «victim» is F. BIESS, *Introduction*, in F. BIESS (ed.), *Histories of the Aftermath. The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*, Oxford - New York 2010, pp. 1-12.

[45] D. HIPKINS - G. PLAIN (eds), *War-torn Tales. Literature, Film and Gender in the Aftermath of World War II*, Oxford - Bern - Berlin 2009; C. BIET, *Éprouver la guerre au théâtre et au cinéma*, in D. LESCOT - L. VÉRAY (eds), *Les mises en scène de la guerre au XXe siècle*, Paris 2011, pp. 15-34.

popular novel such as Heinz Konsalik's *Der Arzt von Stalingrad* (1956) and the successful 1958 film of the same title unabashedly reinstated the stereotype of the brave German soldier, defeated but unconquered, and apt to prove his moral superiority even in the dismal reality of a prisoner camp. The parallel vogue of the *Heimatfilm*, with its idyllic and hyper-nationalistic atmospheres, served the same purpose. The negotiation of a «still usable past» in the Federal Republic was largely dependent on traditional values and imageries[46].

3. *The ambiguity of defeat. Narrations of war in post-heroic Italy*

The German cultural field after 1945 was not alone in registering an interplay of contradictory perceptions and narratives of war. Post-1944 France is another case in point. The French myths of national pride and political regeneration were rooted in a process of heroization of Resistance and Gaullism, complemented by a deliberate oblivion of Vichy and the German occupation (which had amounted to an almost sexual «submission», as Sartre has noted). Similar patterns can be observed in other European countries that have experienced defeat and German occupation[47]. However, the Italian case is notable for a particularly hazy transition to what has been termed the «post-heroic age»[48]. Well into the 1960s, the Italian narratives of the two World Wars appeared comparatively homogeneous. To begin with, at an early stage (between the 1920s and the 1940s) the «discourse» on the Great War had been elaborated in a strictly controlled cultural environment: censorship had silenced all criticism of the Italian intervention and the strategic choices of the political and military establishment. In fact, the literary field was literally flooded with memoirs and fiction (mostly written by young former officers of the reserve) that developed a rather explicit criticism of the incompetence and stupidity of generals. Still, nobody dared to question the legitimacy of the Italian intervention per se and the ineluctability of the armed conflict and patriotic sacrifice. In the

[46] R.G. MOELLER, *War Stories. The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany*, Berkeley CA 2001.

[47] P. LAGROU, *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation*, Cambridge 2000; T. JUDT, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*, New York 2005.

[48] J. SHEEHAN, *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?*, Boston MA 2009.

1940s and 1950s, democratic Italy inherited a cultural market that still registered the hegemony of traditional «war culture», according to which the wielding of arms was a sacred duty for all good citizens, and in which traditional values of martial heroism such as honor, loyalty, and courage were still considered the foundations of the male paradigm[49]. To be sure, as early as 1945 the book and film markets featured works in which the traditional evaluation of war was radically subverted. In 1949, Einaudi published Renata Viganò's *L'Agnese va a morire*. This highly successful Resistance novel described occupied Italy as a victim of German brutality. Men were nonexistent or virtually harmless. Characteristically, the brave protagonist was a woman, an elderly peasant who joined the partisan guerrilla to avenge the killing of her husband. Her outcry against violence («to hell with war and those who wanted it») precluded all interpretations of Italian Resistance as a noble enterprise[50]. Similar themes were addressed in highly successful memoirs and literary texts, such as Italo Calvino's *Il sentiero dei nidi di ragno* (1947) and Giusebbe Berto's *Il cielo è rosso* (1950), to cite but two. These works were unanimous in their rejection of glorious or sacrificial perceptions of war. The disappearance of the male hero was another common denominator. A certain number of cinematic masterpieces adopted this perspective. In Roberto Rossellini's *Roma città aperta* (1945), a devastated and violated capital was inhabited by children, women, and clergymen (all traditionally exempted from the wielding of arms). It would be difficult to imagine a more radical break with classic heroic archetypes.

However, Italian narratives of war did not conform to this one pattern. Well into the 1960s, the Italian cultural field was partly dominated by literary works that were steeped in traditional motifs of the patriotic vocabulary. On the one hand, the 1950s saw the release of numerous combat films (*Carica eroica* and *I sette dell'Orsa maggiore* in 1952, *Amba Alagi* in 1953, *Divisione Folgore* and *Siluri umani* in 1954, to

[49] For a preliminary orientation see M. MONDINI, *Scrivere della guerra, scrivere in guerra*, in M. DE NICOLÒ (ed.), *Dalla trincea alla piazza*, Roma 2011, pp. 123-133; M. MONDINI, *Culture di guerra e tipi guerrieri*, in P. DEL NEGRO (ed.), *Guerre e culture di guerra nella storia d'Italia*, Milano 2011, pp. 109-122; *Manly Heroes and Innocent Victims. Italian Representations of Warfare after Defeat*, in P. TAME (ed.), *Mnemosyne and Mars*, forthcoming.

[50] R. VIGANÒ, *L'Agnese va a morire*, Turin 1994 (1949[1]).

quote but a few). These films were tendentious and extremely naïve, but also extremely effective in reviving the themes and vocabulary of the «heroic defeat». The brave and gallant Italian fighters had lost the war because of ill luck and overwhelming enemy forces, certainly not because of their military shortcomings (more often than not, in these films, the enemy paid tribute to their courage)[51].

In other films, the disillusion spread by the downfall of institutions, the invasion, defeat, and the betrayal of the ruling class cohabited with surviving stereotypes of the martial hero, devoted to his brothers in arms and impatient to fight in order to restore peace and go back home, a pattern that associated the partisan chief (and former army officer) of *Un giorno nella vita* (1946), the company of *Penne nere* (1952), and the angry and disillusioned fascist anti-hero of *Tiro al piccione* (1961), from Giose Rimanelli's novel of the same title[52]. An equally complex admixture can be observed in literature. Eugenio Corti (*I più non ritornano*, 1947), Cristoforo Moscioni Negri (*I lunghi fucili*, 1956), Rigoni Stern (*Il sergente nella neve*, 1953), and Nuto Revelli (*Mai tardi*, 1946) all depicted the retreat of the Italian army from Russia in the winter of 1942-1943. Their accounts were an uncompromising indictment of the mistakes of the regime, the incompetence of generals, and the intrinsic absurdity of siding with the Germans on the Eastern front. At the same time, however, the basic ingredients of the «community in arms» lived on in these epics of defeat and homecoming, drenched in Christian spirituality[53]. In this Russian anabasis, a master narrative of heroism and expiation, the range of emotions and the object of duty were restricted to the smaller group of brothers in arms who were sharing the experience of sacrifice, in whose name alone the protagonists continued to fight and to distinguish themselves through extreme proofs of valor and abnegation. «If I come out alive, it will be with you people», a young caporal said to lieutenant Corti during a tragic escape in the heart of the Russian winter, «Or else, we'll die together»[54].

[51] On the literary canon of «heroic defeat» see J. MACLEOD (ed.), *Defeat and Memory*, Basingstoke 2008.

[52] See G. RIMANELLI, *Tiro al piccione*, Torino 1991 (1953[1]).

[53] M. MONDINI, *Alpini. Parole e immagini di un mito guerriero*, Roma - Bari 2008.

[54] E. CORTI, *I più non ritornano*, Milano 1990 (1947[1]), p. 15.

The motif of martial brotherhood as a microcosm of meaning that survived the ravages of war is a classic *locus* of war narratives, not just a legacy of the previous generation of soldiers-writers (which, among other things, it obviously was). In the narratives of 1914-1918, comradeship and male friendship were obsessively invoked as a moral sanctuary from the horror and dullness of trench life. In that case, too, the celebration of the «brothers» in arms, especially when dead, had modeled itself on such templates as classic Greek epic poetry, Christian martyrologies, and early modern poems of chivalry[55]. The massive reuse of such motifs in war literature—instrumental to the establishment of a consolatory myth of the «heroic defeat» in the aftermath of World War II—is proof of the continuing relevance and enduring persistence of the western paradigm of war[56].

[55] See S. COLE, *Modernism, Male Friendship and the First World War*, Cambridge 2003; J. TATUM, *The Mourner's Song: War and Remembrance from the Iliad to Vietnam*, Chicago IL 2003.

[56] For a detailed analysis see M. MONDINI, *Alpini. Parole e immagini*, particularly pp. 158-196.

Part I
Narrating Early Modern War

Notes on War and Social History

by *Lauro Martines*

1. *Introduction*

A moment of autobiography in my recent book on war provides the ideal point of departure for this essay:

«Many years ago, as a novice historian at Harvard University, I believed that the most demanding kind of history lay in tracking the ties that link high culture, social structure, and politics. Here, it seemed to me, was history of the sort that stretched the intellect and the historical imagination out to their limits. Other young historians at Harvard shared my views. We regarded 'military history' as the realm of simplicity, and therefore not worth pursuing ...

I went on to spend my working life on historical problems far removed from the history of war and armies. But when at last I turned to war, that very distance or estrangement, I hoped, would enable me to see it freshly: from a vantage point that had not been fixed by grooming as a military historian»[1].

In my studies across the years, I had of course read a great deal about war in early modern Europe, but seldom with a determined eye and the will to find out what it was really all about. That kind of concentration was reserved for my primary interests. So, when finally turning to the history of war, I had no true grasp of the nature of European warfare and no reliable picture of what I would find in my researches. But having long considered European social structures, I knew that I was chiefly interested in the social history of war. Hence, I was not going to keep an eye cocked for the fine details of battles, weapons, strategies, war diplomacy, or the biographies of leading generals. This was «military history» of the old school. My principal interests concerned the social makeup of soldiers, their relations with civilians, and the business of armies in the context of the emerging European state. Consequently, the large question of how soldiers were treated by the civilian world also dominated much of my search for an X-ray of war.

[1] L. MARTINES, *Furies: War in Europe, 1450-1700*, New York - London 2013, p. 259.

The food, wages, supplies, and living conditions of soldiers pressed in to the centre of my concerns.

Yet I soon found, as I widened my researches, that short of doing the primary digging myself, I often came away from topics dissatisfied: without the quantitative or decisive material needed to mount the clinching arguments. Despite all the work of the new social historians of war over the past thirty or forty years, I encountered surprising gaps in the swaths of the available scholarship. Following is a list of the topics that call out for research and treatment.

2. *Front-line work on the Italian Wars (1494-1559)*

There is an astonishing deficit of modern work on this capital subject, comparable say to Peter H. Wilson's *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*, or to the study by James B. Wood, *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562-1576*[2]. Strangely, in historical writing on the Italian Wars, Guicciardini and old works of a general sort remain among the foremost sources, as is discernible in recent studies by Guido Alfani and the late Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw. Nadia Covini's well-known book on the Milanese army treats the period before the Italian Wars[3]. And the splendid study of Venetian military organization by the Mallett-Hale duet never passes over, in any pressing analysis, nor in its documentation, to the villages and city walls where all the violence and atrocities against civilians were taking place. Nor again, at any point, does the book follow an army on a sustained campaign, intent on examining its finances, resources, civilian contacts, and fortunes in combat[4].

[2] P.H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*, Cambridge MA 2009; J.B. Wood, *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562-1576*, Cambridge 2002.

[3] G. Alfani, *Il Grand Tour dei Cavalieri dell'Apocalisse. L'Italia del «lungo Cinquecento», 1494-1629*, Venezia 2010; M. Mallett - C. Shaw, *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe*, London - New York 2012; N. Covini, *L'Esercito del Duca. Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza, 1450-1480*, Roma 1998.

[4] M. Mallett - J.R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617*, Cambridge 1984.

3. *Billeting*

Most soldiers in wartime Europe, right up to the 18th century, were quartered on civilians, above all in the countryside, but also in towns and cities when these were under siege. For the social history of war, here was the pulsating heart of relations between soldiers and civilians. Yet the subject has attracted no books *per se*, nor any considerable essay-length studies. Everything we know about wartime billeting in early-modern Europe must be gleaned, more or less impressionistically, from a dense scatter of facts and observations in the apposite streams of scholarship.

Diaries and local chronicles occasionally reveal some of the particulars of billeting. More often, however, they offer descriptions of circumstances or conditions that suggest pictures of wartime horrors. Early in 1635, in the middle of the Thirty Years War, the Imperial siege of Augsburg was brought to an end by famine. More than 4,000 soldiers, meanwhile, under Swedish officers, had been quartered in that city of nearly 30,000 inhabitants for more than two years, imposing wage costs, demands on food, and other strains that helped to wipe out much of Augsburg's population[5]. In the countryside, meanwhile, the relentless work of grinding destruction, brought on by excessive billeting, went on more quietly.

4. *The society of the wagon trains*

European armies, when in the field, were long trains of horses, pack animals, wagons, carts, artillery, soldiers, and camp followers, including craftsmen, women, children, petty food vendors (sutlers), as well as other tradesmen and hangers-on. Not seldom, when a war ended, or troops were dispersed, professionals—mercenaries—passed from one army to another. We may thus speak of «the society of the wagon trains». Yet we search in vain for specialized studies or books on the subject. And once again, to get at the desired information, we must comb through

[5] B. Roeck, *Eine Stadt in Krieg und Frieden: Studien zur Geschichte der Reichsstadt Augsburg zwischen Kalenderstreit und Parität*, 2 vols, Göttingen 1989; Jakob Wagner, *Die Chronik des Jakob Wagner über die Zeit der schwedischen Okkupation in Augsburg vom 20. April 1632 bis 28. März 1635*, ed. W. Roos, Augsburg 1902.

books with other intentions in mind, drawing it out piecemeal, such as from Geoffrey Parker's *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road,* John Lynn's *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, and Peter Burschel's *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts*. Remarkably, no feminist historian has elected to study an army, or a selection of armies, with the aim of getting at the unwritten history of female camp followers in early modern Europe. And perhaps it is more remarkable still that no historian has made a concerted attempt to explain the camp-follower phenomenon: that is, to throw light on why exactly rulers were forced to put up with great numbers of camp followers, evidently seeing them as an integral part of armies, despite the fact that they hindered their progress and maneuverability.

5. *Sutlers, money lenders, and merchants*

A large army could move with hundreds of sutlers in its wagon train, numbering at times as many as one for every sixty or seventy soldiers. They were mostly petty retailers of food—bread, cheese, beer, and brandy, and many were women. The more substantial sutlers, with a wagon or two of their own, were also bound to be money-lenders, such as when offering food on credit. They lived off trade with the soldiers. But under the larger umbrella of trading and money matters, we may also include traders or merchants of the sort who rushed into the ranks of camp followers when an army verged on taking a town by storm. Now, in the ensuing sack, a cascade of goods and valuables, seized by the soldiers, went up for sale to pawnbrokers and the newly-arrived merchants, who swiftly bought up the booty at rock-bottom prices and carted it away for sale and swollen profits in neighboring or more distant towns.

Here again we are completely without the needed studies. Significantly, much of Fritz Redlich's old but still useful article, *Der Marketender*[6], was based to a large extent on material in Grimmelshausen's *Courage, the Adventuress*, which was drawn in turn from a short novel published in 1670 and set in the Thirty Years War.

[6] F. REDLICH, *Der Marketender*, in «Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte», 41, 1954, pp. 227-252.

So far as I know, we do not have a single portrait or sketch of an actual tradesman or tradeswoman who followed armies, sold food to the soldiers, loaned money, or bought their plundered goods.

6. *Logistics and unpaid wages*

If we put the supply and transportation of food for soldiers at the heart of logistics, as I would insist we should, then here is another topic that desperately wants research and study. Only Geoffrey Parker, in his book on the Army of Flanders, has come close to casting some sustained light on how an army was fed, and even his picture is spotty, because it is little more than a part of his much larger canvass.

An army could move and maneuver with a shortage of weapons and even horses; but what could it do without food? Thus, as the logistical problem *par excellence*, the obtaining and movement of bread and other edibles was often closely tied to the phenomenon of unpaid soldiers' wages. For utter penury in armies led directly to raging hunger and turned the whole question of food supplies into a nightmare. Yet to construct a historical picture of these matters, in the state of current scholarship, we must pick our way unsatisfactorily through work that is devoted to administrative and other matters, not to the core problem in logistics: food. In 1552, at the Imperial siege of Metz, there was no food in the vicinity of the city, not even for sale. It had all been eaten or bought up and was being hoarded. The same thing was true towards the end of the royal siege of La Rochelle, in May 1573, when the besieging army was starving, and thousands of soldiers had already deserted[7].

7. *Disease and desertion: vanishing armies*

Although it is well known that early modern European armies could be lethal carriers of disease, of plague and typhus most notably, the subject is without a single study that fixes, say, on two or three armies

[7] On Metz: F.R. PACKARD, *Life and Times of Ambroise Paré (1510-1590)*, London 1922, pp. 182-184; on La Rochelle: K.C. ROBBINS, *City on the Ocean Sea: La Rochelle, 1530-1650. Urban Society, Religion, and Politics on the French Atlantic Frontier*, Leiden - New York 1997, pp. 210-214, and J.B. WOOD, *The King's Army*, p. 263.

and tracks their movement for six months or a year, with a view to establishing the nature of their diseases and death rates. A few general treatments deal with the subject, and one outstanding essay, ranging over the shifting grounds of the Thirty Years War, charts the connected movement of plague and soldiers, as these wound their way through civilian populations. But no army holds the focus of this inquiry; and a great deal must be taken for granted regarding the nature of the diseases in question[8].

Deadly maladies produced in vanishing armies, because they could kill with such speed as to put a large force out of action in a matter of weeks, as happened to a French army just outside Naples in 1528. In this purview, desertion may be associated with disease in the fortunes of war, for the mass deserting of troops also decimated armies, enough to knock them out of action. We touch on a subject here, desertion, which has only recently started to receive specialized treatment, mainly in connection with 17th and 18th century Germany[9].

8. *Relations between officers and soldiers*

Like billeting and the society of wagon-train armies, this topic lies under a screen of impressionistic observations, given out by historians in the process of providing contingent or tangential argument and description. Yet the importance of the ties between officers—noblemen generally—and their men cannot be overestimated. For the former were likely to be the paymasters; they loaned money to their men, punished them, exercised the power of capital punishment in wartime, and controlled them (or failed to do so) in relations with the surrounding world of civilians. In addition, the quasi or outright ownership of companies and regiments by officers above the rank of captain opened the way

[8] Q. OUTRAM, *The Socio-Economic Relations of Warfare and the Military Mortality Crises of the Thirty Years' War*, in «Medical History», 45, 2001, pp. 151-184; E.A. ECKERT, *The Structure of Plagues and Pestilences in Early Modern Europe. Central Europe, 1560-1640*, Basel 1996. On war and disease more generally, see A. CUNNINGHAM - O.P. GRELL, *The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe*, Cambridge 2000.

[9] U. BRÖCKLING - M. SIKORA (eds), *Armeen und ihre Deserteure*, Göttingen 1998, and M. KAISER, *Die Lebenswelt der Söldner und das Phänomen der Desertion im Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, in «Osnabrücker Mitteilungen», 103, 1998, pp. 105-124.

to rampant corruption and the theft of government monies. This has been noted by Lynn, Parrott, Rowlands, and others. At the height of the religious wars in France, officers were known to steal away with the silver intended for the wages of their soldiers[10]. A regiment in the possession of a nobleman, a colonel say, might teem with minor relatives, family retainers, former servants, and men whose recruitment had been obtained by violent impressment[11].

When we cast around for the sources of evidence in this line of inquiry, it is clear that we must turn chiefly to diaries, letters, official complaints, legal proceedings, and financial reports from agents in the field. Focused on the late 16th century, a unique study of corruption in the Spanish army unit garrisoned at Milan, in the Castello, the city's great fortress, reveals an intimate but brutal world marked by favoritism, bribery, coercion, and trickery[12].

9. *Pillage, booty, and «contributions» (war levies)*

The Italian Wars, the French Wars of Religion, Spain's war in the Netherlands, the Thirty Years War, and the wars of Louis XIV triggered colossal movements of wealth between the contending sides, involving goods, landed property, valuables, and cash. Most of the wealth, even real property, changed hands in the form of booty, or in order to raise money for the payment of troops or to pay ransoms. The sacking of rich cities was the paramount event in the history of plundering armies, attested to most dramatically at Brescia (1512), Rome (1527), Antwerp (1576), Mantua (1630), and Magdeburg (1631). But the wholesale

[10] J.B. WOOD, *The King's Army*, p. 277. See also J.A. LYNN, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: the French Army, 1610-1715*, Cambridge 1997; D. PARROTT, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642*, Cambridge 2001; G. ROWLANDS, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV. Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701*, Cambridge 2002.

[11] On these matters, see especially F. DE LEÓN GONZÁLEZ, *The Road to Recroi: Class, Culture and Command in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1567-1659*, Leiden - Boston MA - Köln 2009.

[12] L. RIBOT, *Soldati spagnoli in Italia. Il castello di Milano alla fine del XVI secolo*, in C. DONATI - B.R. KROENER (eds), *Militari e società civile nell'Europa dell'età moderna (XVI-XVIII)*, Bologna 2007.

plunder of wealth, if on a less sensational scale, went on all the time in wartime, not only in the smaller urban centers, but also in the villages and countryside. And this sinister feature of early modern war, frequently the cause of ruin and bankruptcy in rural and small-town economies, has received little concentrated study[13]. Surprisingly, even the sack of Genoa in 1522, with its great orgy of theft, remains wrapped in obscurity, untouched by any modern scholarly treatment. It is difficult to account for this neglect, but I suspect that it has much to do with persisting, old-school traditions in the study of war.

With notable exceptions[14], the historical work of the past generation also falls short of material on the subject of special war levies and «contributions» that were usually imposed on all regions in the vicinity of passing or occupying armies. Some German towns and cities, in the course of the Thirty Year War, were plunged into so much debt by war taxes that it was still being paid off with interest in the 18th century. The literature is thin in studies along this path of research[15].

10. *Hell in the villages*

Long sieges were uncommon, because they were exceedingly costly and ruinous for the army on the offense. The besieging of cities thus tended to be short-term affairs, ordinarily lasting for weeks at a stretch, until the besieged were forced to surrender, or the attacking army was pulled away. It follows that agrarian Europe normally took the full frontal blows of warfare, especially in the vicinity of cities and in the fertile plains and river valleys, as hungry armies marched to their destined points, or scoured the countryside for food, fodder, and sup-

[13] However, the following are notable: G.P. SREENIVASAN, *The Peasants of Ottobeuren, 1487-1726. A Rural Society in Early Modern Germany*, Cambridge 2004; T. ROBISHEAUX, *Rural Society and the Search for Order in Early Modern Germany*, Cambridge 1989; J.C. THEIBAULT, *German Villages in Crisis. Rural Life in Hesse-Kassel and the Thirty Years War, 1580-1720*, Atlantic Highlands NJ 1993.

[14] Especially J.A. LYNN, *Giant of the Grand Siècle.*

[15] But see the article by Miroslav Hroch in K. REPGEN (ed.), *Krieg und Politik, 1618-1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven*, München 1988, pp. 133-149, and articles by Kersten Krüger and Norbert Winnige in B. KROENER - R. PRÖVE (eds), *Krieg und Frieden. Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Paderborn - München 1996.

plies. But navigating through the new social history of war, we look mostly in vain for sustained analyses or rounded, detailed pictures of the conduct of armies in the little towns and villages of Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. Our knowledge, such as it is, of rural conditions in wartime Europe, comes chiefly from the historians of village life, not from the historians of war and armies[16].

11. *Horses and pack animals*

In its larger significance, the importance of horses and pack animals went far beyond the logistical needs of armies. The need for them, when contingents of soldiers were nearby, haunted Europe's small towns and villages. For in wartime, horses in particular easily perished in great numbers. And while the Army of Flanders, for example, might import them from as far away as Poland and Italy, acute shortages were very much the order of the day, never more so than in Germany during the Thirty Years War. The inevitable result was that soldiers turned to the chronic, mass theft of horses, not seldom snatching them from the hands of starving peasants. Next to food, including grains and livestock, horses were the chief target of pillaging armies. And it was theft on a scale that played havoc with farm work, resulting on occasion in the outright collapse of rural economies[17].

The question presents itself: how can we get rounded pictures of the social history of war, above all in its destructive windings through the countryside, when we have absolutely no sense of the numbers, availability, and death rates of horses, not to speak of the local trading in horses and pack animals, or of the input from distant markets? Serious historical scholarship offers us virtually nothing in the way of findings on these matters.

Having stressed the «social history of war», I evidently have a particular kind of history in mind; and clearly, too, in my researches, I found that I was seldom able to amass enough decisive information on the large

[16] See above, note 13.

[17] Key source: MAURUS FRIESENEGGER, *Tagebuch aus dem 30jährigen Krieg*, ed. P.W. MALTHÄSER, München 2007. And here is an outstanding French example: ALEXANDRE DUBOIS, *Journal d'un Curé de Campagne au XVIIe Siècle*, ed. H. PLATELLE, Paris 1965.

question of relations between armies and civilian populations. Well, but why my overriding emphasis on civilians?

War in early modern Europe was rarely a meeting in battle between two great armies. Instead, it was far more routinely a matter of military movement through the countryside, of skirmishes, of camped inactivity, and of putting towns and tiny cities to temporary sieges. War, in short, was war primarily against civilians in town and country. This means that the fine details of battles, weapons, and tactics, so dear to military historians, are all but irrelevant in the delineation of the social history of war. It also means that descriptions of military organization can be played down or edged out to the margins of analysis, unless the particulars are closely related to contact with unarmed civilians, such as in the practice of quartering soldiers on them, or in the levying of «contributions» and special (often crushing) war taxes.

12. *Concluding remarks*

We come to a crucial feature, which binds together the topics listed above.

Most of them were occasioned, or were made mortally toxic, by the ricocheting force of the acute meagerness of funds for war and armies. Again and again in the pursuit of aggressive policies, governments managed to raise the monies to send armies into the field to commence hostilities. But they quickly ran out of cash and ready credit in circumstances that frequently put an end to their ability to borrow money and pay soldiers. This was a chronic condition at the peak of wars, and the claim is backed by a stream of scholarship on the finances of kings, Holy Roman emperors, and German and other princes[18]. Ordinary tax revenue was always a pittance when it came to covering the costs of major wars; and bankers, on top of heavy interest charges

[18] R. BONNEY (ed.), *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200-1815*, Oxford 1999; P.T. HOFFMAN - K. NORBERG (eds), *Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government*, Stanford CA 1994; J.C. BOYAJIAN, *Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650*, New Brunswick NJ 1983; T. ERTMAN, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge 1997. Drawing on the best specialized scholarship, E. BELENGUER, *El Imperio hispanico 1479-1665*, Barcelona 1995, pp. 179 ff., offers a superb detailed summary of Spanish royal finances.

for their loans, demanded hard rights over taxes and other guarantees that hobbled rulers.

What happened out in the field when an army was forced to go without pay? What effects did this have on billeting, booty, wagon-train society, the logistics of food supplies, war levies, village life, and the availability of horses? Much of the answer to this question, if in dramatic terms, is given in the actions of the hungry, angry, and bedraggled army that started out from near Milan in February 1527 and ended with the Sack of Rome in early May. Discipline collapsed; bread became scarce; some soldiers marched with their feet bundled in rags; villages were assaulted and looted along the way; officers either collaborated and connived with the common soldiers, or put their own lives in danger; and the eagerness to sack Rome swelled by the day. When the sack finally came, the rage and sense of injustice of the unpaid soldiers turned into an orgy of violence and theft[19].

The Sack of Rome was the sensational entry into the early modern world of European war, with its campaigns against civilians and its multitudinous quantities of plunder and booty. The barbarous conduct of unpaid soldiers would be seen *ad nauseam* in the French Wars of Religion, in the Netherlands as natives there faced Spain's armies, in the Thirty Years War, and in the campaigns of French armies in the 17th and early 18th centuries.

War put the rules of billeting under intolerable strains, and if the soldiers were hungry, because of being penniless, there were no material limits to what they might demand. In Germany, peasant families could be literally pushed out of their huts into «the snow and woods ... to die and rot of frost and hunger»[20]. And brutality of the same sort was attested to in Holland, where Spanish cavalry officers might quarter their companies «on people so poor that they had to go out and beg for their own children and for the soldiers, including even the soldiers' lackeys»[21].

[19] Sack of Rome: L. GUICCIARDINI, *Il Sacco di Roma*, Firenze 1867; J. HOOK, *The Sack of Rome, 1527*, Basingstoke - New York 2004[2].

[20] L. MARTINES, *Furies*, p. 166. See also R. PRÖVE, *Der Soldat in der 'guten Bürgerstube': Das frühneuzeitliche Einquartierungssystem und die sozioökonomischen Folgen*, in B. KROENER - R. PRÖVE (eds), *Krieg und Frieden*, pp. 191-219.

[21] L. MARTINES, *Furies*, p. 166.

In France, in the 1630s and 1640s, the billeting demands of the French army ran out of control and provoked a series of bloody revolts in small towns and villages in the southwest of the kingdom, in the Périgueux and Bergerac areas[22].

I pointed to the Italian Wars as a zone of study which has been hugely neglected in the sweep of modern, front-line research. Only the teamwork for the three volumes of collected documents on the sack of Brescia (1512), and Roberto Cantagalli's *La Guerra di Siena (1552-1559)*, achieve the standard for the needed scale of research—a level that had been met by Romolo Quazza's fundamental volumes on the dynastic struggle for Mantua and Monferrato[23].

The phenomenon of the unpaid soldier could not fail to change relations between officers and their men. Discipline became a serious problem; mutiny threatened; or common soldiers, borrowing money in order to eat, fell more deeply into debt to their own officers and to sutlers. Spain's armies in the Low Countries and Sweden's armies in Germany, in the Thirty Years War, erupted with many mutinies, foiling policies and leading directly to assaults on civilian populations.

If we cast a cold eye over the landscape considered thus far, is it not obvious that the field is in need of studies, targeting individual armies and their contact with civilian populations? The objectives of such research would be to track the movement of soldiers and to seek answers to the following questions. (1) How were they recruited? (2) What were relations between officers and their men? (3) Were their food supplies sufficient? (4) Did the soldiers often go unpaid? (5) Where and how were they billeted? (6) What were the numbers and kinds of their camp followers and sutlers? (7) Did they fall ill; and if so, what were the maladies, or at any rate the symptoms? (8) Did they collect special war levies, including «contributions» or protection money? (9) And finally, what was the scale of their looting and plundering?

Historical study, meanwhile, is in debt to Europe's villages. It owes them a stream of research on the ravages of war in the countryside. After all,

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[23] R. QUAZZA, *La Guerra per la successione di Mantova e del Monferrato (1628-1631)*, 2 vols, Mantova 1926; on Brescia: V. FRATI et al., *Il sacco di Brescia*, 3 vols, Brescia 1989.

since towns and cities were walled in and usually well defended, most of the life of armies in wartime Europe really went on in the great rural expanses. And this meant continuous contact with villages, with their labor, food supplies, livestock, horses, and other goods. Hence, villagers were the chronic victims of war; but their cries had no volume and no influence. If cities under siege soon gave way to cannibalism when a blockade was successful and the flow of food supplies was cut off, the undefended countryside gave way to the silent killing of famine[24].

The best way to bring these notes to a conclusion is to single out the spectacle of the unpaid army and, behind it, the shadowy insolvent state. These were the true sources of all the atrocities and violence inflicted by soldiers on civilian populations.

As political authority in late medieval Europe edged its way out of a dense scatter of mini-states or statelets, evolving and jelling into larger units in the period from the 14th to the 16th centuries, public finance was called upon to pay for bigger and bigger armies and costlier wars. Both directly and deviously, taxes were relentlessly stepped up, often on a short-term basis, only in due course to be turned into permanent levies. Meanwhile, in their fielding of armies, princes and urban elites, impelled by swelling ambitions, reached far beyond their fiscal resources and the limited capacities of their agents and administrators. In effect, as we have seen, they forced armies to spin out of control. Misery and disaster followed for civilian populations. Accordingly, these fiscal and political matters are very much a part of the social history of war. There is thus all the more reason to underline the thieving violence of armies relative to the ambitious policies of princes and urban war lords. For if the major wars of early modern Europe had a beneficiary—apart from the bankers whose loans raked in mammoth profits—, it was the emerging modern state in France, Spain, Germany, Scandinavia, and eastern Europe. While reaping absolutely none of the benefits, villagers and citizens paid for war out of their very hides, not only in the form of billeting, loot, protection money («contributions»), and other war levies, but also with a multitude of indirect taxes, always the chief source of public revenue.

[24] For one of the fundamental documents on cannibalism, see JEAN DE LÉRY, *Histoire memorable de la Ville de Sancerre*, La Rochelle 1574.

Narrating the Italian Wars (1494-1540)

Contamination, Models, and Knowledge

by *Jean-Louis Fournel*

I. The language of war in the State of War

1. *The double injunction*

The writing of war differs from other writing in that it has a strong identity-based aspect and consistently commits to a particular vision of the world. One component of war chronicles is the rationalization of space and history by their writers and readers alike, strongly evoking the presence of tradition and heritage within them. The writing of war thus lends itself to the process of establishing a model that is systematic yet varies in terms of form and media (monumental or textual, poetic or historiographical, functional, technical, ritualized or celebratory). The problem for this fundamentally repetitive type of writing therefore consists in moving from repetition (which settles for reprisal and imitation) to analogy (which compares in order to distinguish and is aware that things resembling each other do not necessarily stand in for each other) in order to highlight the specificity of each war, while taking into account the fact that the chronicle of one conflict tends to resemble those of preceding wars.

The narration of war indeed always presents a twofold characteristic. On the one hand, it is always already there, as «classic» or atemporal writing, in a predictable account of the struggles of heroes and hu-

I would first and foremost like to thank Jean-Claude Zancarini and Marie-Madeleine Fontaine for the exchanges that we had (respectively over the long course of our joint work on Florentine republican thought and during the recent coordination of a collective volume entitled *La langue militaire et la langue de la guerre au XVIe siècle*, to be published by Droz in 2014) touching on all of the issues addressed in this contribution. I also extend my thanks to Pascal Brioist for having passed along these still-unpublished works, and to Emmanuel de Crouy-Chanel for his invaluable comments on the language of artillery.

mans (from Homer to Thucydides, from Livy to Cesar or Sallust, from Villani to Machiavelli and Guicciardini, from Commynes to Davila or de Thou). On the other hand, it always proves incomplete, to the extent that war by its very nature also falls into the radicalism of a present rich with surprises and produces a demand for the understanding of what is unique about each conflict. In this perspective, language is mobilized in order for this chronicle to be related at once or in turns (depending on places, practices and/or texts) via the 'reprisal' of modules (heroes, loves, and weapons must be sung from Homer and Virgil to Ariosto and Tasso); via the profession of inability to provide an account of a bellicose reality, which maintains an unspeakable aspect («non ho parole pari ai concetti miei», Francesco Guicciardini wrote to the Datario Matteo Giberti in a moment of discouragement on May 28, 1527, three weeks after the Sack of Rome)[1]; and via the measure for distinction produced by a logic of successive approximations for an object that is never self-evident (Machiavelli's *Discourses* and Guicciardini's *Ricordi* represent examples that are striking in their fragmentation, but a further illustration lies in the tormented linearity of the latinized syntax of Guicciardini's *The History of Italy*)[2]. These hunts for a form to construct rational responses to the questionings laid out by war promote the emergence of three ways of treating elements: imitation (or analogy); the confrontation of past interpretative frameworks with present requisites; and the preeminence given to fragmented reconstitutions of meaning and non-linear logics.

While the tension between these different orientations structures the languages of war, it is also essential to note that its consequences and horizon are not merely cognitive: the language of war is distinctive in that it enters into a radical relationship with necessity, with the existence of community. The issues surrounding any conflict have this singular-

[1] There are multiple traces of this provisional *aporia* in the texts of this era: the reinterpretation of the *discorsi* that he provides is also an examination of Machiavelli's sometimes-misleading words: the *concioni* of the *cose fiorentine* are an attempt—much like the *consolatoria* and the two fictitious harangues—to place their own words into the mouths of historical actors in order to better understand what they intended to mean; the final «de-Florentinizing» rewriting of the *ricordi* lexicon also goes in this direction.

[2] See C. DIONISOTTI, *Machiavellerie*, Torino 1970, and J.L. FOURNEL - J.-C. ZANCARINI, *La Grammaire de la république. Langages de la politique chez Francesco Guicciardini*, Genève 2009.

ity, inextricably weaving in weighty consequences for all subjects of history (from the individual to the community). This is furthermore the reason why there comes a moment when analyzing the languages of war ceases to mean only speaking of the war that serves as the reference point, as the ways of waging and living war are indications of a singular way of considering the future of the community—and in short, of doing politics. Is this not what Machiavelli highlights in the prologue to his dialogue on *The Art of War*[3]? Is this not also what he means in responding to the Cardinal of Rouen at the very end of the long chapter III of *The Prince* that it can be admitted that Italians do not understand much about war, on the condition that it be added that the French understand nothing about the State[4]? Not understanding the State (*lo stato*), according to Machiavelli, means to ignore that war is not limited to battlefields, clashes involving formations of pikemen, heavy cavalry charges, and artillery cannonades. The young Florentine lawyer Francesco Guicciardini, early in what was to became a brilliant career, had already provided his own description five years earlier, in 1508, in his *Storie fiorentine* (The History of Florence), emphasizing that such warfare would not only change States, but the ways of govern-

[3] *Arte della guerra, Proemio*, in *L'arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori*, ed. by J.-J. MARCHAND, D. FACHARD, and G. MASI, Roma 2001, p. 27: «Ma se si considerassono gli antichi ordini, non si troverebbono cose più unite più conformi e che, di necessità, tanto l'una amasse l'altra, quanto queste, perché tutte l'arti che si ordinano in una civiltà per cagione del bene comune degli uomini, tutti gli ordini fatti in quella per vivere con timore delle leggi e d'Iddio, sarebbono vani, se non fussono preparate le difese loro; le quali, bene ordinate mantengono quegli, ancora che non bene ordinati. E così, per il contrario, i buoni ordini, sanza il militare aiuto, non altrimenti si disordinano che l'abitazioni d'uno superbo e regale palazzo, ancora che ornate di gemme e d'oro, quando, sanza essere coperte, non avessono cosa che dalla pioggia le difendesse. E se in qualunque altro ordine delle cittadi e de' regni si usava ogni diligenza per mantenere gli uomini fedeli, pacifici e pieni del timore d'Iddio nella milizia si raddoppiava, perché in quale uomo debbe ricercare la patria maggiore fede, che in colui che le ha a promettere di morire per lei?».

[4] *Le Prince / De Principatibus*, ed. by J.-L. FOURNEL and J.-C. ZANCARINI, Paris 2000, pp. 60-62: «E di questa materia parlai a Nantes con Roano, quando il Valentino, che così era chiamato popularmente Cesare Borgia, figliuolo di papa Alessandro, occupava la Romagna; perché, dicendomi el cardinale di Roano che li Italiani non si intendevano della guerra, io li risposi che e' Franzesi non si intendevano dello stato; perché, se se n'intendessino, non lascerebbono venire la Chiesia in tanta grandezza». Resorting to reported conversation is furthermore so infrequent that this alone renders the passage worthy of being highlighted as such.

ing them and of waging war, in a tightly fastened knot encompassing considerations of territory, war, and government[5].

Far from being an exception, a somewhat aberrant interlude or accident of history, during what may be rightfully called an «age», war then becomes an essential component of reflection on the state of the world. War is no longer an incongruity, a relative paradox of political thought, which must only determine whether or not it is legitimate; it becomes a constant, the most basic factor in analyzing relations between States—in terms of wars played out on the battlefield—as well as a condition for the definitions of forms of coexistence, via the examination of power struggles and potential internal conflict in every society.

The new forms of war were what imposed this turning point: more violent, faster, more decisive, more frequent and spread out over the course of the year, Italian war campaigns did not lead to marginal territorial adjustments, but wreaked havoc on the continent's balance, going so far as to threaten the very existence of certain States (on the peninsula, the Kingdom of Naples and the Duchy of Milan lost their independence in this way). At stake was the very survival of the political community as a sovereign entity, in terms of its political as well as territorial perimeter (as 'government' and as 'State'). The effects on the ways of considering the organization of the city-state were immediate, to the extent that old forms (and old words) for the rationalization of conflict (be they communal or humanistic) were undermined by these new ways of waging war. Such a situation could only elicit questionings of the appropriate forms that the narrations of the new warfare should and could take in the construction of a necessary link between the writing of history, war, and politics.

Furthermore, this situation led to a sort of porosity in languages of war, which thus by no means concerned the battlefield alone or were

[5] The observation reappears and is further developed thirty years later by GUICCIARDINI, *Storia d'Italia*, vol. I,9: «... [Carlo VIII] entrò in Asti ..., conducendo seco in Italia i semi di innumerabili calamità, di orribilissimi accidenti, e variazione di quasi tutte le cose: perché dalla passata sua non solo ebbono principio mutazioni di stati, sovversioni di regni, desolazioni di paesi, eccidi di città, crudelissime uccisioni, ma eziandio nuovi abiti, nuovi costumi, nuovi e sanguinosi modi di guerreggiare, infermità insino a quel dì non conosciute; e si disordinorono di maniera gli instrumenti della quiete e concordia italiana che, non si essendo mai poi potuta riordinare, hanno avuto facoltà altre nazioni straniere e eserciti barbari di conculcarla miserabilmente e devastarla».

restricted to military language (namely, language for war as deployment of a particular technology). As a result, it is imprudent to study the language of war using only specialized glossaries and dictionaries, although these tools are clearly useful for making headway in analysis[6]. In fact, in the consideration of war, it is not war alone that is ultimately told. In the successive decades between 1494 and 1540, indeed, a «war generation» allowed for unprecedented reflection on the laws of political community (in the republican Florence of Machiavelli's time) to emerge on the Italian peninsula, alongside a literary codification of the young Italian vernacular language (between Venice and Padua, at the instigation of Pietro Bembo); a historiography that pretended to adopt the syntax of classical Latin historians and the writing logic of Thucydides in order to better express the complexity of the history of their time (with Francesco Guicciardini's *History of Italy*); a series of «behavioral treaties» establishing a worldly ethical-philosophical classicism in order to attempt to escape History in the making (starting with Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier*); and chivalric epic poetry which, with Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*, clearly broke with possible models from the past, while affirming their heritage. In all of these areas, these wars are 'narrated' even when combat is not at issue.

All of these texts fill in a gap and attempt to respond to a question remaining in suspense concerning the rampancy of weapons. In fact, before Ariosto took up the writing of the greatest chivalric epic poem of his time, his predecessor, the count Matteo Maria Boiardo, had abandoned the pen for the sword in 1494, halting there in the writing of his *Orlando innamorato* as words gave way to weapons[7]. Before Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* or *Discourses*, Savonarola had recognized at the beginning of the third part of his *Trattato circa el governo e reggimento della città di Firenze* that he did not know how to reasonably address the seizure of power by force; this admission produced a breach in politi-

[6] Be they old dictionaries or recent glossaries such as the one by M.-A. MICHAUX, *Glossaire des termes militaires du seizième siècle. Complément du Dictionnaire d'Edmond Huguet*, Paris 2008. Among the modern dictionaries, also see R. BUSETTO, *Il dizionario militare. Dizionario enciclopedico del lessico militare*, Bologna 2004.

[7] Mentre che io canto, o Iddio redentore, / Vedo la Italia tutta a fiama e a foco / Per questi Galli, che con gran valore / Vengon per disertar non so che loco; / Però vi lascio in questo vano amore amor / De Fiordespina ardente a poco a poco; / Un'altra fiata, se mi fia concesso, / Racontarovi il tutto per espresso.

cal thought that Machiavelli and his contemporaries were able to fill by constructing a rationale of force. And the titanic effort of drafting the twenty books of *The History of Italy* in less than five years is not unrelated to the distant echo of the words used by the friar from San Marco in one of his daily sermons to evoke this «unusual» war[8], this period so difficult to articulate and explain. From up on his chair in the Duomo, Savonarola was furthermore the first to provide a «live» interpretation of the times in order to explain to the Florentines what they did not understand.

2. *The mistrust of words and the immediacy of language*

Among the factors contributing to Machiavelli's success among his contemporaries upon the publication of his major works five years after his death was his readers' surprise at the language of his texts—an immediate, cutting, almost brutal language, reflecting the internal and external conflicts being considered by the Florentine secretary. Short, neatly balanced sentences pretend to establish definitive distinctions in a «divisible» reality, as if seeking to better capture it in the net of speech («pretend», because we are well aware that Machiavelli himself did not believe in this overly complete survey of dilemma-based argument). He himself announces this in the dedication to *The Prince*, in proclaiming to seek to write without affectation. The only language deemed of worth is that which respects the subject and weight of his remarks—a complex subject leaving no room for lightness, a language as rich in its *varietà* as in its *gravità*. For Machiavelli, this choice meant renouncing the use of overly simple stylistic effects—just as Savonarola mocked the flowery rhetoric of unreformed Dominican clergymen such as Mariano da Gennazzano[9]. Language was to be efficient above all, going right to the point without veering or tolerating hesitation; as in a situation of war, the first imperative for speech is to be clear, precise,

[8] G. SAVONAROLA, *Prediche sopra i Salmi*, ed. by V. ROMANO, Roma 1974, vol. 7, pp. 123-124 (sermon from January 25, 1495).

[9] See J.W. O'MALLEY, *Praise and Blame in Renissance Rome. Rhetoric, Doctrine, and Reform in the Sacred Orators of the Papal Court (c. 1450-1521)*, Durham NC 1979; M. DERAMAIX, *Consumatum est. Rhétorique et prophétie dans un sermon de Mariano da Gennazzan contre Savonarole*, in A. FONTES - J.-L. FOURNEL - M. PLAISANCE (eds), *Savonarole. Enjeux, débats, questions*, Paris 1998, pp. 173-198.

and direct, systematically placing words at the service of things[10]. The language of *The Prince* and *Discourses*, which were started (the former also finished) in 1513, one year after his eviction from the chancery, thus bears the traces of the fourteen years spent writing, transmitting orders and injunctions, precisely describing what had been observed in order to help the *Signoria* to quickly make opportune decisions in the thousands of letters written between 1498 and 1512. In Machiavelli's image, the Florentines who contemplated politics and war in the history of the present time were authors/actors who wrote in order to act and who wrote a great deal, quickly, and using highly disparate forms (political poetry, treaty, dialogue, comedy, letters, historiography, speeches, short stories, etc.), as if they were perpetually seeking the appropriate form to explain an elusive truth. Furthermore, Machiavelli's language displays a tone and rhythm recalling the oral expressive forms of the Dominican preacher in leading spiritual warfare against the lukewarm and enraged. Was Savonarola so far removed from the terms evoked above in the dedication to *The Prince* in stating as early as 1491 in his «poetic art» (*Apologeticus de ratione poeticae artis*) that the preeminence of the language of the Scriptures and Fathers of the Church presumes the erasure of the style of each author, pervaded with the Holy Spirit in order to better transcribe the truth of things, even to the detriment of the perfection of words? His mistrust of the 'sweet words' of the fathers of classical elegance, able to seduce the people but not convince them, thus motivated his preference for the political-spiritual arena of urban life over the books of poets and philosophers (thereby standing up against the sophisticated and elitist eclecticism of Politian, so well-appreciated in Lorenzo's small court, but quickly rejected as guilty of «Asianism» by the new disciples of brother Girolamo). In fact, over the course of the strange continual dialogue that Savonarola kept up with the Florentines in his sermons given between November 1494 and March 1498, he never ceased to question the republican tradition of his listeners and the words that defined it (*legge, libertà, equalità, giustizia, sapienza, arti*, and more) in order to make clear to those who were listening that during those times of constrained upheaval and call for reform, nothing could be taken for granted—not even the adequacy of vocabulary for situations at hand.

[10] This aspiration for efficient language can be compared to the obsession for *brevità* of 16th-century Italian engineers, notably in their book openings (see works cited *infra*, fn. 24).

This did not mean that the words of politics and war had to change, but simply that it was appropriate to resemantize and redefine them to meet the imperatives of the times and need for a «new hymn» (*nuovo cantico*) that had to be «sung to the Lord», according to Savonarola's discourse. The worry and incomprehension that met the unfolding of events also led to an interrogation of the words that had to be used to speak of the «quality of times» (*qualità dei tempi*), as stated by Machiavelli. Wars perceived (rightly or wrongly) as new brought about a crisis in the understanding of what was occurring, as they sparked off turmoil in the known world, imposing a return to 'present experience' as the only certain element remaining. In the language of Florentine republican politics, multiple traces of this questioning of the sufficiency of the linguistic instrument in a situation of crisis thus linger, beginning with the space in which the ultimate standard language of the republic is used: that of the *consulte* or *pratiche*, the meetings of eminent citizens who assembled regularly in times of crisis and especially in times of war, whose official reports, all written in vernacular language (which was a significant innovation), accumulated starting in 1495[11]. As has been commented upon by Denis Fachard, certain participants were at times capable of developing a severe critique of the *tulliane*[12], styled after the humanist model of the Roman orator and which had no effect on the political-military situation. Machiavelli's intentions at the end of *The Art of War* less than twenty years later are similar when, on the last page of the dialogue, he lashes out at the princes of Italy who thought that to win, it sufficed to write a graceful letter in their study or speak eloquently before the ambassadors of the adversary[13]. Behind the author's unnuanced accusation and biting sarcasm lies a

[11] See DENIS FACHARD (*Consulte e pratiche della Repubblica fiorentina*, ed. by D. FACHARD, 4 vols, Genève 1988 [1505-1512], 1993 [1498-1505], 2002 [1495-1498]).

[12] On October 5, 1496, Guido Manelli declared: «noi vegnamo spesso in su questa aringhiera a ffare lunghe tulliane, et nientedimeno a' danari non si provede; e' medici disputano insieme e lo infermo si muore», *Consulte e pratiche 1495-1498*, p. 296. Cf. also D. FACHARD, *Des tulliane du Palais de la Seigneurie aux* bibbie *de l'épistolaire machiavélien*, in A. FONTANA - J.-L. FOURNEL - X. TABET - J.-C. ZANCARINI (eds), *Langues et écritures de la république et de la guerre. Etudes sur Machiavel*, Genova 2004, pp. 103-119.

[13] *Arte della guerra*, p. 287: «sapere negli scrittoi pensare una acuta risposta, scrivere una bella lettera, mostrare ne' detti e nelle parole arguzia e prontezza».

refusal of archaic and useless rhetoric incapable of finding new words to suit new situations.

Guicciardini adopted this suspicion of inherited words better than anyone else: in the «strange times» of the new war in which States crumbled like card castles, it was necessary to watch out for «the sweetness of words» that were inherited, as he declares in his *Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze*[14]. Bernardo del Nero, the dialogue's protagonist, indeed rejects words taken from books, notably those of the *politici*—which here refers to philosophers concerned with reflecting on the *polis* or the *civitas*. The sweetness of words, according to Bernardo, covers facts with a misleading veil that hides effects, as people are so deceived by the names of things that they are ignorant of the things themselves[15]. Names often indicate *romori*, *gridi*, *opinioni vane*, *sospetti*, all expressions of republican speech gone astray, and of which the *orationes fictae* (*Accusatoria, Defensoria, Consolatoria*) of 1527/28 provided an illustration. Similarly, his *History of Italy* contains a wealth of alternative duos, dichotomies including *parole/effetti, parole/fatti, parole/verità, parole/forze* (as for the locution *«sotto nome di»*, in Guicciardini's masterpiece, it takes on a purely negative meaning, referring to an eternally misleading appearance).

All of the key words in the traditional political vocabulary thus underwent the scrutiny of political analysis. The aim is to understand the word *libertà* in the present conjecture (particularly as institutional practices in effect in Florence had never really been a model of «freedom», as Machiavelli and Guicciardini affirm)[16], alongside the terms *uguaglianza*, *popolo*, *legge*, *stato*, *vivere largo (o stretto)*, *virtù*, *ragione*, *bene*, *male*, *fama*, *onore*, *utile*, *reputazione*, *ambizione*. In every instance, the goal was not to put forward another abstract and incontrovertible definition for each of these terms, but to create—via a procedure applied in Guicciardini's *Ricordi* alike, and also systematically used in *History of Italy*—a notation of the erroneous formulations (or what had become

[14] F. GUICCIARDINI, *Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze*, in F. GUICCIARDINI, *Opere*, Torino 1970, vol. 1.

[15] « ... gli uomini si lasciano spesso ingannare tanto da' nomi che non conoscono le cose», F. GUICCIARDINI, *Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze*, p. 336.

[16] F. GUICCIARDINI, *Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze*, p. 441. Cf. *Discorsi*, I, 49 and *Istorie Fiorentine*, beginning of the third book.

erroneous over the years) with the description of the updated notion in a determined situation (hence the variable nature of the definition). More than a definition, this thus entails a description of words and their potential array of meanings, bringing together different points of view. This dominant form of questioning the meaning of singular words to a great extent resulted from the influence of times of war, viewed as imposing a sort of permanent semantic adaptability to preserve what remains of rationality by making clear the ineffectiveness and insufficiency of a certain form of language.

This explains the existence of a partial process of «technicization» of language in the state of war, as Fredi Chiapelli comments in his work on the writings of Machiavelli's government[17], but also why this language could not reveal the full evolution of a vocabulary that was much more open and polysemous than a highly technical functional language, which is not without its influence on the languages of conflicts. One illustration of this lies in the multiplication of determinations associated with the classical terminology of the republican tradition (*tirannide* becomes *mansueta*, *stato* becomes *stretto* or *largo*, etc.): here, adjectives and adverbs can function as a sort of admission that the inherited term no longer possesses a univocal meaning, and that it exists through the forms of its updating (is not the term *modo*, which refers to usages and ways of doing, one of the most heavily used in the Machiavellian vocabulary?).

II. War knowledge and military language: language for war

Language 'for' war differs from language 'of' war in that it is marked not only by the two types of «local» processes—symmetrical and complementary—of gradual «technicization» and contamination between different registers of communication (common vs. specialized language). In fact, military language is more a matter of generalized vocabulary flow between vernacular languages, given that at the time, war was a historical phenomenon of multinational nature, characterized by the practice of an array of languages, with composite armies principally made up of mercenaries of various origins. But this flow of languages was never in one direction alone, and does not entail the form of

[17] See F. Chiappelli, *Studi sul linguaggio di Machiavelli*, Firenze 1952 (cf. pp. 74 ff. on this question), and *Nuovi studi sul linguaggio di Machiavelli*, Firenze 1969.

'influence' alone, although, depending on the century, it is possible to discern the specificities of «national» military technical languages (as such, for example, in the 15th century, fortification was most often said in Italian while artillery was said in French, for reasons pertaining to the domination of architects, artisans or engineers specialized in a given field for each of the countries taken into account)[18].

In the 16th century, a qualitative and quantitative leap forward furthermore occurred in Europe, as displayed by the handful of general studies available on war vocabulary, notably for Italian language those by Piero del Negro[19]. Everything increased: the number of foreign phrases, of neologisms, of translations, of passages involving the three Romance languages (from French to Italian to Spanish, for example) and other languages as well (English and German were also concerned), alongside instances of lending words to other closely-related vocabularies (political, historical, geographical, artistic, etc.). Polyglotism was necessary given a context that was multilingual by definition, with armies mainly made up of mercenaries—and even more so, given that the young vernacular languages were still fragile and not yet stabilized, with vocabularies often characterized by semantic indetermination. A survey of this matter is further complicated by the fact that the language of war did not merely involve passive transmission: the Italian Wars were a period of continuous technical innovation, notably in the realm of firearms and the structuring of various parts of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc.). This is why models of influence (of one language over another), rivalry or hierarchy between military languages and cultures are insufficient in explaining the use of language for war, even in its most technical aspects.

Nevertheless, in a European society in which the political, social and professional elites were profoundly influenced by the recent inheritance of the humanist rediscovery of ancient texts, and their possible

[18] See essay by A. CASTELLANI, *Termini militari d'epoca rinascimentale: l'artiglieria*, in «Studi linguistici italiani», 9, 1983, pp. 31-55, 117-178.

[19] See notably *Una lingua per la guerra: il rinascimento militare italiano*, in *Guerra e Pace* (*Storia d'Italia*. Annali, 18), Torino 2002, pp. 301-338; P. DEL NEGRO, *Tra Italia ed Europa: La guerra nello specchio della lingua*, in A. BILOTTO et al. (eds), *I Farnese. Corti, guerra, e nobiltà in antice regime*, Roma 1997, pp. 245-266. On the language of a *condottiere*, see M.M. FONTAINE, *Le Condottiere Pietro del Monte, philosophe et écrivain de la Renaissance*, Genève 1991.

translations (notably for war, those by Vegetius and by those referred to as the «veteres scriptores de re militari», published together as a micro-corpus of ancient military texts that offered a reservoir of words and examples[20]), the superior proximity of Italian in relation to Latin conferred upon the former the status of «maieutic language»[21], of transition language between Latin and other vernacular languages, without this circulation necessarily entailing widespread Italianisms. As a result, once more, reasoning cannot be merely based on 'national' dictionaries and glossaries and the vain and arduous process of seeking out the chronological preferences of such and such language for such and such term. In the 16th century, the language of war thus comprised a favored linguistic space for lexical «Europeanisms»[22], as in contrast

[20] On this point, see article (and bibliography) by P. RICHARDOT, *Les éditions d'auteurs militaires antiques aux XVe et XVIe siècles*, published on the site of the Institut de Stratégie Comparée. Richardot recalls, among other things, that such a *corpus* entails an innovation as compared with the diffusion of Vegetius alone in the Middle Ages. The first collective edition, including texts by Vegetius, Frontin, Elien (in a text translated from the Latin) and the fake Modestus, came out in 1487 (prepared by Giovanni Antonio Sulpizio da Veroli, Rome, Eucharius Siller, who reedited the entire work at the end of 1494 ...). A major edition of these same texts came out in 1496 thanks to Filippo Beroaldo the Old (Bologna, republished in 1505 by Giovanni Antonio de Benedictis). The first collective edition in France, in Paris (Guy Breslay), was published in 1515 (republished in Lyon by G. Huyon in 1523), in Germany, in Cologne, in 1524 (republished in 1532). The first commentaries on the texts of ancient military writers only emerged in the late 16th century, and favor a less technical humanist perspective.

[21] See P. DEL NEGRO, *Una lingua per la guerra: il Rinascimento militare italiano*, in *Guerra e Pace*, p. 315: «La riproposta della nomenclatura del latino dotto fa dell'italiano una sorta di lingua maieutica che causa o favorisce (non è di regola facile precisare in tali casi il ruolo dell'italiano, dato il sostratto romanzo che condivide con il francese, lo spagnolo ...) fenomeni analoghi in Francia e in Spagna».

[22] I borrow the notion of *Europeanism*, first used in Leopardi's *Zibaldone* which seems not to have attained great critical success, from the study by R. TESI, *Dal greco all'italiano. Studi sugli europeismi lessicali d'origine greca dal rinascimento ad oggi*, Firenze 1994. More generally, see the pioneering work by T.E. HOPE, *Lexical Borrowing in the Romance Languages. A Critical Study of Italianisms in French and Gallicisms in Italian from 1100 to 1900*, Oxford 1971. It is also possible to consult B.E. VIDOS, *Prestito, espansione e migrazione dei termini tecnici nelle lingue romanze e non romanze*, Firenze 1965; J.H. TERLINGEN, *Los italianismos en espanol desde la formacion del idioma hasta principios del siglo XVII*, Amsterdam 1943; B.H. WIND, *Les mots italiens introduits en français au XVIe siècle*, 1928; C. SARAUW, *Die Italienismen in der französischen Sprache des 16. Jahrhunderst*, Berlin 1920; G. KOHLMANN, *Die italianischen Lehnworte in der neufranzösischen Schriftsprache seit dem 16. Jahrhundert*, Kiel 1901; G. BERTONI,

with what became of the Italianisms, Gallicisms and other Hispanisms, the circulation took place simultaneously in all directions, without any consistent simple distinction between source and target languages.

Be that as it may, the development in 16th-century Europe of a complex system of vernacular languages derived from Latin granted a distinctive position to Latinisms, notably in the «noble» language of the writing of Histories or, to a lesser degree, treatises. These Latinisms were confronted with a flourishing technical language created to take into account the new realities of life and military practices, particularly in the field of weaponry: what follows are forms of spontaneous mediations or negotiations for certain words of languages in use with immediate translation-adaptations of terms that become neologisms in the other language, but with a strong foreign aspect (for example, the translations of *Landsknecht* [*lansquenet*] or the vocabulary of fortification or of fencing[23]). Machiavelli was, for example, perfectly aware of this other factor of complexity that emerged in the transition of the military vocabulary from Latin to vernacular.

Alongside the trifold division between contemporary technical language, Latinisms and generic language not yet specific to the universe of war, it is thus pertinent to treat the division between Latin, Tuscan, and other vernacular languages (Italian or not). As such, in the *Discourses* II, 17, in dealing with the *zuffe campali*, Machiavelli says that they are «known in our time by the French word *giornate*, and by the Italians as *fatti d'arme*». The word *zuffa*, of unknown origin (most likely Germanic) but considered as Florentine by the author, corresponds to the «French» word (that is, from the French *journée*) *giornata* and the Italian word *fatto d'arme*; however, here, this is the only instance of the latter expression (*fatto d'arme*) in the *Discourses* and it does not appear in *The Art of War* or in the *Florentine Histories*, whereas *giornate* and *zuffa* appear in more or less equal numbers in designating battles in all of these texts (most often according to a typology opposing internal conflicts or battles of a lesser importance—the association of

L'elemento germanico nella lingua italiana, Genova 1914; R.R. Bezzola, *Abozzo di una storia dei gallicismi italiani nei primi secoli*, Heidelberg 1925.

[23] On the language of fencing, see the works of P. Brioist, *Dire le fer: les mots de l'escrime en Europe à la Renaissance*, in *La Grande Chevauchée. Faire de l'histoire avec Daniel Roche*, Genève 2011.

the adjective *campale* with *zuffa* in fact being rare—on the one hand, to the battles properly occurring in the open countryside on the other hand). Machiavelli does not seem to want to turn to a word that he leaves to the «Italians», and which is extremely present in Cornazzano's writing, for example, while Guicciardini, who rather systematically de-Florentinizes the language of his *History of Italy*, doesn't hesitate in repeatedly using the expression *fatto d'arme* (especially in the early books, which were subject to a most attentive re-reading by the author), but only uses the word *zuffa* once in 2000 pages. Consistently, the complex diachronic stratification (new words continually joining the old ones without causing them to disappear) is matched by what may be referred to as a spatial stratification (with words designating the same thing and hailing from different territories).

It may furthermore be interesting to establish some differences between the language of war in general, and certain highly specialized sub-groups concerning a particular aspect of the military vocabulary (fortifications, artillery or firearms, for example), for which the primacy of certain local professional traditions may lead to an imbalance between Romance languages, especially when the history of a given territory (notably its loss of sovereignty) brings about the immigration of a high proportion of «specialists» to other countries (as was the case for Italian engineers throughout Europe in the late 16th and 17th centuries)[24]. Regardless, the situation is generally that of the largely skillful and sophisticated structuring and balance of the two vocabularies (one of them simultaneously old and new, with Latin roots but in vernacular, while the other is solely modern, consisting of new technical terms able to express the new realities of war). These two vocabularies are balanced by two other vocabularies: on the one hand, the «local» language of battle between individuals, transferred to the language of war (*zuffa* being one example), thus often made up of Florentinisms (or at least of words from the Tuscan-influenced Italian vernacular *koiné* that became predominant over the course of the Quattrocento); and, on the other, the generic language of war not particularly belonging to military specialists, and

[24] On these engineers, see the works of P. BRIOIST, *Les mathématique et la guerre en France, en Italie, en Espagne et en Angleterre au XVIe siècle*, forthcoming, and the recent Ph.D. thesis by N. CASTAGNÉ, *Les mots des sciences: la prose scientifique en langue vulgaire dans l'Italie du XVIe siècle*, Paris 2012.

allowing for varied and mobile uses, direct or not, in speaking of the waging of war or political conflicts.

One illustration of this linguistic complexity and the polymorphous relations with the Latin language lies in the highly singular example from Machiavelli's vocabulary: the Latin military term *deletto*, which refers to the recruitment of infantryman in creating a conscription army. This is neither a regular Latinism (as a limited modification of a Latin term transferred to vernacular language but destined for common use) nor a simple calque (as a passive transcription), but rather, a dynamic and exceptional reappropriation of a word whose weight makes it impossible to render in translation. In order to solidify greater force and charge it with more meaning, the word is furthermore somewhat «burned» upon being used, and is only able to be used for a short time: in fact, while there are thirty or so instances of *deletto* in *The Art of War*, they are entirely concentrated, with one exception, in Book I, in dealing with *armi proprie*; the word is in fact only used two other times in the whole of Machiavelli's writings—in *Discourses* III, 30 and 33. If this use is to be taken as an example, it may be supposed that *The Art of War* is the specific site for the use of the most overt Latinisms, that Machiavelli is aware of using them in unique fashion that preserves a specific linguistic space for the technical Latinism, between Latin and the language of the moderns; he is also aware that Latinisms are reserved for specific *lochi*, infrequently functioning as tool-words for generic use and acting as markers of the true life of words (or conversely, of their being shuttered into a purely bookish and antiquarian textuality). A similar analysis can be undertaken based on another term, even more technical in that it designates a weapon, *l'asta*—the pole arm—(*hasta* in classical Latin), and which too, is only used in *The Art of War* or with a constellation of terms such as those referring to ranks of soldiers (*astati*, *principi*, and *triari*).

What is made obvious here is that it does not suffice to abide by the logic of words in the absence of understanding what this logic says about history in the making, and that words can die—or become mere traces of interest to antiquarians alone, when what they meant no longer corresponds to a reality. In Machiavelli's military language, equivalents for all of the words of the Ancients are therefore not always found, and the author is intent on eliminating the false equivalents of the moderns. However, this certainly doesn't mean that Machiavelli does not know

this vocabulary. In *The Art of War*, plunged in the theoretical effort, there is certainly little interest in the strictly contemporary vocabulary (especially given that the postulate is preserved as to the inferiority of the moderns on a military level—as such, the word *artiglieria* alone is used for all types of cannons), while, on the other hand, in the government writings, I mean in the thousands of letters written by Machiavelli between 1498 and 1512, the modern vocabulary of weaponry is present (and, for example, all categories of cannons are cited in highly differentiated fashion)[25].

What the Machiavellian—or rather, Florentine—case reveals thus by far transcends the work of one or several authors. The composite language of war encompasses an inherited vocabulary, but is permanently endowed with a variable character for two reasons: because war evolves technically, of course, but also because the language of war concerns more than military practices alone, and contaminates other human actions, notably political and historical writings. These ensuing twofold variations and the relative instability that results mirror the military revolution that was underway, and which all players attempted to frame in new knowledge without an idea of where it was heading. The situation favored a sort of military linguistic melting pot, granting the language of war malleability and authorizing all passages and transfers from one language to another, from one territory to another, from one domain to another, from one author to another, from one register to another, from one time to another. At the same time, the language of

[25] On the vocabulary of artillery in Machiavelli's chancery letters, I refer to the work currently being undertaken by C. Manchio in the preparation of her Ph.D. thesis. More generally on artillery terms, see the study by E. DE CROUY-CHANEL, *Précision, Création et circulation du vocabulaire de l'artillerie à la Renaissance: qu'est-ce que le 'basilic de Rabelais'?*, in J-L. FOURNEL - M.-M. FONTAINE (eds), *Langues militaires et langues de la guerre au XVIe siècle*, forthcoming. Crouy-Chanel notably comments: «Dans le même temps où États italiens et espagnols adoptaient les techniques françaises, langues italiennes et hispaniques s'en appropriaient le vocabulaire. Pour avoir une idée de cette rapidité, voyons ... Sanudo. En 1495, il n'emploie pas le vocabulaire français. Mais entre 1496 et 1497, son journal contient des mentions de 'falconeti', 'canoni, che son grosse, di la sorta di quelle conduse il re di Franza'; de 'canone perieri', 'colombine', 'falconi'; de 'colubrine'. Qui plus est, il ne s'agit pas là d'expressions personnelles mais de la reprise de la teneur des dépêches envoyées par ses agents au Sénat vénitien. Autrement dit, il ne s'agit déjà plus d'un langage technique spécialisé, mais d'un vocabulaire déjà courant pour les administrateurs de l'État». Also see *Artillerie et fortification 1200-1600*, Rennes 2011.

war became the ultimate modern example of semantic circulation and hybridization, obliging those seeking to understand the evolutions to establish the history of things before turning their attentions to the history of words.

Wartime Propaganda during Charles VIII's Expedition to Italy, 1494/95

by *Christine Shaw*

In 1866, a French scholar, J. de La Pilorgerie, published a unique collection of printed ephemera, bulletins by which news about Charles VIII's expedition to Italy was circulated in France[1]. They were discovered in a library at Nantes bound into the back of a book. Some pieces are also found in surviving copies elsewhere, but for others, the only known copy is in this collection. It is not known who compiled the bulletins, or on whose orders they were issued. According to La Pilorgerie, the news was circulated on the orders of the court; according to the editor of the letters of Charles VIII, Pélicier, on the orders of the king himself[2]. It seems unlikely that it was on the direct orders of the king: if that had been the case, there would surely have been some mention of that in the bulletins themselves, and there is none. At least some of the bulletins were published in Tours, and seem to have been associated with the royal officials based there—Tours was a centre of royal government at this time—so perhaps they were published by them, either on their own initiative, or on the orders of the court. Several of the bulletins were largely composed of letters from the king to his brother-in-law, Pierre, duc de Bourbon—was Bourbon behind their publication? Some of them are long letters by private individuals to their friends or relatives, which may have been sent to the printer by their recipients, who wanted to disseminate news that had come to them, perhaps taking example from the official bulletins. It may well be that not all bulletins published during the campaign have survived, so speculation about what topics were or were not covered and why could be based on false premises.

[1] J. De La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins de la grande armée d'Italie commandée par Charles VIII, 1494-1495*, Nantes 1866.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 83; P. Pélicier (ed.), *Lettres de Charles VIII roi de France*, vol. 4, Paris 1903, pp. 91-92, fn. 2.

There was great interest and concern in France about this expedition, and much unease that the young king had insisted on leading it himself. Official bulletins were evidently intended to reassure as well as to inform the public. They were not literary works; they might have received more attention from scholars if they had been. Generally, they have been studied for what they reveal about French reactions to Italy, rather than for what the French people were told about the expedition, its purpose, and its progress. If they are not literary works, this does not, of course, mean that they may not be, at least in part, works of imagination. At least one was largely fiction, apparently concocted by officials at Tours.

The focus here will be on how Charles's own role in the expedition was represented to his people, and what justification was offered for hostile acts by the French army. Accounts of various stages of the expedition in letters from the king to Pierre de Bourbon, as printed in the bulletins, will be compared with those given in the letters written by others, by soldiers and officials. As well as the bulletins, La Pilorgerie found and printed several manuscript letters from various individuals, some of them originals, others copies. Queen Anne seems have to have ordered copies of letters to be made and circulated, at least to her officials and others in Brittany[3]. Letters written at the time will be compared with the official account of the expedition—official in the sense that it was written at the king's request by the queen's secretary, André de La Vigne[4]—and with Italian sources.

Charles VIII's expedition turned out to be an unusual war. His purpose was to conquer the kingdom of Naples, which he claimed was his by right as the heir of the Angevin kings. As it proved impossible to assemble a fleet large enough to carry the entire army, with all the horses and artillery, eventually it was decided that the king and the bulk of the troops should go overland. Taking this route meant that they had

[3] J. De La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, pp. 127-128.

[4] *Extrait de L'histoire du voyage de Naples du roy Charles VIII mise par escrit, en forme de iournal, de son exprés vouloir & commandement, par André de la Vigne, secretaire d'Anne de Bretagne, Reyne de France*, in M. Godefroy (ed.), *Histoire de Charles VIII, Roy de France, par Guillaume de Jaligny, André de la Vigne & autres Historiens de ce temps-là*, Paris 1684; another version, much of it in verse, is in A. De La Vigne, *Le Voyage de Naples*, ed. by A. Slerca, Milano 1981.

to pass through several Italian states before they reached the kingdom. Some, Savoy and Milan, were considered to be French allies, and others, Lucca and Siena, to be neutral. Florence and the Papal States were potentially hostile territory, because Piero de' Medici, the head of the Medici party that dominated Florence, and Pope Alexander VI were allies of King Alfonso II of Naples. In the event, neither of Alfonso's allies were willing to put up much resistance to the passage of Charles and his army, and Alfonso abdicated while the king was still in Rome on his way south. Much of what fighting there was did not involve the forces with the king: in the Romagna, for example, where Neapolitan, Florentine, and papal troops faced a detachment of the French and their Milanese allies; and in Liguria, where Neapolitan forces that came by sea to try to prevent Genoa being used as the port of embarkation by the French army were defeated at Rapallo. Some of these activities of other detachments of the French army were mentioned in bulletins, but principally they reported the activities of the king. Charles did see some military action, notably the taking of the stronghold of Monte San Giovanni in the kingdom of Naples, which put up the only serious resistance he encountered on his way to the city of Naples, and the battle on the River Taro at Fornovo, as he was returning to France in July 1495 and found his way blocked by the army of the league which had coalesced against him. Bulletins, therefore, had little to report as to the king's personal prowess as a warrior, or his qualities as a leader in war. Nevertheless, much emphasis was placed on the king pursuing his rightful cause in arms.

The first bulletin in the collection, entitled *Aucuns articles extraits des lettres envoyées de l'ost de la guerre de Naples* (Some extracts from letters sent from the army on the expedition to Naples), was probably issued around the end of November; the most recent news it contained was dated 9 November[5]. (The first printed letter from Charles about the campaign was dated 10 September from Asti, where he fell ill and remained for some weeks[6].) The November bulletin gave a summary account of the campaign so far, including the fall of the stronghold of Mordano, near Imola in the Romagna.

[5] J. De La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, pp. 84-90.

[6] P. Pélicier (ed.), *Lettres de Charles VIII*, vol. 4, pp. 89-91: Charles to duc de Bourbon, 10 September 1494, Asti.

According to the bulletin, Mordano was defended by 1,000 Neapolitan troops and 500 troops of Caterina Sforza Riario, the regent of Imola and Forlì; a local chronicle records that there were 200 defenders, with the numbers in the fortress swollen by many refugees[7]. The garrison refused to surrender, despite a warning from the Milanese commander, Gaspare da Sanseverino, that the French fought «like wild dogs»[8]—a warning not mentioned in the bulletin. After an artillery bombardment lasting three hours, Mordano was taken in an hour, and only five defenders survived, the bulletin said. A contemporary Italian account of the expedition by the Venetian Marino Sanuto told a different story: that the assault met little resistance, that the men and women inside Mordano were slaughtered indiscriminately, and that after it was sacked, only a few houses and the church were left standing[9]. Naturally, no mention was made in the bulletin of the massacre of civilians and the sack of Mordano. In Italian narratives of the expedition, Mordano became an exemplary event that showed what brutality French troops were capable of[10]. The French did indeed use a deliberate tactic of treating savagely places that put up resistance to them at the beginning of a campaign, to dishearten the defenders of other places and encourage them to surrender quickly. In later bulletins, accounts of the fall of other strongholds emphasized the speed of the French assault and the numbers of defenders killed, but presented them, like the sack of Mordano, as gallant actions against redoubtable forces. They would not say that French soldiers had deliberately slaughtered and terrorized civilians in order to demoralize the enemy.

Most of this bulletin concerned Charles's dealings with the Tuscan republics. Both Lucca and Siena, described as enemies of the third republic, Florence, were said to have offered the king their fortresses and ports (in the case of Lucca, its «citez» as well, although Lucca

[7] C.H. CLOUGH, *The Romagna Campaign of 1494: A Significant Military Encounter*, in D. ABULAFIA (ed.), *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494-95: Antecedents and Effects*, Aldershot 1995, p. 211.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] M. SANUTO, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia*, ed. by R. FULIN, Venezia 1883, pp. 95-96.

[10] C. DE FREDE, *L'impresa di Napoli di Carlo VIII: Commento ai primi due libri della Storia d'Italia del Guicciardini*, Napoli 1982, pp. 216-217.

had no subject cities). De la Vigne wrote that the Lucchese received Charles as «their sovereign lord, submitting their town entirely to his obedience»[11]—which they did not, and had no reason to do. They had been asked by the king to provide victuals and free passage for his army through their territory, and invited to send envoys to discuss an alliance against Florence. They sent envoys, but avoided any commitment to becoming involved in the campaign. Charles was welcomed to Lucca as an honored guest, not as a sovereign. While he was there, he asked for a loan, and for custody of a Lucchese fortress, Montignoso (which the French captain sent there handed back to them after a week, because he considered it not worth while guarding)[12].

For their part, the Sienese sent to offer Charles free passage through their territory, but they did not offer him their fortresses and ports. In fact, they turned down requests from the king for custody of their ports, and for a loan[13]. No account was given in surviving bulletins of Charles's passage through Siena. As at Lucca, he was welcomed there with great honor, but with no intention to signify submission to him[14]. Again, there was no reason why the Sienese should have done so. But de La Vigne wrote that the king was received in Siena

«like a prince who came to take possession of this signory and made manifest there all the marks of his dominion ... as a sign of greater submission and deference, they took down some of their great gates, and breached part of their city walls so as to give easier entry and better access to all the French».

All wanted to pay him honor «as to their sovereign lord» («ainsi qu'à leur Souverain seigneur»)[15].

[11] «... leur Souverain seigneur, en soûmettant leur ville entierement à son obeissance», *Extrait de L'histoire du voyage de Naples*, p. 117.

[12] G. TOMMASI, *Sommario della storia di Lucca*, ed. C. MINUTOLI, Firenze 1847, reprint Lucca 1969, pp. 342-3; M. SANUTO, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, pp. 109-111.

[13] G. TOMMASI, *Dell'Historie de Siena: deca seconda, Vol. II, Libri IV-VII (1446-1496)*, ed. by M. DE GREGORIO, Siena 2004, pp. 405-408; M. SANUTO, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, p. 146.

[14] M. SANUTO, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, pp. 144-145.

[15] «... comme une Prince qui venoit prendre possession de cette seigneurie & y faire parôitre toutes les marques de sa domination ... pour marque de plus grand soûmission et deference, ils détacherent & mirent bas quelques-unes de leurs grandes Portes, & abbatirent une partie de leurs murailles afin de donner plus facile entrée & plus d'accés parmy eux à tous les François», *Extrait de L'histoire du voyage de Naples*, p. 120.

These gestures, removing city gates and making a symbolic breach in the city walls, were those that might be expected of a city submitting to a conqueror, let alone greeting a sovereign. The Sienese had not been conquered, had no reason to make these gestures, and there is no other evidence that they made them[16].

No surviving bulletin describes the king's entry into Florence on 17 November. Charles himself reported, in a letter to Pierre de Bourbon, that «I have been very well received by the Signoria and as much honor was done to me as I have ever had in any city of my kingdom ... the Signoria is wholly disposed to do for me whatever I may order them to do»[17]. De La Vigne wrote that the Florentines «paid him fealty and homage, and rendered him honor and reverence as to their king and sovereign lord»[18]. The Florentines did indeed make a great official show of devotion to Charles and of joy at his arrival, because they wanted to emphasize that their alliance with Alfonso of Naples had been the responsibility of Piero de' Medici, who had been ousted from government and fled the city a week before Charles entered Florence. According to a Venetian report which gave a detailed account of the entry, they did take down their gates where he came into the city and really made symbolic breach in the walls nearby, «to please the king» («a compiacentia dil Re»)[19]. His entry was not that of a sovereign, but it was that of a victor. He wore armour, except that he had a crowned hat on his head, rather than a helmet. The French troops paraded in triumph, carrying their weapons as though they were ready for action[20].

[16] The detailed account in M. SANUTO, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, pp. 144-145 of Charles's passage through the three sets of gates at Porta Camollia makes no mention of the gates being taken down or of any breach in the walls.

[17] «... j'ay esté grandement receuilly per la Seigneurie et m'y a esté fait autant d'onneur que j'euz jamais en ville de mon royaume ... la Seigneurie est totallement disposée de faire pour moy entierement ce que je leur ordonneray», P. PÉLICIER (ed.), *Lettres de Charles VIII*, vol. 4, pp. 111-112: Charles to duc de Bourbon, 17 November 1494, Florence.

[18] «... luy firent foy & hommage, & luy rendirent honneur & reverence comme à leur Roy & souverain seigneur», *Extrait de L'histoire du voyage de Naples*, p. 117.

[19] M. SANUTO, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, p. 131.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 131-136; for a summary of numerous descriptions of this entry, see H.-F. DELABORDE, *L'expédition de Charles VIII en Italie: Histoire diplomatique et militaire*, Paris 1888, pp. 457-461.

«This is how that French army with all its train paraded victoriously right through the centre of Florence», declared de La Vigne at the end of his description of the entry[21].

Written before news of the king's entry into Florence reached France, the November bulletin reflects the ambiguity of the Florentines' position before they expelled the Medici on 9 November. Charles, it said, had urged the Florentines to remember their ancient friendship with France, and not to aid his enemies. «Only Piero de' Medici and the group he heads, with a few men-at-arms, hold them in subjection». «It is said that he [the king] will not encounter much resistance [in Florentine territory], because the towns have weak walls, without ports or walkways or ditches. And besides, seven out of eight of them are good Frenchmen». At the end of the bulletin, it was said that the king had yielded to Florentine requests for peace: «they have obeyed him, conceding transit, harbors, support, and help for his men-at-arms with other remarkable promises which are not to be made public at present»[22]. That Piero de' Medici had, on his own initiative, ordered the surrender of major fortresses in Florentine territory to French custody at the end of October, was not reported there.

Printed bulletins about the king's negotiations with Alexander VI and his stay in Rome included letters from Charles to Pierre de Bourbon. They also included a letter from Bourbon to «Monseigneurs de l'ostel de la ville de Paris», dated 23 January, from Moulins, saying he was sending a copy of a letter from the king that had arrived that day, and that he was sure they would want to know the news it contained—which gives an idea where and how that particular bulletin came to be printed[23].

[21] «Voila comme cette Armée Françoise avec tout son train passa lors victorieusement tout au milieu & au travers de Florence», *Extrait de L'histoire du voyage de Naples*, p. 119.

[22] «Il n'y a que Pierre de Médicis, et la bande qu'il gouverne, qui avec peu de gens d'armes, les tiennent en subjection»; «On dit qu'il ne trouvera pas grand resistance, pour ce que les villes sont faibles de murailles, non percées et sans boulevards ni fossés. Et d'avantaige, les trois parts et demy sont bons François»; «lui ont obey, baillé passaiges, ports, confort et ayde à ses gens d'armes avec aultres grandes promesses singulières qui ne sont à declarer pour le present», J. De La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, pp. 84-90.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

The king, it was reported, entered Rome on the last day of December, «with a great force of men-at-arms, armed and well-appointed, and the captains who led them honorably in order, on foot and mounted»[24]. The bulletins made no secret of French distrust of the Borgia pope. The king's letter to Pierre de Bourbon in the bulletin headed *Entrée du roi à Rome* says that he had been advised to make sure that he was secure against the wiles of the pope:

«considering the great declaration that our Holy Father made up till now of supporting and favouring my enemy with troops, strongholds, money, and other aid and negotiations that he has conducted secretly to my disadvantage and prejudice, I was advised above all in regard to him to secure my safe passage. Because, if I did not do this, you will understand the inconvenience and harm that could happen to me»[25].

An unpublished letter written while the king was in Rome, from a French captain, Bernart de Percy, who had been with the detachment of the army that followed the Neapolitan troops retreating from the Romagna, indicated that the French troops felt they were engaged in a serious campaign, with fighting to be done, and dangers to be faced, even if he exaggerated the obstacles to be overcome.

«On our way we have been obliged to take fifty towns or strongholds, the least of which was more than the equal of Saint-Malo or Brest, and besides we have had great trouble crossing two rivers, which were in our way ... if we had been pressed by the enemy the king would not have been able to help us, because the river Tiber is between him and us»[26].

The tone of the bulletin was much more triumphalist:

[24] «... avecques grant puissance de gens d'armes armez et bien appoinctez, et les capitaines qui les conduisoient honnorablement par ordre tant à piè que à cheval», *ibid.*, p. 144.

[25] «... veu la grand declaration que nostre dit Saint père a faite jusques cy de porter et favoriser mon adversaire en gens, places, argent et autres aides et practiques qu'il a menées et conduittes secretement à mon desavantaige et préjudice, je suis conseillié surtout envers lui asseurer mon passage et mon cas. Car si je ne le faisoye vous entendez assez l'inconvenient et mal qui m'en pourrait advenir», *ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

[26] «En nostre chemin nous avons esté contrains de prendre cinquante villes ou places dont la moindre vallait mieulx que Saint-Malo ni Brest, et oultre avons eu deux grans empêschemens à passer deux rivières, qui estoient en nostre chemyn ... si affaire nous feust venue la roy ne nous eust sceu secourir, pour ce que la rivière du Tybre est entre le deux», *ibid.*, p. 131: Bernart de Percy to Hus de la Musse, seigneur de la Musse, 8 January (1495), Rome.

«It is widely said in Lombardy, and the common people are saying, that our lord the king will soon be lord of Italy and emperor of Constantinople. And in and around Naples they are saying that he will subjugate the whole world if he lives ten more years»[27].

As it turned out, Charles and his army encountered much less opposition on their way south from Rome than had been anticipated. At this point, for the first time in the campaign bulletins could report Charles himself seeing action. There is, however, a problem with the bulletin that recounted the first stage of the king's own campaign in the kingdom of Naples (another detachment of the French army was fighting further east). The bulletin includes two letters from Charles to Pierre de Bourbon. The first, dated 9 February, described the taking of Monte San Giovanni in the kingdom, the second, dated 11 February, the taking of Montefortino in the Papal States[28]. In Pélicier's edition of Charles's letters, both are concerned with Monte San Giovanni[29]. Pélicier was transcribing original letters in the Archives nationales; he noted that the letter of 11 February had been published by La Pilorgerie, but not this discrepancy. Even if it is assumed that both La Pilorgerie and Pélicier transcribed the documents in front of them correctly, problems with the dates remain. If both did indeed transcribe their documents correctly, then this is an instance of the deliberate manipulation of the king's letters for propaganda purposes in France.

The dates given in the letter of 11 February fit the taking of Monte San Giovanni better than that of Montefortino—which fell at the end of January[30], not on 10 February. It was the advance guard which took Montefortino; reports of its fall do not place the king there. In a letter of 6 February which he wrote to the Parlement of Grenoble, Charles

[27] «On dit communement en Lombardie, et c'est la voix du commun peuple, que nostredit seigneur le roy sera de brief seigneur des Ytalies et empereur de Constantinople. Et dit on ès parties de Napples et ès environ qu'il subjuguera tout le monde s'il vit encore dix ans»: *ibid.*, p. 149.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 176-179. The bulletin continues (p. 179) with a letter from Charles dated 12 February, referring to a letter of the day before concerning the fall of Montefortino, so La Pilorgerie would have had to make two mistakes in transcribing this bulletin if he erred in reading Montefortino for Monte San Giovanni.

[29] P. PÉLICIER (ed.), *Lettres de Charles VIII*, vol. 4, pp. 166-170.

[30] As reported in a despatch from the Florentine ambassadors with the king: Florence, Archivio di Stato, Archivio della Repubblica, *Dieci di Balia*, Carteggi: Responsive, b. 38, fol. 121: Bishop of Volterra and Neri Capponi to Dieci, 31 January 1494(5), Velletri.

mentioned the fall of Montefortino only in passing, and did not say that he was there himself[31]. In the letter of 11 February, written from Veroli, Charles wrote «I left here yesterday morning» («je partis hyer matin d'icy») to oversee the final assault on the fortress.

«And on my arrival I ordered my artillery to fire and shortly after ordered an assault, so that from the first it took less than an hour for my men-at-arms to enter, and take it by force in my presence ... I assure you, my brother, that I saw the finest combat in the world and such as I have never seen before, which is to say that the attack and combat could not have been better or more valiant»[32].

The defenders of Montefortino, however, did not put up much of a fight, and surrendered as soon as the French artillery had been put into position[33]. Consequently, Charles could not have witnessed the finest combat he had ever seen, whereas the defence of Monte San Giovanni was much fiercer.

So, was the letter of 11 February altered by whoever ordered the compilation of this bulletin, to justify the taking of Montefortino? It did require some justification, particularly in light of the brutal treatment meted out to the people there after its fall. It was, after all, in the Papal States, and had been attacked after Charles had come to terms with the pope. Was the bulletin intended to provide a response to reports of the sack of Montefortino, and the criticism this provoked, as Montefortino joined Mordano on the list of exemplars of the cruelty of the French troops? The king wrote that he sent Montpensier to take the fortress,

«which was held against me, and is one of the places of this country renowned for its strength. In any case, because it could cause some problems if I had left it in the rear, I took advice that I had to have it submit to me, whether through friendship or by force»[34].

[31] P. PÉLICIER (ed.), *Lettres de Charles VIII*, vol. 4, p. 164: Charles to Parlement de Grenoble, 6 February 1495, Ferentino.

[32] «Et à mon arrivée je fais tirer mon artillerie et en peu de temps donner l'assault en telle manière que de la prémière poincte ilz n'arrêsterent oncques une heure que mesdits gens d'armes ne fussent entrez dedans, et la prindrent par force en ma présence ... Je vous asseure, mon frère, que je veis le plus bel esbat du monde et ce que jamais n'avoye veu, c'est à dire aussi bien et hardiement assaillir et combatre qu'il est possible», J. DE LA PILORGERIE, *Campagne et bulletins*, p. 178.

[33] M. SANUTO, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, p. 207.

[34] «... la quelle tenait contre moy, et est une des places de ce pays très renommée de force. Touteffois pour ce qu'elle eust peu porter quelque dommage, se je l'eusse

These were circumstances which applied to Monte San Giovanni.

De La Vigne's account of the action against Montefortino did not give a strategic justification, but one of honour. Giacomo Conti, whose fortress it was, had taken an oath to the king, and then broken his word, joining his enemies:

«he suffered for it, for that town, despite its strong and thick walls was taken by force ... and everything sacked, and even his sons were made prisoners there with a large number of others, as punishment for the perfidy and disloyalty of their father»[35].

Giovanni Conti had been one of the Roman baronial *condottieri* who had considered taking a *condotta* negotiated by Cardinal Ascanio Sforza for the French but then, perhaps unwilling to serve with his enemies the Colonna, had offered his services to Alfonso[36]. Charles gave the fortress and other lands surrendered by Conti to Prospero Colonna, one of the Roman barons who did hold a *condotta* from him.

The letter dated 9 February gave an account of the fall of Monte San Giovanni, but placing the action on that day, rather than on 10 February. The description of the assault was preceded by a more lengthy justification for it. The fortress belonged to the marchese di Pescara,

«held for the enemy, and close to my route. Which, although I had had it summoned to give me supplies and transit for my expedition, had replied differently than it should. And already, for a long time, it had unceasingly made war, burning, taking prisoners, and doing damage to all those around who were known to be my friends and allies, and who are on my side, even in the territory of the Church, since I entered Rome».

The place had fallen within a day, at the first assault, after an artillery barrage lasting four hours, although it had been defended by six or seven hundred good soldiers («bons hommes de guerre») apart from the men of the township, «with little damage to me and to their cost,

laissée derrière, j'ai trouvé par conseil que je la desvoye avoir en obéissance fust ce par amitié ou par force», J. De La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, p. 177.

[35] «... dont mal luy prit, car cette ville nonobstant ses fortes & épaisses murailles fût forcée ... & toute saccagée, mesme ses deux fils avec quantité d'autres, y furent faits prisonniers en punition de la perfidie & déloyauté de leur pere», *Extrait de L'histoire du voyage de Naples*, p. 128.

[36] A. De Boüard, *Lettres de Rome, de Bartolomeo de Bracciano à Virginio Orsini (1489-1494)*, in «Mélange d'archéologie et d'histoire», 33, 1913, p. 321: letter of 13 September 1494; Rome, Archivio Capitolino, Archivio Orsini, Series I, b. 102, fol. 646: Carlo Orsini to Virginio Orsini, 13 September 1494, Rome.

punishment and as an example to those who wish to behave in the same way towards me. And I believe that they have paid heavily for the trouble they gave me»[37].

The savagery of the assault on Monte San Giovanni did indeed discourage other places in the kingdom from putting up resistance. According to Marino Sanuto, the French envoys sent to summon the defenders to surrender had been mutilated, their noses and ears cut off[38]. By the laws of war, that would have given grounds for ruthless reprisals, but, if it were true, the king or his officials might well not have wanted reports of such an insult to be disseminated in France. De La Vigne emphasized the strength of the garrison, «made up of men from different nations, in fact thieves and outlaws for the most part, determined and resolute to go to extreme lengths». Yet the French valiantly captured the fortress at the first assault,

«laying hands afterwards, without pity or mercy, on all those pillagers and evil-doers, whose corpses they threw over the walls into the ditches, which was done in the presence of the king himself; this was some of the most horrible carnage ever seen».

The king, he wrote, ordered that the bodies should be buried, and that the women should be protected from violation, which was done «to the great praise and honourable reputation of the king»[39]. Reports reaching Naples, however, spoke of the rape of all the women, and of

[37] «... tenant party contre, et près de mon chemin. La quelle combien que je l'aye fait sommer de me donner vivre et passage pour mon emprinse a respondu autrement qu'elle ne devoit. Et desjà, despuis longtemps, elle ne cessoit de faire la guerre, brusler, prendre, et dommaigier entour d'elle tous ceux qu'elle savoit estre mes amys et alliez, et qui tenoient mon party, mesmement ceulx de la terre de l'Esglise, depuis que j'estoye entré dedans Rome»; «à mon petit dommage et à leurs despens, punition, et grant exemple pour ceux qui vouldroient faire semblablement à l'encontre de moy. Et je croy que la peine qu'ilz m'ont donnèe leur a esté bien cher vendue», J. De La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, pp. 176-177.

[38] M. Sanuto, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, p. 209.

[39] «... composée de plusieurs gens ramassez de diverses nations, sçavoir des voleurs & bannis pour la pluspart, determinez & resolus à toutes sortes d'extremitez»; «faisans aprés, sans aucune pitié ny misericorde, main-basse sur tous ces pillars & mal-faicteurs, dont ils ietterent aprés les corps pardessus les murailles dans les fossez, ce qui s'executa en la presence mesme du Roy; ce carnage fût un des plus horribles qu'on vît iamais»; «à la grande louange & honorable reputation du Roy», *Extrait de L'histoire du voyage de Naples*, pp. 129-130.

babies being thrown from the walls[40]; Sanuto recorded that only a few women and children escaped the general slaughter[41].

If the bulletin describing that stage of the campaign may have been carefully doctored, the one describing the king's first entry into Naples on 22 February was largely fiction. A letter from Charles to Pierre de Bourbon dated 22 February was published, saying that he had entered the city of Naples that day, but did not wish to make a formal entry («je n'ay voulu, pour le jour, faire ne tenir forme d'entrée»)[42]. But then what may be the same bulletin (it is not quite clear in La Pilorgerie) proceeds with a lengthy description of the entry that the king might have been expected to make into the capital city of a newly-acquired kingdom. At the city gate the crown of the kingdom of Naples was presented to him, and then «the king entered and marched, he and all his triumphant train» («le roi entra et marcha lui et tout son triomphe») to the cathedral, where the clergy sang a *Te Deum*, bells rang, and trumpets sounded. From there,

> «the king was taken to the palace of King Alfonso which had been hung with various tapestries and there the royal throne was placed in great pomp and richly adorned. And immediately the king was conducted by the princes, counts, barons and knights of this land and was raised in royal majesty and given the royal sceptre in his hand and he was crowned and consecrated and confirmed natural and legitimate king of the Kingdom of Naples by a cardinal legate. Immediately all the lords of that kingdom who were there paid him fealty and homage, kissing the king's feet and hands as they were each bound to do»[43].

In fact, the king had ridden through the streets of Naples in hunting clothes, on a mule, with a hawk on his fist—as he was portrayed in a Neapolitan illustrated chronicle—in a deliberately low key entry, with

[40] C. De Frede, *L'impresa di Napoli*, p. 273.

[41] M. Sanuto, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, p. 210.

[42] J. De La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, pp. 198-199.

[43] «Le roy fut mené au palais du roy Alphonse qui était paré de diverses tapisseries et là estait le siége royal mis en grant pompe et paré richement. Et incontinent le roy fut pris et eslevé par les princes, comtes, barons et chevaliers dudit pays et fust eslevé en majesté royale et lui fut baillé le sceptre royal en sa main et mise la dicte couronne et par un legat et cardinal sacré et établi roy naturel et légitime du royaume de Napples. Incontinent tous les seigneurs dudict royaume, qui là estaient luy firent foy et hommage en baisant le roy aux pieds et aux mains ainsi qu'il était chascun tenu de faire», *ibid.*, pp. 202-203.

no ceremony of acclamation, let alone consecration as king[44]. There was no papal legate to crown him king, as Charles had hoped the pope would provide: that was the problem, for he could only be crowned king of Naples, a papal fief, by the pope himself or by a cardinal given legatine powers to do so. Even when Charles did hold a formal entry to the city on 12 May, just before he left Naples to return to France, he still could not be crowned. On that occasion, he did process through the streets in royal robes, wearing a crown, and took an oath to govern well at the altar of the cathedral, but there was no coronation[45]. No bulletin survives giving an account of this far more ceremonial entry of the king to Naples, although a letter from Charles to Pierre de Bourbon of 9 May was printed, which said that he would make «my entry as king» («mon entrée comme roy») in a few days' time[46].

The bulletin recounting the fictional coronation in February went on to describe three days of public rejoicing that had been ordered by the Florentine government, and pointed out that «For several good reasons greater things should be done in the kingdom of France» («Pour plusieurs grandes raisons devrait-on faire plus grands choses au royaume de France»). Officials at Tours, when they heard the news on 14 March, it said, had ordered a procession, and a sermon[47].

No official bulletin of the king's progress back through Italy and of the battle of Fornovo survives. A letter from a Frenchman, Gilbert Pointet, was printed. Dated 15 July, it was written from the perspective of a civilian travelling with the baggage train, and may have been privately printed by the recipient. This claimed the French lost far fewer men—only fifty to sixty against 4,000 Italian dead—and that «when we saw that they were no longer fighting, we retired to the lodgings

[44] R. FILANGIERI (ed.), *Una cronaca napoletana figurata del Quattrocento*, Napoli 1956, illustration opposite p. 128; M. SANUTO, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII*, p. 234; H.-F. DELABORDE, *L'expédition de Charles VIII*, pp. 555-556.

[45] H.-F. DELABORDE, *L'expédition de Charles VIII*, pp. 602-603; G. GALASSO, *Il Regno di Napoli: Il Mezzogiorno spagnolo (1494-1622)*, Torino 2005, pp. 105-106. In the illustrated chronicle, on this occasion the king was pictured wearing a crown, riding a fine horse under a baldaquin: R. FILANGIERI (ed.), *Una cronaca napoletana figurata*, illustration opposite p. 132.

[46] J. DE LA PILORGERIE, *Campagne et bulletins*, p. 262.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

of our choice» («quand nous veismes qu'ilz ne donnoient plus, nous nous tirasmes au logis où nous voulions aller»), which would have been considered a token of victory[48]. De La Vigne claimed that after the enemy had been overcome by the gallant French, «the king and all his men, in token of triumph and victory, slept on the field of battle» («Le Roy & tous les siens en signe de triomphe et de victoire coucha au Champ de bataille»), which they did not. Neither account mentioned the loss of many of king's own personal possessions in the plundering of the French baggage train. Charles himself, in a letter to the people of Lyon, claimed the honours of the battle for the French with «great shame, loss and damage» («grant honte, perte et dommage») to the enemy[49]. In another letter a few days later, he said that at the battle in which God «gave us the victory against our enemies» («nous donna la victoire contre noz ennemis»), some camp followers had pillaged the baggage, including his own jewels, and ordered that if any passed through Lyon, their bags were to be searched[50]. But Italians, too, claimed the victory, not least the commander of the army of the League who had confronted the French army at Fornovo, Francesco Gonzaga. Not all Italians were convinced that the League had won, for the king and his army had, after all, been able to go on their way to Asti. As Pointet made explicit in his printed letter, however, the French army felt far from secure until it reached the safety of Asti; they had travelled in stages as long as the men could bear, «riding always in battle order» («toujours chevauchant en bataille»)[51].

The bulletins were not very sophisticated productions, unless it can be assumed that their very lack of sophistication was a subtle means of indicating the veracity of the information they contained, which does not seem likely. Charles's own letters during the campaign, as printed in the bulletins, made less exaggerated claims than some summaries in the bulletins about the degree of submission shown to him by the Italians as he and his army made their way through the peninsula to Naples, and stopped well short of the claims of de La Vigne. At least one section of a bulletin, describing a coronation that never took place, was sheer

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.

[49] P. Pélicier (ed.), *Lettres de Charles VIII*, vol. 4, pp. 228-229.

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 229-230.

[51] J. De La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, p. 359.

invention, and in direct contradiction to the king's own account of his first entry into Naples. Another bulletin may well include an invented, or at least doctored, account of a controversial episode, the taking of Montefortino. But on the whole, the bulletins would probably have seemed truthful to the people of France, would have fed their hunger for news of the expedition, and calmed their worst fears—they would have been effective propaganda.

Songs of War

Historical and Literary Narratives of the «Horrendous Italian Wars» (1494-1559)

by *Massimo Rospocher*

1. *Introduction*

In a famous passage from his *History of Florence*, Francesco Guicciardini wrote that in 1494: «A fire and pestilence had entered Italy» with the French king Charles VIII's descent south of the Alps, adding, «States toppled and the methods of governing them changed. The art of war changed too»[1]. We can further assert that this «fire and pestilence» that accompanied Charles also transformed the very modalities of narrating war.

Analysing the poems that were routinely performed and sold in Italian piazzas—the so-called «wars in *ottava rima*»[2]—, this essay focuses on the role that *cantastorie*, or street singers, played in establishing a popular literary war genre and a war-information marketplace. It also argues for the street singers' crucial function in constructing a shared historical and literary narrative of the «horrendous Italian wars», as one popular poem dubbed the series of wars fought on Italian soil between 1494 and 1559[3].

2. *The Italian Wars: a 'new' historiographical subject*

Though war was endemic in early modern society, as Lauro Martines suggests in his contribution to this volume, to date we still do not have

Translation by Kevin Reynolds

1 F. GUICCIARDINI, *History of Florence*, New York 1970, p. 88.

2 A. QUONDAM et al. (eds), *Guerre in ottava rima* (hereafter *GOR*), 4 vols, Modena 1989.

3 C. VIVANTI, *Le «Guerre horrende de Italia»*, in *Storia d'Italia*, 2 vols, Torino 1974, here vol. 1, pp. 346-375.

a social history of war in the early modern world; moreover, despite the fact that they have been a central theme in historiography for almost five hundred years, no cultural history of the Italian Wars exploring issues of identity, gender, and cultural exchanges, has ever been published.

This classic subject has, however, regained scholars' attention over the last two decades: the first phase in this renewed interest coincided with the fifth centennial of Charles VIII's invasion of Italy, especially—though not exclusively—in the sphere of French historiography[4]; but more recently Anglo-American and Italian historians have made considerable headway in this area[5]. The abundance of publications and proffering of innovative interpretations of this long violent saga—a veritable watershed period in European history—suggests that we are witnessing the rise of a «new» historiographical subject.

Exhaustive surveys of the entirety of this historical period have recently appeared from a political and military point of view, with a particular focus on the pan-European dimension of the conflicts[6]. Scholars have investigated the impact on Italian society and culture of the tragedy of the Italian Wars through literary accounts of the conflicts[7], analyzed military and war-related language in the early 16th century[8], and reconsidered the conflicts' long-term consequences from an economic and

[4] A.C. Fiorato (ed.), *Italie 1494*, Paris 1994; D. Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy (1494-1495). Antecedents and Effects*, Aldershot 1995; J. Balsamo (ed.), *Passer les monts. Français en Italie – l'Italie en France (1494-1525)*, Paris 1998.

[5] C. Shaw (ed.), *Italy and the European Powers: The Impact of War (1500-1530)*, Leiden 2006; G.M. Anselmi - A. De Benedictis (eds), *Città in guerra. Esperienze e riflessioni nel primo '500. Bologna nelle «guerre d'Italia»*, Bologna 2008.

[6] J.-L. Fournel - J.-C. Zancarini, *Les Guerres d'Italie: Des batailles pour l'Europe (1494-1559)*, Paris 2003; M. Pellegrini, *Le guerre d'Italia (1494-1529)*, Bologna 2009; M. Mallet - C. Shaw, *The Italian Wars (1494-1559): War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe*, Harlow 2012.

[7] D. Boillet - M.F. Piejus (eds), *Les Guerres d'Italie. Histoires, Pratiques, Représentations*, Paris 2002.

[8] P. Del Negro, *Una lingua per la guerra: il rinascimento militare italiano*, in W. Barberis (ed.), *Guerra e pace* (*Storia d'Italia.* Annali, 18), Torino 2002, pp. 301-338; M.-M. Fontaine - J.-L. Fournel - J.-C. Zancarini (eds), *La langue militaire et la langue de la guerre au XVIe siècle* (forthcoming).

demographic perspective[9]. Even in the history of communication the «horrendous Italian Wars» have affirmed their heuristic value. Historians have been able to observe how political debate unfolded within the dramatic context of the wars through the interaction of a variety of languages and media (orality, print, and manuscript) that involved not only the elite but cut across every segment of the urban population[10]. Among the elements that fed into this «evanescent public sphere» there figured the songs and poems that were broadcast and distributed by street singers and peddlers in piazzas throughout Italy.

3. *A marketplace for information: the emergence of contemporaneity*

In the 16th century, several historical factors have contributed to significantly altering the relationship between the political and the literary spheres; war figures prominently among them. In the various poetic genres evolving at the time, war had its allotted space in the chivalric poem, exemplified by classic authors such as Ludovico Ariosto, Matteo Maria Boiardo, and Torquato Tasso[11]. Ariosto in particular interwove two different veins: epic fantasy and historical reality; or the legendary war and the historic war, the wartime imaginary and the real imaginary[12]. Within this culture the Italian Wars promoted the birth and spread of a new literary and editorial subgenre: the «wars in *ottava*

[9] G. Alfani, *Il Grand Tour dei Cavalieri dell'Apocalisse. L'Italia del «lungo Cinquecento», 1494-1629*, Venezia 2010.

[10] M. Rospocher - R. Salzberg, *An Evanescent Public Sphere: Voices, Spaces, and Publics in Venice during the Italian Wars*, in M. Rospocher (ed.), *Beyond the Public Sphere: Opinions, Publics, Spaces in Early Modern Europe* (Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento. Contributi/Beiträge, 27), Berlin - Bologna 2012, pp. 93-114.

[11] L. Bolzoni, *«O maledetto, o abominoso ordigno»: la rappresentazione della guerra nel poema epico-cavalleresco*, in W. Barberis (ed.), *Guerra e pace*, pp. 199-250.

[12] Aside from Lina Bolzoni's aforementioned article, a substantial bibliography on this topic has emerged: L. Pampaloni, *La guerra nel 'Furioso'*, in «Belfagor», 26, 1971, pp. 627-652; S. La Monica, *Realtà storica e immaginario bellico ariostesco*, in «Rassegna della letteratura italiana», 89, 1985, pp. 326-358; E. Scarano, *Guerra favolosa e guerra storica nell'«Orlando furioso»*, in L. Lugnani - M. Santagata - A. Stussi (eds), *Studi offerti a Luigi Blasucci dai colleghi e dagli allievi pisani*, Lucca 1996, pp. 497-515; P. Larivaille, *Guerra e ideologia nel «Furioso»*, in «Chroniques italiennes», web series 19, 2011, 1, http://chroniquesitaliennes.univ-paris3.fr/PDF/web19/Larivailleweb19pdf

rima». In Boiardo's and in Ariosto's major works of the chivalric epic, armed combat (*le armi*) is portrayed as closely connected with love (*gli amori*) in a nexus that is at the same time both vital and oxymoronic. The «wars in *ottava rima*», on the other hand, leave little room for love, although they inject the real Italian Wars into a traditional chivalric and courtly framework.

These compositions closely followed the events of the continuously evolving dramatic historical present, with the succession of sieges, battles, and sacks that terrified the contemporary collective imaginary. Recited in piazzas by itinerant street performers and sold in inexpensive prints, thousands of short poems responded to the horizon of expectations of a public eager for news, and, at the same time, determined the formation of a marketplace of information[13].

Utilizing the new typographic medium in combination with oral performances, street singers responded to a «present» that unfolded rapidly, producing texts intended for immediate consumption. Within a few days they were able to put an account of a battle to verse, perform it publicly, and sell it in the piazza. In a song describing a naval encounter between the Duchy of Ferrara and the Venetians that had taken place along the Po river at the end of December 1509, the Ferrarese singer Bighignol (or Bichignolo) offered a demonstration of the readiness with which the street singers reacted to the incessant unfolding of events. He managed to gather information and compose, have printed, and disseminate his song within about two weeks of the military actions narrated[14]. An even more remarkable turnaround time is explicitly mentioned in a poem in *ottava rima* written about the battle of Agnadello (1509): in the final section of the song, the poet declares that he had

[13] Whose origins can be traced back to the second half of the 15th century: M. MESERVE, *The News from Negroponte: Politics, Popular Opinion and Information Exchange in the First Decade of the Italian Press*, in «Renaissance Quarterly», 59, 2006, pp. 440-480. On street singers and communication see M. ROSPOCHER - R. SALZBERG, *Street Singers in Italian Renaissance Urban Culture and Communication*, in «Cultural and Social History», 9, 2012, 1, pp. 9-26.

[14] BIGHIGNOL, *Li horrendi e magnanimi fatti de l'illustrissimo Alfonso duca di Ferrara contra l'armata de Venetiani in Po del Mile e Cinquecento e Nove del mese di Decembro a giorni vintidoi*, Baldassare Selli, Ferrara 1510. On this performer see R. WILHELM, *Italienische Flugschriften des Cinquecento (1500-1550)*, Tübingen 1996, pp. 150-153, 288-289.

composed and brought it to the printer only two days after the event had taken place[15].

The anonymous singer of *La vera nova de Bressa de punto in punto com'è andata* [The true news of Brescia point by point as it happened], after having concluded his rhyming chronicle of the siege that had just unfolded in the city, added another piece of news that had just arrived, the announcement of an imminent military campaign against Bologna by the «warrior pope» Julius II, which would be the topic of his next song[16]. With this «nova» he left his audience in suspense, anxious for an update on the event, thereby setting in motion a serial mechanism that captivated the public and made it a participant in a collective destiny[17].

Through the widespread broadcast and distribution of these compositions, a collective consciousness of current events and of the historical moment was emerging, a perception that distinguished itself from a generic sense of history bound to a distant past. It would be anachronistic to suggest that in these cheap prints and in the recitations of 16th-century itinerant performers there lay an embryonic form of journalism; nevertheless, these street singers' activities were an important component of the phenomenon that has been recently described as the emergence of contemporaneity—«the perception, shared by a number of human beings, of experiencing a particular event at more or less the same time»[18].

[15] *La miseranda rotta de venetiani a quelli data da lo invictissimo et christianissimo Ludovico re de Franza et triumphante duca de Milano. A di xiiii de Maggio. M.D.IX*, Milano 1509, fol. 4v.

[16] *La vera nova de Bressa de punto in punto com'è andata*, Alessandro Bindoni, Venezia ca. 1512, fol. 2v.

[17] For the presence of such serial mechanisms in the chivalric literature of the era, see: M. VILLORESI, *Il mercato delle meraviglie: strategie seriali, rititolazioni e riduzioni dei testi cavallereschi a stampa fra Quattro e Cinquecento*, in M. VILLORESI, *La fabbrica dei cavalieri. Cantari, poemi, romanzi in prosa tra Medioevo e Rinascimento*, Roma 2005, pp. 130-174.

[18] B. DOOLEY (ed.), *The Dissemination of News and the Emergence of Contemporaneity in Early Modern Europe*, Farnham 2010, here p. XIV.

4. *«These are not tales of poets»: truth versus fiction*

News of contemporary political events spread widely among the people who crowded around the *cantastorie* and purchased the pamphlets that they were selling. These street performers appear to have been conscious of this informative prerogative. In the opening verses of a popular poem about the battle of Ravenna, published in Ferrara in 1512 with the title *Rotta facta per li signori francexi contra li ispani* [The ruin inflicted by the French lords upon the Spanish], the anonymous author told his audience that his motive in composing the work was «not because you would take pleasure from it / but so that you might have some indication of this event»[19]. Expressing himself in a similar manner was Prospero D'Amelia who, before starting to recount the flooding of Rome in 1514, guaranteed his public that «this is the truth which I will tell you about»[20]. At the beginning of a poem on the sack of Rome (1527), Eustachio Celebrino, a picaresque writer and possibly a singer from Udine, addressed the spectators that had gathered around him, distancing himself from the fantastic tradition of chivalric epics. He declared that what they were about to hear were not «tales of poets» («questi non son romanci da poeti») but the facts as they had actually happened[21].

This insistence on the veracity of the information presented was evident in the titles of these works. To pique the curiosity of the public they advertised their texts by singing the title and the first lines, and highlighting the novelty and the truthfulness of the narration, as in works entitled *La vera nova de Bressa de punto in punto com'è andata* or the *Historia verissima dela memorabile guerra de Pavia* [Most true story of the memorable war of Pavia][22]. But other assurances on the quality of the information appeared in the texts themselves.

[19] *Rotta facta per li signori francexi contra li ispani*, Ferrara 1512, fol. 1r.

[20] PROSPERO D'AMELIA, *El diluvio di Roma ...*, Roma 1515, fol. 1r.

[21] EUSTACHIO CELEBRINO, *La presa di Roma. Con breue narratione di tutti li magni fatti di guerre successi, nel tempo che lo esercito imperiale stette in viaggio da Milano a Roma, & di tutte le terre, castelli, e ville che prese el detto exercito, & dello accordo che fece el vice re col papa, & c. Per il Celebrino composta*, in *GOR*, vol. 2, pp. 813-844.

[22] *La vera nova de Bressa*; FRANCESCO MANTOVANO, *Historia verissima dela memorabile guerra de Pavia* (1525).

Certification of the reliability of the news disseminated by the poems was a necessity, for their authority and commercial success relied on it. Sometimes the author would assure his audience that he had been present at the event, as in the case of the soldier-poet Ercole Cinzio Rinuccini who, in his *Istoria come il stato di Milano al presente è stato conquistato* [History of the conquest of the Duchy of Milan], stated that he had personally participated in the battle of the castle of Annone sul Taro, which had fallen into the hands of the French troops in August of 1499[23]. On other occasions the *cantastorie* would relate second-hand information, such as Paolo Danza, who at the end of *La nova de Bressa*, affirmed, «And I wrote this, just as many people told it to me»[24].

Maffeo Pisano declared that he had created his *Lamento di Costantinopoli* [Lament of Constantinople]—an account of the city's fall to the Ottomans in 1453—based on information gathered from letters from the Venetian ambassador to Siena delivered by courier: «letters were sent by courier / relating the deaths of Christians / as you will have heard sooner or late / and as I have composed in these stanzas in rhyme»[25]. In the closing stanza of another of Rinuccini's compositions, the *Istoria nova dela rotta e presa del Moro e Aschanio e molti altri baroni* [New history of the rout and capture of Ludovico «il Moro» and Ascanio Sforza and of many other barons], the author assured his audience that he would return soon to the piazza to relay «new things» (*cose nove*), based on information obtained by couriers who were criss-crossing the peninsula at the time[26].

In Celebrino's «Scusa del Autore alli lettori» [Apology to the readers] before his poetic account of *The Sack of Rome*, the protean Udinese writer defended the authority of his work, claiming to have composed his verses based on the eyewitness account of a captain who had been present at the event and had described it in prose: «He who first wrote

[23] Ercole Cinzio Rinuccini, *Istoria come il stato di Milano al presente è stato conquistato*, Venezia ca. 1510, fol. 1v.

[24] Paolo Danza, *La nova de Bressa con una Barzelletta in laude del re de Franza e de San Marco stampata nuovamente*, Paolo Danza, Venezia s.d., fol. 2r.

[25] Maffeo Pisano, *Lamento di Costantinopoli*, Bartolomeo de' Libri, Firenze 1490, fol. 6v.

[26] Ercole Cinzio Rinuccini, *Istoria nova dela rotta e presa del Moro e Aschanio e molti altri baroni*, Venezia s.n.t., fol. 4v.

this in prose / is a captain well versed in arms / and was present in Rome and witnessed everything». He then took care to protect himself from any eventual errors that might have been detected by other eyewitnesses, attributing them to no ill intent on his part: «For I have written what I heard, but did not see»[27].

The contribution of libels that had been previously distributed and performed in the piazzas was sometimes made explicit. In Francesco Maria Sacchino da Modigliana's pamphlet *Spavento de Italia* [The fear of Italy], the author claimed that he had gathered some information pertaining to those fallen in the battle of Agnadello from the verses of the *cantambanchi*:

«From what I understand based on what has been written
by certain charlatans and scoundrels
about this slaughter and about this conflict ...»[28].

He goes on to specify: «There were 14,000 in one formation / if that charlatan's story is true»[29]. In adopting the estimate of 14,000 victims, which the audience and Sacchino himself could have heard in a public performance or read in one of the pamphlets on the battle of Agnadello[30], he distinguished his own verses about the massacre from the words of those who might «sing about it from atop their benches»[31]. What also shone through was a statement regarding his own identity. He introduced himself as a «very learned young man» and felt it important to differentiate himself from the «charlatans». Sacchino was a «deluxe ballad singer»[32], first in the employ of «Duke Valentino» Cesare Borgia and then of the Republic of Venice, and was more active in the

[27] Eustachio Celebrino, *La presa di Roma* («Ch'io fatto quel che intesi, & non gia visto»), p. 814.

[28] Francesco Maria Sacchino da Modigliana, *Spavento de Italia*, ca. 1510, fol. 2r.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] Among the many surviving works in *ottava rima* dedicated to Agnadello, he could be referring—for reasons of chronology and geo-political origin—to the anonymous *La historia de tutte le guerre facte el facto d'arme fato in Geradada col nome de tutti li conduteri. Facta nuovamente*, s.n.t., in which the figure of «quindeci milia morti in piana terra» [fifteen thousand deaths] is proposed, fol. 4r.

[31] Francesco Maria Sacchino da Modigliana, *Spavento de Italia*, fol. 2r.

[32] For this definition, see P. Camporesi, *Il palazzo e il cantimbanco*, Milano 1994.

itinerant courts of the *condottieri* than in the public squares. Reminding the reader of the difference between himself and those «scoundrel» peddlers of false stories, he implicitly guaranteed the veracity of his particular version.

It was well known that many compositions in circulation mixed reality and fantasy, truth and falsehood; consequently, one had to be cautious of charlatans, to learn to distinguish «the true from the false», and to defend one's own work against accusations of fraud. It was often the authors themselves who put their audience on guard against the «false stories» that were then circulating throughout the peninsula. This accusation was aimed above all at *cantastorie* by vernacular authors from higher social orders.

The Romagnol friar Giraldo Podio da Lugo derided those who, in order to satisfy their thirst for information, threw away their money by acquiring pamphlets containing «badly-written verses», «lies», and the fantasy tales of street singers. In contrast, in the opening of his own poem, the *Hystoria vera de tutto il seguito a Ravenna* [True story of everything that happened in Ravenna], the cleric guaranteed:

«I deliberated with myself
That, in order to satisfy everyone,
I would tell the truth plainly
Exactly as it happened»[33].

A proof of the veracity of his own «war in *ottava rima*» was expressed by the notary Bartolomeo de Cori in the prologue of *La Obsidione di Padua* [The siege of Padua] 1510: «my poem does not err in any way at all / I devote myself to telling you the entire truth». Contrary to the falsehoods mixed with reality that were common in contemporary compositions: «Since, dear reader, you have seen many stories [in print] / in which you can believe what you want of what you've read: / for in them truth is mixed with falsehood»[34].

It was essentially a question of the need to substantiate the difference between the factual content of the action narrated and the contrasting semblance of its literary genre. In Cordo's narrative of the siege

[33] Giraldo Podio da Lugo, *Hystoria vera de tutto il seguito a Ravenna* [ca. 1512], fol. 1r.

[34] Bartolomeo de Cori, *La Obsidione di Padua*, fol. 2v.

of Padua, there was no room for «Fairies, wild animals, monsters, serpents, bears, lions, panthers, tigers, ogres, centaurs, satyrs, giants, fauns, or nymphs», nor for the adventures of Orlando and Rinaldo; but, he promised, «I shall sing to you about all the bitter and difficult things»[35]. He guaranteed that his words should be taken as gospel.

5. *«Blood and guts and death»*

War in the 16th century lacked the ritualized character of medieval wars, as more lethal weapons burst onto the scene and artillery played an increasingly decisive role. At the same time, the dimensions of armies often doubled or even tripled (which resulted in pushing the Italian States to the edge in their ability to field them), while in the great battles of Agnadello (1509), Ravenna (1512), Marignano (1515), and Pavia (1525) alone the number of deaths reportedly reached astonishing figures[36]. Chief among the major innovations that the year 1494 introduced to the art of war were the role of infantry and the use of firearms, which provoked a crisis in the ancient noble chivalry, and which foretold, as a consequence, the bloody nature of battles that invariably concluded with devastations and massacres. «Now wars were sudden and violent», according to Guicciardini, and «battles were fierce and bloody»[37]. From Ariosto's poetry to a more popular poetic activity, the literary field also underwent this new transformation in the representation of the violence that stemmed from war.

The actor and playwright Angelo Beolco offers an extraordinary literary representation of this violence in *The Veteran (Parlamento de Ruzante)*,

[35] *Ibid.*, fol. 20r.

[36] As completely unsubstantiated as they may have been, O. Niccoli, *I morti, la morte, le guerre d'Italia*, in G.M. Anselmi - A. De Benedictis (eds), *Città in guerra*, pp. 119-134.

[37] F. Guicciardini, *The History of Florence*, p. 89. These issues were taken up again in Guicciardini's *Maxims and Reflections (Ricordi)*: «Before 1494, wars were long, campaigns were relatively bloodless, and methods of conquest were slow and difficult. And although artillery was already in use, it was handled so unskilfully that it did little damage. Thus, those who held power stood in little danger of losing it. When the French came to Italy, they introduced such efficiency into war that, up to 1521, the loss of a campaign meant the loss of a state», F. Guicciardini, *Maxims and Reflections (Ricordi)*, 64 (Series C), ed. and trans. Mario Domandi, Philadelphia PA 1965, pp. 57-58.

when the soldier Ruzante, having returned from the field of Ghiaradadda (1509), declares to his friend: «Kinsman, there was nothing but dead men's bones ... as far as the eye can see»[38]. The short poems of the *cantastorie* echo Beolco's work, reminding their audiences that on the battlefield of Ghiaradadda so many bodies were left behind that «the dogs had enough to eat to last them for thirty days»[39]. It is the reality of war, «raw, merciless, and wicked» that dominates the historic present; historic tragedy is projected onto poetic invention: gory clashes, carnage, rapes, and bloody plunders dominate in this literature.

It was a war fought by large armies of anonymous foot soldiers and progressively less a theatre of heroic *gestes* of ancient chivalry. The narratives are coloured with a dramatic realism and imbued with «blood and guts and death»[40]. The slaughter that accompanied the conflicts is described in an abundance of macabre particulars sparing no details, not even those describing anatomical mutilations. The famed Florentine street singer Cristoforo Altissimo—who usually performed before large audiences in piazzas from Florence to Venice[41]—painted a bloody, impressionistic, and wholly apocalyptic portrait of the battle between Christian armies of the king of France and of the Holy League in his *La rotta di Ravenna* [Rout of Ravenna]:

«Lances, pikes, and swords are raised
and then dropped with violent gestures,
the injured and the dead fall in among the blood,
some flat on their faces and some on their backs,
the blood coursing through the streets and gutters
and boiling over the porous and arid terrain:
gurgling among the corpses, the foam
emits thick vapours and the air fills with smoke;
and the smoke mingles with dust

and makes turbid red clouds in the air
and obscures everyone's vision,

[38] ANGLEO BEOLCO (RUZANTE), *The Veteran (Parlamento de Ruzante) and Weasel (Bilora). Two One-Act Renaissance Plays*, trans. Ronnie Ferguson, New York 1995, p. 77.

[39] *Questi xe alcuni rasonamenti intravegnui a Veniexia per la rotta de la armaa co el testamento de Misier San Marco*, L. Rossi, Ferrara 1509, fol. 1r.

[40] BIGHIGNOL, *Li horrendi e magnanimi fatti*, fol. 1v.

[41] L. DEGL'INNOCENTI, *I «Reali» dell'Altissimo. Un ciclo di cantari fra oralità e scrittura*, Firenze 2008.

which caused the majority to fight like blind men.
A thousand vultures and a thousand crows
who screech through the air in different motions,
perhaps attracted by a future meal
make the war seem more wicked still»[42].

Analogous descriptions of that same dramatic encounter appear in the *Orlando Furioso*. Ariosto tries to exalt the chivalric virtues of his patron Alfonso d'Este, who had been encamped on the battlefield of Ravenna on Easter 1512, but the reality of the war always appeared as the antithesis of the courtly ideal. He cannot therefore feign to forget how the outcome of that victory—owing to weaponry, such as heavy artillery, that is anything but chivalric—is a sea of human blood, to the extent that «The horses, fetlock-deep, can scarce advance / For human blood ... saturates the weald» (III, 55)[43]. It is the end of a world, the chivalric world, the fall of courtly society and of the noble aristocracy that Ariosto was seeking to keep alive by projecting chivalric warfare of epochs past onto that of modern times.

The verses of the itinerant street singers, performed, as they were, far from the courts, were directed at an undistinguished audience of townspeople—laborers, artisans, merchants—recording within a chivalric framework the effects of «real» war and the suffering inflicted upon civilians by foreign troops. The chroniclers were witnesses of armies that would set fire to houses and appropriate people's wheat to feed their horses, and they lamented their cruel destiny of seeing «barbarous peoples of various nations conspire to destroy poor Italy, among whom the French, Gascons, Picards, Spanish, Corsicans, Germans, Swiss, Greeks, Albanians, Croatians, Slavonians, Turks, English, Hungarians, Moors, and representatives of every nation in the world, which truly broke everyone's heart»[44]. Such disparate echoes reverberated in the literature of the piazza. There was significant literary production relating to the dramatic effects of the sacks on the civil population, of

[42] CRISTOFORO ALTISSIMO, *La rotta di Ravenna, con una giunta di venti stanze nel fine*, s.n.t. post 1515, II f. Bi r.

[43] ARIOSTO, *Orlando Furioso*, trans. Barbara Reynolds, Middlesex 1975, here vol. 1, p. 171.

[44] SIRANO MASTELLARI, *Memorie delle cose accadute nelle terre di Cento e di Pieve al tempo della guerra di Papa Giulio II dall'anno 1509 fino al 1512, scritte dal notaio pievese Sirano Mastellari*, A. SCAGLIARINI (ed.), Pieve di Cento 1991, p. 58.

which the 1512 French sieges of Brescia and Ravenna and the Spanish plundering of Prato number among the most commonly discussed[45]. Associated with the cruel complement of deaths that accompanied them, sacks aroused horror in the people's psyche, re-evoking in the Christian conscience ancient barbarian invasions and recent massacres at the hands of the Ottomans. The Tuscan *cantastorie* Regolo de' Sorci declares, with regard to the French army's seizure of Brescia, that the commander Gastone de Foix «besieged and cruelly plundered ... / with a cruelty, vengeance, and dishonour greater even than what the Turks had unleashed at Negroponte»[46].

After the battle of Ravenna, French troops embarked on a savage pillage that spared no one, not even the clergy, and remained engrained in the Italian collective imaginary for a long time to come. The *tramontani* were represented by itinerant street singers with the same level of disdain as the enemies of Christianity, for «what they have done to the churches and monasteries, / not even the Turks and Jews would have done»[47]. Analogous accusations were made of the French army by Ariosto (XIV, 8):

«Which neither convents spared, nor monasteries,
No mercy showed to mother, daughter, bride,
And, violating sacred mysteries,
The silver tabernacle of the Host
Purloined and on the ground the wafer tossed»[48].

The brutalization of war took as casualties civilian victims, but this clash between Christians that recalled the massacres of the Turks made political victims of the Italian States. We see an anxious awareness of a common tragic Italian destiny reflected in the narratives of plundering and pillaging.

[45] *La rotta e presa fatta a Bresa per li francesi*, s.n.t. 1512; *La vera nova de Bressa.*

[46] GIACOMO DE' SORCI, detto «Il Cortonese», *Historia dele Guerre, della beatitudine di papa Lulio II*, s.n.t. ca. 1512, fol. 2v.

[47] *Ibid.*, fol. 4v.

[48] ARIOSTO, *Orlando Furioso*, vol. 1, p. 413.

6. *Italy's suffering*

The historiographical debate over the Italian Wars has long felt the effects of the anachronistic and teleological 19th-century prejudice that Italy was destined to unify. Historians insisted on the centrality of the wars of the early 16th century in defining a new age, attributing to them Italy's squandering of political independence, economic decline, and failure to achieve unification. For these reasons, historiography has often narrated this period as the history of a defeat.

But it was not just the rhetoric of the Risorgimento that painted this half-century of war as the history of a military and political setback for the peninsula. The system of the old territorial Italian States did in fact fall into crisis while sparring with the great European monarchs[49]. The invasion of Charles VIII highlighted the idea of Italy as a political entity, an idea that, though fragile, had gained real traction in the 15th century and was symbolized by the series of leagues formed between the Italian States. It was not only Machiavelli and Guicciardini's humanistic historical reflections that contemplated the destinies of the whole peninsula; the 16th-century poems in *ottava rima* revealed a similar perspective, initially on a regional level, which progressively expanded to the wider Italian stage. Through oral and editorial production on the Italian Wars, even contemporaries were able to elaborate on the narrative of a defeat.

Many compositions contributed to the description of the stages of Italy's inexorable decline—an Italy that was no more than a geographic expression, lacking any political cohesion—from the ancient glory of the Roman past to the shambles that were its present. This sentiment is reflected in the subtitle of Vespasiano da Bisticci's *Lamento de Italia* [The lament of Italy], published in 1536 but composed around the end of the 15th century, which intended to narrate «the honourable deeds and memorable victories brought about by Italy, which once dominated the world but then, because of discord and sin, became its servant»[50]. It

[49] A. Aubert, *La crisi degli antichi stati italiani (1492-1521)*, Firenze 2003.

[50] Vespasiano da Bisticci, *Lamento de Italia. Opera nuova nela quale si commemora li honorandi fatti, & le memorande vittorie per Italia riportate, & haver dominato tutto il mondo, & dapoi per la sua discordia e peccati esser divenuta ancilla*, Venezia, Fancesco Bindoni & Mapheo Pasini, 1536, fol. 1r.

was a defeat that was retold through a literary subgenre that reflected psychological and emotive crises in the 16th century: the historical or political lament[51]. Publishers, printers, and street performers all appropriated this genre which also became an enormous popular commercial success.

A survey of a few of the hundreds of titles of editions that date back to the first decades of the 16th century reveal the extent to which the theme of a defeated Italy was present and the degree to which people were conscious of living a moment of political crisis: *Il pianto dell'Italia e delle città saccheggiate in quella* [Italy's suffering, and that of its plundered cities]; *Non dormite o taliani* [Don't sleep, dear Italians]; *El lamento e la discordia de Italia universal* [The lament and discord of all of Italy]; *Le moderne tribulationi de Italia* [The modern tribulations of Italy]; *Spavento de Italia*; *Per la discordia Italia roina* [Italy fallen to ruins because of discord]; *El lamento de Italia* [The lament of Italy]; *Barzelletta dela discordia de Italia* [Song of Italy's discord]; *Guerre horrende d'Italia* [The horrendous wars of Italy][52]. Alongside the titles that reflected the common destiny of the entire peninsula were the laments of individual cities such as Florence, Genoa, Venice, and also Rome after the tragic sack of 1527[53]. Such expressions were fed by a widespread sentiment, a sense of prostration from the continuous divisions and wars that violated the peninsula, which fuelled the theory of a «tormented Italy»[54] that was dominant in 16th-century historical-

[51] On the lament as a political genre A. MEDIN - L. FRATI, *Lamenti storici dei secoli XIV, XV, XVI*, Bologna 1890; F. ALAZARD, *A la recherche d'une langue politique: les lamenti du XVIe siècle*, in M. ROIG MIRANDA (ed.), *Langues et identités culturelles dans l'Europe des XVIe et XVIIe siècles*, Nancy 2006, pp. 209-218; on the lament as a literary genre F. ALAZARD, *Le lamento dans l'Italie de la Renaissance. «Pleure, belle Italie, jardin du monde»*, Rennes 2010.

[52] See *GOR*, *ad indicem*, and A. MEDIN - L. FRATI, *Lamenti storici*.

[53] For post-1527 Rome as the object of a wide-ranging literary production, see for example, the various editions of EUSTACHIO CELEBRINO, *La presa di Roma*, in *GOR*, vol. 1, pp. 107-115.

[54] *Italia travagliata*, «tormented Italy», is the title of a well-known book of the Dominican inquisitor Umberto Locati from Piacenza that examines the dramatic events of 16th-century Italy: *Italia travagliata nuovamente posta in luce, nella qual si contengono tutte le guerre, seditioni, pestilentie, et altri travagli, liquali nell'Italia sono stati dalla venuta d'Enea Troiano in quella, infina alli nostri tempi, da diversi authori racolti*, Venezia, Daniel Zanetti, 1576.

political discourse. This was a representation that spread beyond the Alps, exemplified in French vernacular poetry in which what had been an «earthly paradise» and the «world's garden» transformed into a battlefield strewn with corpses[55].

Italy donned its literary—and iconographic—guise as a woman in difficulty, a symbolism that was based on the anthropological metaphor of the heartbroken woman in need of consolation. This was a long-lasting image that had its roots in the Middle Ages and that would return with vigour during the Risorgimento[56]. This biopolitical representation of Italy was widely exploited in the era's popular iconography and political poetry, which would frequently employ metaphors that referred to relationships of genre in order to take root in the collective mentality.

On the frontispiece of the pamphlet *Spavento de Italia*, a fleeing girl was taking refuge embracing an oak tree, the symbol of the Della Rovere family of Pope Julius II, while the Lion of Saint Mark, revived by a sepulchre, was keeping at bay the French rooster who was pursuing her with wings outspread[57]. The allegory was easy to unravel for contemporaries: the Republic of Venice would gain a new life following its alliance with the papacy, and united they would rise to the defence of Italy from the French threat. On another frontispiece, that of *Lamento de Italia* (1512), by the Piedmontese Giacomo Rossetto, Italy was represented by the image of a woman prostrate on her knees between two legions of soldiers with their weapons drawn[58]. A recurring topical representation at the time, the woman in difficulty, also appeared in the woodcut titled *Italia fragelata* [Italy flagellated], which adorns the frontispiece of a poem by Pierpaolo Venturino, *Euocatione con lachrymosa querela della afflicta Roma* [Evocation with the tearful lament of an afflicted Rome]. In his verses, the poet from Pesaro extends a request

[55] N. Hochner, *Visions of War in the 'Terrestrial Paradise'. Images of Italy in Early Sixteenth-Century French Texts*, in C. Shaw (ed.), *Italy and the European Powers*, pp. 239-252.

[56] A.M. Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento: parentela, santità e onore alle origini dell'Italia unita*, Torino 2000.

[57] Woodcut of the frontispiece in Francesco Sacchino da Modigliana, *Spavento de Italia*.

[58] Giacomo Rossetto, *Lamento de Italia diviso in capituli septe composito per Jacobo Rossetto Darthonese al beatissimo Papa Julio Secondo*, s.n.t. *ante* October 1512.

for assistance in the defence of Rome and of the entire peninsula to the emperor Maximilian I of Habsburg[59].

Italy is also often portrayed as a mother betrayed by her own children: the barons, princes, and local tyrants. This maternal depiction dominates the *El lamento e la discordia de Italia universale*, composed by an anonymous philo-Venetian *cantastorie*, in which the personification of Italy lamented its destiny, which had been etched in stone by recent military defeats and torn apart by domestic struggles between regional states. She had not lost all hope, however, drawing faith from the re-established accord between the warrior pope Julius II and the Republic of Venice. In the prosopopoeia of an afflicted Italy, she addressed the pontiff directly:

«[Hope] I have not lost because there is still
Julius II, who is such a valoros pastor
that he will walk with Saint Peter;
... and so that [Italy] may not be in any part assailed
the power of the Church will prevail»[60].

The vehement invitation extended to the «Italians»—who were defined as such in stark contrast to the French «barbarians»—was to follow the pope, the leader of the Christians and flower of the world, with the goal of driving out of Italy the «French dogs»:

«Onward leader of the Christians,
Pope Julius, flower of the world,
in pursuit of the foreign Gauls
send people who will vanquish
the violent sceptre
which has given you so many anxieties:
onward, courageous Italians!»[61].

The same invocations were accompanied by paraenetic calls for unity and harmony. Only through the union of all of the Italian States could the scourge of the wars be overcome and the peninsula return to its

[59] *Italia fragelata*, woodcut of the frontispiece in PIERPAOLO VENTURINO, *Euocatione con lachrymosa querela della afflicta Roma alla serenissima maiesta dello vecturioso et inuicto Maximiano re de romani per Perpaulo Venturino da Pesaro*, Pesaro, Girolamo Soncino, 1510.

[60] *El lamento e la discordia de Italia universale*, Bologna ca. 1510, fol. 3r.

[61] *Ibid.*

ancient glory; otherwise, a destiny of war and foreign oppression would be inevitable. The exhortation *Non dormite, o 'taliani'* (Do not sleep, dear Italians) reminds readers:

«Italians, if you were united
nobody would engage in war with you,
... but if envy will reign
among you, be certain that
you will always be ruined
by infidels and Frenchmen»[62].

7. *Conclusion*

The songs of war that were performed in squares by street singers provide us with material for a new reading of the Italian Wars through the lens of the history of communication and information, as well as of the history of collective emotions. The dramatic urgency of the «present»» determined the birth of a marketplace of political information of which contemporaneity was a foundational characteristic. The hundreds of short poems produced in this period of protracted battle that affected all the inhabitants of the peninsula represent also an emotive response to a watershed moment.

But equally war reinforces the feeling of living a common destiny and determines the formation of a collective identity that translates into the representation of Italy as a unitary «imagined community»[63], even if afflicted, desolate, vexed by foreign armies and fragmented politically.

«The Horrendous Italian Wars» was the title of perhaps the best-known *cantare* dedicated to this war-dominated period (the work was actually constructed through a sequential assemblage of several poems in ottava rima that had appeared in those years)[64]. And it is precisely on the two

[62] *Non dormite, o 'taliani'*, in *Questa è la istoria del papa contra ferraresi e de le terre novamente prese*, Giacomo de' Sorci detto il Cortonese?, Venezia ca. 1510, fol. 2v.

[63] B. ANDERSON, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (rev. ed.), London 1991.

[64] *Guerre horrende d'Italia. Tutte le guerre d'Italia comenzando dala venuta di re Carlo, del mille quatrocento nonanta quatro, sin al giorno presente*, Antonio da Borgo, Milano 1545.

elements revealed in the title of the popular 16th-century bestseller—the horror of war and the theme of Italy's destiny—that the literary and historic narrative of this extraordinary period is based. These are elements that, it goes without saying, would become omnipresent in the narrative of conflicts in the 20th century: the brutalization of war and the fortunes of the «nation»—which for Italy in the 16th century was more «imagined» than real, but not without meaning.

In God's Fields

Military Chaplains and Soldiers in Flanders during the Eighty Years' War

by *Vincenzo Lavenia*

I.

In 1640, one hundred years after the founding of St Ignatius' religious order, the Flemish province of the Society of Jesus had a monumental book printed that is perhaps the first example in the West of an institution publishing self-publicity. Its title is *Imago primi saeculi Societatis Iesu a Provincia Flandro-Belgica repraesentata* and the volume (roughly one thousand folio pages, of which there was also a version in Flemish) retraces the history of the Society, its triumphs and its martyrs, including stories of missionaries, letters and documents that concern above all the history of the Jesuits in Belgium. It also contains some of the most beautiful engravings of the 17th century, and part of the text also relates the history of the so-called «missiones castrenses et navales», with seven *emblemata* accompanying an account that transcribed extracts from the letters of those fathers, both living and fallen in battle, who were involved in the land and sea chaplaincies during Spain's ferocious war against the 'heretic' rebel provinces of the Low Countries[1].

In detailing the assistance given to soldiers, the authors of the *Imago* wrote that many souls had been and were being saved; but, as tongues continued to wag, the work sought to justify the Jesuits against the ac-

[1] For the history of the book, see M. FUMAROLI, *Baroque et classicisme. L'«Imago Primi Saeculi Societatis Jesu» (1640) et ses adversaries*, in M. FUMAROLI, *L'école du silence. Le sentiment des images au XVIIe siècle*, Paris 1994, pp. 343-365; L. SALVIUCCI INSOLERA, *L'«Imago primi saeculi» (1640) e il significato dell'immagine allegorica nella Compagnia di Gesù. Genesi e fortuna del libro*, Roma 2004; N. TJOLKER, *Jesuit Image Rethoric in Latin and Vernacular: The Latin and Dutch Emblems of the «Imago Primi Saeculi»* (http://www.renaessanceforum.dk/6_2010/06_tjoelker_imago.pdf); J.W. O'MALLEY (ed.), *Art, Controversy and the Jesuits: 'The Imago Primi Saeculi Societatis Iesu'*, forthcoming.

cusation of accepting the task out of interest. How could it be thought that so many priests had sacrificed themselves for lucre? The chaplains had comforted the troops in the snow, without food, in extreme conditions («Saepe fixis media nive tentoriis traductae noctes asperrimo frigore & gelu; saepe annona deficiens, aut famem, aut miserimum victum et alias detestandum, imperavit»). Many of the brethren died in the hospitals or in the front line of battle, inciting the troops. But the fruits of their labours repaid the effort: so much so, that the Jesuits could be described as instituting a new kind of soldier: the *miles christianus*, which an idealizing literature had presented since the times of the crusades. This meant making permanent what still seemed fragile after sixty years of hard work. In fact, we read, chaplains were needed not only in war, but also when wars were interrupted, in peace, and in the camps, where souls could be educated better than in the thick of battle, when the chaplains' main duty was to incite the soldiers against the enemy («in campo non de rebus animi, sed de hoste victoriaque cogitandum»). The ships had been a den of wild animals before the Jesuits arrived («ferarum verius quam hominum receptacula»); and the same could be said for the infantry: «nulli praeter nos medici, pastores nulli». Figures such as Guillaume Buvet, a priest who died at Breda (1625), showed the courage and sacrifice of the Jesuits, silencing their critics. And the account in the *Imago* closed with a triumphant exclamation: «Haec castrensium patrum vita est»[2].

We may mistrust the exalted tones of this work of propaganda and history, but research can demonstrate that the religious climate among the *tercios* and the crews of the Spanish fleet in that period really had changed, thanks to the Jesuits. This is confirmed by Parker's research, which documents what a turning point was the foundation of a pious *Confraternitas Sanctissimi Sacramenti inter milites*, approved by Sixtus V in 1589. The catechesis of the soldiers improved, and the scandals that had involved the first chaplains sent to Flanders ceased. The confraternity put to good use the zeal of the most devout soldiers, using them in works of mercy, in hospital care and in handling the testaments of the deceased; and this confraternity, like the *missio castrensis*

[2] *Imago primi saeculi Societatis Iesu a Provincia Flandro-Belgica eiusdem Societatis repraesentata*, Antverpiae, ex officina Plantiniana Balthasaris Moreti, 1640, pp. 804-826, see also pp. 910-913, for the engravings, see pp. 941-948.

itself[3], was the aim of a man who has an extremely important role in this story—Thomas Sailly, the author of a beautiful illustrated text entitled *Guidon et practique spirituelle du soldat chrestien*. Yet it was not the first text written specifically to catechize the soldiers. If the 1580s were the period in which the first fixed chaplaincies were set up, the preparation of books devised to give a religious purpose to war, to instruct the troops in the faith and to reform a dirty trade that affected the civilian population preceded the Belgian experiment by a few years[4].

This kind of publication—which originated in Italy, to be distributed to the soldiers sent to fight Turks and heretics—flourished in the two centuries in which the first fixed chaplaincies were founded, later enjoying a wide circulation until the two world wars of the last century[5]. There were many of them, and they were conceived with an eye to ease of distribution: almost always written in vernacular, they were quickly imitated in the Protestant world, and distributed to commanders and military confessors, but also to any ordinary soldiers who could read. They have not, on the whole, had the attention they deserve. Nor has the history of the Catholic chaplains in the early modern age—one of the keys to understanding how permanent mass armies were created, motivated to fight and die in the name of an idea (first God, and then Country, as Kantorowicz has written)—received adequate attention[6].

[3] Cf. J. SCHOONJANS, *«Castra Dei». L'organisation religieuse des armées d'Alexandre Farnèse*, in *Miscellanea Historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen*, Bruxelles - Paris 1947, pp. 523-540; G. PARKER, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659. The Logistic of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' War*, Cambridge - New York - Melbourne 1972, pp. 178-179.

[4] For one particular aspect of the Jesuits' military ethos in the early modern age, see D. DE LUCCA, *Jesuits And Fortifications: The Contribution of the Jesuits to Military Architecture in the Baroque Age*, Leiden - Boston MA 2012.

[5] See G. MINOIS, *L'Eglise et la guerre. De la Bible à l'ère atomique*, Paris 1994, *passim*; E. GARCÍA HERNÁN, *Capellanes militares y Reforma Católica*, in H. GARCÍA HERNÁN - D. MAFFI (eds), *Guerra y sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica. Política, estrategia y cultura en la Europa moderna (1500-1700)*, Madrid 2006, vol. 2, pp. 709-742; M. PAIANO, *Pregare in guerra: gli opuscoli cattolici per i soldati*, in D. MENOZZI - G. PROCACCI - S. SOLDANI (eds), *Un paese in guerra: la mobilitazione civile in Italia 1914-1918*, Milano 2010, pp. 275-294; V. LAVENIA, *Milizia e catechesi per il soldato nel cattolicesimo moderno. Un percorso testuale*, in «Rivista di Studi Militari», 2012, 1, pp. 117-140.

[6] E.H. KANTOROWICZ, *'Pro patria mori' in Medieval Political Thought*, in «American Historical Review», 56, 1951, pp. 472-492 (also in E.H. KANTOROWICZ, *Selected Studies*, Locust Valley NY 1965, pp. 308-324).

Doris Bergen has recently edited the proceedings of a conference for scholars of various periods, tracing the long-term history of the relation between war and religious mission in various confessional contexts[7]. And yet there is a significant gap right in the 16th and 17th centuries, those of the Catholic and Iberian hegemony, while in recent years there have been studies (such as those of Donagan, Laurence and Griffin for the period of Cromwell; or Marschke for pietist Prussia)[8] that have filled gaps in research for the reformed world (this also applies to the Sweden of Gustavus Adolphus)[9].

All the same, I think a step back to the late 16th century is useful for understanding how permanent chaplaincies for European armies originated and how they then contributed to the creation of disciplined soldiers in barracks. The catechisms described an ideal model that should be analyzed, bearing in mind their abstract and ideological nature. But if these texts with their many stories are read alongside the history of the first chaplaincies and the accounts written by priests in letters and, sometimes, like a diary[10], they offer a glimpse of the survival of the idea of the holy war after the end of mediaeval chivalry; and of the slow process that later secularized the language of the crusades in

[7] D.L. BERGEN (ed.), *The Sword of the Lord. Military Chaplains from the First to the Twenty-First Century*, Notre Dame IN 2004.

[8] A. LAURENCE, *Parliamentary Army Chaplains: 1642-1651*, Woodbridge 1990; B. DONAGAN, *«Did Ministers Matter». War and Religion in England, 1642-1649*, in «Journal of British Studies», 33, 1994, pp. 119-156; M. GRIFFIN, *Regulating Religion and Morality in the King's Armies 1639-1646*, Leiden - Boston MA 2004; B. MARSCHKE, *Absolutely Pietist. Patronage, Fictionalism, and State-Building in the Early Eighteenth-Century Prussian Army Chaplaincy*, Tübingen 2005.

[9] M. ROBERTS, *The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560-1718*, Cambridge - London - New York 1979, pp. 69-70.

[10] For this type of source in the context of the wars of the 16th century, see C. ZWIERLEIN, *Fonti per una storia delle percezioni. I diari di guerra del XVI secolo (il caso dei partecipanti alle guerre di religione in Francia)*, in A. DATTERO - S. LEVATI (eds), *Militari in età moderna. La centralità di un tema di confine*, Milano 2006, pp. 83-114. The manuscript papers on the Jesuit military chaplaincies in Belgium have been catalogued in A. GAILLARD, *Inventaire sommaire des archives de la Compagnie de Jésus conservées aux Archives Génélares du Royaume à Bruxelles*, Bruxelles 1910; H. CALLEWIER, *Inventaris van het archief van de Nederduitse Provincie der Jezuïeten (Provincia Belgica, vervolgens Provincia Flandro-Belgica) en van het archief van het professenhuis te Antwerpen (1388) 1564-1773*, Bruxelles 2006.

the context of the national states and, then, of the French Revolution; of the discipline imposed on the believer-subject, who, in the modern era, became above all a soldier in uniform; and of the relation between religion and regular armies—a subject recently tackled in the collections of essays edited by Donati and Kroener, Kaiser and Kroll, and Onnekink[11]. And though there has been excellent scholarly research on the military pastors, Catholic and otherwise, who were part of the mass armies of the 20th century[12], we still do not understand how far this originated in the 16th century[13]. It is certainly no accident that the genre of military catechisms started with the Jesuits during the bellicose papacy of Pius V and the wars of religion; and that it was perfected in Flanders before the Twelve Years' Truce. Thanks above all to the Jesuits' *missio castrensis*, this made real the pious hope of many authors during the first half of the 16th century, when the criticisms formulated by Erasmus' irenics[14] were countered by the ideal of a soldier who should curb violence and any tendency to crime and sin, and comply not only with the true faith but also with Stoic ethics.

[11] M. KAISER - S. KROLL (eds), *Militär und Religiosität in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Münster 2004; C. DONATI - B.R. KROENER (eds), *Militari e società civile nell'Europa dell'età moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII)*, Bologna 2007; D. ONNEKINK (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648-1713*, Farnham 2009.

[12] The bibliography is too vast to be given in full. For Italy, see at least R. MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, *La fede e la guerra. Cappellani militari e preti-soldati (1915-1919)*, Roma 1980; M. FRANZINELLI, *Il riarmo dello spirito. I cappellani militari nella seconda guerra mondiale*, Treviso 1991; M. FRANZINELLI *Stellette, croce e fascio littorio. L'assistenza religiosa a militari, balilla e camicie nere 1919-1939*, Milano 1995; G. ROCHAT (ed.), *La spada e la croce. I cappellani militari nelle due guerre mondiali* (suppl. «Bollettino della Società di Studi Valdesi», 112), Torino 1995; for Germany H. MISSALLA, *«Gott mit uns». Die deutsche katholische Kriegspredigt 1914-1918*, München 1968; for the United Kingdom M. SNAPE, *God and the British Soldier: Religion and the British Army in the First and Second World Wars*, London 2005; M. SNAPE, *The Royal Army Chaplains' Department, 1796-1953: Clergy and Fire*, Woodbridge 2008; E. MADIGAN, *Faith under Fire. Anglican Army Chaplains and the Great War*, London 2011.

[13] For the French context and the Huguenot front, see now P. BENEDICT, *Prophets in Arms? Ministers in War, Ministers on War: France 1562-74*, in G. MURDOCK - P. ROBERTS - A. SPICER (eds), *Ritual and Violence: Natalie Zemon Davis and Early Modern France* (suppl. «Past & Present», 7), Oxford 2012, pp. 163-196.

[14] A. PROSPERI, *I cristiani e la guerra: una controversia fra '500 e '700*, in «Rivista di Storia e Letteratura Religiosa», 30, 1994, pp. 57-83.

II.

At this point let us go back to the *Imago*. It was brought out by the printing house of Plantin and Moretus at Antwerp, which was home to an intellectual circle of major importance for the history of European culture and had also published Sailly[15]. It was thanks to their presses that in the late 16th century Justus Lipsius had been able to publish many of his books. Lipsius had been educated by the Jesuits of Cologne, and when he returned to Flanders, after a long stay in Rome and years of teaching, during which he had crossed the religious borders of Europe (pretending to believe, now in Luther, now in Catholicism), he had had direct experience of war in the conflict between Spain and the Seven Provinces that had rebelled against the Habsburgs. As Oestreich[16] noted in a famous essay, Books V and VI of the *Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex* (1589) reflect that context and were the 16th century's most significant contribution to a «modern» concept of disciplining the profession of arms. In those pages, Lipsius dealt with both civil and external war, suggesting that good policy required, above all, proper control of military violence. He therefore set out an ideal of a non-mercenary army whose core figure should be the *miles perpetuus*: the member of a band of soldiers *laboriosi, duri, probi, fati sui securi* and *gloriae avidi*. Stoics in uniform, the new *milites* should put to good use the moral benefits of an elitist philosophy trickling down to the lower social ranks, and should comply with a martial discipline that was the necessary premise for victory in a just war, in which violence was permitted. Nevertheless, this discipline required better equipment, regular pay, permanent lodgings, spiritual assistance and rigorous leadership of small troop units that were carefully selected and willing to moderate their behaviour on the basis of four basic rules: *exercitium, ordo, coerctio et exempla*[17]. Lipsius wrote

[15] L. VOET, *The Golden Compasses. The History of the House of Plantin-Moretus*, 2 vols, Amsterdam - London - New York 1969-1972.

[16] G. OESTREICH, *Neostoicism & the Early Modern State*, Cambridge - London - New York 1982, pp. 50-55. For a sharp criticism of Oestreich's political positions as influencing his reading of history, see P.N. MILLER, *Nazis and Neo-Stoics: Otto Brunner and Gebrard Oestreich before and after the Second World War*, in «Past & Present», 176, 2002, pp. 144-186.

[17] IUSTUS LIPSIUS, *Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex*, Antverpiae, ex officina Plantiniana, 1689.

at a time when mutiny, massacres, rape, and pillage were frequently carried out in the name of religion. His aim was to develop the virtue of the modern soldier: a sober professional, well trained, zealous and religious. No longer exceptional and «anarchic», the army could thus become (and did indeed, shortly after, become in states like Prussia) an ideal social body, an ordinary profession and the basis of political discipline in a well-regulated state.

Oestreich has written that Lipsius' scheme was influenced by the methodology of Ignatius of Loyola (an ex-soldier). But the master of the neo-Stoics did not only read the *Spiritual Exercises*, he also established direct contact with minor figures in the Society of Jesus who, like him, were developing new types of catechisms in that period, which would reform the profession of arms and discipline the conscience of the soldiers[18]. One was Sailly, who was put in charge of the first permanent mission of chaplains—in Flanders of all places: a priest and confessor of Alessandro Farnese, he was admired by Lipsius, and his guide for Christian soldiers was published by Plantin the year after Lipsius' *Politica* appeared (1590)[19]. The other was one of Sailly's masters, whom Lipsius may have met during his time in Rome. This was Antonio Possevino, author of the first catechism for troops: *Il soldato christiano* appeared in 1569 and was later translated and published many times. Possevino was the author of a plan to reform war, in which he envisaged the foundation of military colleges very similar to the barracks of the future, and this later became part of his monumental *Bibliotheca Selecta*. And in the second edition of the work, which appeared in 1603, he recommended Lipsius' works to Catholic soldiers and captains in search of improving reading[20]. In this way the process of Catholic discipline cross-fertilized with neo-Stoic philosophy about war, to oppose Erasmian irenics and also the Machiavellian theory that the Christian faith was incompatible with the classical and Stoic virtue of glory (*Discorsi*, I,12 and II,2).

[18] J. KLUYSTENS, *Justus Lipsius (1547-1600) and the Jesuits, with Four Unpublished Letters*, in «Humanistica Lovaniensia», 23, 1974, pp. 244-270.

[19] L. BROUWERS, *L'«Elogium» du père Thomas Sailly S. I. (1553-1623) composé par le père Charles Scribani S.I.*, in «Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu», 48, 1979, pp. 87-124.

[20] V. LAVENIA, *Tra Cristo e Marte. Disciplina e catechesi del soldato cristiano in età moderna*, in G.P. BRIZZI - G. OLMI (eds), *Dai cantieri alla storia. 'Liber amicorum' per Paolo Prodi*, Bologna 2007, pp. 37-54.

III.

So how did the first permanent, organized military chaplaincies originate? Dozens of letters in various archives (the Jesuit archives and sources in Rome and in Belgium) give us an almost day-by-day account of the process, because, as we know, the Society of Jesus was expert in glorifying its activities, flooding Europe with stories of missions set up in the global empires and with accounts of miraculous conversions. But the question of military missions was more delicate, and for them there were dozens of internal, secret instructions that tried to protect priests from any 'contamination' with the world of war. For brevity's sake, I will leave to one side the first attempts to organize the chaplains (who were not all Jesuits) in the Spanish armies, which date back at least to the 1550s and saw their first results at Lepanto. That was when the scene, which until then had been populated by individual preachers such as Giovanni Capestrano, began to change[21]. I shall start from 1588, the year of the *Invencible Armada*. Around twenty-three fathers left Lisbon, under the guidance of Gonzalo del Álamo: there were eight Portuguese and around fifteen Spanish, including the priests and *coadiutori*, who had power to absolve cases reserved for the Holy Office, heresy above all. However, many died in the hospitals before leaving; others perished during the outward or return journey, and only two fathers survived the shipwreck and reached Flanders. These were Antonio Crespo and Alonso del Pozo, who were able to acquaint themselves with the work that their brethren had done in Belgium[22].

The *missio castrensis* had just come into being, and after 1623, it was flanked by a *missio navalis*, by wish of Ambrogio Spinola and Father Theodore Rosmer, and was stationed at Dunkirk. After 1579, the Habsburg authorities had nominated a grand chaplain for all the armies. At first, it was the Bishop of Cambrai, who in 1583 delegated the function, first to an Italian Franciscan friar and then to a Spanish

[21] E. García Hernán, *La asistencia religiosa en la Armada de Lepanto*, in «Anthologica Annua», 43, 1996, pp. 213-263; L. Brouwers, *Misión Castrense*, in C.E. O'Neill - J.M. Domínguez (eds), *Diccionario histórico de la Compañia de Jesús*, Roma - Madrid 2001, vol. 3, pp. 2687-2688; G. Civale, *Guerrieri di Cristo. Inquisitori, gesuiti e soldati alla battaglia di Lepanto*, Milano 2009.

[22] F. de Borja de Medina, *Jesuitas en la armada contra Inglaterra (1588). Notas para un centenario*, in «Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu», 58, 1989, pp. 3-41.

vicar, Monsignor Francisco de Umara, under the wing of Farnese, whose protection saved him when he was accused of mismanaging hospital funds[23]. In 1597 Archduke Alberto, the new governor of Flanders, entrusted the function of nominating a Vicar General for the armies to the Bishop of Malines[24], a responsibility that was later confirmed throughout the 17th century, suspended only in the years of peace. But it was not easy to coordinate the dozens of priests who were serving in the *tercios*, many of whom were untrained, apostate or corrupt. Nor was it easy to find priests for every linguistic community among the conscripts—there being, ironically, a notable dearth of Flemish priests. Many of the chaplains were by nature restless and in search of adventure, and the Franciscan friars included an Italian and the Spaniard Antonio Granada, who had also had brushes with civil justice in the past.

This was the context of the Jesuits' mission. Many Spaniards had been active in Flanders since 1574, but their presence was opposed by the Flemish as they were regarded as being too close to the Madrid authorities and Don Juan of Austria. The Jesuits' Provincial tried to close down the office; but Rome's envoy, Olivier Mannaert, retained it. In a letter of 1584 he wrote to the General of the Society that he was aware of the mission's shortcomings, but hoped for the arrival of a priest «liber a melancholia, ..., integerrimum, deinde alacrem, excitatum, industrium, robustum, expeditum, et patientem»[25]. Sailly was certainly not sturdy, but (thanks to the support of the Farnese) his austerity seemed to qualify him for a task that the Society had accepted with reluctance.

And so, after the *missio* had been founded, precise instructions were issued that were approved by the General of the Jesuits Acquaviva in May 1588. Priests were advised not to seem too close to the Habsburg commanders so as to avoid criticism. They were also instructed to be

[23] L. VAN DER ESSEN, *Documents concernant le vicaire général Francisco de Umara et l'organisation religieuse de l'armée espagnole aux Pays-Bas pendant les guerres de Flandre (1597-1599)*, in «Analectes pour Servir a l'Histoire Ecclésiastique de la Belgique», 37, 1911, pp. 263-281. For Umara's role in organizing health care see M. PARRILLA HERMIDA, *El hospital militar español de Malinas en los siglos XVI y XVII*, Madrid 1964, pp. 27 ff.

[24] J. LEFÈVRE, *L'aumônerie militaire à l'époque de l'archiduc Albert (1598-1621)*, in «Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire», 7, 1928, pp. 113-129.

[25] Quotation from A. PONCELET, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus dans les anciens Pays-Bas ...*, Bruxelles 1927, vol. 2, p. 407 fn. 2.

scrupulous in their dress, in their handling of sacred things, in correspondence with their superiors and in receiving the last wishes of the soldiers. For their pastoral duties, they should give regular sermons and lessons of catechism, on Sunday at least; and prevent ill-treatment of the civilian population, though here they should act with caution as the soldiers might take it badly. A good chaplain should also gain trust with effective medical treatment and by promoting moral assistance to the troops[26]. To this end, a confraternity was set up that Sailly vindicated as the pride of the *missio*.

At first there were only twenty-four chaplains, some of them priests and some *coadiutori*; but after 1600 Rome halved them, which Sailly accepted with great reluctance. The fervent letters he sent to Acquaviva seem to have been an attempt to convince his superiors of the worth of the mission. In 1590 he claimed to have driven the prostitutes away from the camps and to have converted some British soldiers in the pay of the Spanish[27]. In 1592 he boasted of the services in the hospitals that the Jesuits had made efficient; the divine punishment of hardened blasphemers who had died without warning; and the mercy of Farnese, a sincere «alumnus» of the Church, who had died *pro defensione fidei*. Before dying, on entering a part of the city that was under siege and defeated, he had seen a mother weeping because two of her daughters had been seized by soldiers; he had helped one of the Jesuit fathers save the third girl from the rapists, giving her back to her mother and punishing the soldiers. In short, thanks to the fathers of Brussels and the efforts of the Italian General, the *missio* was gaining the souls of soldiers who were far from the faith and used to living amid sack, sacrilege, blasphemy, rape, ill-treatment of civilians, duels, lust, bigamy, dangerous books, dicing, and cards. Many had begun to confess, while others had converted in the face of divine and diabolic prodigies, of which the historian may have leave to doubt[28]. And to understand how much these sources were a mixture of realistic and idealized ac-

[26] Rome, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (hereafter ARSI), *Inst.* 117a, fols 517r-518v, «Ordinationes pro missione castrensi».

[27] ARSI, *Fl. Belg.* 67, fol. 57r-v.

[28] ARSI, *Fl. Belg.* 67, fol. 76r-v. Cf. 188r-189r, a letter of 1598, which describes priests fomenting war with the symbol of the cross, devils defeated by miraculous divine intervention, the successes of the Confraternity of the Sacrament, the soldiers' Lenten fasts and penances, cures of the vice of drinking, duels prevented by the use of the

counts, one need only read the *Imago*, which mentions that in 1600 at Nieuport three Jesuits had lost their lives: they had incited the troops to battle but they had also begged for mercy for the defeated Calvinists[29]. So, there was no contradiction between appealing to the holy war and mercy—a useful mercy politically after years of mishandling of the crisis by Philip II.

Suspended during the Twelve Years' Truce, the *missio* continued even after the death in 1621 of Sailly, the man in charge of it. And it is significant that it was Carolus Scribani who wrote the first biography of Sailly—the Jesuit who had also described the Catholic death of Lipsius and who had had a long association with the Plantin press[30]. Herman Hugo (author of an *Obsidio Bredana* and a book on chivalry in the ancient and modern world) was nominated as Sailly's successor, but he died of the plague in 1629, when the successes of Breda were now in the past. After 1633 the mission was divided: six fathers were sent to Artois and Picardy, and six to the Moselle, in the fortress of the Marquis of Aytona. After the Peace of the Pyrenees their work came to an end, while the *missio navalis* continued until 1700. It had been established for the fleet of Dunkirk in 1623, and then transferred to Bruges and Ostend[31]. But this new mandate divided the Jesuits as well. It was noted by many that these were not soldiers but pirates. In 1628 a Jesuit wrote that giving them the sacraments was difficult, unless there was actual danger to life. And it was a slow process normalizing the sacraments for the crews[32]. Finally, in 1642 the vicar of the bishop of Malines-Brusells, Carolus Mansfelt, who was responsible for all the chaplains, wrote a treatise entitled *Castra Dei* to regulate some delicate

peaces and the conversion of dozens of heretics in the German camp: «Castrensis missio laboribus multis ac vitae periculis exposita excellentem ac copiosum laboris fructum colligit. Belluas immanes ad humanitatem revocavit».

29 Cf. *Imago primi saeculi*, p. 808.

30 L. Brouwers - J.F. Gilmont, *Carolus Scribani*, Bruxelles 1977; E. De Bom, *Carolus Scribani and the Lipsian Legacy: The «Politico-Christianus» and Lipsius's Image of the Good Prince*, in E. De Bom et al. (eds), *(Un)masking the Realities of Power: Justus Lipsius and the Dynamics of Political Writing in Early Modern Europe*, Leiden - Boston MA 2010, pp. 281-306.

31 E. Hambye, *L'aumônerie de la flotte de Flandre au XVIIè siècle, 1623-1662*, Louvain - Namur - Paris 1967.

32 A. Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie*, vol. 2, pp. 410-424.

questions for the post-Tridentine Church: for example, who could celebrate marriage for soldiers and who could absolve reserved cases like heresy[33]. And in future the chaplains, in Flanders and elsewhere, were to be less closely linked to the religious orders.

IV.

But the production of Catholic catechisms for the soldiers went on and influenced not only the writing of similar works among the Puritans and, later, the English Methodists[34], but also the compiling of collections of casuistry and penal law for the military tribunals that had been introduced among the Spanish and papal troops at the end of the 16th century[35]. But the most complex of the catechisms was Sailly's *Guidon*, and the Plantin-Moretus museum at Antwerp still has the plans for the final printing with the eighteen original drawings for the engravings[36]. The text took up Possevino's proposal, but set it in a more complex context that that of which Sailly had direct knowledge[37]. «C'est une chose fort louable»—he wrote—«quand le prestre et le soldat sont bien unis & d'accord au service de Dieu, de leur patrie et du bien public»[38]. The chaplains, then, were not to seek simply to provide spiritual comfort, because the soldiers needed «de medicins, tant spirituelz que

[33] Cf. CAROLUS A MANSFELT, *Castra Dei, sive Parochia, Religio et Disciplina Militum*, Bruxellis, apud Martinum de Bossuyt, 1642.

[34] I hope to return to this question on another occasion. See, however, B. DONAGAN, *«Did Ministers Matter»*.

[35] Cf. TULLIUS CRISPOLTUS, *Casus militares discussi ac resoluti ... in quibus tota materia delictorum, contractuum ac ultimarum voluntatum militum continetur ... Opus omnibus, praesertim vero militibus militiarum ecclesiasticae ditionis summe utile & necessarium*, Romae, ex typographia Phaei, 1635; FRANCISCUS CESPEDES, *Dubia conscientiae militaria a diversa proposita & resoluta, opus confessoribus militum necessarium*, Mediolani, ex typographia Georgy Rollae, 1643.

[36] J. DENUCÉ (ed.), *Correspondance de Christophe Plantin*, vols. 8-9, Antwerpen - Gravenhage 1918, reprint Nendel 1968, *ad indicem*.

[37] In 1588 Sailly wrote his first work for the soldiers, adapting Possevino's catechism into Spanish.

[38] THOMAS SAILLY, *Guidon et practique spirituelle du soldat chrestien reveu & augmenté pour l'armee de sa M.tè Catholique au Pays-bas*, Anvers, en l'Imprimerie Plantinienne, 1590, p. 158.

temporelz, et des hospitaliers»[39]. The wounded could not be abandoned, and the army now had «personnages qualifiez» who took charge of the weaker. The members of the confraternity handled wills and comforted the dying, «a fin que venans a mourir en la guerre, ilz ne laissent la guerre en leurs familles»[40]. Nor was religious vigilance of the conscripts lacking in the camps. The soldiers often read impious works: «livres des Machiavelles ..., livres de furieux amoureaux et libidinaires». Far better was Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*, which Sailly may have known through Lipsius; and catechisms were necessary[41]. He was familiar with the previous works of his brethren: both Possevino's and those of the Spaniard Francisco Antonio and the Frenchman Emond Auger[42].

But in Sailly the classification of the typical sins of soldiers was accompanied by a more realistic description of the military world, as when the priest condemned those who seized the goods of dead fellow-soldiers[43]. The experience of sieges filled pages, and the sin of drunkenness was regarded as a danger, not only because it fomented brawls and blasphemy, but because it weakened the soldier's resistance. Sailly condemned the widespread use of charms in the camps, and combined classical and biblical *exempla* for soldiers with many modern cases of the triumph of Catholic armies, in Europe and the colonies, also drawing up a war calendar for prayer and worship that included the feast days of the Church's holy warriors and reminders of recent victorious battles against heretics and infidels[44]. Finally, before dying, Sailly recounted his experience in the long pages of a *Memorial Testamentaire*. He had spent his last months in the Palatinate, which had been conquered by the Catholic armies during the first part of the Thirty Years War, and in that German principality he had performed the functions of Senior

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 171, 174-175.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 157.

[42] EMOND [AUGER], *Le pédagogue d'armes, pour instruire un prince chrétien à bien entreprendre et heureusement achever une bonne guerre, pour estre victorieux de tous les ennemis de son Estat et de l'Église catholique*, Paris, chez Sebastien Nivelle, 1568; FRANCISCO ANTONIO, *Auisos para soldados y gente de guerra* ..., En Madrid, por P. Madrigal, 1590.

[43] Cf. THOMAS SAILLY, *Guidon*, p. 71.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 126 ff., 309 ff.

Chaplain at Spinola's request, before returning to Flanders, where the war against the Dutch had resumed.

This meant the first part of the text was written in Germany and dedicated to Spinola (1621), while the second was composed in Brussels in 1622. Sailly listed, first of all, the duties of the generals, those of the military judges[45], the doctors and nurses[46] and of anyone else involved in organizing and supplying the armies, not forgetting women[47] and merchants, who often sold the soldiers poor-quality food and beer, causing disease and death[48]. Sailly also admonished the captains to pay those under them regularly, and exhorted the soldiers not to mutiny, but to obey their superiors, referring to the writings of authors like Scribani[49]. Many pages gave instructions to those confessing the soldiers[50] and others dealt with taxes and the army's financial requirements («car le thresor est semblable à l'estomach des hommes»)[51]. Finally, to exalt discipline, Sailly mentioned the examples of military commanders such as Alessandro Farnese[52] and Archduke Alberto, who had made use of the services of good chaplains like the Jesuit Pedro de Vivero[53].

Having invented catechisms for soldiers, the Jesuits could thus boast—as they did in the *Imago*—that they had created a new ideal of the religious and disciplined *miles christianus*, and at the same time formed the figure of the modern chaplain, showing how to narrate war from the clergy's viewpoint.

[45] Cf. THOMAS SAILLY, *Memorial testamentaire composé en faveur des soldats, premiere partie*, A Lovain, chez Henri Hastens, 1622, pp. 47-61.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 236-248.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 251-254.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 255-257.

[49] *Ibid.*, *Partie seconde*, pp. 32-36.

[50] *Ibid.*, *Premiere partie*, pp. 168 ff.

[51] *Ibid.*, *Partie seconde*, pp. 43-72; *Premiere partie*, p. 259.

[52] *Ibid.*, *Partie seconde*, p. 80.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 124-149.

Chivalric Combat in a Modern Landscape

Depicting Battle in Venetian Prints during the War of the League of Cambrai (1509-1516)

by *Krystina Stermole*

The Italian Wars of the early 16th century are particularly intriguing in the context of this book's exploration of how war has been «narrated» over time because they witnessed not only tumultuous military events, but also the development of a market for news-related print. Texts and images printed in hundreds of copies offered the new possibility of disseminating information about—and interpretations of—contemporary events both rapidly and widely. Many ambitious entrepreneurs thus began experimenting with the creation of printed accounts of recent events, exploiting the news by packaging it as a profit-yielding commodity. Nowhere was the potential for this tested more vigorously than Venice, the city that boasted the most active printing community in all of Europe. This essay explores two large multiblock woodcut prints produced in Venice during the War of the League of Cambrai (1509-1516): a depiction of the Franco-Venetian victory at the Battle of Marignano in 1515 made and published by the printmaker Giovanni Andrea Valvassore with the help of his brother, Florio (fig. 1), and a topographical map of Lombardy indicating the locations of recent battles in the region, including that of Marignano, cut by Lucantonio degli Uberti, a Florentine printmaker working in Venice during the war (fig. 8).

Since these prints seem markedly different at first glance, it is not surprising they have never been explored together before. But the woodcuts actually share a great deal more than the events to which they refer, and the discussion that follows demonstrates how these commonalities offer rare insight into a number of aspects of the dynamic context in which the prints were produced.

First of all, both works present similarly pro-Venetian war narratives, which shed light on how contemporary military events could be visu-

ally represented, and thereby «framed» or interpreted, at the time. As a result, their analysis expands upon recent research into the means and contexts of political expression employed by Venetians who did not belong to the governing patriciate, for the people who made the prints were among these and they designed their works to appeal to a broad consumer base that included them[1]. Secondly, both prints present their content through a combination of textual and visual elements that would have encouraged viewers to consume and interpret them in connection with remarkably diverse communicative contexts ranging from the literary to the geographic. Consequently, they provide valuable evidence of the fluid interconnection of the oral, written, and visual means of early-modern communication being investigated in recent scholarship[2]. The prints' narratives are also presented through an unusual mingling of the same disparate visual languages: both woodcuts draw upon new experimentation with the cartographic conception of space to physically locate the battles they recount while also elevating the protagonists and events of these stories through the employment of older figurative formulae associated with the heroes and exploits of the popular medieval chivalric tradition. The resulting hybrid of cutting-edge and traditional visual genres provides a valuable glimpse into the entrepreneurial approaches of ambitious printmakers in the early 16th century, something that is challenging to explore due to the low survival rate of printed material from the period, especially in the case of large-scale woodcuts[3]; the prints' visual hybridity also constitutes a revealing manifestation of the remarkable confluence of cultural shifts—in the nature and interpretation of modern warfare, in the developing markets

[1] Recent explorations of this theme have addressed oral communication: F. DE VIVO, *Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking Early Modern Politics*, Oxford 2007; E. HORODOWICH, *The Gossiping Tongue: Oral Networks, Public Life and Political Culture in Early Modern Venice*, in «Renaissance Studies», 19, 2005, 1, pp. 22-45; and on the use of the arts as a means of political advancement for non-nobles, see B. DE MARIA, *Becoming Venetian: Immigrants and the Arts in Early Modern Venice*, New Haven CT 2010.

[2] See, for example, the discussion of the intersection of oral communication and print in M. ROSPOCHER - R. SALZBERG, *«El vulgo zanza»: Spazi, pubblici, voci a Venezia durante le Guerre d'Italia*, in «Storica», 48, 2010, pp. 83-120, especially pp. 85, 100 ff.

[3] On the survival rate of large-scale prints, see S. BOORSCH, *The Oversize Print in Italy*, in L. SILVER - E. WYCKHOFF (eds), *Grand Scale: Monumental Prints in the Age of Dürer and Titian*, New Haven CT 2008, pp. 35-51, here pp. 36-37.

of both print and the news, and in the figurative tools employed in the visual arts—that characterized early-16th-century Venice.

In the early 1500s, the rest of Europe's fear about Venice's extensive mainland expansion finally reached a fever pitch[4]. In response, the League of Cambrai formed in 1508, uniting the French, Spanish, English, Germans, and later the pope with the goal of destroying the Venetian republic. The war that ensued after the League's attack in 1509 would last six tumultuous years, with many changes in alliances along the way. Although Venice's experience of the conflict would be marked by more losses than victories, the republic nonetheless survived the war and managed to recover its former mainland holdings.

The last of Venice's important campaigns took place in Lombardy. Lucantonio's and the Valvassore family's prints both relate to the only great victory the Venetians won there, the Battle of Marignano, when a Franco-Venetian alliance defeated the Swiss outside a town near Milan known today as Melegnano[5]. As a result, the French reclaimed Milan, and Venice consolidated its recently reestablished control of its former holdings in the region. Given that many Venetians had perceived the Cambrai War as a divine scourge sent to punish them, they interpreted the victory as proof that they had regained the Lord's approval[6]. In a speech to his people, Doge Leonardo Loredan even called the French king an angel of God[7].

Thanks to the recent boom in the printing industry, war in the 16th century was waged both on the battlefield and in print[8]. Printed texts

[4] On Venice's experience of the Cambrai War, see I. CERVELLI, *Machiavelli e la crisi dello stato veneziano*, Napoli 1974; F. GILBERT, *Venice in the Crisis of the League of Cambrai*, in J.R. HALE (ed.), *Renaissance Venice*, London 1973, pp. 274-292.

[5] On the battle from the perspective of the French, see D. LE FUR, *Marignan: 13-14 septembre 1515*, Paris 2004.

[6] See the description of the victory recorded in M. SANUDO, *I diarii (1496-1533)*, ed. by R. FULIN et al., 58 vols, Venezia 1879-1903, here vol. 21, col. 82, September 16, 1515. In thanks, the government also organized masses, processions, and the distribution of grain to the poor; *ibid.*, cols. 114, 121, September 18, 1515.

[7] *Ibid.*, col. 405, December 20, 1515.

[8] The presses of Venice were particularly active in this regard, but such activity happened throughout Italy; see the news pamphlets gathered in A. QUONDAM et al.

and imagery allowed the production, circulation, and consumption of appealingly biased interpretations of recent political and military events. Lucantonio degli Uberti and the Valvassore family were among the printers to seize the opportunity to explore interest in news-related print, and the mural-size eight-block woodcut depicting the Battle of Marignano by the Valvassore brothers is one of the results (fig. 1).

The woodcut has been little studied to date[9]. The text block in the lower right indicates that it was published by Giovanni Andrea Valvassore, but no one has ever noted before that the print was a family effort[10]: Giovanni Andrea's brother, another woodcutter named Florio, signed the second block from the left in the upper row («FIORIO F[ECIT].»). The work bears no date, and the documentary evidence provides only a *terminus ante quem* of 1539[11]. However, due to its content, medium, and style, the print is usually dated to the year of the battle. Such a date is possible given what we know about the Valvassore brothers' careers—Giovanni Andrea's seems to have begun around 1510 and Florio's definitely had by 1509[12]—although the project would thus have

(eds), *Guerre in ottava rima*, 4 vols, Modena 1989. On printed propaganda connected with Pope Julius II, see M. ROSPOCHER, *Propaganda e opinione pubblica: Giulio II nella comunicazione politica europea*, in «Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico», 33, 2007, pp. 59-99. On French activity, see M.A. SHERMAN, *Political Propaganda and Renaissance Culture: French Reactions to the League of Cambrai, 1509-1510*, in «Sixteenth Century Journal», 8, 1977, 2, pp. 97-128. On Maximilian I's printed wartime propaganda, particularly the figurative woodcuts see L. SILVER, *Marketing Maximilian: The Visual Ideology of a Holy Roman Emperor*, Princeton NJ 2008.

[9] DUC DE RIVOLI - C. EPHRUSSI, *Zoan Andrea et ses homonymes*, in «Gazette des Beaux-Arts», V & VI, 1891, pp. 401-415, here pp. 401-405; A.M. HIND, *An Introduction to a History of Woodcut*, 2 vols, London 1935, here vol. 2, p. 430, n. 5; D. ROSAND - M. MURARO, *Titian and the Venetian Woodcut*, Washington 1976, pp. 32, 36, n. 9; J.R. HALE, *Artists and Warfare in the Renaissance*, New Haven CT 1990, p. 144.

[10] The only surviving impression is in the collection of the Zentralbibliothek in Zurich. Neither A.M. Hind nor David Rosand and Michelangelo Muraro mention Florio's involvement; A.M. HIND, *Introduction to a History of Woodcut*, vol. 2, p. 430, n. 5; D. ROSAND - M. MURARO, *Titian and the Venetian Woodcut*, pp. 32, 36, n. 9.

[11] The print appears in the inventory of the collection of Ferdinand Columbus, who died in 1539; see M.P. MCDONALD (ed.), *The Print Collection of Ferdinand Columbus (1488-1539): A Renaissance Collector in Seville*, 2 vols, London 2004, here vol. 2, pp. 519-520, inv. no. 2815.

[12] Giovanni Andrea and Florio are usually thought of as collaborators from after 1530, because the two worked on book projects together in that period (A.M. SCHULZ,

been an ambitious early work, for multiblock woodcuts were riskier investments due to the time required to cut the blocks and print them[13]. The very fact of the ambition of the print, however, reinforces a date of 1515, for the entrepreneurial risk involved would have been smallest right after the battle, when the relevance and appeal of the print's subject was at its greatest and would likely generate the best return.

The print is dominated by a depiction of the opposing armies engaged in battle. This human event is then located in geographic space by a topographical frame. Balancing out the large depiction of Milan at left, Lodi, Crema, Rivoltella, and Cremona appear around the edges of the right half, where the Po River slices through the action (see figs 2, 3, 4). The figurative battle scene is additionally supplemented by a text block providing a detailed verbal account of the battle and the events that led up to it (fig. 3).

The Valvassore print was a remarkably unique project for its time. Firstly, Venetian mural-size woodcuts were few in number. Secondly, the woodcut is one of only a handful of early-16th-century Italian prints to depict a contemporary battle; as frequent and consequential as the

Giovanni Andrea Valvassore and His Family in Four Unpublished Testaments, in *Artes atque humaniora: Studia Stanislao Mossakowski sexagenario dicata*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 117-25, here p. 117), but there is no evidence disproving any earlier collaboration. Evidence suggests that Giovanni Andrea's career began around 1510 and lasted until his death in 1572; see A.M. SCHULZ, *Giovanni Andrea Valvassore*; L. BAGROW, *Giovanni Andreas di Valvassore*. Even less is known about Florio's activity and career, but one of his monograms («FV») appears in 1509 in an accomplished woodcut of St. George slaying the dragon—a reference to the publisher's name—on the frontispiece of *Accipe studiose lector P. Ouidij Metamorphosin cum luculentissimis Raphaelis Regij enarrationibus* (Venice: Giorgio de Rusconi, May 2, 1509). Unfortunately, the text block's mention of Giovanni Andrea's shop at the Ponte dei Fuseri does not help refine the print's date, for the shop's years of operation are unknown. The only other documentary mention of the shop of which the author is aware appears in a print of Saturn carved by Florio and published by Giovanni in 1544: J.D. PASSAVANT, *Le Peintre-Graveur*, 6 vols, Leipzig 1860-1864, here vol. 5, p. 89. It is also possible that the surviving impression of the print dates from a subsequent printing of the woodblocks, for the use of moveable type in the text block allowed the verbal narrative to be changed for later printings.

[13] On the nature of multiblock designs and the challenges they posed for printers and printmakers by multiblock woodcuts, see D. ROSAND - M. MURARO, *Titian and the Venetian Woodcut*, especially pp. 11, 19; L. SILVER - E. WYCKHOFF (eds), *Grand Scale.*

military clashes of the Italian Wars were, there was little interest in their visual representation in Italy[14]. Decidedly less innovative was the print's figurative style, which reflects little of contemporary experimentation with the pictorial naturalism of the Renaissance style. Although some sense of spatial recession is conveyed through the use of modeling, the dominant effect is one of decorative richness (fig. 2). By bringing everything up to the picture plane and filling every area of the composition with visual detail, the image conveys a pattern-like quality that is further accentuated by the rhythmic stenciling in only three colors and by the exaggerated crowding and overlapping of figures in the battle's fray. There is also an extreme distortion of relative size, whereby the human protagonists and their artillery are given visual focus by dwarfing landscape elements like cities or rivers that in reality are proportionally much larger (see fig. 4).

That the *Battle*'s appearance evoked older visual models such as medieval tapestry rather than contemporary works in the new high Renaissance style becomes particularly evident when the print is compared to some of the cutting-edge imagery produced at the time in the same medium. The great painter Titian, for example, designed a woodcut of the *Submersion of Pharaoh's Army in the Red Sea* (fig. 5) early in his career, shortly before the Battle of Marignano[15]. While the painter must have chosen his subject in part because it possessed an appealing, and hence saleable, contemporary resonance—the Israelites' deliverance was easily interpreted as a parallel for Venice's own survival of the German emperor's recent attack on the lagoon[16]—such an elevated *istoria* also provided the ideal context in which to showcase and promote his

[14] See the extensive exploration of the subject in J.R. HALE, *Artists and Warfare*. The rarity of large-scale prints of battles seems to be clear in the remarkably small number of them appearing in the inventory of the print collection of Ferdinand Columbus, who collected very broadly and without discrimination; M.P. MCDONALD (ed.), *Print Collection*, vol. 1, p. 164. On the depiction of battles in large-scale woodcuts, see S. BOORSCH, *Oversize Print in Italy*, p. 38.

[15] On the date, see D. ROSAND - M. MURARO, *Titian and the Venetian Woodcut*, pp. 70-73.

[16] To make sure this connection was noted, Titian dressed Pharaoh's soldiers as contemporary Germans, among other things; see L. OLIVATO, *La Submersione di Pharaone*, in S. BETTINI (ed.), *Tiziano e Venezia*, Convegno internazionale di studi, Venezia 1976, Vicenza 1980, pp. 529-537, here pp. 535-536.

grandiloquent new style[17], the print's primary purpose. Titian's depiction of the Egyptian army literally engulfed and overwhelmed by powerful waves and roiling clouds marvelously displays the painter's ability to imbue a naturalistically rendered scene with a profoundly affecting psychological intensity.

In the sparse scholarly discussion of the Valvassore *Battle*, the print's old-fashioned appearance seems to be the main reason for the lack of interest shown in it[18]. Comparing the work to one like Titian's, however, is neither logical nor fruitful. The painter's imagery was an attempt to exploit a reproducible medium as a means of inspiring painting commissions from cultured patrons, whereas the Valvassore print was designed to appeal broadly for direct and immediate monetary gain. Far more can be learned from the *Battle*'s conception and design when they are discussed in connection with more like-minded projects—namely, other kinds of news-related print.

In Venice, the cheapest and most abundant printed material recounting the war's events took the form of news leaflets. Unlike the ostensibly objective prose of today's newspapers, these pamphlets presented openly biased accounts of recent events in rhyming verse[19]. They were popular rather than erudite in nature, and evidence in fact suggests that they were an outgrowth of the oral performances of streets singers[20]. The pamphlets' popular character was reinforced by the fact that their composition was often modeled after the most common and well-liked martial tales of the day, the still-fashionable chivalric romances of the

[17] See most recently U. ROMAN D'ELIA, *The Decorum of a Defecating Dog*, in «Print Quarterly», 22, 2005, 2, pp. 119-132.

[18] In their discussion of the woodcut as a medium of artistic innovation and creativity, David Rosand and Michelangelo Muraro mention it only fleetingly as «tapestry-like», and John Hale has criticized the print as «a conventionalizing broadsheet writ large» in an «unfashionable» style, J.R. HALE, *Artists and Warfare*, p. 144; D. ROSAND - M. MURARO, *Titian and the Venetian Woodcut*, p. 32.

[19] A. D'ANCONA, *La poesia popolare italiana*, Livorno 1906, pp. 75-85; A. MEDIN, *La storia della Repubblica di Venezia nella poesia popolare*, Milan 1904, especially ch. 7; M. MESERVE, *News from Negroponte: Politics, Popular Opinion, and Information Exchange in the First Decade of the Italian Press*, in «Renaissance Quarterly», 59, 2006, 2, pp. 440-480; A. QUONDAM et al. (eds), *Guerre in ottava rima.*

[20] R. SALZBERG - M. ROSPOCHER, *Street Singers in Italian Renaissance Urban Culture and Communication*, in «Cultural and Social History», 9, 2012, 1, pp. 9-26.

Middle Ages[21]. The written accounts of news leaflets thus borrowed the romances' lilting *ottava rima* meter, literary style, and narrative topoi. They also frequently incorporated visual cues that broadcast an association with publications of chivalric literature by employing an older gothic typeface rather than the newer roman one[22] (sometimes throughout, more often for just the eye-catching title) or by including generic woodcuts of knightly battle on the title page (figs 6 and 7); in fact, this imagery was sometimes obtained by directly recycling blocks originally cut to illustrate printed romances[23]. A good example is a pamphlet by Teodoro Barbiere that recounts the events of the very same clash referred to in the large woodcuts by Lucantonio and the Valvassore brothers (fig. 7). The pamphlets' echoing of printed romances would have made them accessible, and presumably saleable, to a broad public; it would have also enhanced the leaflets' appeal by casting the protagonists and events of their narratives as martial heroes and legendary exploits, thereby allowing buyers to purchase grand and celebratory accounts of their military victories.

Both the content and the appearance of the Valvassore *Battle* strongly connect it to these contemporary news leaflets. To begin, the lengthy verbal account at lower right (fig. 3) is printed with moveable type rather than being carved directly into the block and presents its title and colophon in gothic type. In addition, the narrative shares the pamphlets' language and tone, beginning with a promise to «satisfy» those seeking a «blow-by-blow» account of the battle and naming the most important military leaders and places involved. This factual account is further enriched by the print's figurative composition, which is richly informative despite its style. The scene clearly identifies the participants, with banners bearing their heraldic arms. Inscriptions single out the victors' leaders—the king of France (lower right) and

[21] A. QUONDAM, *Introduction*, in A. QUONDAM et al. (eds), *Guerre in ottava rima*, vol. 1, pp. 8-9.

[22] On the use of gothic typeface in popular publications, see P. GRENDLER, *Form and Function in Italian Renaissance Popular Books*, in «Renaissance Quarterly», 46, 1993, 3, pp. 451-485, especially 459-461.

[23] In two instances, the borrowings came from printings of the romances *La Trabisonda istoriata* (1492 edition) and the *Aspramonte* (1508 edition); on these V.M. D'ESSLING, *Les Livres à figures vénitiens de la fin du XVe siècle et du commencement du XVIe*, 3 vols in 5 books, Florence 1907-1914, here vol. 2/2, pp. 568-589, cat. nos 2411, 2412.

Venice's commanding general, Bartolomeo d'Alviano (upper right corner; fig. 4)—and all of the various components of contemporary armies appear: infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The image even provides a meaningful emphasis of the strategically important French cannon, whose transport over the Alps via a new route was an incredible feat[24], by including a large number, many in the actual act of firing. Moreover, the work tempers the sense of timelessness of the stylized battle scene by including toponymic indicators that situate the fray in a very real space that has been cartographically defined. But the print echoes the news leaflets in another way also, for at the same time that it conveys an abundance of factual information, its figurative style evokes a similar connection with the medieval romance tradition, and thereby elevates the content's tone and significance.

In asserting the connection between the *Battle* and news leaflets, it is also important to note that Giovanni Andrea Valvassore himself printed a number of the latter over the course of his career[25]. What is more, on at least one occasion he produced printed works of both types narrating the same historical event: his large-scale woodcut depiction of the Turkish siege of Rhodes of 1522 also appears in a much smaller version on the cover page of a news pamphlet he issued recounting the same event[26]. This repetition in different contexts on different scales, and both with and without textual accompaniment, implies that Valvassore saw the two projects as performing a related function and suggests he was experimenting with offering the consumer different types of printed works presenting the same news.

In the light of the evidence, both visual and contextual, it is tempting to suggest that the *Battle of Marignano*'s unique combination of text

[24] On the Alpine crossing D. LE FUR, *Marignan*, pp. 83-89.

[25] A. QUONDAM et al. (eds), *Guerre in ottava rima*, vol. 1, p. 73, cat. no. 95. It should be noted that the source dates the work as ca. 1530 because that is the earliest printed text with a colophon including both Giovanni Andrea's name as publisher and a date is from that year. There is, however, no reason to presume that Valvassore had not already begun publishing work, especially in cases of cheap projects like this one. Too little print has survived, and too little of what has fails to provide the details of its publication.

[26] Giovanni Andrea Valvassore, *Siege of Rhodes*, 1522, multiblock woodcut, ca. 77.5 x 56.8 cm (London, British Library); *El lachrimoso lamento che fa el gran maestro de Rodi* (Venice: Giovanni Andrea Valvassore, 1522).

and image was a creative attempt to please buyers of both categories of printed products by offering a mix of the two. Whatever the case, the *Battle*'s unusual combination of large-scale, old-fashioned figurative imagery with visual topographical markers and a verbal history represents a fascinatingly hybrid work that was both informative and exalting. The question of whether the print was to function more as a contemporary yet elevated account of a recent event or a retrospective commemoration of one from the past is impossible to answer, due to the lack of a secure date for the work.

But experimentation with news-related imagery through the same mixing of visual languages in the monumental woodcut could yield quite different visual results. Mere days after the Battle of Marignano, a ten-block woodcut depicting the region of Lombardy came off the press[27]. Although not a single impression of this work has survived, its appearance seems to have been preserved in a smaller single-sheet copy produced by the Florentine printmaker Lucantonio degli Uberti (fig. 8)[28]. While the Valvassore project's innovation lay in its depiction of a contemporary battle, Lucantonio's work and the massive one it copied were among the first printed maps of Lombardy ever produced[29]. Although the Venetian *Stato da terra* had been mapped in the later 15th century after the government commissioned topographical descriptions of all its mainland holdings in 1460[30], the enterprise yielded hand-drawn works accessible to a privileged few. Printed maps of the Venetian mainland only began to become available to a broader public from the

[27] Fernando Colombo's print inventory records that the print bore the date of September 20, 1515, six days after the battle on the 13 and 14; M.P. McDonald (ed.), *Print Collection*, vol. 2, pp. 570-571, inv. no. 3164.

[28] No proper study of Lucantonio's work has yet been carried out; see P. Kristeller, *Early Florentine Woodcuts*, London 1897, pp. XL-XLV; A.M. Hind, *Early Italian Engraving*, 7 vols, London 1938-48, here vol. 1, pp. 211-214; A.M. Hind, *Introduction to a History of Woodcut*, vol. 2, pp. 452-456; G. Patellani, *Lucantonio degli Uberti*, in «I quaderni del conoscitore di stampe», 20, 1974, pp. 46-50, here pp. 46-47.

[29] Only two earlier hand-drawn maps (extant) and two printed ones of the region (not extant) are known; see R. Almagià, *Monumenta Italiae Cartographica. Riproduzioni di carte generale e regionali d'Italia dal secolo XIV al XVII*, Firenze 1929, pp. 9, 17.

[30] On the commissioning and significance of the maps by the government's Council of Ten, see G. Mazzi, *La Repubblica e uno strumento per il dominio*, in «Architettura e utopia nella Venezia del Cinquecento», Milano 1980, pp. 59-62, here pp. 59-60.

1520s, and little is known about the production and collection of such works before mid century[31].

Lucantonio's map displays a banderole ostensibly identifying its subject as «LONBARDIA», while a colophon in the lower left indicates its authorship and where to buy it[32]. The woodcut presents a richly detailed topographical description of northern Italy, displaying both geographic features, such as lakes, rivers, and hills, and urban centers, which range from tiny hamlets to large cities. The view extends from Milan in the east to Venice in the west, and reaches as far north as Codroipo and south to Reggio Emilia. Inserted within the topographical view, the locations of five battles are also marked by the inclusion of small figurative scenes paired with inscriptions indicating their locations, antagonists, and dates: Fornovo (1494), Agnadello (1509) Padua (1509; fig. 10), Vicenza (1513, though labeled as 1514; fig. 10), and Marignano. Figure 9 shows a detail of the battles of Agnadello and Marignano, respectively labeled as «The battle between King Louis [XII] and the Venetians, 1509» and «The battle of Marignano of King Francis [I] of France against the Swiss, 1515». With Marignano being the latest battle shown, it is reasonable to assume that it was the event that sparked the print's production.

Until now, Lucantonio's work has received remarkably little attention from art historians, for it is usually typologically pigeonholed as a regional map[33]. But while the print presents a leggible topographical representation[34], the relative distances and placement of the elements depicted are not yet cartographically precise, and the artist has used figurative means (small mountains, towns depicted as grouped buildings)

[31] On map production, see D. WOODWARD, *Maps as Prints in the Italian Renaissance*, London 1996, pp. 3, 5; on map collecting, see F. AMBROSINI, *«Descrittioni del mondo» nelle case Venete dei secoli XVI e XVII*, in «Archivio veneto», 1981, pp. 67-79.

[32] «NOVVM LANGOBARDIE OPUS SVNMA DILIGENTIA INMPRESSIT VENETIS LUCAS ANTONIVS DE RVBERTIS APDE PONTE DIVE MOISES CVM GRATIA».

[33] R. ALMAGIÀ, *Monumenta Italiae*, p. 117, pl. XIX; L. LAGO (ed.), *Imago mundi et Italiae: La versione del mondo e la scoperta dell'Italia nella cartografia antica*, 2 vols, Trieste 1992, 2, pp. 253, 256, fig. 12; P. BARBER, *The Maps, Town-Views and Historical Prints in the Columbus Inventory*, in M.P. MCDONALD (ed.), *Print Collection*, pp. 246-262, here p. 257.

[34] It was considered accurate enough to serve as a model for subsequent, more rigorous scale-maps of the region; R. ALMAGIÀ, *Monumenta Italiae*, p. 28.

to mark the view's features rather than the dots and lines of modern maps. Cartography was only in its infancy at the time, and Lucantonio was not primarily a mapmaker: the bulk of his work consisted of woodcut illustrations and autonomous figurative prints[35]. Like other printmakers of his day, he created a «picture-map» rather than a «scale-map»: as cartographic historian P.D.A. Harvey explains, «picture-maps» are «the products of ... artists who would probably have been unable to understand our distinction between those of their works that we call maps and the others that we do not, and who certainly used the same styles for both»[36]. David Woodward coined the term «geographic print»[37] for such works, and this is an appropriate way to describe Lucantonio's design.

The treatment of maps as figurative images had its roots in the medieval tradition of *mappaemundi,* one of which was on public display in Venice's Rialto market from the 14th century[38]. Geographically centered around Jerusalem, these Christian topographical views were enriched with references to biblical events. As descendants of these, late-15th- and early-16th-century maps often glossed information acquired from objective observation or analysis with qualitative information, yielding exercises in what Juergen Schulz has aptly called «moralized geography»[39]. By the turn of the 15th century, humanist interest in Ptolemy's *Geography* was sparking experimentation with printed chorographic descriptions of cities and regions for a broader public. One of the most famous examples, the large bird's-eye view of Venice by the artist Jacopo de' Barbari (fig. 11), was produced about a decade before the Cambrai War.

[35] See above fn. 28, and the scattered references to the artist and his work in M.P. McDonald (ed.), *Print Collection.*

[36] P.D.A. Harvey, *The History of Topographical Maps: Symbols, Pictures and Surveys*, London 1980, pp. 14, 48.

[37] D. Woodward, *Maps as Prints*, especially p. 100.

[38] For an excellent discussion of this development over time, see J. Schulz, *Jacopo de' Barbari's View of Venice: Map Making, City Views, and Moralized Geography before the Year 1500*, in «Art Bulletin», 60, 1978, pp. 425-474. The original execution of the map at the Rialto probably occurred when the market was rebuilt in the 1320s; R. Cessi - A. Alberti, *Rialto*, Bologna 1934, p. 39. The work was restored in 1459; F. Sansovino, *Venetia città nobilissima descritta in XIIII libri*, Venezia 1581, p. 134.

[39] J. Schulz, *Jacopo de' Barbari*, pp. 425-474.

Close study of de' Barbari's work has revealed that although its naturalistic description records much of Venice's appearance, the view has actually been carefully reworked to celebrate certain aspects of the Venetian republic[40]. One of the many examples is how the city's form has been manipulated in order to place Venice's representative politico-religious and economic centers—the Piazza San Marco and the Rialto market—in line with one another at the city's center to create an axis of power. Another is the inclusion of non-topographic details, such as the numerous galley ships peppering the scene and the pagan gods of the sea and commercial activity, Neptune and Mercury, all of which served to underscore and exalt Venice's dominant and profitable relationship with the Adriatic.

Lucantonio's work shares much with de' Barbari's view, for it too pairs objective topographic description with subjectively chosen insertions. As J.B. Harvey has noted, maps in this period must be understood not as «'neutral' or 'value-free' representations», but as «socially constructed perspectives» shaped by both what is shown and what has been omitted—what he calls «silences»[41]. Analyzing Lucantonio's work from this perspective reveals that what does and does not appear transformed the print's chorographic description into a spatial narrative about the contemporary struggle to control territory.

First of all, although the print's title and colophon both identify it as a depiction of Lombardy, the region has been cartographically delimited in an unexpected way. The decision to use Milan and Venice as the spatial brackets framing the view results in the exclusion of many Lombard cities farther east and the inclusion of a vast swath of north-eastern Italy that was not perceived as part of *Longobàrdia,* including the Venetian lagoon. In addition, Lucantonio has marked only certain battlefields. Together, the carefully defined topographic frame and the battles selected for depiction within it do more than merely describe

[40] The studies of the print are too numerous to list here. To see the print in context and comparison with other views of Venice, see G. ROMANELLI - S. BIADENE, *Venezia piante e vedute: Catalogo del fondo cartografico a stampa*, Venezia 1982. For rich studies of de' Barbari's view in particular, see J. SCHULZ, *Jacopo de' Barbari*, and most recently B. WILSON, *The World in Venice: Print, the City, and Early Modern Identity*, Toronto 2005, pp. 25-50.

[41] J.B. HARLEY, *Silences and Secrecy: The Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern Europe*, in «Imago Mundi», 40, 1988, pp. 57-76, here p. 58.

Lombardy or locate military sites. They turn the image into a carefully crafted pro-Venetian martial narrative. How Lucantonio's print literally «frames» the geographic region establishes the story's setting, while the battles it depicts constitute the sequence of events that introduce the dimension of time and identify the main protagonists.

As the view's chosen spatial parentheses, Milan and Venice define the true territory of interest as being not Lombardy, but a specific theater of war: the territories Venice was fighting to reclaim when the print was made. This pro-Venetian interpretation finds reinforcement not only in the orthographic treatment of the map's labels, which clearly reflect local usage and dialect (Louis XII, for example, is referred to using the Venetian equivalent «Alvise» in the inscription associated with the Battle of Fornovo), but also in the fact that all of the battles depicted involved Venice and four of the five transpired during the Cambrai War; furthermore the view's chosen boundaries only just exclude the cities of Novara and Ravenna, where important battles occurred in the same period without Venetian involvement. The celebratory nature of the print's temporal narrative comes into focus when «reading» the depicted events chronologically. The story begins with the Battle of Fornovo of 1494, when the Italian League of Venice temporarily vanquished the French at the beginning of the Italian Wars. It then continues with Venice's rout by the League of Cambrai at Agnadello, its miraculous defense of Padua against the Germans, and its loss at Vicenza to Spanish-German forces. The tale concludes with the Venetian victory at Marignano. With the battles of Fornovo and Marignano as the print's temporal beginning and end, the image becomes a narration of Venetian supremacy in Lombardy. The view's omissions, or silences, also encourage this interpretation, for some of the great military disasters Venice experienced within the map's boundaries do not appear, such those of Polesella and Brescia[42]. In short, by mapping the region's battle scars both spatially and temporally, the print transforms the topographic landscape into a highly selective narration of the military events of the preceding twenty years, one that strategically reconstructs Venice's presence on the mainland over time and thus implicitly yet indelibly

[42] On the rout of the Venetian fleet at Polesella in 1509, see R. FINLAY, *Venice, the Po Expedition, and the End of the League of Cambrai*, in «Studies in Modern European History and Culture», 2, 1976, pp. 37-72; on the sack of Brescia, see G.T. DEGLI ALFIERI (ed.), *Storia di Brescia*, 3 vols, Brescia 1963, here vol. 2, pp. 259-57.

inscribes its continued influence there. The Venetian government evidently approved of what the print was selling, for the print's colophon indicates Lucantonio was allowed to publish the work «cum gratia».

In the light of the interpretation of Lucantonio's map proposed here, it is interesting to note the different sense of Venetian political geography apparent in de' Barbari's pre-war city view. Here the urban centre dominates, and its relationship to the *Stato da terra* is made peripheral by the region's depiction as a thin strip of land along the horizon. This «backgrounding» of the *terraferma* paired with the emphasis of Venice's maritime power through the inclusion of the Roman gods and a profusion of galleys contrasts powerfully with the focus on Venice's presence on the mainland in Lucantonio's work. Scholars have argued that de' Barbari's view provided a well-timed emphasis of Venice's sea-faring roots that would have both helped to assuage growing international displeasure with the republic's expansion on the mainland (which would shortly lead to the formation of the League of Cambrai) and appealed to Venetians who responded to this with nostalgia for their maritime past[43]. If so, then Lucantonio's print likewise responded to contemporary events fifteen years later by transforming the city from a marvel of nature isolated by the waters of its lagoon into a powerful magnetic pole with an extended sphere of political and military influence during the Cambrai War.

But Lucantonio's work draws upon different visual references to enrich or gloss its spatial description. Whereas de' Barbari introduced maritime references, Lucantonio borrowed from the imagery of chivalric battle. The small figurative scenes marking the battle sites are modeled after the illustrations found in printed romances discussed earlier, the very same ones that were often recycled or imitated for cover-page illustrations of news pamphlets and that also influenced the appearance of the Valvassore *Battle* (see fig. 7). The siege of Venetian-held Padua by the German army, for instance, is rendered by the inclusion of the attacking army's military tents encamped outside the city walls (fig. 10), while the clashes appear as stylized encounters of mounted figures (fig. 9). Unlike the figurative content of the Valvassore *Battle*, Lucantonio's imagery adds no factual information whatsoever, but its presence and

[43] B. WILSON, *World in Venice*, pp. 44-45.

appearance would have evoked the same kinds of interpretive connections. By encouraging the viewer to link the print's military events with the context of chivalric tales, it would have subtly conjured a heroic atmosphere that emphasized and further elevated the celebratory nature of the martial narrative. This may have been even more pronounced in the original ten-block map, whose greater size would have allowed the scenes, if they appeared, to be larger. If contemporary viewers did in fact interpret Lucantonio's visual cues as proposed here, then the map of Lombardy can be understood as a narration of events that intermingles borrowings from the same range of sources as the Valvassore *Battle,* but shifts the visual emphasis to the topographic setting. In a way, the geographic print presents a zoomed-out view of the human struggle that dominates the battle woodcut.

One can easily imagine why the makers of these prints felt confident that they would possess a broad appeal. Their pro-Venetian narratives offered the chance not only to learn about Venice's achievements, but also to celebrate them. After all, the nature of the prints as visual images required the spatial depiction of the territory Venice was fighting to control, thus allowing them to inscribe the republic's presence in and posession of the contested landscape of northern Italy in an indelible way. If seeing is believing, then these prints would have been a welcome sight after years of military tumult.

Unfortunately, a lack of evidence about who bought the prints prevents anything more than speculation about their consumption or reception[44]. In theory, the lower cost of monumental woodcuts in comparison to similarly sized painted works and their production in hundreds of copies should have made the prints accessible to a large and varied range of consumers. There is reason to believe that some were seeking a means of responding to the difficult experience of the Cambrai War by means of the possessions they displayed in the representative spaces of their homes. In a speech to his fellow patricians in 1513, Doge Leonardo Loredan lamented that the weapons and armor once displayed in Venetian residences as symbols of the republic's justice and

[44] The only person documented as possessing either work—and he in fact owned both the *Battle* and the original ten-block map of Lombardy that Lucantonio copied—was a Spaniard rather than a Venetian, the print collector Fernando Colombo; see above, fns 11 and 27.



Figure 1. GIOVANNI ANDREA VALVASSORE - FLORIO VALVASSORE, *Battle of Marignano*, c. 1515, woodcut printed from six blocks on six sheets (joined and colored), 56.8 x 155.5 cm (Zentralbibliothek Zürich, Graphische Sammlung und Fotoarchiv).



Figure 2. GIOVANNI ANDREA VALVASSORE - FLORIO VALVASSORE, *Battle of Marignano* (Zentralbibliothek Zürich, Graphische Sammlung und Fotoarchiv), detail: A portion of the battle scene and the city of Lodi.

Figure 3. GIOVANNI ANDREA VALVASSORE - FLORIO VALVASSORE, *Battle of Marignano* (Zentralbibliothek Zürich, Graphische Sammlung und Fotoarchiv), detail: The text block at lower right and the city of Crema and the Po River.

Figure 4. GIOVANNI ANDREA VALVASSORE - FLORIO VALVASSORE, *Battle of Marignano* (Zentralbibliothek Zürich, Graphische Sammlung und Fotoarchiv), detail: The Venetian captain general Bartolomeo d'Alviano and the cities of Crema and Rivoltella.



Figure 5. After TIZIANO VECELLIO (TITIAN), *The Submersion of Pharaoh's Army in the Red Sea*, c. 1514-1515, woodcut printed from twelve blocks on twelve sheets (joined), 118 x 215 cm (Cambridge MA, Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University, courtesy of Harvard Art Museums / Fogg Museum, Gift of W.G. Russell Allen, M12047).



La vera Noua de Bressa de punto in punto come andata. Nouamẽte ipressa.

Purificata virgo che nel tempio
Volesti presentar il tuo figliolo
Sol p nostra salute e nostro exẽpio
Che in te nõ si trouo fallacia o dolo
Aspira al seruo to ignorãte e sẽpio
Da ql tuo venerando e sacro polo
Chio possa dir una felice noua
Di tua virtu chel bel leon rinoua
Ora si Italia gemitosa e stanca
Oppressa da barbari in ogni parte
Che mai pensossi ritrouarsi franca
Ne piu ricuperar le antiche parte
Ma ecco il bel leõ che alza la brãca
Cũ tẽpo: e lassa pax marce e le carte
Dãdo de pilglio a bressa si potẽte
Razendo la al suo stato obediente

El fatto darme del Christianissimo re di Franza contra Sguizari. Fatto a Meregnano appresso a Milano del. M. D. XV. adi. xiii. de Septembre.

O Alma del tuo figlio madre e ſpoſa
Maria del ciel imperio imperatrice
intatta pietra netta e pretioſa
piu che altra caſtiſſima e felice
appreſſo el trino vno amor glorioſa
di lalbor di ſalute alma radice
preſtami gratia alumina mia mente
che infinito piacere dia alla gente

Signor qui non biſogna di Troiani
cantar qui come Paris tolſe Helena
ne come vn tempo i glorioſi Albani
pugnar per Roma e fu tra lor grā pena
ne come venne armati i tre ſoprani
Hannibal Philippo e Re Porſena
ne come Iuba occiſe Curione
che in altra parte mia muſa ne pone

Laſſar intendo Ceſar e Pompeo
Quirino Athene e ruinar Theſſaglia
el don che fece il vecchio Ptolemeo
del qual ne ſeguì tanta trauaglia
che ſpero con lagiuto di Peneo
coſe cantar che non fia di men vaglia
ſe ſtati attenti con vera memoria
daro principio ad vna noua hiſtoria

Correa gli anni mille cinquecento
quindeſe che Ieſu carne humana preſe
del mele de Genar in vn momento
in Franza fu creato vn Re corteſe
di real ſangue pien di ardimento
che mai fu fatto ſimil nel paeſe
dapo che queſto Re ſo incoronato
el ſuo conſiglio preſto hebbe adunato

Adunati che fu ſuo conſiglieri
in piedi el Re ſe fu preſto leuato
e comincio con vn parlare altieri
che mai ſentito fu il piu ornato
cari ſignori miei volentieri
da me ogniun di voi ſara pregato
chi porta fede ala corona mia
con meco vegnira in lombardia

A

Figure 7. Teodoro Barbieri, *El fatto darme del christianissimo re di Franza contra Sguizari. Fatto a Meregnano appresso Milano del MDXV adi XIII de septembre*, Venice?, c. 1515, fol. Ar (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Palat. E.6.5.3.I/14).

Figure 8. LUCANTONIO DEGLI UBERTI, *Map of Lombardy*, c. 1515, woodcut, 53 x 39.5 cm (Roma, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele).



Figure 9. LUCANTONIO DEGLI UBERTI, *Map of Lombardy* (Roma, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele), detail: Battles of Agnadello and Marignano.



Figure 10. LUCANTONIO DEGLI UBERTI, *Map of Lombardy* (Roma, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele), detail: Battle of Vicenza, siege of Padua and view of Venice.



Figure 11. JACOPO DE' BARBARI, *Bird's-Eye View of Venice*, 1500, woodcut printed from six blocks on six sheets (joined), 134 x 280.8 cm (London, British Museum © The Trustees of the British Museum. All rights reserved).

military might had been replaced by frivolous banquet tables[45]. Moreover, sumptuary laws restricting wartime spending on lavish decoration for the home were also enacted[46]. Under such circumstances, Lucantonio's *Map of Lombardy* and the Valvassore *Battle* would have provided affordable yet nonetheless visually impressive solutions; certainly their grand scale—as well as the addition of colored paint in the *Battle*'s case, which made it look more like a painting—would have encouraged the works' visible display[47]. Woodcuts like these may have proven popular and impactful, for a number of large-scale prints would later be produced in connection with the important battle between the Germans and the French outside Pavia in 1525, one of which was apparently by Giovanni Andrea Valvassore[48].

Despite the questions that remain about the prints' owners and use, what can be said with certainty is that the woodcuts' narrative commonalities offer valuable evidence of how some printmakers responded in similar ways to the markets for news and print in wartime Renaissance Venice. Perceiving a demand for imagery celebrating Venetian military successes, Lucantonio and the Valvassore brothers drew upon similar sources and mingled the same disparate visual languages in their search for saleable formulae. Intriguingly, the interconnectedness of their works seems to have been paralleled by numerous intersections in the printmakers' production. Florio Valvassore, for example, would copy a monumental woodcut of St. George killing the dragon by Lucantonio[49], and although Lucantonio issued the copy of the ten-block map of Lombardy, it was Giovanni Andrea who later went on to

[45] M. SANUDO, *Diarii*, 18, cols. 245-246 (October 25, 1513): «... prima ogni casa avea la soa lanziera di arme, cussì è stà disfate e poste tavole di compagni, e confessa lui Principe fo di primi che disfè la lanziera a San Canzian in la soa casa per metter la tavola di la soa festa».

[46] Archivio di stato di Venezia, Provveditori alle pompe, *Decreti* (1334-1689), 1514.

[47] Ferdinand Columbus kept his large prints in rolls, but this was necessary because his collection was so large he could never have displayed even a fraction of it at one time (M.P. MCDONALD, ed., *Print Collection*, vol. 1, pp. 162-164) and he also bought the prints as someone uninvested in the battle's particular significance.

[48] On prints related to Pavia, see J.R. HALE, *Artists and Warfare*, pp. 184-192; P. BARBER, *The Maps*, p. 482. Valvassore's work is not extant.

[49] M.P. MCDONALD (ed.), *Print Collection*, vol. 2, pp. 481-482, cat. nos 2656, 2656a.

become a successful mapmaker[50]. Much more could be learned about the entrepreneurial nature of print culture by seeking out and exploring other instances of overlapping activity and approaches.

The pivotal period in which hybrid works like the ones discussed here were produced, however, was brief. In time, the science of mapmaking was refined, and the decorative figural language of the chivalric Middle Ages was finally eclipsed by the naturalism and grandeur of the Renaissance style. As a result, the Valvassore *Battle* and Lucantonio's *Map of Lombardy* provide rare and valuable evidence of a fleeting transitional moment marked by the confluence of momentous developments in the nature and experience of war, the figurative arts, and the distinct but overlapping markets for news and print.

[50] On Giovanni Andrea's activity as a mapmaker, see L. BAGROW, *Giovanni Andreas di Vavassore: A Venetian Cartographer of the 16th Century. A Descriptive List of His Maps*, Jenkintown 1939; R. ALMAGIÀ, *Il mappamondo di G.A. Valvassore*, in «Rivista geografica italiana», 27, 1920, pp. 17-30.

Part II
Narrating Modern War

Beyond Glory? Writing War

by *Jay Winter*

Writing about war encompasses all literary traditions, in the same way as configuring war traverses the centuries since Lascaux, and just as filming war has been imbedded in the medium ever since the first moving pictures were made. All are imaginative leaps aimed at transmitting something both ubiquitous and hard to grasp. The cultural history of war is the sum of these efforts, among others, these signifying practices through which we have tried to see and to make sense of those forms of collective violence we call war.

Since 1900, this effort has become more difficult. The institutions of war have mutated and so have literary, figurative, and filmic efforts to capture some of its multiple meanings. As war has changed, so have the stories and images we create about it.

In a field as vast as this one, modesty is a necessary response to the sheer scale of the subject. No one historian alone can write of war since 1900; all we can do is look at how some of its features have been filtered through the works of imagination it has provoked and precipitated. Samuel Johnson liked to say that every time he trudged up the steep slopes of a moral problem, he passed Plato coming down the other side. In the field of war studies, there is no Plato, partly because, war, like a mutant virus, keeps changing its forms and technology keeps multiplying its cruelties. I prefer to adopt an uncertainty principle here, making clear that what I offer are small flares to lighten up a very dark landscape. Fernand Braudel once wrote that we know as little of war as we know of the true nature of matter. He was right, but it is evident that we must still try to understand it anyway, to show anyone who will listen or look the shape and horror of the plague that it is.

What we know of war, I argue, is always mediated knowledge and feeling. The event itself, what Walt Whitman called the «red thing», the actual killing, is beyond us. We need lenses to filter out some of its blinding, terrifying light in order to see it at all. I want to draw at-

tention to these lenses as the elements, which make understanding war possible at the same time as they limit and at times distort what we see.

One such element is linguistic in a straightforward sense. My argument is that language frames memory. I believe that whatever language we utter, we speak differently of war. I take English and French as my points of reference. Those learned in other languages can test this hypothesis easily enough. My claim is that languages of war, like those of peace, are neither interchangeable nor are they transparently equivalent. Each brings its history, its music, its memory of the past with it. We have many languages of war, and once we realize that, we can register the uncomfortable fact that the mountain of literature we have about war is one of the real towers of Babel of our time.

I will try to persuade you that language frames memory by addressing one question, which highlights such linguistic and cultural differences. The question is this: why does Britain have Great War «war poets» understood as a compound noun, while all other combatants have poets who wrote about war, individually and not collectively? The answer in part, I believe, lies in the different connotations and denotations of the word «glory» in different languages. That is the key to my argument.

Once again, I emphasize the tentative nature of these claims. No one can capture war within his grasp or even imagine it fully in his mind. But we can and must recognize the astonishingly varied way people have tried to convey some of its nearly hypnotic power, that uncontrollable avalanche of violence which is still there. Remember, Trotsky was said to have remarked, you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you. We must return the compliment.

So my inquiry, simply framed, is directed at providing an answer to this conundrum: why is it that a selection of British war poetry written during or about the 1914-1918 conflict still serves, a century later, as a British cultural archive of popular images and phrases associated not only with that war, but with war as such? Archives are always selective, and this one is no exception. By no means was all war poetry written by trench soldiers, and by no means did all trench poetry enter the canon, but over time, a loosely defined set of such poems took on a metonymical function; the part stood for the whole. Why and how did this happen?

One reason that this small selection of soldiers' war poetry became iconic is that it struck then as now a popular chord. It captured a sense, widely-, though not universally-shared after the Armistice, that the war was an exercise in futility, and that older languages of grandeur and glory had be recast in the light of what soldiers saw and felt during that war. That recasting is in part the achievement of war poetry. In effect, what the British war poets did was to clean up the English language, degraded by propaganda and civilian euphemism concerning events and cruelties most people at home could hardly imagine. War poetry brought the language of industrialized war down to earth, down to the muddy terrain of the Western front, and thereby provided a specifically British poetic pathway beyond glory. Below, I will suggest that slow but measurable changes in the British language of glory—as opposed to the French or the Irish—provided the framework for their work and for its resonance, its lingering appeal.

In no other country did the vast array of poetry produced during the Great War yield such a discrete body of materials which came to constitute for Britain what Jan Assmann has termed a repository of «cultural memory». Here is his understanding of the term:

«Cultural memory has its fixed point; its horizon does not change with the passing of time. These fixed points are fateful events of the past, whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance). We call these 'figures of memory'»[1].

In countless cities, villages, and towns in Britain and Northern Ireland, such «recitation, practice and observance» time and again has linked the words of the war poets with public remembrance of the Great War. It is in this sense that we can speak of a body of poetry written by soldiers of the Great War as having provided a kind of «cultural memory», a timeless register of terms and images through which later generations still frame their understanding of the 1914-1918 war and its aftermath. My claim is that what Jan Assmann terms «cultural memory» operates differently in different languages.

It is partly in language, and partly in history more generally, that we can find part of the answer to the question as to why is there voluminous poetry about the 1914-1918 conflict scattered throughout the world,

[1] J. ASSMANN - J. CZAPLICKA, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, in «New German Critique», 65, 1995, pp. 125-133.

but «war poetry», understood as a compound noun, a discrete corpus of writing, only in Britain? A journey across the Irish Sea may offer some hint of an answer to this question.

In 1936, William Butler Yeats explained the omission of the poetry of Wilfred Owen from his Oxford Book of Modern Verse in these terms:

«I have a distaste for certain poems written in the midst of the great war; ... The writers of these poems were invariably officers of exceptional courage and capacity, one a man constantly selected for dangerous work, all, I think, had the Military Cross; their letters are vivid and humorous, they were not without joy—for all skill is joyful—but felt bound, in the words of the best known, to plead the suffering of their men. In poems that had for a time considerable fame, written in the first person, they made that suffering their own. I have rejected these poems for the same reason that made Arnold withdraw his 'Empedocles on Etna' from circulation; passive suffering is not a theme for poetry. In all the great tragedies, tragedy is a joy to the man who dies; in Greece the tragic chorus danced»[2].

When he learned that some were shocked at the exclusion, he elaborated on his Olympian disdain for Owen, calling him «all blood, dirt & sucked sugar stick» and judging him to be «unworthy of the poets' corner of a country newspaper». He famously concluded: «There is every excuse for him but none for those who like him»[3].

The «excuse» for him and for those who admired him in Britain was that Owen's work operated within a linguistic grammar and register of emotion different from that of Yeats and many other writers in Ireland and on the Continent. This is not to say that there was only one voice in which either Yeats or other Irish poets spoke on this subject; it is rather that the shadings of meaning read into war differed in Ireland and in Britain, for the simple reason that their histories and their language diverged in important ways. The same, I believe, is true of French writers. The point here is to highlight what was particularly British by stepping outside of its literary and historical boundaries[4]. When we do so, we can see that the British register of what came early on to be termed «war poetry» moved «beyond glory», or in Yeats's language, beyond the «tragic joy» he believed to be at the heart of poetry[5]. «Tragic joy»

[2] W.B. YEATS, *Oxford Book of Modern Verse*, Oxford 1936, p. XXXIV.

[3] *Letters on poetry from W.B. Yeats to Dorothy Wellesley*, London 1940, p. 113.

[4] Thanks are due to Sarah Cole for her comments here and elsewhere.

[5] R. FOSTER, *W.B. Yeats. A Life. The Arch-Poet*, vol. 2, Oxford 2003, pp. 555-558.

was not the register of Owen or of much of British war poetry, because life in the trenches had blown such notions to pieces.

Yeats' choice paradoxically highlights the character of much British poetry of the Great War and the reasons why a socially constructed corpus of work became central to the way later generations in Britain have imagined the 1914-1918 conflict. The war poets pointed to a way beyond glory, at the very moment the word had lost its purchase in describing the fate and fortune of the men who had fought in the Great War. That was their achievement, and the reason their work has had such enduring resonance among generations of readers.

The significance of this poetic archive of the war is independent of the representative character of the writers or of their views. Much ink has been spilled unnecessarily in challenging the view of the war poets' words as misleading in constructing the way «ordinary soldiers» saw the war[6]. Skeptics argue that Owen and company did not share the working-class attitudes of the overwhelming mass of soldiers who served in the ranks. Such men, they hold, had lived difficult lives, and living in a ditch in Flanders was not fundamentally different from living in urban or rural poverty before 1914. They were proud of their war service, and did not shrink from boasting about it. Whether or not these claims are true is beside the point. What matters is that the words of the war poets reverberated; and millions of readers have been drawn to their work, still in print long after the Armistice. What the Germans term «Rezeptionsgeschichte» matters[7]. Cultural archives are selective by nature; inclusion and exclusion reflect very broad trends in the consumption as well as in the production of texts, independent of their authors. Unlike the «Auden generation»[8] or artistic circles like the Fauves or the impressionists, many war poets died before they could have had a say about being placed in a group of fellow soldier-writers. That the British war poets have entered the English-language cultural archive is indisputable. The question that follows is why there and not elsewhere?

[6] C. BARNETT, *A Military Historian's View of the Great War*, in *Essays by Divers Hands. Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature*, NS, 36, 1970, pp. 1-18.

[7] G. GRIMM, *Rezeptionsgeschichte: Grundlegung einer Theorie: mit Analysen und Bibliographie*, München 1977.

[8] S. HYNES, *The Auden Generation: British Writing in the 1930s*, London 1988.

One answer is that the British war poets spoke a certain kind of English, a poetic language that was precisely that—English, rather than French, or German, or Irish or American English. In this part of his work, Yeats, who after all wrote his own war poetry, had his own views about modernism which made him dislike Owen among others, and spent a good deal of the war in London, nonetheless inhabited a poetic and literary space closer to that found in France than to that found in Britain during and after the war[9]. Many Irish and French writers still saw «glory» in war, in part because it was still possible to use that rhetoric and for two principle reasons. Writers in both countries had at their disposal an older revolutionary rhetoric, which they adapted to the issues of the day, and secondly, Roman Catholicism kept the notion of «glory» alive among communicants and freethinkers alike in both civil war Ireland and Republican France, but not in Britain in the same way or to the same degree.

When Yeats wrote of the men of the 1916 insurrection, he claimed that «a terrible beauty is born». In doing so, he was speaking out of a romantic tradition of 19th-century insurrections alive not only in Ireland but also in France. Here is Victor Hugo's paean to glory in his 1831 poem *Chants du crépuscule*, honoring those who died in the revolution of the previous year:

«Ceux qui pieusement sont morts pour la patrie
Ont droit qu'à leur cerceuil la foule vienne et prie.
Entre les plus beaux noms leur nom est le plus beau.
Toute gloire près d'eux passe et tombe éphémère;
Et, comme ferait une mère,
La voix d'un peuple entier les berce en leur tombeau»[10].

That revolutionary language had little resonance in Britain, nor did the Catholic romanticism of Padrick Pearse and his brethren. War poetry in England had the room to move beyond glory because British political, religious, military, and literary traditions created an entirely different cultural environment out of which a variety of poetic and prose reflections of the Great War emerged.

[9] I am grateful to Nicholas Allen for his advice on this point. See his *Modernism, Ireland and Civil War*, Cambridge 2009.

[10] V. Hugo, *Œuvres complètes: Les Feuilles d'automne. Les Chants du crépuscule. Les Voix intérieures. Les Rayons et les Ombres*, Paris 1909, vol. 17, pp. 203-204.

I want to suggest, therefore, that the French word «gloire» is not the same as the English word «glory», and that the difference may arise in part from history and from the distinction between Catholic and Protestant usages and connotations. Here is a plaque from the village church at Auvers-sur-Oise, a church made immortal by Van Gogh's rendering of it. The plaque (fig. 1) captures the voice of the village priest:



Figure 1. *Monument aux morts*, parish church Auvers sur l'Oise.

«Hommage d'affectueuse reconnaissance à mes chers enfants que j'ai élévés dans l'amour de Dieu et du Patrie, ils sont tombés glorieusement au champ d'honneur.

Gloire à DIEU!
Gloire à notre France immortelle!
Gloire ici base et là Haut à ceux qui sont morts pour elle.
Ceux qui pieusement sont morts pour la Patrie
Ont droit qu'à leur tombeau la foule vienne et prie,
Entre les plus beaux noms leur nom est le plus beau!
Reposez en paix, mes chers enfants.
Dormez dans la gloire!!!
Votre vieux Curé bien fier de vous,
Qui n'a jamais désespéré de la victoire».

I hesitate to translate this passage, since my intention is to compare and not to ridicule. It is evident that the curé is drawing both on his faith and on Victor Hugo's poetry, in particular his *Chants du crépuscule* of July 1831, honoring those who died in the revolution of the previous year, and who were illuminated in the light of the glory of the revolutionary tradition.

To be sure, in a single essay I have to be very selective in presenting evidence of a different Anglo-Saxon turn of mind. I ask you to trust me that the vicar of Auvers-sur-Oise used words found in hundreds of war memorials throughout France, and that the following image is one that can be found scattered throughout the archipelago of Imperial (now Commonwealth) War Graves cemeteries. It is the phrase chosen by the parents of one British soldier who died in the northern part of the Gallipoli peninsula, during the landing at Suvla Bay in the summer of 1915. The parents of J.M. Brown, of the Derbyshire Regiment, who died there, declared his death was «not [for] glory, but [for] a purpose». The war poets captured this significant shift in ways vernacular English framed the carnage of the First World War (fig. 2).

Let me move to another register entirely and add some statistical evidence in support of my argument about British attitudes to and reference to «glory». Together with a consortium of universities, Google has created a unique statistical database, composed of 6,000,000 books produced between 1800 and 2000, every page of which has been scanned in machine-readable form. We can search these two billion words easily, through Google N-grams, or graphs, where N means the number of occurrences in print of a particular word in a particular year. User-friendly software enables us to compare the frequency of the



Figure 2. *Not glory but a purpose*, family inscription Suvla Bay, Gallipoli.

use of different words over time in a very large corpus of published books[11]. I present three comparisons: one for the word «gloire» in French over the period 1900 to 1930, and a second for the word «glory» in British English books over the same period. The upward inflection in the recourse to «gloire» contrasts strikingly with the slow decline in the use of the word «glory» in British English. In the second set of graphs, the contrasts show the same pattern, though set against the years 1900-2000. The peak of «gloire» in French in the whole of the 20th century is during the Great War; in contrast, «glory» in British English has declined in virtually a linear fashion from the Victorian years to the present. If we look to the *longue durée*, we can see other variations. Over 1800-2000, «glorious» is more robust than «glorieux»,

[11] J.-B. MICHEL et al., *Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books*, in «Science», 331, 2011, pp. 176 ff.

and the Napoleonic peak of «gloire» anticipates Victorian «glory» before both enter their long decline, interrupted in French by a rise in «gloire» during the Great War.

To be sure, the presence of a word in a book does not describe its weight or its significance, but these data are consistent with my argument that language patterns vary over time and in different linguistic spaces, and so do the way different languages encode widely disseminated messages both about war in general and about the Great War in particular (figs 3-8). In a nutshell, language frames memory.

This decline in references to glory in British books is matched by a decline in the use of other similar signifiers: «empire» and «imperial» declined from the 1880s on; so did «honour», «bravery», and «courage», along with «crown», «monarchy», «King» and «Queen». This is not to say that Britain was any less an imperial monarchy in 1920 than in 1880; it is just that the language of imperial and monarchical grandeur appeared in published books in Britain less in the early 20th century than before, and that that decline continued throughout the century. Going beyond glory was, as it were, in step with the times, at least as measured by the written and published word.

My argument, then, is that the war poets helped to disseminate a non-glorious lexicon about war. The ground had been prepared for them to do so. «Glory be to God for dappled things», wrote Gerard Manley Hopkins in 1883. The word «glory» very frequently operated in a sacred register. The war poets took the language of the Bible and turned it to new uses in their meditations on war. They did not turn away from Scripture, or from romantic tropes, but refashioned them in order to frame an angry indictment of those who let the war go on[12].

Nothing like the King James Version of the Bible exists in France, where a divided nation shared two robust yet contradictory traditions—the Catholic and the French Revolutionary tradition. Each had its own rhetorical life in 19th-century France, and each had its own version of glory at its core. In contrast, by 1900, despite pride in the Empire, and the literature of the Raj, glory was becoming an outmoded, even an archaic, word in England, conjuring up martial images, to be sure, those

[12] J. WINTER, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*, Cambridge 1995, chap. 8.

Figure 3. Glory and glorious, 1900-1930



Figure 4. Gloire and glorieux, 1900-1930



Figure 5. Glory and glorious, 1900-2000



Figure 6. Gloire and glorieux, 1900-2000



Figure 7. Glory and glorious, 1800-2000



Figure 8. Gloire and glorieux, 1800-2000



of Crispin Crispian's day in Henry V, of Gloriana, the first Elizabeth, and the Glorious Revolution. All once glorious perhaps, but hardly the signature (outside of Protestant Ireland) of a trading nation without a standing army, and whose powerful navy had the great advantage of doing her work at sea and abroad. Perhaps the Crimean war had knocked the stuffing out of the word «glory», despite Tennyson's six hundred; the first war photographs and reports of the shocking sanitary conditions of army encampments in *The Times* trampled on notions of «glory», as did much of Kipling's words about Tommy Atkins. There were many words one could use about the Boer war of 1899-1902, but «glory» or «glorious» is not one of them, except in the gentle mockery of Gilbert and Sullivan about who was or was not an English man. In the Edwardian period, conscription was the mad dream of a small group of Conservatives, and military service in no way constituted a pillar of citizenship, as it did in France. When Elgar and Benson wrote «Land of Hope and Glory» in 1902, they were trying to revive a set of images and impulses slowly but surely fading away.

The contrasting history of the two countries lay behind the fact that the French word «gloire» is not in any meaningful sense the equivalent of the English word «glory». In 1914, the two words carried different associations and had very different echoes. True the Royal anthem spoke of the King as «happy and glorious», but I suspect that that choice of words arose out of finding a suitable partner to «victorious»; the alternatives are appalling—vainglorious, uxorious, stentorious, and so on. In addition, church rhetoric was fading as political rhetoric in Britain. There was in late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain a movement away from church attendance which caused the Anglican Church no end of worry. There was a similar decline in the number of parishioners taking mass in France every Sunday, but in Britain, the language of politics was less and less about religious sentiment and more about social class[13]. The Dreyfus affair ensured that Catholicism and Republican values remained at war until 1914.

My claim, therefore, is that the war poets wrestled with the notion of «glory»; indeed, they wrestled it to the ground in ways that did not happen elsewhere. Glory has a history, and so do the attitudes, which

[13] G. STEDMAN JONES, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982*, Cambridge 1983.

lay behind it. That history is different in Britain, France, and Ireland. And in a host of other countries too. My linguistic competence limits me to a small part of Western Europe, but my claim is broader and open to interrogation. Changes in English usage, I claim, made the language of British war poetry ring true in Britain. It is hardly surprising, I believe, that it has taken a full century to get some British war poetry into French, and then only partially. French war poetry works differently, because the language of glory was and to a degree is still alive. Not so in Britain. It is in these subtle cultural differences that I seek an explanation for the fact that while there is a substantial corpus of poetic works written by French soldiers during and after the war, there is no such thing as a group of «war poets». Fighting on French soil, French writers remained within the orbit of glory. Some British poets, now canonized as «the war poets», went beyond it.

In the tradition of Reinhard Koselleck and *Begriffsgeschichte*, or the history of concepts[14], I will stake my claim that «glory» and «gloire» operate in different semantic systems, carry different connotations, redolent with images and emotions arising out of different revolutionary and religious contexts. The literary and mental furniture many British soldiers brought with them to the front was not the same as that French or German soldiers carried with them. True enough, British soldiers had a reservoir of swashbuckling tales of imperial conflict from which to draw, and many could recite Kipling's verse «though I've belted you and flayed you, by the living God that made you, you're a better man than I am Gunga Din». But the Raj was a long way from the Somme and Passchendaele; «glory» was the stuff of other times, other places, other nations, with other histories and other sacred texts.

To be sure, British war poetry is not one thing; it emerged in stages, over time. But it is still true that the move beyond «glory» in war poetry marks a boundary between British and Continental poetic responses not only to the Great War, but to other wars. In France twenty years later, there was Resistance poetry, which to an extent had a collective character, in part arising out of the strength of the Communist party and the role it played in the *Maquis*. But in 1914-18, even when the invasion of France gave every reason for Frenchmen to view the war

[14] R. KOSELLECK (ed.), *Historische Semantik und Begriffsgeschichte*, Stuttgart 1979.

as a calamity inflicted on them by Germany, there still was no outburst of soldiers' poetry which turned into a collective body of work.

The language of glory is undercut by dissent. And dissent during the war was much more muted in France than in Britain. With military service as the price of citizenship from 1848 on, refusal to serve was tantamount to betraying the sovereign people. Not so in Protestant Britain, where the strength of the call to arms in 1914 and 1915 was that it was voluntary. And when the need for men made conscription necessary, provision was made for those who could not in conscience bear arms and take the lives of other men. Here too we find a distinct contrast between British and French military practices and traditions. In France, the notion of conscientious objection was virtually unknown in 1914, and remained so throughout the century. In Britain, the dissenting tradition was robust, and in both world wars, objections on grounds of conscience were duly recognized in law, when they arose from undisputable transcendental or clear religious convictions.

The war poets were dissenters in another sense, one which arose out of moral considerations rather than religious ones. In a secularizing nation, the war poets reconfigured conscience outside of conventional faith. Their secular beliefs and their eyes led them to indict the war and the men who allowed it to go on for 50 bloody months.

It is important to note that the war poets were not pacifists; if they had been, they would not have been in uniform. Their active service gave them the moral authority to denounce that war, and the suffering it caused. Their references to shell shock are part of their dissenting legacy. A war which, by its very industrialized nature, drove perfectly sane men mad was one which had redefined what bravery and honor meant. A new «anatomy of courage», in the words of Charles Moran, had to be described, and the war poets did so, bearing in mind the faces of «those whose minds the dead have ravaged», in Wilfred Owen's phrase. War poetry helped introduce the term «shell shock» into the lexicon of war, where it remains to this day. Not so elsewhere. Iconic language is language, which finds a niche in the vernacular. What better instance of this is there than the British war poets' reference to the awkward, puzzling, frightening, and, stigmatized category of psychological injury in war? Revealingly, there is no equivalent French poetic or other literary response to the recognized medical category of shell shock; «choc traumatique» simply does not carry the same connotations.

It is important to repeat the injunction that Owen, Sassoon, Gurney, Rosenberg did not write as a group. Furthermore, none of the war poets had the slightest idea they were writing canonical texts; that was not the way they were written, but it is the way they have been read, taught, mastered, set to music, and passed on to younger generations. Even in the 21st century, after every single soldier who fought in the war had died, the war poets still are quintessentially English figures. They are indeed among Jan Assmann's «figures of memory»: the sentinels of the two minute silence of Armistice Day. They seem to stand guard over the nation's acknowledgement, or active knowledge, its re-cognition, its eternal return to and remembrance of the catastrophe of 1914-1918.

One puzzling question is why the Second World War did not produce its company of British war poets? There were those who left poetry of great power and technical skill, but the collectivity «war poets» we have described emerging out of the 1914-1918 has no British analogue for the Second war. One explanation is that poetry is a form of commemoration, and British commemoration after 1939 suffered from a particular problem. First World War writing and commemorative sculpture was bathed in the language of never again; those who gave their lives did so, in order that their children would not have to do so in their turn. And then Hitler made «never again» vanish into thin air. «Never» lasted 21 years, and thereafter war casualties were heavier among civilians in Britain than in the military, at least until D-Day in 1944.

This sense of a disappointed anti-war spirit may help us understand why Second World War commemoration, and English poetry within it, returned to the Great War poets. The war against Japan was a more complex subject, with racial and imperial overtones, but the victory over Hitler was both one which had to be won with gritted teeth and the consequences of which had to be endured. The language of that endurance was already there: the Great War poets had provided it.

And so it was perfectly natural that when Benjamin Britten, a pacifist composer, wrote his *War Requiem* for the re-consecration of Coventry Cathedral in 1962, he would turn to the poetry of Wilfred Owen to complement and renew sacred texts. In the midst of *Requiem aeternum*, right at the start, we hear a tenor rendering «What passing bells for these who die as cattle? / Only the monstrous anger of the guns». Then in the *Dies irae*, the baritone recites: «Bugles sang, saddening the evening air; / And bugles answered, sorrowful to hear». In the

Offertorium, we find Owen's Abraham, whose hand was not stayed by an angel, «but slew his son, and half the seed of Europe one by one». In the *Libera me*, we hear Owen's «strange meeting» with «the man he killed». This braiding together of the Latin *Missa pro defunctis* with fragments of Owen's poetry was not only extraordinarily powerful, but it gave a new impulse to the afterlife of the «war poets», just in the run-up to the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of war in 1914, a moment from which a new «memory boom» devoted to the Great War was about to take off[15].

On Armistice Day 1985, a plaque was placed in poet's corner in Westminster Abbey to 16 men who wrote war poetry about and during the Great War[16]. What better representation is there of the canonization of the war poets? School curricula have ensured that the younger generation has the chance to be exposed to this «cultural archive» of the nation's past. In 2012, one of the four awarding bodies responsible for the Advanced level course in English literature offered students «World War One literature» as one of four options from which they could choose for the examination[17]. Other awarding bodies offered similar options on war poetry for A-level pupils in English literature[18]. Web sites of sixth-form colleges present syllabi and reading materials for those who make this choice[19]. Many similar instances can be cited. To be sure, a common education may be a body of learning we have all forgotten over time. But it is the music of the words, the cadences of the poems, which linger, at times subliminally, at times with direct effect, long after schooldays. And those sounds and gestures, half remembered, half forgotten, help us to see how deeply imbedded the

[15] J. WINTER, *Remembering War: The Great War between History and Memory*, New Haven CT 2006.

[16] In alphabetical order: Richard Aldington, Laurence Binyon, Edmund Blunden, Rupert Brooke, Wilfrid Gibson, Robert Graves, Julian Grenfell, Ivor Gurney, David Jones, Robert Nichols, Wilfred Owen, Herbert Read, Isaac Rosenberg, Siegfried Sassoon, Charles Sorley, Edward Thomas.

[17] January 2012 1741/2741 English Literature A (AS and A2), http://www.aqa.org.uk/qualifications/a-level/english/english-literature-a.php

[18] Unit F661, http://www.wjec.co.uk/uploads/publications/8144.pdf

[19] Just one instance among many: http://www.tomlinscote.surrey.sch.uk/documents/6thFormCoursesBooklet-Sept2012.pdf

poetry of the Great War is in the ways substantial numbers of men and women think about their country's past.

In conclusion, it may be useful to tie some of these threads together and to speculate yet again on the peculiarities of the English. One explanation for the English *Sonderweg* is the extent to which the classics and literature dominated elite education in the period prior to the Great War. Rhetoric, usually classical rhetoric, the historian of education Antoine Prost tells us, was more central to the curricula of the public schools of England than to the great *Lycées* of France or the *Gymnasia* of Germany. Partly, this was a function of educational reforms. In France, the Third Republic added geography and history as focal points of the school curricula, and thereby lessened the time and space left for the classics. In Germany, the sciences had a position in the school curricula and in university life that was superior to that in her competitors'.

But there is a more directly political matter which may have been decisive. The outcome of the war, and its staggering human costs, left deeper and more lingering doubts in Britain as to the meaning of victory. Frenchmen and women had little doubt as to the justice and necessity of expelling from their land an invading army which treated the captive population the way all invading armies had done before. The meaning of victory was less troubling too in parts of the Dominions. Soldiers who had fought for Australia and Canada by fighting for Britain retained their laurels as the founding fathers of their allied though more fully independent nations.

Among defeated countries, the meaning of the war was hardly ambiguous. Two million German soldiers had died for nothing; the same was true for one million men who died while serving the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Italian nationalists were outraged at their treatment at Versailles, where, despite the loss of 600,000 men, their territorial ambitions were thwarted.

In other cases, defeat led to a heroic new lease on national life. In post-Ottoman Turkey, a proud national movement under Ataturk arose directly and heroically out of the ashes of defeat. And the acceptance of defeat at Brest-Litovsk gave the Bolshevik regime the space and time it needed to assure its existence by winning the civil war and establishing in its wake the USSR. Muscular militarism may have been the enduring legacy of the war and its post-war upheavals in Eastern Europe.

Only in Britain did the debate about what the war had achieved stimulate such ambivalent attitudes. To Ted Hughes, the war was a defeat around whose neck someone hung a victory medal. The shock of war losses was so severe that the notion of a Pyrrhic victory made sense. No nation could survive another such episode in gallant sacrifice. And once the early economic troubles of the 1920s turned into the inter-war depression, once the brotherhood of arms turned into the embitterment of the General Strike of 1926, then what possible benefit the British people had gained from their victory became a question without an answer. War poetry expressed this ambivalence. It was proud, elegiac, angry, dedicated to protecting from trivialization the memory of men pushed beyond the limits of human endurance in a war, which placed metal against men and assured that the men would lose. It offered a semi-sacred epitaph to the Lost Generation, and offered it up to the nation not only as a memorial but as a powerful if vague explanation of why Britain, once a great power, had become a country with a great future behind it. War poetry was pessimistic history, nostalgic history, elegiac history, written in a language that has endured. It is in no sense the only register in which images of war have been passed on from generation to generation, but it is there, still. It has provided generations of schoolchildren with a language for family history, their family's history, a history of pride and of wounds, wounds that have never healed. It is to war poetry that we must turn to understand why commemorating the Great War in 2014, a century after the outbreak of the conflict, still has a taste as of ashes to it[20].

In the space of this essay, I cannot possibly offer you an interpretive guide to all war writing. My aim has been much more modest. It is to show in one particular case that language matters, here as elsewhere, and language, while inflected by regional, ethnic, and social class distinctions, is a national resource, through which groups of people tell stories about their past and other groups of people listen to them over time. As such, my conclusion is that the phrases «glory» or «la gloire», «the Great War» alongside «la Grande Guerre», are national speech acts, with very different connotations, and remain among those untranslatable terms which tells us who we are.

[20] As, at long last, it finally does in Ireland; see S. BARRY, *On Canaan's side*, London 2011; J. HORNE (ed.), *Our War*, Dublin 2010.

«Small Soldiers»: When Children Kill

by *Carine Trevisan*

In *Lord of the Flies*, a novel published in 1954, William Golding imagines what can happen to civilized children (they are British) when left to fend for themselves on an island after they have been shipwrecked in a context of aerial warfare. They quickly regress to an archaic way of life, devoted to their immediate survival (eating, finding shelter). Some of these children quickly become killers, starting with animal hunts, which evolve into manhunts. The children start killing each other. In *Le Grand Cahier* (published in 1986), Agota Kristof also writes about child killers in a war context. These very frightening children, who over-invest the constantly threatening, external reality to the detriment of their internal world, reject any expression of their feelings, seeming to have no inner life. With it's chilling writing style (the book has been qualified as an «exercise in cruelty»), this text takes devastated childhood to the most extreme degree, to the point where it becomes disquieting: the disappearance of the ability to dream, to imagine, anesthetized emotional life, destruction of anything that can create a link to the other, hence insensitivity to death, whether it be taken or given[1].

These texts question the Rousseauist conception (dating back to the 18th century) of childhood innocence, and reflect the psychoanalytical hypotheses according to which childhood is the very age of perversity and cruelty (Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*)[2], when neither compassion nor pity is experienced. It is a cruelty which is reactivated during adolescence when the self is not only confronted with the re-emergence of its murderous Oedipal desires that can be acted out thanks to biological maturity, but when it also becomes the terrain of instinctual chaos due to physical metamorphosis (also known

Translation by Iréne Clevenot

[1] See C. Trevisan, *Les enfants de la guerre: 'Le Grand Cahier' d'Agota Kristof*, in «Amnis», 2006, 6.

[2] S. Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, New York 2010.

as the «pubertal earthquake»), the reorganization of identifications, the injunction to be oneself. Adolescence is a painful stage when the individual loses the foundations of his identity, often experiences depersonalization, feelings of emptiness that he fills by addictive behaviors (the use of drugs, alcohol ...), thought evasion, often translated into violent actions like self-mutilation, suicide, and aggressiveness. This stage is also characterized by attempts to achieve narcissistic triumphs at the cost of the destruction of the other, an ambivalent affirmation of self, in distress or through violence.

Thus, it is not surprising, despite the recent concern regarding childhood protection, that the child or the adolescent could have been considered to be the perfect soldier: vulnerable and submissive, because his psychic universe is not well protected against intrusion from the outer world or the inner one (his drives). He is in search of identifications[3], unclear about what concerns his body or the body of others, on the frontier where Eros and Thanatos come together, instincts of self-preservation and of death.

Kipling's *Drums of the For and Aft* (1888) can also be considered as an emblematic story. This story evokes the mobilization of children in the English army in India and describes the feats of two fourteen-years-old children who were enlisted in a perfectly legal way at the age of twelve: two «small demons», two «insolent and depraved little drummers», both of whom were often whipped by the drum major. These two children prevent the defeat of the regiment of adult soldiers by placing themselves at the front, after having drunk a keg of rum to the astonishment of all: «the battle was suspended in order to observe the two children» and the pity felt by the Afghan enemy: «Don't kill these children: take them alive and we will convert them». The children end up being shot anyway, but in the conclusion: «the battle was won by John and Lew whose slight frames were brought back just in time to fill two empty spaces at the entrance of the vast grave dug to receive the dead». It is an emblematic story because of the extraordinary courage of these children, the inversion of the child-adult relationship. Emotion remains muted and on the part of the adults, there is a system of denial in play regarding the exposure of the children.

[3] The role of the idol is often played by movie icons such as Rambo or Schwarzenegger; see M. Osseiran-Houbballah, *L'Enfant-soldat*, Paris 2003.

Before I approach the texts of the corpus, I would like to mention the discomfort that is experienced while reading them. Not so much because of the violence described, but rather because of the lack of air. It seems that the impossibility, for the «small soldier», to understand what is happening to him exists after the fact: the texts are clearly written long after the events, because these children had been mainly preoccupied by their survival and had had neither the psychic capacity to write nor the time to do so. In spite of this distance, the texts remain marked by the gaps, the holes in their memory, which affect the imagination, the expression of emotion, and the lack of inventiveness. It seems that even if the desire to write later on shows their effort to think about their experience anew and perhaps to find peace with it, the irreparable remains.

The first disconcerting element upon reading these texts is the experience of dissociation between appearance and the self. The «small soldiers» have the appearance of children but are called upon to behave like adults. Although soldiers have long been infantilized, in this case, the children are propulsed out of their childhood state by a brutal separation from what constituted their familiar world (sometimes by voluntarily running away). A moral and physical ordeal, a swift and violent initiation into adulthood. It is in such a way that Lucien Badjoko talks about the harsh apprenticeship: «the physical training was designed for adults but they didn't differentiate between us»[4] and Ahmadou Kourouma writes: «I wanted to become the little lycaon of the revolution» (a stray dog that hunts in packs, eats everything, father, father, all, everything ...) To become a good little lycaon of the revolution, you need to kill your parents with your own hands ..., kill one of your own parents (father or mother) and then be initiated»[5]. By committing parricide or matricide, the children prove that they have abandoned everything and that the war clan to which they now belong has become their only home. The brutality of the initiation can lead to death as Badjako pointed out when he writes about three children dying of exhaustion and beatings, and he concludes: «the instructor lined up the three small bodies»[6].

[4] L. BADJOKO, *J'étais un enfant soldat*, Paris 2005, p. 40.

[5] A. KOUROUMA, *Allah n'est pas obligé*, Paris 2000, p. 177.

[6] L. BADJOKO, *J'étais un enfant soldat*, p. 23.

These children must shift brutally from the world of play to that of reality. China Keitetsi recounts a scene where children are asked to play in the sand: «Once again I thought it was a kind of game and was wriggling in anticipation». They rapidly realized that the game was, in fact, to be the sentinel. Children were used as warning signals: «Before we had time to understand what was going on, the bullets were whistling by our ears»; «The noise was deafening. I had never been so scared in my life. It was anything but a game»[7].

Often in these stories, there is a sort of short circuit between the imaginary world and reality: confusion between play and reality, the enactment of an aggressiveness which should stay in the realm of fantasy. In an essay on children and war, Winnicott observes that in the latency period, between the ages of five and eleven, children do not like real violence but their games and their fantasies show extreme aggressiveness[8]. Badjako also notices this confusion as he evokes the way child soldiers can easily slip back and forth between play and reality: when ten-years-old soldiers who have already killed get their pay, they buy remote-controlled cars and play with their Kalashnikovs still strapped to their backs. The same author writes about the porosity of the frontiers between the imaginary world and reality for a child. Commenting upon action movies where people «were bickering with weapons», he writes: «A fire lit up in my stomach ... I wanted to experience these kinds of things ... I also knew how to draw a pistol and a Kalashnikov. And I had plastic toy weapons ... I played war with my friends»[9].

The wavering of identity, the confusion about one's place also goes from a stage of submission to one of omnipotence. The child seems to be liberated from his shackles and becomes the one who has the power to decide who shall live or die: «We, the Kadogos, we had the power to decide on life or death»[10].

This confusion also develops with changing appearances: «friends yesterday, enemies today, acquaintances tomorrow ...». It is extremely

[7] C. KEITETSI, *La petite fille à la Kalachnikov, ma vie d'enfant soldat*, Bruxelles 2004, p. 92.

[8] D.W. WINNICOTT, *Les enfants de la guerre*, Paris 2004.

[9] L. BADJOKO, *J'étais un enfant soldat*, p. 18.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

difficult, even for a mature reader, to understand the game of alliances in what are known as «tribal wars» in Africa. In fact, the witness statements are often accompanied by historical annotation. The question of finding one's bearings can be settled in an expeditious manner, as we can see in I. Beah's account.

«Adolescents were immediately recruited and branded with the letters RUF, wherever it pleased the rebels. Not only were you branded for life, but you could no longer escape, because when the soldiers ran into a young boy bearing rebels' acronyms on his body, they would slay him without asking any questions and the armed civilians would do the same»[11].

This lability emphasizes common adolescent disorders. Child soldiers are hybrid and monstrous beings. Neither this nor that. Therefore, in Badjoko's account of the children's triumphant arrival in Khinshasa and the amazement of the population: «They are children! ... They were forgetting a detail. We were now wicked»[12].

Expelled from childhood, the «small soldier» becomes a pariah who cannot readapt to civilian life and generates a sense of fear within his own family.

We note in these texts, the obsessive presence of the body. In Badjoko, the children are called *swahili*: «too small». If all soldiers experience the vulnerability of their bodies during battle, here, because they are children, it is even more important. In Kourouma's texts, the child is called «little man». He is no higher than an officer's stick. This fragileness is, in a way, compensated by the kind of prosthesis that can consolidate the body. Therefore, we see the decisive importance of the weapon, considered to be an extension of the body (sex, child, and mother at the same time). «I also see my M16, here, in my hands», Badjoko writes[13]. «This weapon, I like it for its noise, it is beautiful ... My gun, my baby that never leaves my side, never, not even when I wash myself»[14]. Or again Kourouma: «The only substance we have is our kalash because Allah does not leave those he has created hungry»[15].

[11] I. Beah, *Le chemin parcouru, mémoires d'un enfant-soldat*, Paris 2007, p. 33.

[12] L. Badjoko, *J'étais un enfant soldat*, p. 79.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

[15] A. Kourouma, *Allah n'est pas obligé*, p. 128.

The weapon plays the role of a transitional object. In the same way, the uniform becomes a sort of protective envelope that consolidates a still wavering identity: «I always liked the uniform ... It makes you important»[16]. But this envelope remains artificial. This fragileness also transpires from the statement's mangled sexuality. The children are in no way protected by the adults. They are the ones who have to take care of them and simultaneously, they remain at the mercy of the perverted fantasies of these same adults. They are sexual objects for adults and become sexual predators themselves, but without any dimension of pleasure. Thus, a young virgin man who can choose a woman as he pleases notes: «It was fast. I told myself it was the first time and that it did not matter»[17]. Or, as we read in Kourouma's work, when he paints the portrait of a young female soldier who is also a chain smoker: «She had become completely crazy. She fingered her gnoussou-gnoussou in front of everybody in a provocative way so they would come and make love to her in public»[18].

There can even be a denial of the body's gender. Thus Keitetsi lets women seduce her by pretending to be a boy. From that point on, men will constantly rape the young girl[19]. The disturbed sexuality can also be seen in the obscenity of the language. So is it that Kourouma always swears on the «ass» or the sex of his father.

These children or adolescents are ultimately deprived of their bodies. We know that drugs are often involved, sometimes blended in with food. They thus struggle to become proper subjects and avoid what is at the core of the maturation process of adolescence: the art of being oneself. They are first and foremost «killing machines» as they are known in Mozambique.

These children are essentially preoccupied by their survival. Not only do they appear to possess only an atrophied emotional life, but it seems that their minds are also damaged. We witness a succession of atomized facts or events, of fragmented texts sometimes containing barbaric

16 L. Badjoko, *J'étais un enfant soldat*, p. 19.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

18 A. Kourouma, *Allah n'est pas obligé*, pp. 86-87.

19 C. Keitetsi, *La petite fille à la Kalachnikov.*

scenes. Their impact on the children—that prevent them from making any sense of what they are experiencing—can only be read between the lines. This psychological poverty, this emotional black-out is a condition of their survival. Thinking appears to be a poison that makes one suffer, and the condition of their survival is a freezing of affects which collapse in the body. In Badjoko's work, we read about two would-be fugitives who are being punished, whipped, before the eyes of the other children: «I saw the boys' eyes. I had never seen that expression on someone before. Their whole soul was pouring out of their eyes. My head was spinning»[20]. Feelings are chased away «with anger»[21]. The acting out of the offense, whether it be torturing or killing, replaces and eliminates their ability to think. These deeds are often executed without an ounce of remorse. These child killers that have often been unloved don't have great consideration for human life—perhaps because they are too young to appreciate its value.

Nonetheless, resistance mechanisms against psychological destruction can be found in these stories. In Kourouma's work, we read about the litanies of funeral orations paying tribute to dead children. These orations reintroduce rites where everything else seems to have been destroyed.

Last of all, there appears to be an attempt at reparation through writing. Keitetsi says she can finally «mentalize» her experience and that she can really express her emotions in writing. Writing also allows her to introduce a third person, a witness. We can thus understand the importance for these ex-child soldiers of addressing their readership. Kourouma says he writes with four dictionaries. He wants to address a heterogeneous audience: indigenous black Negroes from Africa, French toubabs (white men) from France, settlers, French speakers of all shapes and sizes.

The last chapter of the essay written by Mouzayan Osseiran-Houbballah about child soldiers is entitled *When fathers kill their sons*. The author points out the fact that throughout History, emphasis has been put on parricides much more than on infanticides and yet the battlefield is the «privileged place for sacrificing sons»[22].

[20] L. BADJOKO, *J'étais un enfant soldat*, p. 28.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[22] M. OSSEIRAN-HOUBBALLAH, *L'Enfant-soldat.*

This infanticide is a symptom of dementia according to the heart-wrenching witness account of a woman from Berlin (who is describing the Soviet troops' entry into this city in 1945):

«On the barricades, the Volkssturm is mounting guard in uniforms patched up with colorful pieces of fabric. We see children of a frighteningly young age, their faces white as milk, buried under steel helmets ten times too big for them. We perceive with horror the timbre of their clear voices. They are all, at most, fifteen years old, and seem so thin and frail in their uniforms that float around their limbs.

Why are we so shocked by this type of infanticide? All it takes is for the children to be three or four years older and no one is shocked to see them shoot or destroy anymore. Where is the line? Is it when the voice breaks? Because in my memories, what hurt me the most was hearing the clear and high pitched voices of these poor kids. Until now 'soldier' meant 'man'. And the man is a genitor. For these children to be mowed down even before they have matured must certainly go against some law of nature. It is totally counter-instinctual. Indeed, it goes against any instinct for the conservation of the species as in the case of certain fish or insects that eat their young. This should not exist in the human race, but the fact it does is unquestionably a symptom of dementia»[23].

[23] *Une femme à Berlin, Journal 20 avril - 22 juin 1945*, Paris 2006, p. 35.

Gendered Narratives of the First World War

The Example of Former Austria

by *Christa Hämmerle*

1. *Commemoration and re-writing: 2014 as a historiographical chance*

Research into the First World War is once again gathering momentum. The coming centenary of 2014, which marks the start of this war, has already led to a flood of relevant initiatives: from newly formed expert networks and often multivolume proposed academic publications to diverse exhibition and film projects and globally oriented internet platforms, from symposiums and workshops to summer schools, dissertation scholarships and a multitude of source editions. Even for historians established in this field, it is already difficult to keep track of the breadth of activities that are currently planned in view of the imminent centenary as well as the often very disparate approaches to re-examining the First World War, which are an inherent part of these activities. They not only include—as can already be seen—new insights and critical reflections; the academic demands sometimes pair up with the dilettantism of old-fashioned military history, and are still linked to outmoded myths of interpretation or ideologemes of semi-official representations of war—not least in Austria, where World War research on 1914-1918, measured against international standards, for a long time remained backward, i.e. was also shaped by *apologia* and the cultivation of tradition as well as military-political instrumentalization[1].

Translation by Helen Stringer

An earlier and more expanded version of this article in German has been published under the title *Der Erste Weltkrieg aus frauen- und geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive. Forschungsthemen und -desiderate in Österreich*, in «Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur», 56, 2012, 3, pp. 218-230. The author would like to thank Marco Mondini for his agreement to publish this paper here.

[1] Cf. espescially O. Überegger, *Vom militärischen Paradigma zur «Kulturgeschichte des Krieges»? Entwicklungslinien der österreichischen Weltkriegsgeschichtsschreibung im*

Precisely with respect to the Austrian research landscape, it can by all means be considered positive, therefore, that the First World War is currently shifting from a position at the sidelines, which it adopted in comparison to the strong culture of remembrance of the Second World War, back to the center of collective memory concerning the «era of catastrophe» of the 20th century[2]. In this light, the coming centenary of 2014 represents an opportunity, not only because it is motivating a vast number of historical projects and studies, but also because, in connection with this, it hopefully allows a long-standing re-evaluation of the events of 1914 to 1918. More often than before, these are already being placed within a broad context, in particular through the approaches of social, economic, and cultural history and the «history of experiences» as well as the more recent research on war violence, which should lead the current re-writing of the history of the First World War and counteract the narrowness of traditional military history and war history approaches[3].

Although perspectives from women's and gender history on the catastrophe of the First World War are occasionally represented in this historiographical re-writing, there is much hesitation about integrating them thoroughly, particularly within the Austrian research landscape. A field of historiography that has been highly developed theoretically and methodologically for many decades here still often meets with contempt, or, in the best case, marginalization and a merely superficial inclusion of

Spannungsfeld militärisch-politischer Instrumentalisierung und universitärer Verwissenschaftlichung, in O. Überegger (ed.), *Zwischen Nation und Region. Weltkriegsforschung im interregionalen Vergleich. Ergebnisse und Perspektiven*, Innsbruck 2004, pp. 63-122; as well as the case study on Tyrol O. Überegger, *Erinnerungskriege. Der Erste Weltkrieg, Österreich und die Tiroler Kriegserinnerung in der Zwischenkriegszeit*, Innsbruck 2011.

[2] This labelling for the whole period between 1914 and 1945 was introduced by E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes. A History of the World 1914-1991*, London 1994.

[3] Cf. for example A. Holzer, *Das Lächeln der Henker. Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevölkerung 1914 bis 1918*, Darmstadt 2008; O. Überegger, *«Man mache diese Leute, wenn sie halbwegs verdächtig erscheinen, nieder». Militärische Normübertretungen und ziviler Widerstand an der Balkanfront 1914/15*, in B. Chiari - G. Gross (eds), *Am Rande Europas? Der Balkan – Raum und Bevölkerung als Wirkungsfelder militärischer Gewalt*, München 2009, pp. 121-136; M. Geyer, *War and Terror. Some Timely Observations on the German Way of Waging War*, in M. Geyer (ed.), *War and Terror in Historical and Contemporary Perspective. American Institute for Contemporary German Studies*, Baltimore MD 2003, pp. 47-69.

the topic «women», thus in no way exploiting the potentials of women's and gender history. The fact is thereby ignored that wartime societies from 1914 to 1918, and equally the complex consequences of the First World War, cannot be sufficiently understood without considering the analytical category of gender—which the international state of research by now clearly reveals[4]. The First World War, as a virtually total war, was based on the mobilization of the entire society; this means, among other things, that gender discourse was also employed as a «weapon» in order to achieve this objective—in accordance with the power-producing and -stabilizing function of the category gender[5]. At that time it was used by many actors of intensive war propaganda in order to mobilize men and women equally—to serve with weapons as well as at the so called «home front», which in the contemporary discourse had primarily female connotations. In contrast to this stood the ideal of the fighting man embodying soldierly, i.e. also heroic values, which was derived from the republican concept of the «citizen soldier» and during the 19th century became anchored in the system of general conscription: A man who was prepared to sacrifice himself for his fatherland and for the defense of the women and children in his native country[6]. However, in the reality of war, this image was contradicted and overturned just as the dichotomous war support by women, which corresponded to their supposed «nature», encountered many limitations and ambiguities; the constant shifting, transgressions and irritations of the propagated gender order are equally included in the theoretical concept of the relational category gender, and they are, as we shall see, even more apparent in a wartime situation.

[4] There is a rich body of international literature on this; see for example S.R. GRAYZEL, *Women and the First World War*, London - New York - Toronto 2002; K. HAGEMANN - S. SCHÜLER-SPRINGORUM (eds), *Heimat – Front. Militär und Geschlechterverhältnisse im Zeitalter der Weltkriege*, Frankfurt a.M. - New York 2002; M.R. HIGONETT - J. JENSON et al. (eds), *Behind the Lines. Gender and the Two World Wars*, New Haven CT - London 1987; C. HÄMMERLE - O. ÜBEREGGER - B. BADER-ZAAR (eds), *Gender and the First World War*, Basingstoke - London - Oxford 2013.

[5] Cf. for a theoretical conception of this kind especially the extremely influential approach of J.W. SCOTT, *Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis*, in «American Historical Review», 91, 1986, 5, pp. 1053-75; in regard to the history of masculinities also R.W. CONNELL, *Masculinities*, Berkeley - Los Angeles 2005[2].

[6] Cf. for example, for the German Empire U. FREVERT, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society*, Oxford 2005.

In the following, various women's and gender history aspects of the First World War will be examined. The focus here will be on the former Austria, i.e. the western half of the Habsburg Empire, which alone represents a dense terrain that in many respects has not yet been researched. In view of the accompanying *desiderata*, the relevance of the analytical category gender shall in particular be made clear for future Austrian World War historiography, in connection with the necessity to identify potentially relevant topics. The opportunity has now arisen to increasingly motivate these kinds of research efforts[7].

2. *(Self)-mobilization of women at the «Home Front»*

Let us first examine the commencement of war in the summer of 1914. At that time, an «enthusiasm for war», long overestimated in the research as the so-called «spirit of 1914», did not prevail in large parts of Austro-Hungary, but the outbreak of war against Serbia and the Entente powers initially found widespread support—not least among many women. They became the most significant part of the «home front», which was intensively advanced by means of the strong, gender-specific argumentation of the war propaganda—it therefore was no accident that the term «home front» was invented at that time to label the widespread mobilization of the entire population into war-supporting action «behind the front»[8]. Moreover, the large-scale commitment of women at the very start of the war was (jointly) organized and supported by numerous women's associations. In particular, many sections of the bourgeois and proletarian women's movement, which had formed over the previous decades, took part—often enthusiastically—in the rapidly established «Freiwillige Kriegsfürsorge» (Voluntary War Relief Work). Only a small group of members of the more radical «Allgemeiner Österreichische Frauenverein» (General Austrian Women's Association) represented an exception in this respect, as they opposed

[7] For an earlier record of the research field «War and Gender», see C. HÄMMERLE, *Von den Geschlechtern der Kriege und des Militärs. Forschungseinblicke und Bemerkungen zu einer neuen Debatte*, in T. KÜHNE - B. ZIEMANN (eds), *Was ist Militärgeschichte*, Paderborn - München - Wien 2000, pp. 229-262.

[8] K. HAGEMANN - S. SCHÜLER-SPRINGORUM (eds), *Heimat – Front*, p. 20; S.R. GRAYZEL, *Women's Identities at War. Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France during the First World War*, Chapel Hill NC - London 1999, p. 11.

the war from the beginning and subsequently participated in the European Women's Peace Congresses in neutral countries. The absolute majority of the other women's associations joined forces in the summer of 1914 to form the national «Frauenhilfsaktion im Kriege» (Women's Aid Action in War). A first appeal launched throughout the monarchy «To Austria's Women», which mobilized them to provide devotional support for the coming war, even appeared one day before the declaration of war to Serbia, on 27th July 1914.

The field of activities specified by the «Frauenhilfsaktion im Kriege» was immense and by far exceeded the traditional forms of private women's charity efforts or welfare work as already practiced in the 19th century. It stretched from the immediate establishment of a «Labedienst» (refreshment services) for passing troops at stations and the care of the wounded, to the manufacture, packaging, and sending of diverse «Liebesgsaben» (charitable gifts) for the soldiers at the fronts, and from the construction of sewing and knitting stations or other working possibilities for the many women who had become unemployed as a result of the war, various collections of material goods and money, the provision of wartime cooking courses, to taking care of poor, pregnant women, mothers, children and babies as well as work in the increasingly necessary public soup kitchens and warm rooms[9]. In addition, a position as a war nurse proved particularly attractive to many thousands of women—not only in the more or less safe hinterland, but also in the mobile field hospitals, which were often stationed very close to the front lines. Here too, many women signed up voluntarily to personally serve the fatherland and, as some have explicitly expressed it, to be «in the field»[10].

[9] I. BAUER, *Frauen im Krieg. Patriotismus, Hunger, Protest – Weibliche Lebenszusammenhänge zwischen 1914 und 1918*, in B. MAHZOHL-WALLNIG (ed.), *Die andere Geschichte. Eine Salzburger Frauengeschichte von der ersten Mädchenschule (1695) bis zum Frauenwahlrecht (1918)*, Salzburg - München 1995, pp. 283-310; C. HÄMMERLE, *«Wir strickten und nähten Wäsche für Soldaten ...» Von der Militarisierung des Handarbeitens im Ersten Weltkrieg*, in «L'Homme. Zeitschrift für Feministische Geschichtswissenschaft», 3, 1992, S. 88-128; C. HÄMMERLE, *«Zur Liebesarbeit sind wir hier, Soldatenstrümpfe stricken wir ...». Zu Formen weiblicher Kriegsfürsorge im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Ph.D. thesis Wien, 1996, pp. 109-208, 259-316; M. HEALY, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire. Total War and Everday Life in World War I*, Cambridge 2004, pp. 163-210.

[10] For example, R.M. KONRAD, *Schwestern als Menschen. Aus den Aufzeichnungen einer Armeeschwester. Im Selbstverlage erschienen*, Innsbruck s.d. (1922), pp. 4 f.; E. HROUDA, *Barmherzigkeit. Als Freiwillige Malteserschwester im Weltkrieg*, Graz 1935, pp. 7 f.

What they experienced there over the years has hardly been studied—especially as the work and the suffering of the war nurses in Austria did not penetrate the collective memory of post-war society[11].

In the official (gender) discourse of wartime, all these activities of women were genuinely connected with the concept of «social motherhood», which was also propagated comprehensively by the First Women's Movement—despite all differences between its branches. There were even those who claimed that it was only the war as a «great teacher» that again «unveiled the immeasurable store of deep, true, blessed femininity» in the women, something that had always «lain dormant» in them[12]. As a result, they would «[fight] the enemy with the noble female weapons of love and compassion, self-sacrifice and industriousness»[13]—which corresponded to a dichotomic and hierarchical gender order that had been constantly upheld in the discourse. This gender order always placed the extensive and publically visible «serving», «helping», and «sacrificing» of women in the war as described above—which they themselves often judged as proof of their achieved citizenship—beneath the male contribution of the soldiers as «true heroes». International gender research has drawn intensive attention to this fact and displayed a vivid interest in the controversially discussed question of the emancipatory consequences of the varied war commitment of women[14].

[11] Cf. as a study that introduces these kinds of texts at least in a small selection D. ANGETTER, *Dem Tod geweiht und doch gerettet. Die Sanitätsversorgung am Isonzo und in den Dolomiten 1915-1918*, Frankfurt a.M. 1995, pp. 231-238.

[12] *Almanach des Kriegsjahres 1914/15 der patriotischen Frauen Österreichs, zu Gunsten des Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds für die gesamte bewaffnete Macht*, Wien s.d. (1915), pp. 56, 83.

[13] A. VON GLASER-LINDNER, *Die Frau im Kriege*, in *Patriotisches Bilderbuch*, hrsg. vom Kriegshilfsbüro des k. k. Ministeriums des Innern mit einem Vorwort von Dr. E. Prinz v. u. zu Lichtenstein und 12 Illustrationen von Maximilian Liebenwein, Wien 1915, p. 94.

[14] Cf. for a synthesis, for example U. DANIEL, *Frauen*, in G. HIRSCHFELD - G. KRUMEICH - I. RENZ (eds), *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg*, Paderborn - München - Wien 2003, pp. 116-134; M.R. HIGONETT - P. HIGONETT, *The Double Helix*, in M.R. HIGONETT - J. JENSON - S. MICHEL, *Behind the Lines*, pp. 31-47. Critical against the over-estimated meaning of the First World War as a catalyst of women's suffrage also B. BADER-ZAAR, *Women's Suffrage and War: World War I and Political Reform in a Comparative Perspective*, in I. SULKINEN - S.-L. NEVELA-NURMI - P. MARKKOLA (eds), *Suffrage, Gender and Citizenship. International Perspectives on Parliamentary Reforms*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2009, pp. 193-218.

Research has also made very clear the large extent to which women replaced or had to replace the men who were called up—the longer the war lasted, the greater the extent. This occurred in many occupational fields, from agriculture and industry, offices and businesses to the postal service, rail service, and Vienna trams. Here in particular, the female conductors advanced rapidly to become a popular and much-cited war-time phenomenon, and, as such, metaphorically stand for the continual evaluation that the development of women's work during the war was sensational; thus, it was often overestimated[15]. In the long-term tendency, which also comprises the pre- and post-war periods, and in the synopsis of all branches, there was, however, less a sensational increase between 1914 and 1918 than a much more striking shift of women's work to domains that were of importance for the war effort, in particular the greatly expanding arms industry, where besides young people and men exempted from military service many women were employed. Their situation, which was shaped by sinking actual wages, extremely long working hours (including at night), bad sanitary conditions and a high risk of industrial injuries, dramatically worsened during the course of the war, to the point of impoverishment and restrictions on personal mobility due to a tightening of the «Kriegsleistungsgesetz» (law on war services) on 18th March 1917. At this point, a decisive expansion of the obligation to work was enacted, which specified that «for all employees of the war industry regardless of age and gender», labor mobility, that is, the right to change jobs, was suspended; women were thereby also placed directly under this law. Only its further reform on the basis of a draft presented in March 1918, which actually planned to introduce the general obligation to work for women between the ages of 18 and 40, and aimed to extend that of men who had not been called up to between 16 and 60 years, could no longer be realized at a time when the war economy was facing collapse; in this sense, the moloch of war thus reached the limits of feasibility[16].

[15] S. AUGENDER, *Arbeiterinnen im Ersten Weltkrieg. Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen proletarischer Frauen in Österreich*, Wien 1987; see also for Germany U. DANIEL, *The War from Within: German Working Class Women in the First World War*, Oxford - New York 1997.

[16] Cf. S. AUGENDER, *Arbeiterinnen*, pp. 102-106; M. GRANDNER, *Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik in der Kriegswirtschaft. Die freien Gewerkschaften Österreichs im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Wien - Köln - Weimar 1992, esp. pp. 271-300, 400-421.

3. *Protest and resistance*

The «home front», however, fell apart much earlier, or rather it was in fact shaped from the very beginning by social contradictions and class conflicts, competition and resentment, suffering and sadness as well as the rapid onset of disillusionment, protest and the longing for freedom[17]. In the second half of the war at the latest, when the military failures piled up on both front lines of the k.u.k. Monarchy, despite the «Pyrrhic victory» in the 12th Battle of the Isonzo[18], a downright «battle» began to rage in this respect at the «home front». It was not only about the constant raw material requirements of the war industry, which were given absolute priority, but similarly about foodstuffs and everyday goods. From 1916, this was dominated by dramatic shortages, caused by factors such as the blockade on the part of the Entente, the decline in domestic production and internal imports as well as several failed harvests, which turned day-to-day life into a fight for survival for an increasing number of people. As early as April 1915, a rationing of foodstuffs and basic commodities had set in, which was continually expanded and which created a dense institutional network of competent authorities and central economic organizations. Assessed according to criteria such as age, level of need, possibility of «self-subsistence», sex and work load, there were soon not only bread, flour, milk, sugar, meat, and potato cards, and similar, but also «clothing cards», and «requirement cards» for shoes, etc. At the end of 1916, regionalization was additionally introduced, according to which the cards could be only redeemed at certain places or shops; despite this, the supply difficulties and quality problems constantly increased.

Before long, the experience of shortages, whether of fuels, soap, or clothing, and above all the daily hunger, became drastic, in particular in the cities and large industry regions of the western half of the Austro-

[17] Cf. for this in particular the analysis of M. HEALY, *Vienna*, as well as O. ÜBEREGGER, *Der Intervento als regionales Bedrohungsszenario. Der italienische Kriegseintritt von 1915 und seine Folgen in der Erfahrung, Wahrnehmung und Deutung der Tiroler Kriegsgesellschaft*, in J. HÜRTNER - G.E. RUSCONI (eds), *Der Kriegseintritt Italiens im Mai 1915*, München 2007, pp. 117-137; O. ÜBERERGGER - M. RETTENWANDER, *Leben im Krieg. Die Tiroler «Heimatfront» im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Bozen 2004, especially pp. 190-241.

[18] M. RAUCHENSTEINER, *Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg*, Sonderausgabe Graz et al. 1997, pp. 493-512.

Hungarian Empire. In parallel, illnesses such as tuberculosis and various deficiency syndromes became more frequent, thus increasing the necessity of welfare work through private as well as public initiatives—even if the readiness to perform voluntary relief work had long been nowhere near as great as at the start of the war, and state-organized welfare work had to be relied on to a much larger extent. That way, paradoxically, the war to a certain degree also became a driving force for welfare state tendencies, something that manifested itself at the end of 1917 in the creation of an independent «Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge» (Ministry for Social Welfare) with its own «Kommission für Frauenarbeit» (Commission for Women's Work), in which, again, representatives of the largest women's organizations participated. Their purpose was, for example, to coordinate the newly established system of female inspectors for working women and at the same time to start preparing the downsizing of the female workforce at the end of the war. After all, the changed gender-specific division of labor—the advancement of women in professions that had hitherto been exclusively or predominantly «male», as mentioned above—was seen as a temporary solution that was to be abolished as quickly as possible after the end of the war[19].

Hunger and shortages moreover became the trigger for widespread resistance. Even before and then particularly from the time of the «hunger winter» of 1916/17, when the situation escalated dramatically and the specific Austrian «war absolutism» increasingly came under fire, there were often mass protests against state mismanagement and the supply disaster that had been exacerbated by constant price increases, corruption, and profiteering. On the one hand, protests took place as early as 1915 in particular in the form of many spontaneous «inflation demonstrations» and «food riots» at markets and other public places. These were often started by women, youths, and children, and early on also included demands for peace. On the other hand, from the summer of 1916, targeted protest campaigns of the working population

[19] K.M. SCHMIDLECHNER, *Die neue Frau? Zur sozioökonomischen Position und kulturellen Lage*, in H. KONRAD - W. MADERTHANER (eds), *... der Rest ist Österreich. Das Werden der Ersten Republik*, vol. 2, Wien 2008, pp. 90 f.; I. BAUER, *«Im Dienste des Vaterlandes». Frauenarbeit im und für den Krieg*, in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR ARBEIT, ABTEILUNG FÜR GRUNDSÄTZLICHE ANGELEGENHEITEN DER FRAUEN (ed.), *Geschlecht und Arbeitswelten* (Beiträge zur 4. Frauen-Ringvorlesung an der Universität Salzburg), Salzburg 1998, pp. 49-62.

and strikes by the male and female industry labor force, which made various demands, from the improvement of the miserable living and working conditions to concrete labor union issues, became ever more frequent. The first large strike movement took place in May 1917 and still primarily aimed for a reorganization of the standard working hours as well as, in continuation of previous «bread strikes», the supply of the labor force with sufficient foodstuffs, although this was quickly exceeded or expanded—like in the large January strike of 1918—by the increasingly loud demand for peace; however, the labor unions and the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei (SDAP), if anything, took an appeasing position here[20].

4. *(Non-)masculinity at the front and elsewhere*

And the soldiers at the battle fronts, who were the only ones labeled as «genuine», «true» men within the gender discourse of the war society? Or the young and old men at the «home front» who had been released from military service or were not fit for duty, whose status as men therefore was particularly fragile and thus needed to be specially justified[21]? The significance of the category gender should also be assessed highly with respect to all of these groups of men. On the one hand, it created hierarchies and differences between men—either within the male «front community», which consisted in reality of very different powerful (or powerless) soldiers of all ethnicities of the Habsburg Empire and was moreover shaped by strict class divisions between officers and men[22], or in other contexts. These groups were equally characterized by a competition of situationally as well as socially, culturally, ethnically, religiously, etc. differentiated, i.e. varied (self-)conceptions of (non-)masculinity, which within a wide spectrum were positioned in relation to the hegemonic model of the soldier—mostly as subordinate

[20] Cf. for all of this S. AUGENDER, *Arbeiterinnen*, pp. 208-214; M. GRANDNER, *Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik*, pp. 343-379; B. UNFRIED, *Arbeiterprotest und Arbeiterbewegung in Österreich während des Ersten Weltkrieges*, Ph.D. thesis Wien, 1990; for Tyrol O. ÜBEREGGER, *Intenvento*, pp. 124 f.

[21] M. HEALY, *Vienna*, pp. 258-299.

[22] E. HANISCH, *Männlichkeiten. Eine andere Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Wien - Köln - Weimar 2005, pp. 40 f.

or inferior, as this ideal could hardly be achieved[23]. Accordingly to such a structure of masculinities, non-fighting men were 'on principle' considered less important than the fighting soldiers (or the fallen soldiers, who were thereby equally declared heroes), whose ideal was already immortalized during the war: in the myth of the «mountain warriors» fighting «man against man» in the traditional style on the one hand, and the martially branded «Isonzo fighter» originating from the industrialized warfare on the other[24]. In contrast to such warrior concepts, non-combatant men were often considered (effeminate) «cowards», «shirkers», «base wallahs», etc.—all terms that can be found not only in the public discourse, but also in the language of front-line soldiers. Nevertheless, these men were highly represented in the factories and administration just like the prisoners of war who were made to work, and the dramatically increasing numbers of physically or psychically handicapped, i.e. disabled or mentally ill, victims of wartime violence.

Neither the ways in which these kinds of situations and positions were experienced and interpreted by the men who were affected in large numbers, nor the often rapid onset of disillusionment of the troops at the fronts have been researched to any significant extent for Austro-Hungary[25]. The self-perceptions of the men who for various reasons were relatively low down in the military hierarchy as well as the soldiers' perceptions of others have also barely been studied. This applies,

[23] Such a view on the always hierarchically structured relations between men or various forms of masculinity follows the current leading concept of R.W. CONNELL, *Masculinities*; cf. critically addressing some aspects of the model C. HÄMMERLE, *Zur Relevanz des Connell'schen Konzepts hegemonialer Männlichkeit für «Militär und Männlichkeit/en in der Habsburgermonarchie 1868-1914/1»*, in M. DINGES (ed.), *Männer – Macht – Körper. Hegemoniale Männlichkeiten vom Mittelalter bis heute*, Frankfurt a.M. - New York 2005, pp. 103-121.

[24] The differentiation between these two propagated types of warrior is dealt with—too strictly—by H.-G. HOFER, *Nervenschwäche und Krieg. Modernitätskritik und Krisenbewältigung in der österreichischen Psychiatrie (1880-1920)*, Wien - Köln - Weimar 2004, pp. 271-282; cf. also C. HÄMMERLE, *«Es ist immer der Mann, der den Kampf entscheidet, und nicht die Waffe ...». Die Männlichkeit des k.u.k. Gebirgskriegers in der soldatischen Erinnerungskultur*, in H. KUPRIAN - O. ÜBEREGGER (eds), *Der Erste Weltkrieg im Alpenraum. Erfahrung, Deutung, Erinnerung / La Grande Guerra nell'arco alpino. Esperienze e memoria*, Innsbruck 2006, pp. 35-60.

[25] For the Tyrolian war society O. ÜBEREGGER, *Der andere Krieg. Die Tiroler Militärgerichtsbarkeit im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Innsbruck 2002, esp. pp. 387-413.

for example, for the Jewish soldiers[26] who often suffered discrimination in the Habsburg Army, and for homosexuals, about whose war deployment in Austro-Hungary we know almost nothing[27], as well as for the large spectrum of defiant soldiers, whose behavior was already strongly pathologized by the military psychiatry of that time. And what about—to expand the spectrum again—the many shell-shocked soldiers[28], the so called «Überläufer» (defectors), the «Selbstverstümmler» (self-mutilators), and other «not reliable» soldiers, right through to the deserters, who when caught were more or less strictly punished and/or sent back to the line of battle[29]? Did their precarious situation in the wartime society that glorified only the fighting male evoke a crisis in their self-conception as a man? And how were the later lives of these men as well as their social and familial positions affected?

These indications of the heterogeneous male gender group, which always possessed a hierarchical internal structure, illustrate that a polar conceptualization of wartime society along the dichotomy of «front» and «home front», derived from the hegemonic gender order, makes little sense, at least when only the slaughtering and, in connection with this, the army consisting singly of men are ascribed to the former area, and either just the «civilians», not differentiated according to gender, or women and children are ascribed to the latter. Although the importance of women at the «home front», as already revealed, was very large—indeed, the «home front» has primarily female connotations in the gender discourse—and although the military was an institution exclusively occupied by men, in which to a certain extent masculinity

[26] Cf. M.L. ROZENBLIT, *Sustaining Austrian «National» Identity in Crisis. The Dilemma of the Jews in Habsburg Austria*, 1914-1919, in M.L. ROZENBLIT - P.M. JUDSON (eds), *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*, New York - Oxford 2005, pp. 178-91; M.L. ROZENBLIT, *Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I*, Oxford - New York 2001.

[27] Cf. for Germany the newest research by J. CROUTHAMEL, *«Comeradeship» and «Friendship»: Masculinity and Militarisation in Germany's Homosexual Movement after the First World War*, in «Gender & History», 23, 2011, 2, pp. 111-129.

[28] H.-G. HOFER, *Nervenschwäche*, pp. 185-282.

[29] O. ÜBEREGGER, *Der andere Krieg*, pp. 232-311. How strongly hegemonic masculinity can shape the (self-)image of deserters, above all in times of total war, has recently been examined by M. FRITSCHE, *Proving One's Manliness: Masculine Self-perceptions of Austrian Deserters in the Second World War*, in «Gender & History», 24, 2012, 1, pp. 35-55.

reigned, in reality the two spheres were closely intertwined and were shaped by a coexistence, cooperation or opposition of both (or several) genders—in respect to femininities as well as masculinities. A gender-history approach can clearly demonstrate this. It thereby departs from the narrow viewpoint of traditional military and war history, which for a long time evaluated «front» and «home front» as separate spheres and thus lost sight of the complex social connections of total warfare.

While building upon the previous observations, the interweaving and inseparability as well as the constant intertwining of «front» and «home front» or «hinterland» can be made visible in further dimensions. This should be briefly addressed in the final part—first keeping in mind that, in fact, many women were also situated in the vicinity of the First World War battlefields. Besides the already mentioned army nurses as well as Red Cross helpers and several wives who travelled to be with their husbands, and besides individual figures such as the reporter employed by the war press office, Alice Schalek[30], there were, for example, prostitutes who worked near to the front and female civilians who had remained there when the population only provisionally fled or was evacuated[31]. It was also possible for them to become victims of direct wartime violence—in particular in the case of air raids, which occurred at the South-Western Front from the outset of the First World War, and rapid troop movements. The myth of warfare to defend the homeland and protect the women and children lost any validity, also in view of war-related hunger as well as cold, hardship, and illnesses, right through to fatal epidemics, which amongst others befell many war nurses.

For several outlying areas of the Habsburg Monarchy, research has moreover identified the—always controversial judged—existence of female soldiers in the Ukrainian and Polish units of the k.u.k. Army, in rare cases even in a fighting function. They fought there especially for nationalist reasons[32]. In addition, throughout the Monarchy there were

[30] Cf. for example E. KRASNY - M. PATKA - C. RAPP et al. (eds), *Von Samoa zum Isonzo. Die Fotografin und Reisejournalistin Alice Schalek*, Wien 1999.

[31] Cf. for example H. KUPRIAN, *«Entheimatungen». Flucht und Vertreibung in der Habsburgermonarchie während des Ersten Weltkrieges und ihre Konsequenzen*, in H. KUPRIAN - O. ÜBEREGGER, *Der Erste Weltkrieg im Alpenraum*, pp. 289-306.

[32] A. LESZCZAWSKI-SCHWERK, *Amazonen, emanzipierte Frauen, «Töchter des Volkes». Polnische und ukrainische Legionärinnen in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee im Ersten*

approximately 33,000 to 50,000 women who from the spring of 1917 onwards took up positions as «Weibliche Hilfskräfte für die Armee im Felde» (The Women's Auxiliary Labor Force)—most likely in part to escape from the catastrophic living conditions in the hinterland. The primary purpose of this measure to integrate women into the military network, which followed similar developments in other belligerent nations, was to counter the lack of soldiers, who were thereby freed up for direct deployment in the line of fire. This was one reason for the bad reputation acquired by the «Women's Auxiliary Labor Force»; like other women's groups who were located in the military field, they were readily accused of an immoral way of life, not least in a sexual sense—but they were nevertheless irreplaceable for the military. Employed directly by the latter, these women worked as office workers and telephone operators of the 1st and 2nd class or as cooks, waitresses, washerwomen, seamstresses, tailors, shoemakers, saleswomen as well as technical assistants and farm workers; in addition, this group later also included army nurses and nurse's aides[33].

It should be made clear that all of the groups of women mentioned lived through the war often close behind the line of fire, or they were as women part of the area that is commonly referred to as the «back area», but in reality to a large extent often became blurred with the front. Here they frequently became direct victims of the war[34] and also in many ways crossed over the limitations assigned to their sex and the hegemonic norms of femininity, thus undermining the masculinity of the military field. Their presence there also evoked—as gender research would formulate it—a range of «gender troubles», which means a veritable, and for many people irritating, «gender disorder»[35].

Weltkrieg, in L. Cole - C. Hämmerle - M. Scheutz (eds), *Glanz – Gewalt – Gehorsam. Militär und Gesellschaft in der Habsburgermonarchie*, Essen 2011, pp. 55-99.

[33] Recently A. Hois, *Weibliche Hilfskräfte in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Diplomarbeit Wien, 2012.

[34] The range of violent acts against women always includes sexual violence, which has not been examined for the k.u.k. Army up to now. Cf. for the 20th century in general, D. Herzog (ed.), *Brutality and Desire. War and Sexuality in Europe's Twentieth Century*, New York 2011.

[35] Cf. for example H. Hacker, *Ein Soldat ist meistens keine Frau. Geschlechterkonstruktionen im militärischen Feld*, in «Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie», 20, 1995, 2, pp. 45-63.

5. *Summary*

Despite the constant attempts to utilize or exploit an unambiguously polar gender order for the purposes of war, the war-related «gender troubles» should above all be examined by the current research in order to understand the specific dynamics of wartime society. It is thereby revealed that gender is always a fluid category, and, as such, interpreted, appropriated, and practiced very differently by historical actors—especially in a wartime situation, when constructs of masculinity and femininity became even more fragile. Gender was nevertheless employed to a large extent as a discursive weapon in the First World War in order to mobilize men as well as women into supporting the war, both at the front and the home front. Exposing this kind of exploitation is one of the tasks of World War research in addition to demonstrating the constant intertwining and interweaving of these two spheres.

Inter-Allied Community?

Rituals and Transnational Narratives of the Great War

by *Victor Demiaux*

1. *Introduction*

In July 1919, a few days after the signature of the Versailles Treaty, victory celebrations took place in the capital cities of the Allied countries of Western Europe. Featuring massive military parades, these war closing rites providing a retrospective symbolic narrative of the conflict. In Paris, on July 14th, the victorious troops passed under the Arc de Triomphe. Doing so, they passed through a set of German guns circularly located around the monument, before moving along the Champs-Elysées, marching past a series of decorative devices evoking the martyr cities and the great battles fought from 1914 to 1918. At the very center of this narrative were actually not so much the French than the Allied armies. American, British, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Serbian, Romanian, Siamese, Greek, Polish, and Czechoslovak took part in the military parade led by Marshal Foch, who had assumed the unified command of the Allied armies on the Western front in March 1918. Then came the French troops behind Marshal Pétain. This presence of the national armies as part of a vaster entity also characterized the celebratory programs of the ceremonies that took place in London and Brussels in the very same week.

It is this setting of the Allies as main protagonists of the war narrative that I would like to question in this paper. The Inter-Allied symbolism of the victory celebrations carried tacitly a sense of identity, a common «we» that was opposed to the enemy «they». Exploring the contours of this component of the war narrative also implies assessing its functions

I thank Lorris Acot, Marion Fourestier, and Rachel Renault for having read the first drafts of this paper. I also want to express my gratitude to John Horne for having suggested to me the idea of the Great War as a «transnational moment».

and its limits. This is assuredly a more familiar point of view. Whereas limited scholarly attention has been up till now devoted to the staging of the Allied community[1], the focus has generally been on the numerous divergences and tensions that divided the Allies all along and after the war. It is a mostly justified view, in the realm of diplomacy and strategic command, as well as from the point of view of a more down-to-earth history of the frontline war. The image of a harmonious Inter-Allied unity, such as it was pictured by the victory celebrations, was indeed largely idealized. To some extent, it might have been made necessary precisely because of the constant tensions along national lines within the Entente[2]. However, purely and simply dismissing this image is not entirely satisfactory. After all, the national grand narratives often tend to hide conflicts and diverging voices. This generally does not prevent historians from studying them. Beyond their documentary function, these discourses play a historical role, which should be assessed. In this paper, I will therefore deliberately take seriously the Inter-Allied protagonist that was pictured by the victory celebrations.

This mainly implies historicizing it and tracing how the Allied community tended to take shape in the various narratives that accounted for the war between 1914 and the first postwar years. Would the victory celebrations have occurred two years earlier, it is likely that they would have been very different and that the Allied component would have played a much more restrained role. Indeed, I argue that it is only in the second half of the war that the notion of «Inter-Allied» progressively became a significant category for understanding the war and for shaping narratives and discourses accounting for it. From the point of view of the public rituality, 1918 marked the crossing of a threshold. It was characterized by an efflorescence of celebrations of the Allies. Most importantly, in these celebrations, the Allies were increasingly framed as a coherent group. As we will see, the emergence of the «Inter-Allied» in the public ritual at the end of the war was brewing from the beginning of the war in the development of the Entente. Scrutinizing the inner

[1] This is all the more surprising as this aspect is not absent from other contemporary forms of war accounts. See for example the collections of the *Historial de la Grande Guerre*, in Péronne, where a few labels underline the importance of the representation of the Allies in many wartime popular products.

[2] L. Bonin Longare, *Psicologia interalleata del dopoguerra*, in «Nuova antologia di lettere, scienze ed arti», 16 September 1924, pp. 97-123.

workings of this gigantic, imprecisely outlined and constantly moving entity enables to make out phenomena that progressed silently, before crystallizing and being reflected in the public discourse and symbolism.

Doing so also allows us to identify the producers of the Inter-Allied public rituals that developed around the end of the war and, above all, to contextualize their activity within the general frame of the Great War. Moreover, this survey will be the occasion to emphasize the importance of the very vectors, which conveyed war representations and narratives. In this respect, the public rituality has a highly specific status. Representing an Inter-Allied community by means of public ceremonies is not the same thing as conveying it through other media. Of course, organizing a parade involves material contingencies, logistics, and a plurality of actors far more important than print media. More crucially, it means resorting to expressive tools (flags, marches, uniforms) that stand close to the official pump which aims at legitimizing (see sacralizing) State power. In this sense, tracking the ritual staging of the «Inter-Allied» throughout the Great War is a way of assessing the evolving importance of this representation within the war cultures.

2. *Representations and practices of the alliance at the beginning of the Great War*

In this first section, I aim at sketching the status of the alliance in popular representations of the conflict, including images of wide circulation, at the beginning of the Great War. At the same time, this focus on the first years of the war highlights, from the standpoint of the organizational practices, the dynamics of functional integration within the Entente. These dynamics involved the ongoing development of Inter-Allied organizations in a great variety of sectors and gave rise to what I propose to name the «Inter-Allied sphere».

The Allies are widely represented in the public discourse and imagery in the various belligerent countries from the very first months of the war. Their presence in the visual universe of the contemporaries is vividly illustrated by the postcard. Thus, the theme of the Allies is depicted in many ways: Allied soldiers, flags of the Allied countries, Allied generals, heads of Allied States. Mentioning this early importance of the image of the Allies in the war discourse only aims to add

nuance to my overall argument and at qualifying the statement of the explosion of the Inter-Allied in 1918. In-depth studies of significant corpuses of postcards (or of other media) would surely permit to confirm this argument[3]. But, as we shall see, the 1918 explosion of the Inter-Allied topic in the public discourse is much easier to make out through a survey of public rituals. Another notable aspect of the strong presence of the Allied symbolism in the public space is that it can be considered as part of a familiarization process of the wide audience with a new reality. In that sense, it shares some traits of the national pedagogies whose production and dissemination through various vectors are told by the historiographies of the modern nation-state building. Such images constantly evoked the global nature of the war and their very use reflected the fact that even this global aspect was widely integrated from early on during the conflict. This is illustrated by another very trivial example—chosen precisely for its triviality—of how the image of the Allies was resorted to. This announcement (see picture below), published in the «Illustrated London News» in January 1915, touts a bar of soap by reusing one of the key watchwords of the mainstream war narrative (protecting home) and by exploiting its polysemy. The title «The six Allies» refers to five characters, plus the soap. The designers of the ad probably considered that the image of the five Allied soldiers had the capacity to conjure instantaneously the idea of protection and thus allowed the reader to associate this soap with it. This image therefore provides us with a representation that was immediately familiar to the broad readership of the «Illustrated London News». Interestingly, the alliance is pictured as something lightly but clearly hierarchical. All five juvenile characters are soldiers, with the exception of the British, who is dressed with civilian clothes. This reminds us, in passing, that the representation of the Allies and of the alliance was not at all fixed: finding a picture of the British ally as a civilian—and therefore non-combatant—alongside other Allies in uniform later in the war is very unlikely. The Belgian and the French soldiers immediately surround the British character while the Russian and the Japanese are on the margins of the group. This might refer to the geographical as well as the perceived racial and political distance

[3] The problem here is precisely to gather a significant corpus. Most of the postcards repositories do not sort them by date. Accordingly, they hardly provide a chronological viewpoint on the war. Even when they do so, the number of postcards is often too small to allow for quantitative assessment.

to these two former Allies. Very often, the image of the alliance is well structured and features such subtle reminders of its asymmetry as it is perceived in the eyes of the broad audience.



Figure 1. Advertisement published in the «Illustrated London News», February 1915.

This picture directs us to a reading of the alliance as a felt reality but whose content is rather weak since the link between the Allies is strongly overshadowed by the dimension of the otherness. It should however not obscure the fact that the question of a more substantial reality of the unity of the Allied nations could also be a topic of discussion and concern from the beginning of the war. Somehow, this unity was negatively achieved through the transnational sense of indignation felt in the Allied opinion in front of the «German atrocities»[4]. The importance of these episodes at the beginning of the war in the radicalization of the barrier between «us» and «them» is henceforth well known. But

[4] J. HORNE - A. KRAMER, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial*, New Haven CT 2001, 608 pp.

whether this «we» was either limited to the national community or tended to include a broader group framed by the belonging to the Entente (or at least to some transnational entity) is less obvious for us, as it probably also was at the time. Any clear-cut answer to this question would likely be misleading. On the other hand, ignoring it would mean failing to capture a part of the contemporary cultural landscape. In a book published in early 1916, the Swiss anthropologist Eugene Pittard echoed—with skepticism—these concerns:

«As soon as the war was declared, newspapers incessantly talked about belligerent 'races'. At the beginning, many even wrote that the war was a struggle between races ... We have be reminded of this from time to time. From the start of the war, I do not think there was a day—and this is probably true for all my colleagues—when I was not asked about it: 'Keep us informed! How should we view the Latin race? or the Germanic race?»[5].

Pittard's work should have consisted of two volumes but only the first one was published. Entitled «Les alliés» and falling into a series of chapters devoted to each of the Entente countries (English, Serbians, French, Italians, Montenegrins, Russians, Belgians). If Pittard did not endorse the idea of a combined race (he even rejected the idea of «pure» national races), he cleverly associated scientific integrity and fine editorial marketing as the title and structure of the book were designed to meet a social demand which he himself emphasized and which would justify the republication of the book in 1918.

Along with its presence in the minds of mobilized populations, the alliance was an effective organizational reality whose operating capacities had to be optimized in order to cope with the needs raised by this conflict of a new kind. Faced with the challenge of managing the war and coordinating their efforts, the belligerent States gradually set up Inter-Allied authorities, first in the fields of military organization, censorship, and supply. For many politicians and officials from various Allied countries, this probably represented a constraint accepted by necessity. But other clues signal that some of them enthusiastically engaged in strengthening ties and cooperation in which they may have seen more than a mere response to immediate technical needs. This is illustrated by the creation in 1915 of the Inter-Allied Parliament.

[5] E. PITTARD, *Les Races belligérantes, esquisses anthropologiques*, vol. 1: *Les alliés*, Paris 1916.

An initiative of French MP Franklin-Bouillon, it was equipped with a standing secretariat and was made up of representative sections of 25 members of the British, French, and Italian Parliaments and would convene every three months[6]. Its aim was to increase the cooperation between the Allied nations and to strengthen their ties. Such an initiative remained rather formal and was hardly reported in the press before 1917. However, the creation of the Inter-Allied Parliament reflected a growing interest among some elite circles for strengthening international political ties among the Entente beyond the sole creation of *ad hoc* bodies. Some important members of the Inter-Allied Parliament wanted to foster further interaction. In the cases when they took initiatives in that direction, this could but result in a strengthening of the concrete content of the Entente. This is particularly true of the Italian MP Gallenga-Stuart who was to play a prominent role in the Inter-Allied celebrative efflorescence at the end of the war, as we will see. Sure, the Inter-Allied Parliament is no more than an embryonic attempt whose significance is not easy to assess. Nevertheless it seems to have been part of a broader phenomenon of Inter-Allied association that started to develop around 1916/17, before reaching a peak in 1918 and 1919. It first involved elite circles, such as the Union interalliée, which was created in Paris in 1917, but also came to be widened through the creation of all kinds of Inter-Allied congresses, such as the Inter-Allied Freemasonry Congress or the Inter-Allied socialist Congresses, for instance. The Entente therefore constituted a large framework, which tended to create links, associations, and networks that would otherwise not have existed. That this framework was loose and uneven should not lead to disregarding its effects. Inter-Allied sociability will turn up again in the practical organization of Inter-Allied ceremonies in 1918.

The very names of the Inter-Allied Parliament and of the Union interalliée raise the question of the relationship between the public image of the Allies and the organizational reality of the alliance. The neologism «Inter-Allied», first limited to the technical lexicon of military bureaucracy and logistics, progressively entered the political area and the self-representation of the warring societies. Research on scanned periodicals allows us to grasp the moment when the word «Inter-Allied» entered the common vocabulary, in 1917. The occurrence of this word

[6] J. Rais, *Le Parlement interallié*, in «L'Europe nouvelle», 2, 1918, pp. 2235-2236.

in the mainstream press reveals that the contemporaries did become acquainted with a new category. This is what confirms its later use to name realities of a symbolic kind pertaining to the realm of identity. For sure, the numerous projects of Inter-Allied medals and monuments that emerged in 1918 and 1919 exceeded the reference to mere technical offices. At this point, I am therefore tempted to characterize the set of phenomena I have mentioned as a very gradual move toward the constitution of an Inter-Allied sphere.

3. *The Allies staged: the Allied celebratory explosion of 1918*

The staging of all the Allies as a community in the public rituality is hardly to be found in the first part of the Great War beyond expressions of bi-national amity. Significantly, when Italy joined the Entente and entered the war in May 1915, the French government organized an official ceremony in Paris, which completely neglected to honor the Entente as a whole. Taking place on 28 June 1915, the ceremony was cast into the prewar model of the celebrations of the Solferino battle, which had been reinvigorated by groups promoting Franco-Italian amity. Such bi-national functions were commonplace in France during the first part of the war. They conveyed the prewar legacy of endeavors aiming at firming bonds of alliance in a difficult diplomatic context. Thus, celebrations had exalted the Franco-Russian alliance and the Franco-British rapprochement. The media had extensively reported on them since the 1890s. Paradoxically, it is rather at the margins of the conflict, in neutral countries, that one can trace the earlier clear depiction of the alliance and of the Allies in public ceremonies organized by pro-Entente associations. This is the case in several countries in South America which organized meetings and galas in honor of the «Allies»[7].

Comparing the festive programs of the four Bastille Days held in Paris during the Great War helps capture the emergence of the Inter-Allied in the ritual symbolism, in the French context. In 1915, the ceremony was centered on the transfer of the remains of Rouget de Lisle, the songwriter of the *Marseillaise*, to the national military crypt of the Hôtel des Invalides. In the following year, the military parade featured French

[7] Bruxelles, Service public federal des Affaires étrangères, *Dossiers guerre 14-18*, cl B 420, «divers. Sympathies de l'étranger».

but also Russian, English, and Belgian troops. In 1917, however, only French soldiers took part in the parade. The other nations were only mentioned in the press through the texts of congratulatory telegrams from heads of Allied States sent to the French President. The change in 1918 was all the more evident when Bastille Day was pictured as a festival of universal significance (for instance, the headlines of «Le Petit Parisien» on that day were: «our national holiday, festival of the nations»). Importantly, the pictorial presence of the Inter-Allied topic pervaded the whole celebration, much more than had been the case in the previous years. On the first page of «Le Petit Parisien» snapshots represented the Polish and Czechoslovak flags, as well as the awarding of decorations to French, American, British, Portuguese, and other Allied soldiers and officers. The collective figure of the «Ally» was also evoked by a ceremony at the statue of Strasbourg, on the Place de la Concorde. Finally, the press echoed the official submission by the Italian Under-Secretary of State for propaganda, Gallenga-Stuart, of the register containing the signatures of 300,000 of his fellow countrymen as an expression of sympathy to the French and Allied cause. But the Parisian Bastille Day in 1918 was also part of a larger celebratory cycle. On 4 July, indeed, the American national day was officially celebrated, while the French authorities had solemnized the British Empire Day by organizing conferences throughout France to enhance the role of this ally in the war[8].

The same trend is to be found in Italy. Actually, it is far from easy to draw a clear-cut line dividing the different national cases. The organization of such ceremonies often derived from a kind of imitative contagion or, simply, from the normal course of diplomatic protocol. It imposed, for instance, that an Allied country celebrated the 4th of July as its own national day if other Allies had taken the same steps. From early 1918 on, in Rome, official visits of Allied dignitaries became dramatically more frequent and much more elaborately staged than before. At the same time, public celebrations were organized throughout the peninsula on the occasion of the French and American national days. In many cities where British and French troops had been stationed since the end of 1917, they featured joint military parades of Allied and Italian troops.

[8] COMITÉ L'EFFORT DE LA FRANCE ET DE SES ALLIÉS (eds), *La fête de l'Empire britannique, Empire day [24 mai 1918]*, Paris 1918.

In Italy, as in France, the summer of 1918 was a time of intense public staging of the alliance.

Whatever may have been the political motivations behind it, this dramatic upsurge of the figure of the Allies in the ritual discourse reveals a change in the mainstream war cultures. The Allies had acquired a new status in them. Their staging henceforth resorted to the ritual magic of tools usually devoted to the symbolic legitimization of political power. This betrayed a trend toward a sacralization of an alliance which was henceforth a key element of the meaning that was given to the ongoing war.

4. *A producer or Inter-Allied ceremonies: Romeo Gallenga-Stuart*

The inflation of public rituals celebrating the Allies in 1918 is a quite evident phenomenon, at least in France and Italy. What is less clear is the meaning of this phenomenon. To interpret it, it is necessary to go beyond the description of the mere ritual performance and to scrutinize the machinery and the agents who produced it. Who actually wrote this Inter-Allied narrative of the war? And to what purpose? A series of factors should be considered to answer these questions: Wilson's speech on the right to self-determination might have reconfigured the mainstream war speech by strengthening the idea of a struggle for the nationalities[9]; the major offensives unleashed by the Central Powers starting from March 1918 and the extreme strain this imposed on the civilian populations of the Entente countries might have required to support the home fronts' morale. In this respect, the image of the alliance was deemed particularly motivating since enhancing the strength of the Allies. Thus, the 1918 celebrative mania would result from the search by the belligerent States for new means of managing the masses after a year of morale erosion. Lastly, this celebrative efflorescence might come from a diplomatic dynamic of imitation, each tribute organized by one country being automatically imitated or reciprocated by the others.

[9] D. ROSSINI, *Il mito americano nell'Italia della grande guerra*, Roma - Bari 2000. See also a recent study of the reception of the Wilsonian speech in the colonies of the great powers: E. MANELA, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Oxford - New York 2007.

Focusing on the figure of Romeo Gallenga-Stuart allows us to tackle this question in a more down-to-earth manner. A former member of the Inter-Allied Parliament, he was appointed Under-Secretary for foreign Propaganda when the function was first created in November 1917, under the authority of Prime Minister and Home Secretary Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. As such, he played a prominent role in the organization of the Inter-Allied public ritual in 1918, not only in Italy but also abroad. As we mentioned, he handed President Poincaré the 300,000 signatures in support of France and the Allied cause that had been gathered in the Rome province[10]. The mission of Gallenga-Stuart as the Under-Secretary for foreign Propaganda was to improve the image of Italy among neutral and Allied countries, to enhance the importance of its war effort and to justify its war aims. Indeed, the Treaty of London had just been publicly disclosed by the Bolshevik authorities who had thus revealed the territorial haggling that had preceded Italy's entry into the war. In a June 1918 report summarizing the activities of his Undersecretariat since its inception, Gallenga-Stuart explicitly integrated organizing public ceremonies into the arsenal of means used to achieves its objectives:

«In any auspicious occasion, the Undersecretariat has sought to deploy its business for the purpose of promoting or facilitating events in Italy able to effectively influence the public opinion of the foreigners»[11].

He then mentioned in that sense the ceremonies organized in Rome since April 1918, the gathering of signatures in support of the Allies in view of their solemn presentation to the Allied governments on 14 July. The utilitarian function of these symbolic events was crudely stated:

«These events have the dual advantage of serving as Home propaganda and at the same time of resulting among foreigners [it is not about Allies anymore, here!] in reciprocal events in our honor. This is why this Undersecretariat has deemed useful to aim, as much as possible, also in this area, at intensifying the expressions of sympathy toward the Entente countries»[12].

[10] BIBLIOTHÈQUE DE DOCUMENTATION ET D'INFORMATION CONTEMPORAINE, *Guerre mondiale 1914-1918*, 4 delta 406 (Italie. Manifestations en l'honneur des alliés), f. 1.

[11] Roma, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (hereafter ACS), *Carte Gallenga*, b. 1, fasc. 7: «la propaganda all'estero, novembre 1917 - giugno 1918».

[12] ACS, *Carte Gallenga*, b. 1, fasc. 7: «la propaganda all'estero, novembre 1917 - giugno 1918».

5. *The co-production of the Inter-Allied rituality*

This focus on propaganda seen as a rational activity control by a small group of conscious, if not Machiavellian, actors should be qualified in two ways. First, by taking into account how the very inner-workings of the Entente contributed to the accession of people with a certain profile to important positions. Second, by taking into account how a discourse initially created and disseminated from above was actually received and appropriated by various sectors of civil society.

First, the presence of Gallenga-Stuart at the head of an authority as important in the context of 1918 as the Under-Secretary of State is far from evident. After having voluntarily enlisted in 1915, Gallenga-Stuart had been assigned in 1916 to the Propaganda Office. Occupying this somewhat subordinate position he was given a series of missions in Great Britain, because of his good knowledge of the local aristocratic circles. English was indeed his mother tongue (his mother was Scottish) and he had a perfect knowledge of the country's literature. It is thanks to these missions that Gallenga-Stuart acquired a stature that made him apt to be appointed to such an important position in November 1917[13]. The war, and the Entente, had therefore provided him with a great opportunity to leverage his international social and linguistic capital. The same reasons account for his already mentioned presence in the Inter-Allied Parliament in 1916. Then he tied or strengthened relationships with men like Stephen Pichon or Lord Harmsworth that would prove valuable in his position of Under-Secretary of State. This gave him much credit when he proposed the idea of Inter-Allied propaganda meetings that became effective starting from March 1918. In his above quoted report, Gallenga-Stuart wrote:

«The practical results of these meetings have appeared in the cordial and diligent collaboration of our agents with those of England, France, the United States of America ... The Entente propaganda offices are now in constant contact with each other, exchanging news and suggestions, with a clear mutual benefit»[14].

Gallenga-Stuart also presented the ceremonies related to the official visits of symbolic figures of the Allied countries as a result of this en-

[13] L. Tosi, *Romeo A. Gallenga Stuart e la propaganda di guerra all'estero (1917-1918)*, in «Storia contemporanea», 1971, 2, pp. 519-542.

[14] ACS, *Carte Gallenga*, b. 1, fasc. 7: «la propaganda all'estero, novembre 1917 - giugno 1918».

hanced collaboration. The Under-Secretary of State firmly expressed his political will as the first cause of these realizations. But we should not overlook that such a will would probably never have been effective without the functioning of this peculiar entity, subject to a continuous strengthening process of its organizational structures, that was referred to as the Entente.

On the other hand, this view of the Inter-Allied discourse as the result of the sole State activity must be amended by underlining the processes of appropriation and circulation of this discourse in the belligerent societies. I will confine myself here to discuss this broad issue by presenting only two revealing examples.

On 22 July 1918, the Lucca *Comitato di Resistenza interna* (an association typical of the self-mobilized groups that emerged in the Italian bourgeois and middle class after Caporetto) wrote directly to the government to denounce the lack of exposure of the French flag on public buildings on the day of the French national holiday in Lucca. It also insisted that orders be sent to the local prefect so that appropriate rejoicing be planned on 4 August 1918, the anniversary of Britain's entry into the war[15]. This was significant of a want to exalt not just a bilateral friendship but the community of all the Allies. Indeed, while the United States and France had been celebrated at a few days distance, honoring Britain—the third great Ally—completed a celebratory cycle (Britain's lack of a national day could be resolved by celebrating either Empire Day or her entry into the war). Civil society appropriated initiatives first promoted by the government and could even interpret them in an unexpected manner, as the ubiquitous image of the Bastille and the assimilation of Germany with the nations' Bastille on 14 July 1918 illustrates. In the same vein, Mussolini stated in his 14 July 1918 editorial for «Il Popolo d'Italia» that his newspaper had been the first promoter of the idea to celebrate the French national day, before it was taken over and implemented by the government. However true this claim might have actually been, the point is that a figurehead of the interventionist movement deliberately took over these official initiative whose he contributed to forge and disseminate original interpretations.

[15] ACS, *Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri*, 1918, fasc. 13.1, «anniversario dell'entrata in guerra dell'Inghilterra 4 agosto 1914».

The celebrations of July 1918 in Italy were thus occasion for the display of numerous speeches framing the Great War as a transnational—mostly European—struggle, not only as a national war. The image of the Italian Great War as the fourth Risorgimento war was then overshadowed by an Inter-Allied narrative whose a key episode had taken place even before Italy's entry into the war, the battle of the Marne. In the same vein, the public speeches held on this occasion often drew on the European memory of the French Revolution (the storming of the Bastille) in order to build a transnational account of the Great War. Gallenga-Stuart's role in circulating this Inter-Allied narrative should not be exaggerated: once it had been released, many actors adopted it without feeling under any obligation to comply with any governmental copyright. By echoing the Inter-Allied speech, they revealed at the same time the undeniable power of the Italian State authorities and its limits.

6. *Conclusion*

Antoine Prost and Jay Winter have recently underlined the importance of writing transnational accounts of the Great War[16]. No doubt that focusing on the the Entente and on the Allies can be a way of framing such a historical narrative. In this paper, I have emphasized the transnational logics that resulted in the production of a discourse about the alliance more than the very content of this discourse. Not doing so would have proved difficult. This discourse could indeed vary from one Allied country to another. It could also vary depending on the circumstances. It evolved all along the war. The figure of the Ally never ceased to be highly ambivalent or elusive. The image of the Allies as a cohesive community was even more so. Sure, the importance of the Allies in the public discourse tended to rise from 1914 to 1918 but this never was a simple and smooth process. As Charles Ridel has shown, the move could even proceed the other way round. From 1916 onward, as the figure of the obsession of the shirker in French public opinion began to fade away, the Allies tended to be scapegoated in compensation[17].

[16] A. Prost - J.M. Winter, *Penser la Grande Guerre un essai d'historiographie*, Paris 2004, pp. 264-272.

[17] C. Ridel, *Les Embusqués*, Paris 2007.

On the other hand, such criticism also tacitly implied the idea of a community and of common duties.

This story also emphasizes the specificity of the public ritual as a medium. Being bound up with the sacred, it reveals the urge to highlight some cultural elements that had previously received less importance. This medium is also at a crossroad of interpretations. Insofar as it involves a great number of agents who organize it or who reinterpret it, making sense of it, the ritual tends to dilute the notion of authorship. As Howard Becker has shown about the work of art, it is produced not so much by a single individual than by a cooperation network[18]. This means that «narrating war» is exclusively done neither by some Machiavellian agents, nor by society as a whole but, rather, by moving and unpredictable constellations, which it is the historian's task to empirically re-frame.

It is not before the last months of the war that the imagery of the Inter-Allied community was fully developed and sacralized within public ritual. This image possessed some motivating force from the beginning of the war but it reached its full power only after several years. The clear and structured image of the Inter-Allied community such as it appears in the 1919 victory celebrations was the result of the political, cultural, and organizational dynamics unleashed by the intricate development of the Entente. More broadly, there is some clue that scrutinizing this never fully completed or stabilized entity could provide an introduction to further investigations of the Great War understood as a «transnational moment». To which extent the Inter-Allied idea worked as pedagogy of a new 20th-century internationalism or, rather, was a legacy of 19th century internationalisms remains to be explored.

At last, the story of the growing recourse to public rituals also announces the great fascist liturgies. If the fascist religion itself remained in limbo in 1918[19], the ritual obsession that would mark the *ventennio* was already well under way.

[18] H. Becker, *Art worlds*, Berkeley CA 1982.

[19] E. Gentile, *Il culto del littorio. La sacralizzazione della politica nell'Italia fascista*, Roma 1993.

The Great War in Comics

Italy and France, 1914-2012

by *Roberto Bianchi*

Exploring the representations of the Great War in French and Italian comics means addressing a type of source that has been the item of different scholarly approaches and has produced very different scientific results in the two countries. The present study, a preliminary report on a still ongoing research, will focus on a few selected issues connected with the exploitation of comics as a source for the historical study of the past. By drawing on recent publications and exploring some of the leading debates in the history of comics, I will attempt to outline a comparison between French *bandes dessinées* and Italian *fumetti*, and to point out patterns of continuity and discontinuity in a particularly diverse artistic and editorial corpus. Among other things, this body of material has only been partially reconstructed and analyzed so far.

The relations between *bandes dessinées* and history—the history of comics 'and' the presence of comics in history—have been the item of numerous and at times quite meticulous research projects by French or francophone scholars. The same is true of the Anglo-Saxon world, and, to an extent, even of Germany, where the market for comics is comparatively marginal[1]. In Italy, however, the intersections of comics and history have never been subjected to a systematic study. Educators, semioticians, linguists, experts of mass communication, and sociologists (not counting collectors and amateurs) have produced a wealth

Translation by Francesco Peri

[1] See M. PORRET (ed.), *Objectif bulles. Bande dessinée & histoire*, Genève 2009; R. MOUNAJED, *Geschichte in Sequenzen. Über den Einsatz von Geschichtscomics im Geschichtsunterricht*, Frankfurt a.M. 2009; D. GRÜNEWALD (ed.), *Struktur und Geschichte der Comics. Beiträge zur Comicforschung*, Bochum - Essen 2010; J.A. LENT, *Comic Art of Europe. An International, Comprensive Bibliography*, London 1994; J.A. LENT, *Comic Art of Europe through 2000. An International Bibliography*, 2 vols, Westport CT 2003.

of interesting essays, each in their own specific field of expertise, but the potential for interdisciplinary synthesis that has benefited historical research on other sources and mass medias is still largely unexploited[2]. One of the few available works on the history of the historiography of comics in Italy highlights the dearth of recent studies on the distinctive characters, the specific features, the transformations, and the social impact of comics in contemporary Italy. This particular history is «yet to be written»[3].

As a matter of fact, Italian historians of the contemporary age have long disregarded a type of source that has much to tell us about the mechanisms of war propaganda, the more or less successful attempts at a nationalization of the masses throughout the 20th century, and the relations between the State, the editorial market, and mobilized or demobilized societies in the extended aftermath of both world wars[4]. More generally, the centrality of comics to cultural and social history (and to the history of publishing) continues to be ignored by most scholars in spite of a growing scientific interest for such issues as the mobilization of children, the nationalization of the «people in infancy», a few selected periodicals for children like the «Corriere dei Piccoli», and the relations between comics and fascism. Over the last few years, however, a growing body of innovative work in this field has begun to shape a distinctive new current[5].

[2] See J. MEDA, *Per una storia della stampa periodica per l'infanzia e la gioventù in Italia tra '800 e '900*, in F. LOPARCO, *I bambini e la guerra. Il Corriere dei Piccoli e il primo conflitto mondiale (1915-1918)*, Firenze 2011, pp. 7-33; R. BIANCHI (ed.), *Fumetti nella storia, storia nei fumetti*, in «Passato e presente», 88, 2013, pp. 143-169; E. MORIN, *La testa ben fatta. Riforma dell'insegnamento e riforma del pensiero*, Milano 2000, p. 40.

[3] F. GADDUCCI - M. STEFANELLI, *La storiografia del fumetto in Italia. Tradizioni e strategie culturali*, in S. BRANCATO (ed.), *Il secolo del fumetto. Lo spettacolo a strisce nella società italiana 1908-2008*, Latina 2008, p. 130. See also F. GADDUCCI, *L'avventurosa unità d'Italia*, in G. BONO - M. STEFANELLI (eds), *Fumetto! 150 anni di storie italiane*, Milano 2012, p. 18.

[4] See however N. SPAGNOLLI, *Guerra e pace nel fumetto italiano e tedesco. Propaganda, (ri)educazione e memoria (1939-1965)*, Ph.D. thesis Verona, 2012.

[5] See A. GIBELLI, *Il popolo bambino. Infanzia e nazione dalla Grande Guerra a Salò*, Torino 2005, p. 68; J. MEDA, *Il «Corriere» va alla guerra. L'immaginario del «Corriere dei Piccoli» e le guerre del Novecento (1912-1945)*, in «Storia e documenti», 6, 2011, pp. 97-114; J. WINTER, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History*, Cambridge 1995; S. GILLIS - E. MACCALLUM-STEWART, *Children's Cul-*

All along the 20th century, comics have had a critical impact on the education and literacy rate of generations (some would speak of «multimedia literacy»). Still, historians have consistently underrated or dismissed them as sources, even in the most detailed studies of the long-period construction of social consensus and the education to patriotism and citizenship[6]. In 2011, when Italy celebrated the 150th anniversary of national unity, a superb exhibition entitled *Fare gli italiani. 150 anni di storia nazionale* (Making Italians. 150 Years of National History) opened at the Officine Grandi Riparazioni in Turin. Divided in fourteen «thematic units», it presented a variety of objects, photographs, pictures, works of art, reconstructions, and installations, but not a single comic book was on display[7].

That comics enjoy a different status as historical sources in Italy and France had already become apparent during the 90th anniversary of the Great War. In France, the representation of the Great War in francophone *bandes dessinées* was the item of numerous exhibitions, catalogues, and cultural events; Italy attempted to answer in kind, but the scope and outcomes of Italian initiatives proved hardly up to par. Some interesting didactic experiments have been attempted in selected schools, and a few monographic exhibitions, such as «Fumetti di trincea. Strisce di storia» (Trench comics. History in comic strips)[8], have tried to hold their own, but the magnitude and range of French

ture and the First World War, in «The Lion and the Unicorn», 31, 2007, 2, pp. V-IX; L. Guidi, *«Maledetto chi parla di pace». La Grande Guerra sulle pagine di una rivista per l'infanzia*, in D. Menozzi - G. Procacci, - S. Soldani (eds), *Un paese in guerra. La mobilitazione civile in Italia (1914-1918)*, Milano 2010, pp. 213-236.

6 See M.I. Palazzolo, *L'editoria verso un pubblico di massa*, in S. Soldani - G. Turi (eds), *Fare gli italiani. Scuola e cultura nell'Italia contemporanea*, vol. 2, Bologna 1993, p. 314.

7 See G. De Luna - W. Barberis (eds), *Fare gli italiani. 150 anni di storia nazionale*, Torino 2011; *Fare gli italiani 1861-2011. Una mostra per i 150 anni della storia d'Italia*, Milano 2011; M. Bertolotti, *Fare gli italiani. 150 anni in mostra*, in «Passato e presente», 86, 2012, pp. 95-105.

8 See *Trieste 1918. La prima redenzione novant'anni dopo*, Milano 2008, pp. 127-139. Two slightly later exhibitions hosted in Prato and Riccione respectively deserve to be mentioned in this context: *Guerra & Pace. Prato 2000. XXIII rassegna del fumetto e del fantastico*, special supplement to «Fumo di China», 75, 2000; *Strip Wars. Echi di guerra nel fumetto italiano*, special supplement to «Fumo di China», 100, 2002.

initiatives, particularly at Péronne's «Historial de la Grande Guerre», were incomparably greater[9].

Both countries have traditionally produced distinguished work on the history of the Great War, but Italian and French approaches have been quite different from the start. The reasons for this discrepancy are manifold, and not all are dependent on specific national traditions in contemporary history: more often than not, dissimilarities can be accounted for in terms of the specific structure of the book market and connected with the higher or lower cultural status of comics in the eyes of the scholarly community. It must be noted that reflecting on the relations between comics and contemporary history is not the same as analyzing the relations between comics and the history of comics, whose periodization is still open to much debate[10].

If historiographic models are few and far between, methodological problems are rife, beginning with the risk of succumbing to what Ernst Gombrich has called «physiognomic fallacy». Pictures cannot be considered as unmediated expressions of an age or an alleged «spirit of the times», lest we end up extracting from images only what we already know (or believe to know) from other sources, or treat them as additional evidence for preconceived theories. Artistic style as an index of social and cultural transformations is highly «problematic»: one cannot study visual sources as a «mere reflexion» of reality; images need to be addressed as an integral component of historical reality. There is no other way to analyze the subject matter of a picture as it was represented and interpreted by the author and, parallel to this, to explore the culture, the mentality, and the social context that are encoded in a given picture[11].

[9] See Y.-M. LABÉ, *La «der des ders» de Tardi exposée à Péronne*, in «Le Monde», August 13, 2009; V. MARIE (ed.), *La Grande Guerre dans la bande dessinée de 1914 à aujourd'hui*, Milano 2009.

[10] For a short introduction see R. BIANCHI, *La storia nei fumetti, i fumetti nella storia. Questioni e problemi per una ricerca in corso*, in *Strisce di Risorgimento. Risorgimento e unità d'Italia nei fumetti e nella stampa per ragazzi*, Chieri 2011, pp. 9-23. See G. PROCACCI, *Alcune recenti pubblicazioni in Francia sulla «cultura di guerra» e sulla percezione di morte nel primo conflitto mondiale*, in N. LABANCA - G. ROCHAT (eds), *Il soldato, la guerra e il rischio di morte*, Milano 2006, pp. 107-124.

[11] E.H. GOMBRICH, *Meditations on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays on the Theory of Art*, London 1963, pp. 70-91; G. DE LUNA, *La passione e la ragione. Il mestiere dello*

Of course, in the particular case of comics the ties between the artistic production and the historical context are stronger than anywhere else. Comics are made to sell, they are a product of mass society and of a publishing market dominated by big cartels populated by many small publishers. At the same time, comics were and have always remained a «poor man's art», owing to their power to afford unlimited flights of imagination for an extremely modest price, and to operate with an incomparably greater freedom than either cinema or television.

Undoubtedly, the structure of the market for comics in Italy and France is fundamentally different: francophone comics have benefited from the outset of a much larger pool of readers, publishers, distributors, artists, and draughtsmen. One of the pioneers of contemporary comics in the first half of the 19th century was Rodolphe Töpffer, a Swiss from Geneva. Additionally, French comic artists have learned much from the remarkable products of the neighboring Belgian school[12]. According to estimates, in France alone 40 millions of comic books were sold in 2010, with an overall turnover of 400 million Euros (+25% in three years). About ten years ago, specialized publishers such as Dargaud and Dupuis boasted annual revenues of 50 to 70 million Euros. Of course European figures are hardly comparable with the overall sales figures of Japanese majors (in the same period Kodansha made the equivalent of 1.5 billion Euros), and the data from the last two years evince a downward tendency[13]. Still, compared to the Italian market, where the general number of publishers and publications has been increasing, but the print runs and the readership have been gradually shrinking, French sales figures are remarkable[14].

storico contemporaneo, Milano 2004, pp. 135-136; C. GINZBURG, *Miti, emblemi, spie*, Torino 1986, p. 50, quoted in P. GINSBORG, *Storia e arte nell'Italia del XX secolo*, in *Novecento. Arte e Storia in Italia*, Milano 2000, p. 41.

[12] See P. GAUMER, *Dictionnaire mondial de la BD*, Paris 2010.

[13] See D. PASAMONIK, *La BD franco-belge dans le monde: un nain parmi les géants*, in http://www.actuabd.com (30/1/2013). In the same period great American publishers such as Marvel or DC Comics have attained annual revenues of 62 and 50 million Euros respectively. For recent figures see X. GUILBERT, *Numérologie – Une analyse du marché de la bande dessinée en 2011*, in «du9», 2011, pp. 1-73.

[14] See ISTAT, *Annuario statistico italiano*, 2002-2010; «Annuario del fumetto», 15, 2010, pp. I-VIII; 16, 2011, pp. I-VIII; R. CUPPARI, *Editoria e fumetti in Italia*, in «La Fabbrica del Libro», 1, 2009, p. 34.

These national discrepancies have obvious repercussions on the production and distribution of comics about the history of the Great War. According to research data acquired a few years ago, as many as 120 comic books dealing with World War I were printed in France between 1914 and 2008 (not considering the *bandes dessinées* published on periodicals and, more recently, the internet or other electronic supports, which can hardly be considered comics proper). Figures for Italy are still uncertain, but overwhelming evidence suggests that the total was significantly smaller. Another interesting parameter for comparison is the evolution of publishing patterns over time[15].

During the war, France saw a greater diffusion of comic books and serialized stories in publications for a young public. The first examples that come to mind are the adventures of classic characters that the French public already knew and appreciated, such as Louis Forton's three little rascals *Les Pieds Nickelés*, regularly featured since 1908 on the weekly «L'Épatant». During the war they, too, were symbolically «mobilized» to fight against the *boches* on a sort of imaginary front. Their adventures involved French children in a fantastic parallel conflict. Another notable example was *Bécassine*, the Breton housemaid, «the prototype of the gullible woman with a heart of gold». Created in 1905 by Jacqueline Rivière and Joseph Pinchon for «La Semaine de Suzette», a weekly for «jeunes filles de bonne famille», it announced the triumph of the Belgian *ligne claire*. The adventures of these and other characters accompanied the «first great moral and intellectual mobilization of the children», extensively described and examined in the literature[16].

In the new technologically advanced mass conflict, a harbinger of the coming «age of extremes», it was no longer possible to wage a war without spreading hate and mobilizing the younger genera-

[15] See B. DENÉCHÈRE - L. RÉVILLON, *14-18 dans la bande dessinée. Images de la Grande Guerre de Forton à Tardi*, Turquant 2008, p. 26.

[16] S. AUDOIN-ROUZEAU, *La guerre des enfants 1914-1918. Essai d'histoire culturelle*, Paris 1993, p. 186, pp. 101-102; L. VAN YPERSELE, *Images de guerre, guerre d'images. Les représentations de la Grande Guerre dans Bécassine et les Pieds. Nickelés*, in V. MARIE (ed.), *La Grande Guerre*, p. 31; A.-M. COUDERC, *La Semaine de Suzette. Histoires de filles*, Paris 2005. In 1913 Caumery (Maurice Languereau) replaced editor in chief J. Rivière as the leading writer.

tions[17]. Italy entered the war in 1915, after a year of virulent struggles and clashes between an interventionist front (a minority, but spearheaded by outstanding intellectuals and well established in major cities) and a neutralist faction (numerically dominant, but fragmented and not very well connected in government circles). When the neutralists were silenced and war was eventually declared, building a consensus proved to be much harder than elsewhere[18]. Italian authorities had to deal with a characteristic deficit of national identity, and they attempted to do so by subjecting a country that would never experience the likes of a 1914 «Community of August» to a renewed patriotic pedagogy. Parallel to this, it was necessary to reinstate and consolidate the existing hierarchies and social privileges to keep peasants in a subordinate role: peasants would march to the front along with industrial workers and artisans, but without really blending in, and just like the urban proletariat, relegated to the margins of political life, they would never form an authentic part of the Nation[19].

The «Corriere dei Piccoli», a weekly supplement to the Milanese newspaper «Il Corriere della Sera», was founded in 1908, a year that many scholars, following a rigid and now obsolete periodisation, consider an important *terminus a quo* for the introduction of comics in Italy. The new publication greatly contributed to building a consensus for war by mobilizing a younger readership[20]. As the war with Turkey had shown, the readers of the «Corriere dei Piccoli», much more numerous than the public for other periodicals for children such as «Il Novellino» or

[17] See E. TRAVERSO, *À feu et à sang. De la guerre civile européenne 1914-1945*, Paris 2007, p. 152. «In a sense, Europe was born from that first, seemingly incommensurable collective experience», A. GIBELLI, *Il popolo bambino*, pp. 41-42.

[18] See A. FAVA, *Mobilitazione patriottica, assistenza all'infanzia, educazione nazionale nella scuola elementare dell'Italia in guerra (1915-1918)*, in D. MENOZZI - G. PROCACCI - S. SOLDANI (eds), *Un paese in guerra*, p. 151.

[19] See M. ISNENGHI, *Il mito della Grande guerra*, Bologna 1997, p. 327; E.J. LEED, *No Man's Land. Combat and Identity in World War I*, Cambridge 1979, pp. 39-72.

[20] On illiteracy in Italy see G. VIGO, *Gli italiani alla conquista dell'alfabeto*, in S. SOLDANI - G. TURI (eds), *Fare gli italiani*, vol. 1, pp. 37-66; D. MARCHESINI, *Città e campagna nello specchio dell'alfabetismo (1921-1951)*, *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 9-40; E. DE FORT, *Scuola e analfabetismo nell'Italia del '900*, Bologna 1995, pp. 27-37.

«Il Giornalino»[21], were a strategic target. During the conflict, between 1914 and 1919, the print run was doubled, and 19th century publications for children, formerly vehicles for the moral values of Risorgimento, all but disappeared[22].

The mobilization campaign began almost immediately, in the year of Italian neutrality. Starting with the summer of 1914, the «Corriere dei Piccoli» began to run articles and stories featuring new or restyled characters that mimicked the imagery and rhetoric of the Risorgimento and were presented as role models[23]. In these early weeks, graphic narrations and comic panels exemplified a wide range of exemplary behaviors and interpretations aimed at integrating children into the patterns of wartime mobilization, transforming them into little soldiers deployed on the inner front. Such beloved characters as Schizzo, Luca Takko and Gianni, Tofoletto Panciavuota, Abetino, and the female heroin Didì were suddenly operating on the front during battles and armed clashes, leading their allies and friends to victory. In other instances, they were bravely sacrificing themselves in the rear, particularly in mobilized cities and the countryside[24].

[21] Two years before the Sarajevo incident, a survey conducted on selected elementary schools in Bologna showed that 65% of the young students used to read the «Corriere dei Piccoli», against a mere 7,5% and 6,5% respectively for the other two publications. 50% of the pupils had read De Amicis's *Cuore* and 21% *Pinocchio*. More than 9 out of 10 male pupils in the fourth grade qualified themselves as «subscribers» to the «Corriere dei Piccoli» or «assiduous readers» thereof, see M. Fiore, *La lettura dei «piccoli». Un'indagine del 1912*, in «La Fabbrica del Libro», 1, 2005, pp. 33-38.

[22] From 153.000 copies in 1914, the print run grew to 227.000 copies in 1918 and 326.000 in 1919 (Archivio Storico Corriere della Sera, *Area Diffusione e vendita*, b. 7322, «Cronistoria medie annue di tiratura, vendita e percentuale di resa. Corriere dei Piccoli»). Thanks to Nicola Spagnolli for the information.

[23] On the «Risorgimento canon», see A.M. Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santità e onore alle origini dell'Italia unita*, Torino 2000, p. 53. On the survival of that canon see the same author's not uncontroversial *Sublime madre nostra. La nazione italiana dal Risorgimento al fascismo*, Roma - Bari 2011, particularly pp. 94-145.

[24] See F. Loparco, *I bambini e la guerra*, p. 76; J. Meda, *Il Corriere va alla guerra. L'immaginario del Corriere dei Piccoli e le guerre del Novecento (1912-45)*, in «Storia e Documenti», 6, 2001, p. 99; M. Pignot, *I bambini*, in S. Audoin-Rouzeau - J.-J. Becker (eds), *La prima guerra mondiale*, Torino 2007, p. 52; L. Guidi, *«Maledetto chi parla di pace»*, p. 214.

Such authors as Antonio Rubino, Attilio Mussino, Gustavo Rosso, and Mario Mossa de Murtas were drawing on well-experimented languages in their attempts to establish a grammar and a style of expression that would distinguish Italian comics for decades to come. Their work was immediately exploited for trench journals. In autumn 1917, after the defeat at Caporetto, of which nothing was said in the weekly the comics of the «Corriere dei Piccoli» changed in style or were put on stand-by: during the last and most dramatic year of the war, the most talented authors for children had moved on to work for trench journals, under the direct supervision of the Propaganda department of the army[25]. By collaborating with such war periodicals as «La Tradotta», the press organ of the III army, or «La Ghirba», printed by the V army, well-established and experienced comic artists played a fundamental role in the rise of mass journalism in Italy[26]. Comic panels were numerous, if admittedly less spontaneous than their counterparts in French trench journals.

In other words, from the very start comics played an important role in the history of the press and the rise of literacy in 20th century Italy. Graphic narration—modeled after the «Corriere dei Piccoli» and combining the vilification of the enemy with motifs of the traditional popular print[27]—proved much more effective than purely text-based propaganda, since the army of the Kingdom of Italy was for the most part illiterate and only imperfectly nationalized[28].

[25] See A. FAETI, *Guardare le figure. Gli illustratori italiani dei libri per l'infanzia*, Torino 2001, p. 227; G.C. CUCCOLINI, *La rivoluzione incompiuta. Fumetti e personaggi del «Corriere dei Piccoli» dalle origini al secondo dopoguerra*, in G. GINEX (ed.), *Corriere dei Piccoli. Storie, fumetto e illustrazione per ragazzi*, Milano 2009, p. 49; F. LOPARCO, *I bambini e la guerra*, p. 174.

[26] See M. ISNENGHI, *Giornali di trincea 1915-1918*, Torino 1977, pp. 63, 81, 84-87; A. SANGIOVANNI, *Le parole e le figure. Storia dei media in Italia dall'età liberale alla seconda guerra mondiale*, Roma 2012, p. 109; C. BARRUEL - P.-Y. CARLOT, *Le Cœur des Batailles: une mémoire à l'œuvre*, in V. MARIE (ed.), *La Grande Guerre*, p. 57.

[27] See N. MARCHIONNI, *«L'arte della guerra» in Italia nel primo conflitto mondiale*, in N. MARCHIONNI (ed.), *La Grande Guerra degli artisti. Propaganda e iconografia bellica in Italia negli anni della prima guerra mondiale*, Firenze 2005, p. 49. The *figurinai*, traditional authors of popular illustrations for children who perpetuated pre-modern styles of representation in the early 20th century, all but disappeared after the war. For more information see A. FAETI, *Guardare le figure*, p. 9.

[28] See P. PALLOTTINO, *Storia dell'illustrazione italiana. Cinque secoli di immagini riprodotte*, Firenze 2010, pp. 321-322.

With the downfall of the Central Powers, the Great War seemed to vanish from the French *bandes dessinées*. The same is not true of Italian *fumetti*. Between 1918 and the 1960s, with the exception of occasional reprints of older stories published during the mobilization, French comic books about World War I were virtually non-existent[29]. The Italian «Corriere dei Piccoli», however, continued to represent and interpret domestic and foreign political affairs: demobilization, the gendered tensions between unemployed male veterans and women workers hired during the war, the events leading to the expedition to Fiume etc.[30]. Later, in Mussolini's Italy, the Great War, presented as the spark that had kindled the Fascist revolution, was rarely featured in comic books dealing with major episodes of national history and in the periodicals for young readers, whose «golden age» was in the 1930s. This comparative absence of war-themed comics reflected a choice of tactful insubordination against the directives of the regime[31].

In the twenty years that followed World War II, representations of the Great War in Italian comics grew increasingly scarcer, but remained fundamentally consistent with previous trends[32]; during the same period, in the French *bandes dessinées* comics dealing with World War I continued to be marginal. In both countries, particularly in France, the Great War made a brilliant comeback as a subject matter for the «ninth art» with the powerful renewal of comics at the end of the 1960s, and with the rise of new publications aimed at a grown-up public. In

[29] See B. Denéchère - L. Révillon, *14-18 dans la bande dessinée; Bibliographie bande dessinée et Grande Guerre*, in V. Marie (ed.), *La Grande Guerre*, p. 107.

[30] See, for example, «Corriere dei Piccoli», January 12th and 26th, May 19th, and Sempteber 28th 1919. See I. Macera, *Italia! Italia! Italia! Il «Corriere dei Piccoli» dall'armistizio di Villa Giusti alle elezioni politiche (novembre 1918-novembre 1919)*, M.A. thesis Florence, 2012; C. Carabba, *Corrierino, Corrierona. La politica illustrata del Corriere della Sera*, Milano 1998, p. 55.

[31] See F. Gadducci - L. Gori - S. Lama, *Eccetto Topolino. Lo scontro culturale tra fascismo e fumetti*, Roma 2011, pp. 125-129; L. Becciu, *Il fumetto in Italia*, Firenze 1971, p. 114; C. Carabba, *Il fascismo a fumetti*, Rimini 1973, pp. 45-51; N. Binazzi, *Parole nella «Giungla!». Risorgimento e altri miti per le giovani camicie nere*, in «Zapruder», 25, 2011, pp. 56-75.

[32] A good example would be *Storia d'Italia*, a long series written and illustrated by D. Natoli for the «Corriere dei Piccoli» in the early 1950s (particularly instalments 112 to 126, published between 1954 and 1955).

the 1970s, war-themed comics were numerous: 64 original stories, not counting reprints, were published in a single decade. More than a half of the total since 1914[33]. The 80th and 90th anniversaries of the Great War further precipitated this trend.

This comeback, which has grown even more emphatic in recent years, has been described as a mild obsession (*engouement*) of French comic artists for the Great War[34]. This phenomenon has no counterpart in Italy.

Republican Italy has always privileged Risorgimento, fascism, and World War II as a backdrop for historically themed comic books[35]. However, if no explosion of *fumetti* about the Great War can be observed in recent years (more or less the same goes for British *comics*[36]), the presence of war-themed subject matters has become steadier over time, and has experienced a slight increase since the end of the 1960s, when a variety of new products appeared on the market. Some of these were extremely traditional in their storytelling and contents, and exhibited a conventional style; others were highly innovative and original.

The persistence of antiquated languages and narrative patterns as far as the Great War is concerned is readily apparent in highly successful comics such as Enzo Biagi's monumental *Storia d'Italia a fumetti*[37] and *Il papero rosso*, one of the extremely rare Great War-themed stories featured in the Walt Disney weekly «Topolino»[38]. Episodes from World War I also appear in lesser known works such as Roberto Molino's

[33] See B. Denéchère - L. Révillon, *14-18 dans la bande dessinée*, p. 26; *Bibliographie bande dessinée*, pp. 107-108.

[34] A. Chante - V. Marie, *Mythologies iconographiques de la Grande Guerre en bande dessinée*, in V. Marie (ed.), *La Grande Guerre*, p. 13.

[35] See «Pioniere» and «il Vittorioso»; F. Fasiolo, *Italia da fumetto. Graphic journalism e narrativa disegnata nel racconto della realtà italiana di ieri e di oggi*, Latina 2012, p. 150.

[36] See M. Conroy, *La guerre dans la BD*, Paris 2011, pp. 46-58; *Les comics anglo-saxons*, in V. Marie (ed.), *La Grande Guerre*, p. 109; J. Mak, *Quand les comics montent au front! Évocations et représentations de la Grande Guerre à travers la bande dessinée anglo-saxonne (1914-2008)*, *ibid.*, pp. 93-105.

[37] See E. Biagi, *Storia d'Italia a fumetti*, vol. 3: *Da Napoleone alla Repubblica italiana*, Milano 1980, pp. 135-146, illustrated by G. Gaudenzi.

[38] See G. Chellini, *Il Papero rosso*, in «Topolino», 1641, May 10, 1987.

biography of Mussolini[39] and in the early installments of a militant celebration of anti-fascist Resistance published on the highly successful catholic weekly «Il Giornalino» on the fiftieth anniversary of the Italian Liberation[40]. The weight of tradition, particularly in the composition of the panels, is overwhelming in a few recent products that were commissioned by regional administrations and stand out for their poor artistic value and their lack of actual content[41]. Hugo Pratt's now classic stories were completely different in style and infinitely more substantial. The adventures of Corto Maltese, who made his debut in a time of radical renewal of Italian comics and remarkable advances in the historiography of World War I, were set in the vicinities of the Great War[42]. Among other things, the comeback of history as a subject matter for comics in the 1970s was indebted to the output of such writers and illustrators as Mino Milani[43], Dino Battaglia[44], Sergio Toppi[45], Attilio

[39] See A. GUJON - M. FERRARA - G. FELETTIG, *Eroi e personaggi parlano*, vol. 3, Milano 1972.

[40] See R. CALEGARI, *Il figlio ritrovato*, in «Il Giornalino», May 3, 1995, now in R. CALEGARI, *Storie di resistenza*, special supplement to «Il Giornalino», 2010, and in *Eroi e battaglie di frontiera*, Milano 2011, pp. 129-144.

[41] See P. BRUNI - R. FASSI, *Storia della Lombardia a fumetti*, Varese 2007; P. AMADEO - A. CALISI, *I grandi d'Italia*, Roma 2004. See A. GOFFREDI - G. MAESTRI, *Lombardia (n)evergreen. Una rilettura a fumetti dell'unità d'Italia*, in «Zapruder», 25, 2011, pp. 146-154; R. BIANCHI, *Grandi patrie, piccole storie. Nazione e Risorgimento nei fumetti*, *ibid.*, p. 3. See also M. SCIAME, *Gabriele d'Annunzio tra amori e battaglie. Il fumetto*, from a play by E. SYLOS LABINI and F. SALA, supplemen to «il Giornale», February 7, 2013, pp. 28-30.

[42] *Una ballata del mare salato*, Corto Maltese's debut adventure, takes place between 1913 and 1915. It was originally published in the Italian monthly «Sgt. Kirk» (1967-1969); a few shorter episodes set in 1916-1919 were published in the 1970s in the French magazine «Pif» and in the Italian «Linus». This material has been collected, reprinted, and translated numerous times. For an introduction see G. MARCHESE, *Leggere Hugo Pratt. L'autore di Corto Maltese tra fumetto e letteratura*, Latina 2006, pp. 26-27.

[43] See M. MILANI, *L'autore si racconta*, Milano 2009; *Le mani di Mino, l'opera narrativa di Mino Milani attraverso le immagini dei suoi illustratori*, Roma 2008.

[44] See M. MILANI - D. BATTAGLIA, *Duello sugli oceani*, in «Corriere dei Ragazzi», 32, 1972; M. MILANI - D. BATTAGLIA, *Uomini in guerra*, Milano 1979, pp. 16-44; M. CUOZZO, *Dino Battaglia. L'immagine narrante*, Napoli 1999.

[45] See S. TOPPI - M. MILANI, *Il giorno che vennero i carri armati*, in «Corriere dei Ragazzi», 27, 1973; S. TOPPI - M. MILANI, *La vita di un soldato*, in «Corriere dei

Micheluzzi[46], Guido Crepax[47], or, at another level, Bonvi and De Maria, authors of *Nick Carter*[48], and even some of Alfredo Chiappori's satirical strips[49], to mention but a few of the very best artists, extremely different in style and scope. This trend continued in later years, not without remarkable difficulties.

The extremely graphic but exhilarating adventures of Suor Dentona at the front, serialized by Filippo Scòzzari on anti-establishment magazines such as «Il Male» (from 1978) and «Frigidaire» (from 1980), and now collected in a volume[50], were an innovative by-product of the post-1977 avant-garde. (In Italian history, 1977 was a year of virulent social unrest, intense cultural protest and violent political confrontations.) In Pablo Echaurren's biographies of Marinetti and Mayakovsky, dating from the 1980s, the Great War was more than just a background, and the depiction of the aftermath of the conflict appeared to incorporate art historian Claudia Salaris's controversial theories about the history of futurism and the Fiume movement[51]. Pierluigi Negriolli's *Il soldato dell'imperatore* (written by Carlo Dogheria and

Ragazzi», 42, 1974; for a later and more accomplished work see S. TOPPI, *Myetzko*, in «Comic Art», 56, 1989. See also HAMELIN (ed.), *Sergio Toppi. Il segno della storia*, Bologna 2009.

[46] See A. MICHELUZZI, *Petra Chérie*, in «Il Giornalino», 1977-1981; *Attilio Micheluzzi. Architetto d'avventure*, Bologna 2008.

[47] See G. CREPAX, *L'Uomo di Pskov*, Milano 1977; G. CREPAX, *Viva Trotsky*, in «Alterlinus», 8-9, 1974, and «Charlie mensuel», 72, 1975. See S. ZANATTA, *Corpi di donna: oggetti o soggetti?*, in S. ZANATTA - S. ZAGHINI - E. GUZZETTA, *Le donne del fumetto*, Latina 2009, pp. 65-83.

[48] See, for example, BONVI - G. DE MARIA, *Fräulein Doktor*, in «Corriere dei Ragazzi», 15, 1973; BONVI - G. DE MARIA, *Ottobre*, in *Nick Carter Story*, special supplement to «Jonny Logan», 31, 1975. The «Corriere dei Ragazzi» had refused to publish a story whose backdrop was the Russian Revolution.

[49] See A. CHIAPPORI, *Storie d'Italia. Dallo Stato liberale all'Italia fascista*, Milano 1981, pp. 9-15. This volume collects older panels and was not reprinted in the special edition for Italy's 150th anniversary: *Storie d'Italia 1846-1896*, Bologna 2011.

[50] See F. SCÒZZARI, *Suor Dentona. L'integrale*, Roma 2012.

[51] See P. ECHAURREN, *Caffeina d'Europa. Vita di Marinetti*, Roma 2009; P. ECHAURREN, *Majakovskij*, Roma 2012; C. SALARIS, *Alla festa della rivoluzione. Artisti e libertari con D'Annunzio a Fiume*, Bologna 2002; however see R. BIANCHI, *Pace, pane, terra. Il 1919 in Italia*, Roma 2006.

Ettore Paris[52]) and Giancarlo Berardi and Maurizio Mantero's *Carso, 1917* are two more fine specimens from the 1980s[53].

The evolution of comics as a cultural medium in the last quarter of the 20th century has left a clear mark on recent Italian products, attesting to some authors' awareness of ongoing historiographic debates and to their quest for an original approach to a market for comics that has grown increasingly complex and at the same time is ostensibly shrinking.

Some of these publications were printed to be distributed in bookstores and specialized shops: I am thinking of *Storia di nessuno*, adapted from actual letters from the front[54], the surprising *Guerrè di Pietro*, unwittingly echoing the scholarly debate on the «European civil war of 1914-1945»[55], or Paolo Cossi's work[56]. However, the same is true of occasional serialized publications distributed in newsstands, and therefore labeled as «popular comics», such as Luca Enoch's historically accurate *Lilith*[57], the mini-series *Greystorm*[58], and selected volumes of Carlo Ambrosini's *Napoleon*[59] (all published by Bonelli Editore) or the no. 5 of «John Doe»[60]. In fact, one of the most interesting comic books celebrating the 150th anniversary of national unity was distributed in the newsstands in 2011. The story was set in September

[52] «Questotrentino», 22, 1983; F. RASERA, *Antieroi e eroi per forza*, in «Questotrentino», 15, 2008.

[53] See G. BERARDI - M. MANTERO, *Carso, 1917*, in «Comic Art», 58, 1989.

[54] See A. DI VIRGILIO - D. PASCUTTI, *La Grande guerra. Storia di nessuno. Cronaca a fumetti*, Padova 2008; M. CERNE, *La prima guerra mondiale a fumetti*, in *Trieste 1918*, pp. 127-139.

[55] See R. RECCHIONI - LEOMACS, *Battaglia. Le guerre di Pietro*, Milano 2007; E. TRAVERSO, *À feu et à sang*, p. 29; R. BIANCHI (ed.), *La guerra civile europea*, in «Passato e presente», 79, 2010, pp. 19-32.

[56] See P. COSSI, *Medz Yeghern. Il grande male*, Milano 2007; P. COSSI, *1918. Destini d'ottobre. Britannici oltre il Piave*, Vittorio Veneto 2007.

[57] See L. ENOCH, *Il fronte di pietra*, in «Lilith», 3, 2009.

[58] See A. SERRA - G. COZZI, «Greystorm», 12 vols, 2009.

[59] See C. AMBROSINI - P. DEL VECCHIO, *Il cane di corallo*, in «Napoleone», 23, 2001; C. AMBROSINI - E. MAMMUCARI, *Angeli nella guerra*, in «Napoleone», 48, 2005. See also E. PIBOLDI, *La colonna infernale*, in «Dampyr», 49, 2004, cover.

[60] See L. BARTOLI - R. BURCHIELLI, *Io conosco JD*, in «John Doe», 5, 2003.

Figure 1. R. Recchioni - Leomacs (M. Leonardo), *Battaglia. Le guerre di Pietro*, Milano 2007, p. 52 (© Roberto Recchioni e Leomacs).

1918 in the rear lines, among army doctors, nurses, *carabinieri*, and peasant families[61].

Plots are varied, but they generally tend to focus on the lives of marginal characters: men and women at grips with a huge, unpredictable ordeal with no great protagonists. Heroes and heroines are weak, even when they are granted superpowers, like Lilith: they can do nothing to influence the course of the conflict. The best they can accomplish is slightly inflecting the shape of single events, by carrying out missions that are not immediately connected with the dynamics of a conflict whose visualization has always been difficult.

Similar themes can be traced in French comics of the same period. In recent years the production of *bandes dessinées*, as intense as ever, has touched upon a greater range of subjects and questions than it was previously the case. In the following, I will propose a short selection with no claims to completeness.

Many volumes make use of actual letters, either directly quoted from archives or previously published in anthologies. *Paroles de poilus*[62] and *Paroles de Verdun*[63], for example, collect the visual work of numerous artists, alternating debutants and senior masters such as David B., author of *Par les chemins noirs*, a comic book on Italian interventionism, the Fiume movement, and *squadrismo* in the aftermath of the Great War[64].

Verdun[65], published on the 90th anniversary of the war, was more traditional and modest in scope, both for its visual quality and its content. On the same occasion, however, Jean-Pierre Gibrat's remark-

[61] See F. Artibani - I. Milazzo, *La cura*, in *150° Storie d'Italia. Il lungo cammino*, vol. 1, supplement to «Famiglia Cristiana» e «Il Giornalino», 2010, pp. 93-122.

[62] Actual and fictional texts provide the foundation of *Paroles de poilus. Lettres et carnets du front 1914-1918*, Toulon 2006; *Paroles de poilus*, vol. 2: *Mon papa en guerre*, Toulon 2012.

[63] See *Paroles de Verdun ou le jeu de l'oie en BD*, Toulon 2007.

[64] See David B., *Par les chemins noirs*, Paris 2009. The most representative work of this distinguished artist, one of the founders of L'Association (1990), is *L'Ascension du Haut Mal* (1996-2003), an autobiographical series dealing with his brother's fight with epilepsy, but steeped in reminiscences of the Great War.

[65] See R. Secher - G. Lehideux - J.-C. Cassini, *Verdun. 21 février 1916-18 décembre 1916*, Acigné 2008.

able two-volume set on *Mattéo*'s adventures in the Great War[66] and a collection of war-themed works by young artists from Picardy were valuable additions to the canon[67].

The four-volume *Notre mère la guerre*, published between 2009 and 2012, is based on fictional soldier letters[68]. The more recent *Svoboda!*, the alleged diary of a Czech soldier fighting in the Hapsburg army on the Russian front, is also based on fictional sources. The protagonist was imprisoned by tsarist troopers and later enrolled in the French *Légion Tchèque* fighting against the Red Army[69].

Other works, such as the deceivingly light-hearted *Les Godillots*[70] or such evocative volumes as *Les sentinelles*[71] do not claim to be based on actual documents. The story and the character design for *Vies tranchées*, however, were inspired by archival sources from a real-life psychiatric facility for war veterans. *Vies tranchées* illustrates the life of some fifteen men who were physically and mentally mutilated by the so-called «workshop of war»[72], following their ordeal from the trenches to the hospitals. *L'Ambulance 13* and *Gueule d'amour*[73] are devoted to the *Service de santé des armées* and to the trauma of facial mutilation, *La Grippe Coloniale* is devoted to the 1918/19 flu pandemic[74], while

[66] See J.-P. Gibrat, *Mattéo. Première époque (1914-1915)*, Paris 2008; R. Secher - G. Lehideux - J.-C. Cassini, *Mattéo. Deuxième époque (1917-1918)*, Paris 2010.

[67] See *Cicatrices de guerre(s)*, Amiens 2009.

[68] See Maël - Kris, *Notre mère la guerre*, 4 vols, Paris 2009-2012.

[69] See J.-P. Pendanx - Kris, *Svoboda! Carnet de guerre imaginaire d'un combattant de la Légion Tchèque*, vol. 1: *De Prague à Tcheliabinsk*, Paris 2011.

[70] See Olier - Marko, *Les Godillots*, vol. 1: *Le Plateau du croquemitaine*, Charnay-lès-Mâcon 2011.

[71] See X. Dorison - E. Breccia, *Les sentinelles*, 3 vols, Paris 2009-2011.

[72] See J.D. Morvan (ed.), *Vies tranchées. Les soldats fous de la Grande Guerre*, Paris 2010; on medical sources see A. Gibelli, *L'officina della guerra. La Grande Guerra e le trasformazioni del mondo mentale*, Torino 1991.

[73] See P. Cothias - P. Ordas - A. Mounier, *L'Ambulance 13*, vol. 1: *Croix de sang*, Charnay-lès-Mâcon 2010; D. Priet-Mahéo - A. Ducoudray, *Gueule d'amour*, Antony 2012. See B. Bracco, *La patria ferita. I corpi dei soldati italiani e la Grande guerra*, Firenze 2012.

[74] See A. Huo-Chao-See, *La Grippe Coloniale*, 2 vols, Grenoble 2003-2012.

Franck Bourgeron has adapted *L'Obéissance*, a novel set in 1918[75]. Daniel Casanave and Frédéric Chef have re-examined the life of the man who killed Jean Jaurès in a volume that does not spare graphic representations of the war front and mobilized cities[76].

Le Cœur des Batailles, a series with a militant edge, focuses on two French soldiers: an Alsatian and an African. The narrative backdrop is provided by the chronicles of an imaginary trench journal, by the mutual attraction of the two protagonists and by the «major» international history between the end of the 19th century and World War II. Controversial French debates on memory, history, the public uses of the past, and, crucially, the impact of post-colonial studies are confronted head on[77].

The most well-know and controversial French comic artist to deal with the Great War is of course Jacques Tardi, author of a long and substantial series of volumes dealing with the lives of soldiers at the front, or set in Paris during the war[78]. Between 2008 and 2009, Tardi has published a 6-volume series, *Putain de guerre!*, each volume dealing with a year between 1914 and 1919[79]. Considered by some a manner of «official» anti-war comic artist[80], Tardi was criticized by others for his morbid

[75] See F. BOURGERON, *L'Obéissance*, Paris 2009, from a novel by F. Sureau (Paris 2006).

[76] See D. CASANAVE - F. CHEF, *Villan, l'homme qui tua Jaurès*, Montpellier 2011. Some panels representing the entrance of the German army in Bruxelles are found in RODOLPHE - L. ALLOING, *La marque Jacobs. Une vie en bande dessinée*, Paris - Tournai 2012, pp. 11-14.

[77] See J.D. MORVAN - I. KORDEY, *Le Cœur des Batailles*, vol. 1: *La Marne*, vol. 2: *Verdun*, Paris 2007, 2008; vol. 3 is forthcoming: *Le Chemin des dames*. See C. BARRUEL - P-Y. CARLOT, *Le Cœur des Batailles*, pp. 57-67. See also A. BECKER, *La Grande Guerre en 1998: entre polémiques politiques et mémoires de la tragedie*, in P. BLANCHARD - I. VEYRAT-MASSON (eds), *Les guerres de mémoires. La France et son histoire*, Paris 2008, pp. 83-93; N. OFFENSTADT, *L'histoire bling-bling. Le retour du roman National*, Paris 2009, pp. 41-53 and 83-90; on the «historicisation of memory» see E. TRAVERSO, *L'histoire comme champ de bataille. Interpréter les violences du XXe siècle*, Paris 2011, pp. 252-257.

[78] See V. MARIE, *Entre mémoire et histoire. La fabrique d'un imaginaire de la Grande Guerre en bande dessinée*, in V. ALARY - B. MITAINE (eds), *Lignes de front. Bande dessinée et totalitarisme*, Genève 2011, pp. 185-206; V. MARIE, *Entre fiction et histoire: la construction d'un imaginaire de la Grande Guerre chez Jacques Tardi*, in V. MARIE (ed.), *La Grande Guerre*, pp. 41-55; B. DENÉCHÈRE - L. RÉVILLON, *14-18 dans la bande dessinée*, pp. 36-63 and 64-85.

[79] J. TARDI - J.-P. VERNEY, *Putain de guerre!*, 2 vols, Paris 2008 and 2009, with a DVD: *Putain de guerre! Tardi et Verney sur le champs d'horreur*, as a supplement to vol. 2.

predilection for the exhibition of maimed bodies, a peculiarity that makes his work very hard to exploit in educational contexts[81]. However, Tardi is indisputably the best-known European author of comics with a militant edge dealing with the war that ushered in the 20th century.

On the whole—as the selection of recent works that I have presented, however cursory, appears to prove—comics have variously evolved over the last hundred years, but they have never forfeited a civil and political passion that remains, to this day, far from being spent. Even if comics as mass products are characteristically quick to adjust to the requirements of the market, they betray an acute awareness of the political uses of history (even if they rarely incorporate concepts and viewpoints from academic history).

Contemporary comics as a cultural medium appear to mirror the evolving patterns of social imagination more than to influence them. Unsurprisingly, the selected works that I have cited above tell us more about the age and society that produced them than they shed light on the events and historical processes whose interplay produced the Great War and dominated its aftermath. A great deal of scholarly work remains to be done in this field, but historians with an ambition to understand the evolving representations and the social memory of the Great War in contemporary mass media cannot afford to ignore comics as a distinctive type of cultural products.

[80] N. OFFENSTADT, *Les fusillés de la Grande Guerre et la mémoire collective (1914-2009)*, Paris 2009, p. 137.

[81] See V. MARIE, *De case en classe, étudier une fiction historique en bande dessinée: «C'était la guerre des tranchées» de Jacques Tardi*, in N. ROUVIÈRE, *Bande dessinée et enseignement des humanités*, Grenoble 2012, p. 244; B. TILLIER, *Tardi, de l'Histoire au feuilleton*, in «Sociétés & représentations», 29, 2010, pp. 9-24; M. BRANLAND, *La guerre lancinante dans l'œuvre de Jacques Tardi*, *ibid.*, pp. 65-78.

Italian War Memorials after the Two World Wars

Notes from a Regional Research Project

by *Nicola Labanca*

1. *A new approach*

In the field of historical studies, a new approach to war memorials, in particular, that to soldiers fallen during the First World War, sprang up in the Eighties. Books by George Mosse on the nationalization of the masses[1] or the myth of the fallen soldier[2], more specific research by Antoine Prost[3], Annette Becker[4] and Reinhard Koselleck[5], and more internationally acclaimed studies by Jay Winter[6] gave rise to a brand new and important series of studies. For the first time, war memorials, until then critically observed exclusively by art historians, had now become subjects of the historian[7].

At that time, the Eighties, collections of images of war memorials were still quite sporadic, yet sufficient to draw a new interpretation. Memorials, especially those of the Great War, served to unify nations. They were

Translation by Irene Diamond

1 G.L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*, New York 1975.

2 G.L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, New York 1990.

3 A. Prost, *Les monuments aux morts. Culte républicain? Culte civique? Culte patriotique?*, in P. Nora (ed.), *Les Lieux de mémoire*, vol. 1: *La République*, Paris 1984.

4 A. Becker, *Les monuments aux morts. Patrimoine et mémoire de la Grande guerre*, Paris 1988; A. Becker, *Le culte des morts, entre mémoire et oubli*, in S. Audoin-Rouzeau - J.-J. Becker (eds), *Encyclopédie de la Grande Guerre 1914-1918*, Paris 2004.

5 R. Koselleck - M. Jeismann (eds), *Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne*, München 1994.

6 J. Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*, Cambridge 1998.

7 J. Winter - E. Sivan (eds), *War and Remembrance in the XXth century*, Cambridge 1999.

not so much a sign of the gratitude of the living (or of the survivors) to the dead as an initiative taken by some political actors. It was not necessarily the central government that realized them: they were made by numerous local agencies, which Jay Winter called a «community of mourning» (other scholars extended this concept and spoke of national communities of mourning). They were often private initiatives by the families of the dead, who were the first to move and urge for (and sometimes to erect) the war memorials. Given the large national dimension of the phenomenon, the war memorials, rather than works of artistic enthusiasm, were handcrafted or even produced industrially. In the age of technological reproducibility of the work of art[8], war memorials were not always of great artistic value: what was important was their overall effect. For this reason and for a long period of time, art historians were never truly devoted to their study.

The above-mentioned books by historians opened up a new way to perceive war memorials, especially those of the Twenties. Indeed, this was the most important decade in which a real «monumentificazione»[9] (excess of monument-building), that is, the widespread upsurge in the erection of war memorials, hit Europe. These books changed our way of looking at memorials by suggesting that we should not only observe them, but also study and understand them.

2. *Late Italian studies*

Italian historians of the Great War were slow to seriously study the issue of war memorials. The first few articles, mostly research proposals, were not sufficient to hide the fact that there was an overall delay in Italian studies regarding this phenomenon. Perhaps it was Mario Isnenghi who was the first to devote attention to the problem of Italian monument-mania, writing a chapter of his book on the cultural impact of wars on the Italians. But Isnenghi's book, like those of a few who had preceded it in Italy (and, indeed, more or less like all the international studies of the Eighties and Nineties), was based on sharp intuition rather than on

[8] W. BENJAMIN, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit. Drei Studien zur Kunstsoziologie*, Frankfurt a.M. 1963.

[9] M. ISNENGHI, *Le guerre degli italiani. Parole immagini ricordi 1848-1945*, Milano 1989.

extensive documentation. A thorough knowledge of the actual memorials erected during the 20th century in Italy was far from being available.

Since then, but mostly in the Nineties, a few other scholars performed some local experiments in the field, analyzing towns or provinces. Some surveys or empirical research in urban and provincial areas were carried out. However, it was only a decade later, when, taking advantage of funding thanks to the *Monticone Act* (March 7, 2001, no. 71, named after the member of Parliament and historian Alberto Monticone), that proper and systematic censuses of war memorials were carried out. However, it was not the historians but the *Soprintendenze alle arti e ai monumenti* (Art and History Superintendents) that directed these censuses: because of a shortage of central funds, they worked at territorial, regional, or even provincial, levels[10].

One might think that by doing so, the initiative had passed once again to art historians, now more indulgent than they had been in the past and, usually, more lenient with and less critical of war memorials than war historians. In a largely Berlusconian decade, was the study of art to replace the study of politics? Could the way to study and consider these «stones of war» go back from the hands of history to those of art (that is, from studying archives about erecting and using these war memorials to just looking at them)?

3. *A local research agenda*

It is in this context that I directed a research group on war memorials in Tuscany[11]. Our research agenda, like others, has its limitations. Firstly, a regional perspective inevitably restricts the sample. Secondly, we limited our study to the capitals of the local provinces (*capoluoghi di provincia*) in Tuscany and, to validate our assessments, we carried out a more detailed study of all the municipalities (*comuni*) of four Tuscan provinces. The ten cities that were studied have quite different histories. The provinces were chosen on the basis of their different features: the most urbanized

[10] We have them for the provinces of Siena, Grosseto, Salerno, Genoa, Arezzo, Naples, Ferrara, Brescia, Milan, Monza, and—even if less systematic—for the Venetian region.

[11] It was based between Siena and Florence, thanks to a cooperation between the Università degli studi di Siena and the Forum per i problemi della pace e della guerra (Florence), and private funding.

area of the Florentine province and the most agricultural one of Grosseto, the rather internally geographically diversified one of Lucca and the more homogeneous one of Siena. With this design, our case study is only a local one, but the area concerned has been a politically important one since both the First and Second World Wars, and was never analytically studied before[12]. Even though it is just a small sample, our research project is still the most extensive one ever carried out by Italian historians who study this topic in some detail.

Another extremely innovative aspect of the research project was that for the first time in Italy, in a scholarly experiment of this size, we studied war memorials to the fallen both in the First and in the Second World Wars[13]. The latter have been studied both for the dead in regular warfare (in the fascist war of 1940-1943) and for those in the irregular-partisan war of 1943-1945. The questions we wanted to address were therefore a little different from those in studies of the Eighties, which concentrated mostly on the Great War memorials. We were interested not only in the original features of the emergence of the 'modern memory' of war after 1918, but also in the effect that the mass death had in the 20th century and in its differentiating impact on the public sphere, as far as war memorials and signs of public memory dispersed among the Italian *arredo urbano* (urban artifacts) could tell to us.

In the following pages, we will summarize some notes, thoughts, and results.

4. *Italian names*

We can start by thinking more deeply about the specific Italian denominations used for this phenomenon.

In the Italian language, they are called «monumenti ai caduti» (memorials to the fallen), not «monuments aux morts» as in French, or «war memorials» as in English and in German («Kriegerdenkmal»). In Italy, the honor is implicit, not explicit as in German («Ehrenmal», or its synonyms:

[12] For the First World War M. BALDASSARI, *Attraverso il conflitto. Rielaborazioni, usi e traiettorie della Grande guerra dalla vigilia al fascismo in Toscana*, Ph.D. thesis Pisa, 2008.

[13] M. MONDINI - G. SCHWARZ, *Dalla guerra alla pace. Retoriche e pratiche della smobilitazione nell'Italia del Novecento*, Sommacampagna 2007.

«Ehrentafel» tombstone/plaque of honor, similar to «Gedenktafel» memorial/commemorative plaque). Of all the European denominations, the Italian one is, thus, the most euphemistic—except perhaps for the Russian «Pamjatnik pavsim»—because it refers to the fallen. It should be noted that the Italian form is not passive as it would be if it referred, for example, to «pushed», or «killed», but intransitive, in itself very close to the reflective form (there is no indication of any acting subject other than itself). In the Italian language, «caduti» would indicate the soldiers have fallen by themselves, not as a result of being pushed: they do not seem to have been killed, they are not dead. For this reason, in order to make the matter clear, a recent interdisciplinary conference has not spoken of «memorials to the fallen» but of «pietre di guerra» (war stones). Actually, with very few exceptions, these symbols of memory in stone (memorials, headstones, tombstones, etc.) had the function of national and military re-mobilization together with or, rather than, that of mourning.

However, it is not just a question of names. In Italy, the extent of war memorials as an historical phenomenon was, and still is, relevant. It is well known that, apart from the rather few memorial symbols to the heroes of the Risorgimento—to the King, Garibaldi, «garibaldini» (Garibaldi's volunteers), and to very few important military commanders and soldiers—and apart from an even more limited production of memorials for the colonial wars (limited, of course, also because of the results of those campaigns, from Dogali to Adowa[14])—the wave of memorials erected to the military dead of the Great War was the first and largest state-sponsored intervention in the national public art realm.

Italian memorials to the fallen in the First World War took, then, the place of those to the heroes of national unity and occupied the central squares of all the cities and most of the towns. Italy witnessed the emergence of numerous memorials and signs of memory: the Italian military dead moved from their cemeteries and took over the centers of towns, occupying them with their public art. In his well-known novel, *I Malavoglia* (*The House by the Medlar Tree*), Giovanni Verga depicts the unitary State in the dress of military conscription, that takes lives from the country to the war; in Carlo Collodi's *Pinocchio*, the national State is the *carabiniere* who arrests the boy-puppet; in real Italy, the State occupied Italian piazzas with stones of war, war memorials etc., hiding war politics under the

14 N. LABANCA, *In marcia verso Adua*, Torino 1993.

euphemistic collective name of the fallen. Immediately after the end of the Great War, in Italy voices rose against «monumentificazione», the cult of monument-building and/or «monument-mania».

Names carry with them not only euphemism and hypocrisy, but also injustice. Memorials to the fallen of the Great War are memorials to dead soldiers. However, war evolved and, from the First to the Second World War, new categories of dead appeared (or rather, disappeared): in 1940-1945, not only men and soldiers, but also women and civilians, died. Passing from one world war to the other, in Italy the name *monumenti ai caduti* (monuments to the fallen) remained, even if it seems less apt to use it for the Second World War, when the fallen military are no longer alone.

For all these reasons, in order to contrast and understand in depth what happened as regards the First and Second World Wars, for our research, we decided to choose a comparative and a longer perspective to understand Tuscan war memorials. This led us to more fully realize how the Tuscans dealt with the memory of (and memorials to) the mass deaths of two different mass world wars.

5. *Art and history*

When, in the Eighties and Nineties, international scholars were able to elaborate their interpretations with just a limited number of images of war memorials, it was perhaps easier.

Since then, accurate censuses have made it possible to know hundreds of signs of memory in territories as limited as a region, or a province, or even a large city. This means that, nowadays, historical research has to face greater challenges in order to draw a credible and complete picture, yet it is also more likely to get a closer picture of how things really went in historical reality.

The rather simple image of a sequence of artistic styles—which had been the mainstay of previous interpretations—is now being challenged by recent contemporary censuses, since it shows the coexistence in the same period of very different styles. Even the image of the public-national Great War memorials as expressions of national communities of mourning seems challenged, when put to the test in the archives of the small local communities. To be more precise, these archives give names to those

who wanted these monuments, they speak very clearly about local political struggles, and show the efforts of specific agencies-actors of the local political system; in short, they reveal a real scuffle for memorials in stone (*memorie di pietra*) and, if the picture of a community in mourning is not very plausible, it is even less so at a regional or even national level.

Once again, moving from an initial historically-inspired vision of the monuments to a methodical consultation of archival sources means that the history of war memorials is much more complex than just a series of art styles and an expression of an un-named community in mourning over these «stones of war»[15].

6. *Art and politics*

In some previous studies, politics was somewhat sacrificed compared to art and mentality, or to the psychology of the masses. However, now it has returned to take up a little space in the history of war memorials.

Of course, what has been achieved should not be lost or rejected. The sequence, or alternation, of different artistic styles—from realistic-expressionist to classicistic-traditional—remains crucial to the interpretation of how campaigners for war memorials thought they could shape the memory of their compatriots who had died in war. We now know how important the role of private actors was in building the memory of the Great War: Oliver Janz stressed the role played by the families of the dead in promoting private and even public memories of the war, and of the deaths connected to them[16].

However, local sources highlight the real scramble to take possession of the memory of the military dead, i.e. to be the first to build the monument, which was meant to remain the only one, especially in small towns. Particularly in the immediate postwar period, many memorials were erected by committees of liberal nationalists or, sometimes, by distinguished

[15] N. LABANCA (ed.), *Pietre di guerra. Ricerche su monumenti e lapidi in memoria del primo conflitto mondiale*, Milano 2010.

[16] O. JANZ, *Das symbolische Kapital der Trauer. Nation, Religion und Familie im italienischen Gefallenenkult des Ersten Weltkriegs*, Tübingen 2009; O. JANZ, *Il culto della guerra*, in D. CESCHIN - M. ISNENGHI (eds), *Italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni*, vol. 2: *La Grande Guerra: dall'Intervento alla 'vittoria mutilata'*, Torino 2008.

members who had supported the war effort, or even directly campaigned for entering the war. In those days and years, a national-liberal imprint on those stones of memory, rather than a catholic or even socialist one, was undoubtedly an important political choice. For the more radical people, whether to have a monument, or not, was a political choice.

Artistic style remained a crucial element of the monument and so it was often already outlined in the documents drawn up by the committees for the memorials and in the letters sent to the artists, appointing them to carry out the work. In any case, because of the great demand, i.e. because of the large number of memorials requested by local communities, especially in memory of less important people in smaller towns, the monuments ended up by being selected from catalogues of companies specialized in war memorials (more or less like tombstones chosen from the catalogues in the cemetery industry) rather than being designed by talented artists. In these cases, art did not matter so much; authorship vanished and everything was more a matter of industrial or artisanal products, of course, sometimes indicative of the community's taste and sometimes of the important people in the committees, rather than of Art with a capital letter.

In brief, art alone does not explain the political struggles (local and national ones) fought for war memorials.

7. *Town and country, city and town*

The Gramscian attention to difference between town and country, which sometimes meant between larger cities and smaller towns, has become generally important in Italy, also in order to understand the history of war memorials.

In urban areas, the game that political players participated in, also for the erection of war memorials, was much more complex and varied than that played in small towns. In the latter, once the local important 'family' had put up a sign of memory on their building to honor their fallen, or when the narrow circle of prominent people reaffirmed their political leadership in local communities and asked the local authority to erect a monument in the central square, then, perhaps, one, two, or sometimes, three signs of memory were erected and, thus, there was no space left for more memory/memorials.

Instead, in larger cities, a struggle and/or a debate about war memorials arose, forming a system whose size and importance indicate the complexity of the city and of its political landscape. Major institutions, political parties, trade unions, prominent families, liberal committees and socialist worker unions, brotherhoods of all kinds, schools, and other different kinds of agencies and groups come into play. Already when the war was being fought or, when it had ended, scrambles for war memorials witnessed several competing groups and different views in action. Once one monument was erected, others—other agencies in the complex world of mass mourning—were likely to enter the game. The fascist regime added its own logics to all of this, with its new needs, new styles, new and great spaces[17]. If local collective communities of mourning existed, especially in urban areas, they divided themselves into various groups, each with its own memory of the dead in war. In this scenario, various styles were considered suitable at different times, but it could also happen that different styles were chosen in the same period by different actors, in order to mark identity and group self-representation.

In any case, it was very rare, especially in urban areas, that all the dead had a right to a monument. This was so not only because the memory of the dead by the living survivor is always selective, but also because the war had been a mass and total one.

Many deaths then were not remembered, once again showing that remembering the fallen was a matter of choice and of politics. Even when the names of the military dead were quite well known, as was possibly so after the publication of the *Albo d'oro* (the official Roll of Honor compiled by the Ministry of War[18], unfortunately only available for Tuscany in 1945-1946), erecting a war memorial and writing names of the dead on it revealed policies and, indeed, choices. Indeed, the scholar should bear in mind that finding a lot of names does not mean that these were all the

[17] In particular L. FABI, *Redipuglia. Storia, memoria, arte e mito di un monumento che parla di pace*, Trieste 2002[2]; B. TOBIA, *L'Altare della patria* (L'identità italiana), Bologna 1998; L. CADEDDU, *La leggenda del soldato sconosciuto all'Altare della patria*, Udine 2001; L. VANZETTO, *Monte Grappa*, in M. ISNENGHI (ed.), *Luoghi della memoria. Simboli e miti dell'Italia unita*, Roma - Bari 1996. In general E. GENTILE, *Fascismo di pietra*, Roma - Bari 2008; B. TOBIA, *Salve o popolo d'eroi. La monumentalità fascista nelle fotografie dell'Istituto Luce*, Roma 2002.

[18] MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA, *Militari caduti nella guerra nazionale 1915-1918. Albo d'oro*, 28 vols, Roma 1926-1964.

names involved, nor that studying a lot of monuments, implies that these are all necessary.

It was also because of this political and selective character of war memorials that sometimes consent could easily develop into dissent or dissatisfaction. Rarely, in small towns, could monuments seek to cover the entire space of the fallen.

In a word, it is very clear that in urban contexts, war memorials cannot be understood one by one, but only within their system. Furthermore, the memory of the fallen seems also a question of the political presence in the urban landscape and not just a matter of the shared grief of the communities.

8. *Time. From the First to the Second World War*

The time factor, as much as that of style, seems to have played a role in the history of war memorials. In this sense, the memory of the Great War intersected with the memory of the Second World War and, in order to understand the former (and/or the latter), one should take both into account.

The space for «monumentificazione» seemed to be opening up once again during, and after, the Second World War. Actually, as in most European countries, there were fewer Italians who died in 1940-1945 than in 1915-1918, even though the numbers involved were much greater. However, this did not mean that the mass death caused by this new world war was less imprinted in the conscience of the people, since the horror of death was multiplied due to the manner in which people died. In brief, there was no shortage of space for a new monument-mania once again.

Nevertheless, as before, while the war was going on, the fascist regime was much less likely or prepared than «cadorniana» Italy (from General Luigi Cadorna)[19] or Liberal Italy, to accept that there could be casualties in its 'imperial' war. This was the reason why few memorials to the fallen could be established in Italy in 1940-1943. Afterwards, when the war was over, and when it should have become possible and necessary to honor the dead, Italy had changed and had become a democracy, unfortunately

[19] M. Isnenghi - G. Rochat, *La grande guerra 1914-1918*, Scandicci 2000.

for the military dead in regular fascist war and for their relatives (though, very fortunately, for the living and the whole country). Thus, the military dead of the 1940-1943 war had died for a war that post-1945 Italy did not want to remember or even to understand sometimes; 'heroes' of that war were now considered 'wrong' heroes and the Italians did not seem to be so interested now in knowing their names or their deeds. The military dead of 1940-1943 were then soon forgotten, since they were the casualties of another, past-gone, and finished Italy. Hence, there were only a few war memorials of the fascist war.

Some actors moved into action, not without creating other problems. Even though the Catholic Church intervened ambiguously, generic stones «to the dead in war» or «to the fallen in all wars» appeared on the walls of its buildings. Apart from the Church, associations of veterans tried to remember their fallen war comrades. Nevertheless, unfortunately for the dead, the leaders of these associations had remained too often ideologically close to the fallen regime to allow Italy, now a democratic republic, to tolerate the apologies of the past emerging from the press of these circles and turned into tombstones.

One could argue that all this happened because democratic Italy preferred to have other heroes, those from the partisan warfare, and then could suggest that the place of the war memorials for 1940-1943 might have been used for the ones for 1943-1945[20]. In a sense, this argument is close to the one about an alleged communist or Marxist hegemony on the Italian culture, and even on the Italians, after the Second World War.

As a matter of fact, as far as signs of memory and war memorials are concerned, democratic or partisan Italy never really won the game on war memory. Even in large Tuscan cities, where there was most likely a socialist-communist subculture, great memorials to the partisans were never built. Then, the relative silence about the military dead of 1940-1943 was not a fault of the partisan memory of 1943-1945. Furthermore, as far as the memory of the First World War is concerned, nothing could overshadow the war memorials of the Great War. It is true that many commemorative stones were put on the houses where the partisans were born or—preferably—where they were tortured or shot dead (in the end,

[20] G. SCHWARZ, *Tu mi devi seppellir. Riti funebri e culto nazionale alle origini della Repubblica*, Torino 2010; M. MONDINI, *Alpini. Parole e immagini di un mito guerriero*, Roma - Bari 2008.

where they lost). In any case, there were very few Great War memorials to the Resistance, and the language used in the inscriptions was almost entirely of a patriotic, and not a revolutionary, nature. The signs of memory to the Resistance did not erase the memory of previous regular wars: and, in the end, even these signs to the partisans remained marginal and unimportant.

What happened, and what counted more, was that all the memory of the Second World War was insignificant compared to the «great memory» of the Great War, and to its reality. The military dead of the fascist war were forgotten, but also those of the partisan war were little remembered. Perhaps democratic Italy no longer needed heroes and in general—as Mosse had grasped—the myth of the fallen had ended. However, it could be that the peculiarities of Italian history in 1940-1945 mattered very much, probably more than the general trends in the history of memory. In any case, all this ended with leaving more or less undisputed the military dead of the Great War at the center of Italian (and Tuscan) squares (and public memory and art).

Despite all these peculiarities, discontinuities, and changes, however, there were some continuities between the two immediate post-war periods. The choice to erect a monument or not remained political, and a perspective of political history seems as relevant as that of art or mentality history. After 1945, communities in mourning were very divided; of course, after a civil war, this happens to a greater extent than after a national war. Not all the combatants were assured a right to a memory: this was so after the First World War, despite the intense monument-mania, and even more so after the Second World War, because of the particular moment in which people had died and also because of the political actors who remembered their deeds.

The dead to be remembered always seem to be chosen, and the choice is often the result of politics or, at least, of policies but, in any case it is still a choice.

9. *Rituals*

The importance of politics, along with artistic styles, mentalities, and attitudes, cannot be understood only in terms of formal activities of political associations, parties, or parliaments. The erection of war memorials

should also be analyzed, perhaps primarily, in terms of political religions, or «new politics» (in Mosse's language). War memorials, in fact, are important not only for the style in which they are molded at the time of their conception and inauguration, but also for the public use society makes of them over time. An abandoned monument, or a plaque that has never been read, does not have the same importance as memorials in the central square of the town, in front of which—year after year—religious processions, demonstrations by veterans, official commemorations, public memories of the war, i.e. mass political rituals, are held.

These 'visited' war memorials, with the passing of time, have often been 'enriched'. In the face of the silence of the Democratic Republic as regards the fascist war, some of the Great War memorials in Italy have been enriched/betrayed: in any case, their scope has been extended, with tombstones and plaques to the fallen of other wars, starting from the Ethiopian one and more consistently with the memory of the Second World War in general, and especially of the fascist campaigns of 1940-1943. On many occasions, art historians have criticized this disfigurement, responsible for betraying the original artist's aims and mentality. Others, however, have stressed that this 'extension' of mourning the military dead from the national war to the fascist ones has transformed these monuments. Instead, Giorgio Rochat has recently invited people to reconsider these criticisms in the light of the sacredness attained by the First World War memorials: at the beginning, they were clearly connoted as 'stones of war' but, in his opinion, over time, they have been transformed into lay altars not to this or that war, but to war in general. Thus, according to Rochat, the political re-use of the Great War memorials—leaving aside the Republic's reluctance to commemorate the military dead of the fascist war—has transformed the perception of these memorials[21].

Whatever the opinion regarding this point is, what should be emphasized here is that an historian's perspective (e. g. history of political rituals) and historical sources, such as the archives, to further understand the use and reuse of these historical signs of memory, can help to integrate (and overcome) a purely aesthetic view of monuments. Historians should know very well that, in itself, a sign of memory may remain the same over time, but its meaning can also be changed by its use in the course of history.

[21] Giorgio Rochat, in his speech at «Una rete di ricordi. La memoria digitale dei Caduti nella Grande Guerra», Milan, 13 April 2012, forthcoming.

In this sense, the artistic and the historical value of war memorials could be very distant from each other.

10. *The necessity of comparison*

Some features of the signs of memory built in honor of the dead in the First and the Second World Wars by societies can be understood better by comparing them with each other.

On the Western front, as is well known, soldiers experienced a war whose features were relatively similar. This made things easier for «political entrepreneurs» of post-1918 memory. Of course, some differences remained: e.g. between the veterans of the Italian-Slovenian front on the Karst and those fighting on the White War front in the Italian-Austrian Alps, or between infantry and artillery soldiers, between 1914/15 and 1917 or 1918, not to mention between Italians on the one hand, and the Austrian-Hungarian-Balkans on the other one. Later, with the increasing Liberal «monument-mania», and then, with the growing fascist propaganda—aiming, thanks to numerous material and symbolic resources, at presenting the regime as the grateful son of the victory in the Great War—some more space was left for more specific memories. Despite all these differences, a certain similarity in the war experience made it possible to unite a lot of those who had died in collective memorials: all the military dead were perceived as 'trench soldiers'.

On the contrary, for Italy, the combatants in the second world conflict had to cope with very different war experiences, such as, different fronts, different wars, regular and irregular wars[22]. All these differences in the war experience did not help veterans and post-war society to develop a common image of the combatants to be converted later into stone memorials. The war experiences had been so different from the very different war fronts of 1940-1943, that it was not possible to have a common path, in memory and in associations, with the regular soldiers of the fascist war. All one has to do is to remember the sharp division among veterans of World War II with regard to the two halves, 1940-1943 and 1943-1945: ultimately, and for a long period of time, it made it very difficult, if not impossible, to mourn soldiers and partisans together (in Italy they were

[22] G. ROCHAT, *Le guerre italiane 1935-1943*, Torino 2005.

never able to form a single veterans' association). Starting from these divisions and differences, and somehow even thanks to the desire of the Republic to forget the fascist war, as well as to the embarrassed caution with which the partisan war was remembered, what resulted was that each side erected separate memorials to 'their' dead.

Actually, in the end, both groups suffered from a reduction in economic and symbolic resources available to veterans from both experiences. And, as a matter of fact, both were more similar to each other, if compared with what happened to their ancestor veterans of the Great War.

In any case, the memory of the dead in the Second World War should have soon taught how much that division would make erections of a sign of memory much more difficult and even more casual in post-1945 than in post-1918. Once again, at a local level a lot depended on local factors: the presence or absence of a charismatic figure of a veteran, the local presence of a relatively strong number of veterans coming from a single war experience or front (only this could give strength to requests for having a monument), the random insertion of veterans or their associations in local networks of political relations. The result over a long period of all these local random conditions could only have ended in a certain randomness of war memorials. In turn, this could only increase the imbalance of the overall image of the war that the veterans, with their memorials, presented to the public opinion. Moreover, all these differences among former soldiers and their war experiences reinforced the prejudice of the public and civil society against an often-incomprehensible fragmented world of corporate veterans of World War II. All this resulted in making the war less comprehensible to the civilians and reinforcing a perfect spiral of silence.

Some of these factors were already present in post-1918: the war often seemed incomprehensible to civilians and non-combatants. However, in post-1945 Italy, these feelings helped in a decisive way to (not) erect signs of memory. The fragmentation of experiences and memories among former soldiers, now veterans, became a strong reason for the particularity of the urban geography of war memorials. It also increased friction, competitiveness and, eventually, divisions among veterans themselves as well as between these and the civilians. The reasons for the relative absence of a public memory of the Second World War, and of the fascist war in particular, then may be found—without overlooking the general

policy of the Republic—not so much in the desire to overpower it with other memories from the partisan war, or to the cultural hegemony of the left-wing parties, but to internal divisions in the veteran movements and, ultimately, to the nature of the war itself.

These general features, of course, were different for different periods. Memorials of the First World War in the Twenties, especially until 1925/26, when the last projects of Liberal Italy had been carried out, were not the same as those of the Thirties and of the time of late and 'imperial' fascism. Similarly, for the memory of the Second World War, a more pronounced Republican silence in the Fifties and Sixties was replaced by a more dynamic phase in the Seventies and Eighties. Moreover, it would be wrong to see the memories of the two wars as parallel, and not connected, systems: not only because of the simple tombstones to the dead of World War II which often updated the older memorials of World War I in the early decades of the Republic. In the Seventies and Eighties we witness some signs of a new interest in the dead military of the Great War, an interest which became stronger after the end of the Cold War. New players and new generations of political entrepreneurs of war memories had now come into action, while Republican reluctance to come to terms with the memory of the fascist war had lessened and mentalities had changed.

Some change was also a result of the work of historians. For instance, as regards the First World War, this has been obvious (but not in Tuscany) in some Italian attempts to erect a monument to those people shot at dawn: this phenomenon called «fucilazioni esemplari» (exemplary shootings) has been the subject of much recent historical research. With regard to the Second World War, after new studies in the Eighties, in the Nineties signs of memory dedicated to the Italian Military Internees (Italienische Militärinternierte, IMI) began to appear: they were rather small memorials, usually inconspicuous, located in the outskirts rather than in the central squares of the cities, but they explained well the intertwining of new historical studies with the intention of the Republic to remedy the silences of the past. New attention to the Imi also reflected a change in and an extension of the concept of the Resistance[23]: a less politicized approach to its history, a more institutional one than there had been immediately after the war or in the Seventies, and one that concentrated on

[23] *Dizionario della Resistenza*, Torino 2000.

the partisan side. The last decades unfortunately also witnessed continuing political-ideological conflicts as regards memories and tombstones: signs of memory to heroes of the antifascist Resistance have once again been strongly criticized and sometimes even physically demolished by neo-fascist groups, people that in the new Italian political climate of the last two decades apparently felt stronger.

More in general, as far as World War II is concerned, the last two decades have witnessed two new waves, in features and size, of war-related memorials, which have begun transforming the Italian urban landscape and the public image of war. A first wave, small but significant, concerned explicitly remembering the civilian victims of war, hitherto greatly neglected. In particular, in Italy, new monumental-memorial attention has been brought to the victims of (Anglo American) bombings. This attention, with the moving of the eye from the military dead to the civilian victims, is mostly welcome. Even so, it would be naïve not to observe that it has sometimes been politically rather ambiguous: deprecating death caused by the «wings of democracy», in the new political atmosphere of recent center-right cabinets, while even the remembrance of the Peace Treaty of February 1947, signed by the Italian government together with the Anglo-American winners of the war, has been strongly contested, since it was sometimes interpreted as aiming at a «revisionist» reading of the war.

The second wave, much greater and more important, concentrating on the memory of racial deportation and extermination (the memory of political deportation and forced labor is still very much allive in Tuscany, but this somehow remains an exception in the overall Italian context). After the fiftieth anniversary of the Italian racial laws (1988) and, especially after the establishment of the Holocaust Remembrance Day (*Giorno della memoria*), act of July 20, 2000, commemorated yearly every January 27, there has been positive and great public attention given to this subject, which hitherto had been unfortunately neglected for a long time. This attention has resulted in a number of new signs of memory.

What do these waves have in common, even though they are very different from each other? The first remark that one can make is that, even after half a century, the memory in stone of the Second World War did not stop. The second one is that both waves stress the image of Italians as victims. This is evident in the case of the Nazi extermination of the Jews, even in the widespread use in Italy of the term «Shoah», or even «Holocaust» (though we may wonder how many Italians know what

these terms mean), but not of the other term of the attempted «Final Solution to the Jewish problem». It seems that there is something general in Italy in this praise to the Victims, especially regarding the Second World War. Somehow, in the long run, but certainly in a significant way in the last two decades, much of the Italian perception of that war has come under the star of the Victim and along the lines of a reassuring «victimization» of the national past.

To make a comparison, we may observe that, for a number of reasons, even the memory of the Great War has become much more appreciated in Italy under the label of victimization—'poor' soldier victims of their generals, 'poor' civilian victims of the difficult conditions of wartime, 'poor' Italians always victims. As we are now close to the centenary celebrations of the Great War, this could be of paramount relevance to the national mood about the war, and we may wonder if all of this will produce a further new wave in war memorials in Italian squares.

11. *The Church*

A common feature in Europe's memory of the fallen, both in the First and the Second World Wars, is the presence of signs of memory in places of worship.

In history, death in war and religion had always had a close relationship that a recent process of secularization has only touched on. Thus, it is not surprising that, even in Italy, the churches (obviously mostly catholic, but with some protestant ones too) and synagogues hosted headstones and memorials to the dead soldiers. However, in Italy, this presence seems rather peculiar for its time, size, and role.

Already during the First World War, churches began to host stone memories to the dead: as had always happened, human remains of young people (especially if they were from important families) who had died in battle were hosted in churches, in obvious competition with the public spaces of liberal and secular or fascist Italy. Sometimes not the bodies but the names and tombstones commemorating people and local communities in general had the same honor inside the places of worship, and frequently they had strongly nationalistic and warlike inscriptions. In some sense, burials and tombstones demonstrated the integration of the catholic laity and clergy in Cadorna's Italy.

This approach did not seem restrained, but rather upheld, in the Thirties. This is not surprising because of the new atmosphere of intimacy between the old Church and the new regime following the Lateran Treaty. In some cases, however, there now appeared weak signs of distinction from the more bombastic fascist rhetoric, which in those years was invading the squares and the streets around the church. Nevertheless, it seemed, as it probably was, more a distinction in style than a desire to distance itself.

More interesting and important, by comparison, is the Catholic Church's reaction after World War II. While Republican Italy, as we have already seen, was silent, the Church was now ready and willing to play, with mutual benefit, a substitution role. On the walls of the churches, tombstones «to the fallen of the 1940-1945 war» or memorials «to the fallen of all the wars» now appeared. These contained sentences, which were bound to sound rather ambiguous in Italy, because they did not distinguish the Resistance war of 1943-1945 from the Fascist one of 1940-1943. At the same time, this conduct did raise a feeling of gratitude among those who had lost loved ones in the Fascist war. In an exchange of favors, we can say, the Democratic (and Demo-Christian) Republic presented/left to the Church something of the memory of the fallen in Mussolini's war. This saved the Republic from its own important but embarrassing obligations to perform a civic duty and, thus, it was able to avoid coming to terms with the memory of fascism.

The exchange of favors between Church and State had contradictory results. On the one hand, it could have been welcomed in the short run by the government and the new political class even if, in the long run, it unfortunately slowed down the learning and development of a new Republican and democratic rhetoric in this field, or even made it impossible. On the other hand, the Church's memory of the Fascist war, so vague and human-based, was tolerated by the Left, which was satisfied but, in fact, relegated to a lower-level as regards the memory of the Resistance and the partisan war—with its small 'plaques' and absence of great memorials. In the end, an exchange of favors and a party game made it possible for the State to delegate the memory of the dead of 1940-1943 to a non-State and non-public institution, such as the Church.

Once again, the Italian history of war memorials erected to the 20th century's mass deaths cannot be understood deeply without taking into account both world wars. It helps to highlight the continuity and discontinuity among their signs of memory.

12. *Reading inscriptions*

What is even more complex is the topic of inscriptions hosted by these signs of memory, a topic that refers to the political nature (much more than to the artistic style) of war memorials. In general, once again, this public epigraphy has been studied, whenever that has been done, by separating the world wars and, indeed rightly so, as we are speaking of a national war, a fascist war, and a Resistance or liberation war. However, doing so would suggest a greater degree of discontinuity than, in reality, seems to be appropriate[24].

From a distance, adopting post-modern and post-national positions, all these writings seem to be imbued with a warlike and warmongering discourse[25]. For instance, the semantic field and language remains the same in not just a few Liberal-nationalist epigraphs compared to some more explicit inscriptions by the fascist regime, especially in the Thirties, at the time of the «Empire». Other continuities recur: some-semantic fields such as honor, heroism/hero, and blood persist. In the public lyrics about the Resistance, these would be outweighed just a little later, in the Sixties and Seventies: only then did Italy seem to show that it had changed, by changing the values it had found in the heroes and the fallen to be praised. Similarly, among other things, we find, on the one hand, continuity and resonance in the religious-Catholic language of homilies «to the fallen of all wars», already typical in the immediate post-war Demo-Christian Italy and, on the other hand, generic condemnations of the civilian war-casualties. Deprecating the war without explaining that it was a fascist war, especially when speaking of Anglo-American aerial bombings, risks making it difficult to understand what war, and under what conditions, we are talking about and the reasons why Italian civilians died. Thanks to all these continuities, and failing to appreciate what a fascist was, and what kind of war was necessary to eradicate Nazi-fascist occupation, fascism once again disappears into universal hymnodies to the generic Victim of war. The long-standing, ever-serving, and reassuring eulogy of the poor little civil community

[24] F. FERGONZI, *Dalla parte degli artisti: la lingua della scultura e la lingua dei monumenti*; P. D'ACHILLE, *Una lingua lontana? Rileggere le lapidi*, in N. LABANCA (ed.), *Pietre di guerra*.

[25] A.M. BANTI, *La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santità e onore alle origini dell'Italia unita*, Torino 2000; A.M. BANTI, *Sublime madre nostra. La nazione italiana dal Risorgimento al fascismo*, Roma - Bari 2011.

wounded by external and foreign enemies resurfaces. In a word, «culture de guerre»[26] reigns here.

But as historians, if we limited ourselves to this point, that is to recognizing and even condemning the warlike continuity on tombstones and war memorials, we would save our souls and we would be perfectly politically correct: but we would not have made many advances in historical understanding. Apart from any evident continuity related to the common theme of 'war', the inscriptions from 1915-1918, 1940-1943 and 1943-1945 reveal strong discontinuities. If one reads nationalist funerary and celebrative inscriptions on war memorials from the last years of Liberal Italy, and compares them with the bombastic propaganda of the Fascist war memorials or with the praises to the partisans who died in the Resistance war, a general diversity in the aims and in the rhetoric adopted becomes fully evident. Sometimes the same rhetorical formula circulates among them: for instance, for 1915-1918 like for 1943-1945, a sort of easy demonization of the everlasting German-Teutonic enemy seems to recur: but under the rhetorical cloak, things are different, and quite a new spirit is present.

Moreover, some other discrepancies remain. Among others, it is easy to admit that even today Italy differs from other European countries as regards memorials for the First World War: Rome has still not had the courage to re-integrate into the national community (at least to some extent) the people shot at dawn and the deserters. In Italy, unlike in France and in the British Isles, they remain absent in every *Albo d'oro* and also in the general public memory—and this has happened even though in Liberal Italy there were more shootings in 1915-1918 than in the abovementioned countries. There is no permanent memorial to remind Italians of this sad side of the war.

In conclusion, a comparative study on lyrics and epigraphs of the two world wars is very complicated, with all its complex balancing of continuities and discontinuities. This kind of study has still to be carried out in Italy.

[26] G. Procacci, *Alcune recenti pubblicazioni in Francia sulla «cultura di guerra» e sulla percezione della morte nel primo conflitto mondiale*, in N. Labanca - G. Rochat (eds), *Il soldato, la guerra e il rischio di morire*, Milano 2006.

13. *Much more complex monuments*

In conclusion, the international studies of the Eighties-Nineties lay the foundations for our present understanding of the historical relevance of war memorials. They also outlined a periodization, which is still very important, even though these studies were based on what we can now call incomplete documentation. The most recent, more accurate, and much more extended, censuses of war-memorials substantially confirm that periodization, but they make the picture much more complex. Moreover, if the first studies focused almost exclusively on memorials for the Great War, today it appears not only useful, but also necessary to take into account those for the dead in the Second World War. Only this comparison makes it possible to have a much needed, more complex, picture of how the European societies of the 20th century, between continuity and change, coped with mass death and world wars.

In this perspective, even a local-regional study on Tuscany may provide some initial suggestions

Analyzing Tuscan war memorials for the First and Second World Wars, it has become obvious how much politics and societies have changed and, consequently, how mass death in war has changed. If the need to develop public mourning remained, societies continually had to re-invent the forms of this social task. As is well known, 'inventing' does not mean forging entirely artificial constructs from non-existing bases. In any case, the task was performed by political actors who differed from one period to another, with different goals and results. They chose different artistic forms, and were linked to different (and often divided) communities of mourning. Only their political role remained constant.

It cannot be taken for granted that the signs of memory for the mass deaths in mass-armies of world wars managed to appease the bereaved families, relatives, and friends of the dead. It cannot be excluded that, instead of calming their memory, war memorials functioned as reminders of the death inflicted on the survivors' relatives. Rather than consent, these signs of memory could have given rise to a sort of social hatred that survivors felt against those who had brought death to their own relatives and friends. Moreover, since we cannot assume that many names on a stone are the names of all the dead in war, it remains questionable whether releasing a message from a war memorial and receiving it may be considered the same story.

The size of the mass deaths in the 20th century world wars—even more so if compared to our very contemporary so-called «zero-death» asymmetric armed conflicts—was so great and so terrible that it is difficult to predict when, or if, it will be possible to completely wipe out its memory. The continuous re-invention of the memory of the dead has so far experienced different and changing forms, for the First and Second World Wars.

Then it cannot be excluded that—around the centenary of the Great War and the seventieth anniversary of the Second World War—other memorials will be erected. They will measure the sensitivity of today's societies to the remembrance of world wars. They will hopefully fill gaps in our culture of memory. They will re-invent and re-interpret what has already been remembered.

All this may show once again that war memorials are political choices made by the survivors in the name of the dead.

Narrating War in Fascist Empire Cinema

by *Ruth Ben-Ghiat*

I.

On October 2, 1935, Benito Mussolini stepped out on the balcony of Rome's Piazza Venezia to address the largest rally in the fourteen years of the Fascist regime. Surrounded by microphones and movie cameras, Mussolini hailed his audience:

«Blackshirts of the Revolution! Men and women of all of Italy! Italians all over the world, beyond the mountains and beyond the seas: listen well! A solemn hour is about to sound in the history of the fatherland. At this moment twenty million men occupy the public squares of all Italy. Never in the history of mankind has there been seen a more gigantic spectacle. Twenty million men: one heart, one will, one decision».

The decision to which Mussolini referred was that of invading Ethiopia, an act that would avenge the Italians' defeat at Adwa by Ethiopian troops almost forty years earlier. The regime had planned the invasion since 1934, and Italian soldiers stood ready at the Ethiopian-Eritrean border even as the Duce spoke[1]. The Fascists resembled French and British imperialists in wrapping their territorial aggressions in the cloak of the civilizing mission, but were perhaps unique in proclaiming the arrogant European, with his history of disregard for Italy, as the enemy, alongside the African. As Mussolini told his listeners, Ethiopia and the Great Powers conspired to «deprive us of a bit of a place in the sun». The announced League of Nations sanctions played into this rhetoric of victimization, with Mussolini protesting Europe's backing of «an African country ... without a shadow of civilization», over «a People of poets, artists, heroes, saints, navigators, and transmigrants [*trasmigratori*] ... to whom humanity owes some of its greatest achievements»[2]. Here, as on so

[1] Luce newsreel B0761, October 8, 1935, at www.archivioluce.com

[2] B. MUSSOLINI, *La mobilitazione generale*, speech dated October 2, 1935, in *Scritti e discorsi*, Milano 1935, vol. 9, pp. 218-220. On the importance of the «Mediterranean as prison», M. FULLER, *Moderns Abroad. Architecture, Cities and Italian Imperialism*, London - New York 2007, pp. 39-48.

many other occasions, the Italian leader invoked what Avishai Margalit has termed «episodic memory», or the memory of past emotions, such as collective humiliations, as a means of catalyzing Italy[3]. In the piazzas, as on screen, Fascism's imperial justifications and mobilizations rested on the reiteration of a *récit* of national abjection. The Duce's October 2 discourse, which invoked the ignominies of Adwa, Versailles, and the sanctions, turned an ideology of victimization into a rationale for aggression. «*Ora basta!* / We've had enough!» roared Mussolini at the close of his speech, declaring war not only against Ethiopia but against an entire international system that placed Italy in a subaltern state[4].

Although the Duce pledged in that speech to prevent the coming war from escalating into a «European conflict», the Ethiopian invasion set into motion a chain of destructive events that contributed to the outbreak of World War Two. It weakened the League's authority, destabilized European diplomatic relations, and flaunted state sovereignty and multiple international protocols. Among these last was a ban on chemical weapons, which the Fascists used in massive quantities: the modalities of the Italian employment of aviation and gas, along with the industrial scale of the mobilization, made Ethiopia an «experimental field of violence» for the next five years[5]. Six months later, the Italians announced victory in Ethiopia and the establishment of Italian East Africa. In reality, entrenched Ethiopian resistance made this «conquest» unstable and incomplete, and more air power was deployed in Ethiopia in the years following the proclamation of Empire than during the war. The Axis alliance of 1936 brought new engagements (Spain, in 1937) and spurred the Fascists to pursue old imperial ambitions, which strained Italy's military and financial resources to the limit (Albania, occupied

[3] A. MARGALIT, *The Ethics of Memory*, Cambridge MA 2002, especially pp.107-146.

[4] S. FALASCA-ZAMPONI, *Fascist Spectacle. The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*, Berkeley CA 1997, p. 170 and chapter 5.

[5] See A. MATTIOLI, *Experimentierfeld der Gewalt. Der Abessinienkrieg und seine internationale Bedeutung 1935-1941*, Zürich 2005; G. BROGNI KUNZI, *Italien und der Abessinienkrieg 1935/36. Kolonialkrieg oder Totaler Krieg?*, Paderborn 2006; A. MATTIOLI - A.-W. ASSERATE (eds), *Der erste faschistische Vernichtungskrieg. Die Italienische Aggression gegen Äthiopien 1935-1941*, Köln 2006, which builds on the path-breaking works by G. ROCHAT, *Guerre italiane in Libia e in Etiopia*, Treviso 1991, and A. DEL BOCA, *Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale*, 4 vols, Roma - Bari 1976-1984, and by the same author *Gli italiani in Libia*, 2 vols, Roma - Bari 1986-1988.

in 1939), but also created new circuits of international exchange. In fact, fierce resistance caused the war to drag on long after May 1936, when the Italians declared victory and the creation of an Italian East Africa (AOI) whose administrative units encompassed Ethiopia and the previously occupied territories of Eritrea (1890) and Somalia (1908). Although Fascism's Empire formally referred only to AOI, it brought Italy's Mediterranean colonies (Libya and the Dodecanese Islands, both acquired in 1912) into a larger geopolitical configuration, setting the stage for further expansionism[6]. Inside Italy, the Ethiopian war was also a watershed event. Italy's further extension into sub-Saharan Africa intensified existing anxieties about the safeguarding of racial purity and the production of a new generation of Italians who were physically and spiritually fit for imperial command. After 1935, the regime's military goals increasingly conditioned every aspect of Fascist policy, from the economic sphere (autarchy), to culture and the media (heightened state intervention and centralization) to attempts to transform everyday practices (the «reform of custom», which mandated the Roman salute; the anti-consumption «politics of austerity»). This new chapter of the regime would end in a spiral of loss, the fall of East Africa in 1941 followed the next year by Libya and by the general surrender of Fascist Italy to the Allies on September 8, 1943.

My essay examines this parabola of mobilization and defeat through the lens of cinema, in particular the empire films made from 1935 to 1942. I concentrate in particular on the relationship of cinema and aviation, since Italian Fascism's colonial conquests depended so heavily on air power, and since the new imagined communities made possible by air travel lay at the heart of the dictatorship's distinctive imperial ideologies. My analysis of the aviation blockbuster *Luciano Serra pilota*, showcases cinema's role in diffusing these ideologies and imaginaries. As we will see, cinema has its own modes of narrating war, ones centered less on the reconstruction of fact than on emotionally connecting with spectators by communicating the «driving symbols, desires, and tropes» that undergirded Fascism's imperial projects[7].

[6] N. LABANCA, *Oltremare. Storia dell'espansione coloniale italiana*, Bologna 2002; G. ROCHAT, *Le guerre italiane 1935-1943. Dall'Impero d'Etiopia alla disfatta*, Torino 2005.

[7] M. FULLER, *Moderns Abroad*, p. 38.

II.

The term «empire cinema» is not a familiar one in scholarship on Italian film. Like the French, Italians and those who work on their cinema have preferred to speak of «colonial cinema», leaving «empire cinema» to refer to the British case[8]. In using the category of empire cinema throughout this essay, I wish to call attention to the myriad effects the period of imperial expansion inaugurated by the Ethiopian invasion had on film policies and practices. The propagandistic demands of the Ethiopian war and the declaration of empire opened a new phase of discussion within Italy about the nature of the power and modernity of the cinematic apparatus and the place of film within Fascist agendas of war and cultural diplomacy. Italian features on imperial themes made between 1936 and 1942 reflect this particular moment in Italian film culture, as do the circumstances of their production and reception. My use of the term empire cinema is also meant to flag the importance the pursuit of empire had for Italians, in the liberal as well as Fascist era. While the Italian occupations remain much less well known than the French, British, and Dutch cases, they were no less intertwined with nation building: indeed, since Italy unified in 1870, they asserted Italy's unity and international status with regard to more established countries. Without colonies, Italy would always be Europe's boot, never its heart or head, and dispossessed of the power, prestige, and possibilities that came with overseas expansion[9]. During the Fascist period, though, empire represented more than an escape route from a position of perceived marginality within Europe: it was also a stage from which to demonstrate Italian modernity to the rest of the world. The obsessive display of communications, military, agricultural, and medical technology in empire films, and the frequent recourse to non-fictional inserts of mass

[8] See R. BEN-GHIAT, *Italian Fascism's Empire Cinema*, Bloomington IN 2014, for a fuller examination of the issues raised in this article. Also for surveys and reviews of such films, J. GILI - G.P. BRUNETTA (eds), *L'ora dell'Africa nel cinema italiano, 1911-1989*, Rovereto 1990; L. ELENA (ed.), *Film d'Africa. Film italiani prima, durante, e dopo l'avventura coloniale*, Torino 1999; M. ARGENTIERI (ed.), *Schermi di guerra: Cinema italiano, 1939-1945*, Roma 1995; M. ARGENTIERI, *Il cinema in guerra. Arte, comunicazione, e propaganda in Italia 1940-1944*, Roma 1998, are indispensable.

[9] R. BOSWORTH, *Italy and the Wider World*, London - New York 1996; R. BOSWORTH, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers. Italian Foreign Policy before the First World War*, Cambridge 1979.

battle and labor—the twin pillars of the imperialist enterprise—asserted the Italians' ability to correct the shame of Adwa and impose a vision of modernity founded on the regimentation of bodies and the mastery and transformation of terrain. The films examined in this essay register these anxieties of late arrival: empire, in these films, is very much still in the making, with conquest, rather than governance, at the center of the dramatic agenda.

The Mediterranean was the field of action upon which these imperial agendas depended, and it was subject to reinventions and re-imaginings that are visible in the realm of empire film. The Mediterranean, Mia Fuller observes, was a means of achieving Italian autonomy from Europe, but also the key to reversing a history of Italian marginalization within the continent[10]. Control of the Mediterranean would make Italy the vital hinge between Europe and Africa, and Italy's long coastlines, which had long marked its peripheral place on the continent, would now allow for control of a network of ports that stretched from the Adriatic to the Red Sea. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, this vision expanded into an Axis plan for a new pan-region, Eurafrica, which in the Fascist iteration presented an Italian-controlled Mediterranean as a «soldering zone between continents»[11]. This notion of Italian influence extending through and beyond the Mediterranean was naturally connected to the revival of Rome as a model of imperial power. Rome and the ideology of *romanità* served the Fascists as a «utopia of the past» which supposedly differentiated Italy's imperial vision from that of contemporary powers while providing a historical justification for Fascist expansion. A Mediterranean empire would allow Italians to be recognized as modern by northern European countries, while finally living up to their own glorious Roman past[12].

[10] M. FULLER, *Moderns Abroad*, pp. 39-62; C. FOGU - L. RE, *Italy in the Mediterranean Today: A New Critical Topography*, in «California Italian Studies», 1, 2010, 1, pp. 1-9, and the other articles in this special issue; S. TRINCHESE (ed.), *Mare Nostrum. Percezione ottomana e mito mediterraneo all'alba del '900*, Milano 2005; I. CHAMBERS, *Mediterranean Crossings. The Politics of an Interrupted Modernity*, Durham 2008.

[11] A. KALLIST, *Fascist Ideology. Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945*, London - New York 2000; D. RODOGNO, *Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo. Le politiche di occupazione dell'Italia fascista in Europa (1940-43)*, Torino 2003.

[12] J. ARTHURS, *Excavating Modernity. The Roman Past in Fascist Italy*, Ithaca NY 2012.

All of these ideological burdens weighed upon empire films, which had heavy political demands upon them relative to the rest of Fascist-era cinematic production. They were to placate the international community, highlighting the humanitarian aspects of Italy's colonization, while also advertising Italian modernity and military strength. They aspired to compete with Hollywood and other foreign productions for the attentions of audiences abroad, both for profit motives and as part of a strategy of achieving influence through «two peaceful but very potent arms: culture and commerce»[13]. By demonstrating the benevolence and the authority of Italian rule, they aimed to convince inhabitants of occupied territories to collaborate with the regime. And they were to mobilize Italians at home and in Italian communities abroad for combat and settlement in the colonies, creating a constituency and legitimacy for empire and expanding the horizons of Italians' national allegiances and imaginaries. The multiple propagandistic agendas and markets of empire films, their politically sensitive nature, and the substantial capital investment that they necessitated meant that most of them took shape at the very vertices of the regime. The Duce's son Vittorio Mussolini, the director of the magazine «Cinema» and a pilot who served in Ethiopia and later in Greece, played a central role in promoting such films, serving variously as producer, screenwriter, supervisor, investor, and as liason with the censors and his father, when necessary.

III.

Almost all Italian empire films are war films: they stage dramas of conquest and occupation and, during World War Two, dramas of defeat as well. They feature battle scenes, sometimes of mammoth scale, and real military men, rather than actors, make up the rank and file combatants seen on screen. These men utilize weapons and material on loan from the armed forces, which also supplied consultants to verify the accuracy and feasibility of the directors' envisioned military maneuvers. Empire films are thus a window on the relationship of war and cinema during the Italian dictatorship, and in particular on how the Fascists sought to use the cinema as an «eye of war» («occhio della guerra»), moving from representation of war to the militarization of the cinematic apparatus.

[13] *Elementi per una nuova geografia italiana*, in «Critica fascista», September 1, 1937.

This new way of thinking about cinema dated from World War One, and united the gaze with the potential to inflict violence and positioned the camera operator alongside the bomber and machine gunner as a force for the creation of history[14]. Aerial warfare had particular importance in this regard. The prominence given to aviation within many empire films mirrors its importance within Fascist culture as a realm where older fantasies of movement and conquest came together with the new cultures of violence made possible by changes in military technologies. Bringing together imperial strategies of visual domination (the mapping and classifying of peoples and terrain) with the replication of industrial warfare's targeting sightlines and aerial perspectives, these movies reflect and further the agendas of political visualization that subtended Fascism's attempts to transform and «reclaim» (*bonificare*) the landscapes and populations under its control[15].

The production process of empire films in the colonies also reinforced cinema's function as a technology of conquest and governance. Shooting on location in the colonies, which involved close collaborations with the Italian military, provided occasions for film professionals to vaunt their own martial experiences and virile qualities. For directors and their assistants, who often were in charge of hundreds or thousands of Italian and *askari* soldiers and indigenous extras, it provided a chance to have their own experiences of colonial command. The director Goffredo Alessandrini, who utilized 12,000 Eritreans for battle scenes in his 1939 film *Abuna Messias*, recalled in the 1970s that the scale of these productions, and the risks involved, often made the production of the film more compelling than the film itself. Comparing his directorial actions to those of a military authority, he mused that it was often «hard to remember that you are there to tell a story». At times, as in the case of the men who made Istituto Luce newsreels and documentaries, filmmaking coincided with and was part of military service in Africa. Michael Geyer's description of the militarized European societies of the

[14] P. Virilio, *Guerre et cinéma. La logistique de la perception*, Paris 1991; P. Virilio, *La Machine de vision*, Paris 1988; A. Feldman, *Violence and Vision: The Prosthetics and Aesthetics of Terror*, in V. Das et al. (eds), *Violence and Subjectivity*, Berkeley CA 2000, pp. 46-78.

[15] On the trope of *bonifica*, R. Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922-1945*, Berkeley CA 2001; allied concepts in E. Gentile, *La via italiana al totalitarismo*; R. Griffin, *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion*, London 2006.

interwar period as ones in which «war ascribed status to individuals and lent meaning to the 'work' of those who participated in it», also fits the culture and character of the world of Italian empire cinema, with its blurred lines between military and cultural practice[16].

Luciano Serra pilota exemplifies this engagement of war and cinema in its plot points and cinematography as well as in the history of its production and reception. The movie is best known as a star vehicle for Amedeo Nazzari, known popularly as «the Italian Errol Flynn», and its box-office success testified to smooth blending of propaganda and entertainment. With a title character who is forced to leave his family and emigrate to Brazil after World War One due to underemployment, only to answer Mussolini's call for such emigrants to fight for the *patria* in Ethiopia, the film plays into the regime's attempts to exploit this «nation outside the Nation», as the Fascist official Piero Parini called it in 1935, for its martial causes[17]. Yet it also proclaims that a generation of emigrant Italians, who were so marked by their time abroad, were little suited for Fascism's autarchic future. In Ethiopia, Luciano is reunited with his pilot son Aldo, who has been trained by the Aeronautical Academy and has a docility unknown to his father. Here I will focus on the ways the movie's celebration of the Fascist cult of aviation also plays on the violence, aerial and other, that so marked the Ethiopian war and occupation. The film's *equipe* included many of the protagonists of the entangled realms of empire film and aviation: the photographer Filippo Masoero, head of the Air Force's cinema unit, who wrote the original story; the documentarian Mario Craveri, who shot the aviation footage; the pilot Vittorio Mussolini, its supervisor; and the Governor of Libya, Italo Balbo, who had no direct involvement in the film but whose aeronautics policies and transatlantic flight to Brazil partly inspired the plot. Through the phantom protagonist of Balbo, the movie also celebrated the layered histories of violence that supported Fascism up and through its imperial enterprise, from the revolutionary energies of squadrism to the targeted destruction made possible by the mechani-

[16] G. ALESSANDRINI, in F. SAVIO, *Cinecittà anni trenta*, 3 vols, Roma 1979, here vol. 1, pp. 33-34; M. GEYER, *The Militarization of Europe, 1919-1945*, in J. GILLIS (ed.), *The Militarization of the Western World*, New Brunswick NJ 1989, p. 101.

[17] P. PARINI, *Gli italiani nel mondo*, Roma 1935, p. 9; B. MUSSOLINI, *La mobilitazione generale*. On *Luciano Serra pilota* see R. DE BERTI, *Dallo schermo alla carta*, pp. 85-95.

cally assisted gaze from aerial bombers. The movie's financial backers included the National Association of Industrial Motors and Aircraft[18].

As a war film, *Luciano Serra pilota* capitalized on the international success story of Italian aviation: airplanes, not accordions, would be the symbols of Italianness abroad. During the Italo-Turkish war (1911-1912) Italians had pioneered reconnaissance and bombing day and night flights, and under the influence of General Giulio Douhet, trained heavily in strategic bombing and developed the Caproni, the first aircraft capable of precision bombing. Balbo's championing of Douhet's ideas as Undersecretary (1926-1929) and then Minister of Aeronautics (1929-1933) ensured that bombing technology played a key role in colonial conquest[19]. Balbo's greatest fame came from his daring transatlantic «mass air cruises» to Brazil (1930) and the United States (1933), which advertised the Italians' courage and cutting-edge aviation technology, but he also spearheaded the regime's massive investment in aviation technology and infrastructure. By 1939, Italy ranked third worldwide for range of destinations and for volume of goods and people transported; 25 foreign air forces were training pilots in Italy; 39 nations were importing Italian aeronautics products (including the lightweight Avia movie camera); and the Italians held 110 world records for distance, altitude, speed, load, acrobatics, and more[20].

Luciano Serra pilota has a direct relationship with this aviation culture, from its featuring of Ala Littoria planes, to its staging of a transatlantic flight from Brazil to Italy, to the aerial aesthetics and acrobatics featured in the movie. Improved imaging devices since World War One made for new visions of landscape, captured in these photos of Quoram and

[18] r.g. *Momento aeronautico*, in «Cinema», February 10, 1942. Information on funding from J. GILI, *Il film dell'impero*, in J. GILI - G.P. BRUNETTA (eds), *L'ora dell'Africa*, p. 64.

[19] M. PAGLIERO, *L'Aeronautica Militare dall'Eritrea alla Spagna*, and M. FERRARI, *L'Aviazione Italiana nella Prima Guerra Mondiale*, in A. ANDREOLI - G. CAPRARA - E. FONTANELLA (eds), *Volare! Futurismo, aviomania, tecnica e cultura del volo 1903-1940*, Roma 2003, pp. 39-43 and pp. 45-49.

[20] These were preceded by Western and Eastern Mediterranean trips in 1928 and 1929. On these trips and all aspects of Balbo see C. SEGRÈ, *Italo Balbo. A Fascist Life*, pp. 191-265; S. MAGGI, *Storia dei trasporti in Italia*, Bologna 2009, pp. 188 and 271; G. CAPRARA, *La storia dell'aviazione italiana*, in A. ANDREOLI - G. CAPRARA - E. FONTANELLA (eds), *Volare!*, pp. 1-33; I. BALBO, *Sette anni di politica aeronautica, 1927-1933*, Milano 1936.



Figure 1. Reconaissance of Quoram (source: A. PAVOLINI, *Disperata*, Florence 1937).

Somalia published in Alessandro Pavolini's Ethiopian War chronicle *Disperata*[21] (figs 1 and 2). The practice of strafing, while risky, also afforded pilots closer views of landscape and what Vittorio Mussolini called aerial bombings' «aesthetic effects»[22]. Mussolini junior's experiences in Ethiopia, rendered in print through his 1937 war chronicle *Voli sulle Ambe*, also find expression in the movie he supervised in spectacular flight scenes and on the ground physical battlefield encounters.

That *Luciano Serra pilota* marked a new level of involvement among the aviation and cinema industries and the Fascist war machine is clear from its positioning in the Fascist press as a production that was itself a

[21] B. HUPPAUF, *Modernism and the Photographic Representation of War and Destruction*, in L. DEVEREAUX - R. HILLMAN (eds), *Fields of Vision. Essays in Film Studies, Visual Anthropology, and Photography*, Berkeley CA 1995; N. STEIMATSKY, *Italian Locations*, Minneapolis MN 2008; D. DERIU, *Picturing Ruinscapes: The Aerial Photograph as Image of Historical Trauma*, in F. GUERIN - R. HALLES (eds), *The Image and the Witness. Trauma, Memory, and Visual Culture*, London - New York 2007, pp. 189-206.

[22] A. PAVOLINI, *Disperata*, Firenze 1937; V. MUSSOLINI, *Voli sulle Ambe*, Firenze 1936, pp. 28, 47-48, 34, 71.



Figure 2. Bombing of Somalia, 1936 (source: A. PAVOLINI, *Disperata*).

martial and heroic enterprise. Alessandrini set the tone here. In *Cinema*, he boasted of the 15,000 kilometers he, Craveri, and producer Franco Riganti flew to shoot documentary footage and scout locations. Utilizing «magnificent Ala Littoria aircraft», Capronis, and automobiles, they endured 50 degree Celsius temperatures and sudden floods to select sites for the battle scenes. Throughout, they were accompanied by the Air Force officer who served as aviation liason and guarantor of the fidelity of the movie's military maneuvers. «[In combat], as is known, columns of soldiers advance with a network of scouts at their side and the vigilant eye of aviation above them», the director wrote, giving his own trip the feel of a military reconnaissance mission.

Other members of the production echoed this paramilitary and masculine tone. Actors, crew, producers, and directors presented the making of *Luciano Serra pilota* in the press as an opportunity to live (and sometimes relive) their own war stories and flight experiences. Riganti, as producer, compared his experience in managing this «difficult undertaking» to fighting a battle, with 25,000 machine guns employed, 550 bombs exploded, and 40,000 rifle shots fired, as well

as a near fatal plane crash he was involved in during some of the 640hours of flying time that accrued during filming. Arata called it «the kind of job that makes the veins pulse», while the actor Mario Ferrari reminded readers his role as a pilot and Air Force commander drew on the real combat he had experienced as an aviator in World War One. «But this was only a film ... what a shame», he lamented. Even the young and shy Roberto Villa confessed that he had gotten the flying bug while on set—«I jumped onto the fuselage»—inspired by Riganti, Alessandrini, and the other amateur aviators in the troupe. Only Nazzari, who did not join the troupe in Africa, distanced himself from the chorus of masculine (self)celebration, praising instead the «real pilots» and «real inexhaustible legionaries who did the long African marches»[23].

Alessandrini also presented colonial filmmaking as a form of colonial command in his account of his 1937 scouting mission. He, Craveri, Riganti, and Army Major de Sarno visited the Galla, choosing 4000 of these «magnificent warriors, who are celebrated throughout the Empire for their courage and valor» by subjecting them to battle simulations. During the Ethiopian invasion, De Sarno had «organized this undisciplined mass of raiders to fight alongside us in the battles of Endertà and Ascianghi». Now he had a cinematographic mission: «to get them used to the camera», and after would be taking on «the no less difficult task of transforming men who only know how to plunder into a peaceful mass of farmers». Alessandrini later singled out the Eritrean *ascari* actors favorably, remarking that they were more «adaptable» because they had recently finished their military service in Ethiopia. «They already were in the habit of obeying and when they heard commands they accepted them almost with pleasure»[24]. In fact, *Luciano Serra pilota* featured not only 4000 Galla and the Eritrean *ascari* but 1000 «Abyssinians from irregular bands» and cavalry squads from Godo Fella, all of whom were pitted against 1000 Italians borrowed from

[23] R. Villa - M. Ferrari - A. Nazzari, *Come abbiamo fatto Luciano Serra, pilota*, in «Film», August 6, 1938. The photographer Aldo Tonti also recalled the set's martial tenor in *Odore di cinema*, Firenze 1964, pp. 50-55.

[24] G. Alessandrini, *15000 Km. di preparazione a «Luciano Serra, pilota»*, in «Cinema», June 25, 1937; *Primize su «Luciano Serra, pilota»*, in «Cinema Illustrazione», March 9, 1938.

the Army, the better to convince audiences of the defensive nature of any Italian aggression shown on screen[25].

I focus now on that aggression, considering the film's relations with histories and memories of violence that go beyond the film frame and beyond the colony. Here Luciano's rescue of his wounded son Aldo is paralleled by another plotline: the need to save Italian civilians who are stranded in a train sabotaged by the Ethiopians. Shots of Ethiopians descending upon the train, with flashes to panicked faces of men, women, and children conjure threats of rape and dismemberment, including castration—the latter two of which were continuously mentioned in Fascist propaganda as proof of the enemy's barbarism. Well armed with machine guns and knives, the Ethiopians far outnumber the Italian Army, but they cannot match the planes that, just in time, fly in and save the day, like the cavalry in the Western. The bombings create huge smoke effects much like those described admiringly by Mussolini junior in his pilot chronicles, and the sequence resolves in a skillful montage of scattering Ethiopians, dust, and smoke, until our vision is obscured completely, opening a transition which is also an ellipsis, as it places us back in Italy, at the ceremony honoring Luciano after his death (fig. 3). The «fog of war» which ends the battle sequence acts as a smokescreen in other ways as well. As we have seen, *Luciano Serra pilota* builds on the cult of Italian aviation encouraged by Balbo's transatlantic flights, and retraces one leg of Balbo's Brazil-Italy journey. Luciano, however, acts as Balbo's doppelgänger, less in terms of direct physical resemblance than in his doing wrong what Balbo did right: while Balbo's flight came with the benediction of the state, and involved a disciplined collective, Luciano's flight was illegal, an act of misguided individualism. «I'm leaving anyway», he says when told that taking the plane to Italy would be a theft, with a high risk of death en route. And indeed the plane plunges into the sea, and with it, supposedly, Luciano's former identity and character. He is reborn in Ethiopia, where, integrated into the Militia with other wayward emigrants, he is able to acquire a sense of discipline and regain his paternal role. Yet both in Rio and in the Italian colonies, Luciano shadows not only Balbo the media star and aviator but Balbo the former squadrist. For

[25] G. ALESSANDRINI, *Come abbiamo fatto Luciano Serra, pilota*, interview in F. SAVIO, *Cinecittà anni trenta*, vol. 1, pp. 33-34; G. ALESSANDRINI, *15000 Km. di preparazione a «Luciano Serra, pilota»*.



Figure 3. The Fog of War (source: Still from G. ALESSANDRINI, *Luciano Serra pilota*).

in its iconography, characterizations, and marketing, the film exploits a history of squadrist violence that the regime sought to banish on the Italian streets while simultaneously reviving its spirit in the colonies, as a recruitment tool for the Ethiopian War.

The vehicle for this evocation of squadrism throughout the regime was the Fascist Militia, which the real Balbo had founded in the early 1920s as a point of confluence for Blackshirts. Throughout the regime, the Militia's rhetoric, structure (squads formed its base units, with Legions uniting fifty or more squads) and uniform kept alive the Fascist credo of violence as regenerative, The Ethiopian War presented their first mass mobilization of the Fascist period, with the Legion of the *fasci all'estero* integrated into a regular Militia unit and renamed the 221st legion. It was this legion that allowed the expatriate Luciano Serra to find his «home» in Ethiopia[26]. In Ethiopia, the Militia quickly became

[26] R. MARCELLINI, *Legionari del Secondo parallelo*, Luce D004601, www.archivioluce.com. On the Militia in Ethiopia, G. ROCHAT, *I volontari di Mussolini*, in N. LABANCA (ed.), *Fare il soldato. Storia del reclutamento militare in Italia*, Bologna 2007, pp. 123-140.

known for its brutal and marauding nature, and Giulietta Stefani's observation that that Militia service in Africa «provided an organized context within which [men] could experiment with camaraderie and collective violence» is on point[27]. For squadrists, violence was not an accidental or ancillary byproduct of political struggle, but had its own value as «fulfillment of an important social mission» and legitimation of one's own masculinity. This spirit of masculine freedom and transgression pervaded the culture of imperial conquest. An example among many: Ciano's bomb squadron *Disperata*, and Pavolini's book about it, took its name and skull and crossbones emblem from the original Florentine band of blackshirts[28]. For men within this culture, Balbo's fame remained tied to his squadrist identity, which was occasionally evoked through cinematic flashings. A 1936 Luce newsreel of a parade in his honor as Governor of Libya singled out a dagger held proudly, asserting the memory of the squadrist past[29].

Throughout the movie, Nazzari, as Luciano, channels and embodies this squadrist spirit, his «force of will, rough energy, and severe frankness», propelling him from one liminal situation to another[30]. «Mine is an escape», he tells a friend of his decision to leave Italy rather than become an *impiegato*, or functionary, in his father-in-law's business. His character embodies early Fascism's ideal «dynamic-defiant man». Yet his job in commercial aviation in Rio does not satisfy his urges for freedom and action. A shot of his «passenger» Simba the

[27] G. STEFANI, *Colonia per maschi. Italiani in Africa Orientale: una storia di genere*, Verona 2007, pp. 60-61; G. ROCHAT, *I volontari di Mussolini*, pp. 125-126.

[28] M. FRANZINELLI, *Squadristi. Protagonisti e tecniche della violenza fascista, 1919-1922*, Milano 2003, p. 44; A. CAPONE, *Corporealità maschile e modernità*, in S. BELLASSAI - M. MALATESTA (eds), *Genere e mascolinità*, Roma 2000, pp. 215, 221; M. MILAN, *The Institutionalization of Squadrismo*, in «Contemporary European History», forthcoming.

[29] Luce newsreel B0911, *La sfilata militare alla presenza del Governatore della Libia Italo Balbo*, 1936, www.archivioluce.it; L. MARKS, *The Skin of the Film. Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses*, Durham 2000, p. 80.

[30] PUCK, *Galleria: Amedeo Nazari*, in «Cinema», December 10, 1938. Ivo Perilli, who wrote an early version of the screenplay, recalls that Luciano was conceived as being «kind of crazy ... one of those avaiators who fought the war of '15/'18 and never demobilized, who could not stand the idea of returning to civilian life, and did crazy things ... Fascism was born from combat and therefore many aviators became spontaneously fascists», I. PERILLI, in F. SAVIO, *Cinecittà anni trenta*, vol. 3, pp. 923-924.

lion roaring in his cage captures Luciano's own chained-up energies, which burst out when he makes his daring but ill-fated solo departure for Italy[31].

Luciano's impulsive nature is in fact depicted as an asset on the battlefield, especially in the context of service in the free wheeling Militia. In one of the film's most intense scenes, Luciano abandons his unit and runs off to save Aldo, only to be chased by a white-robed Ethiopian soldier, who is given close-up treatment as he struggles with his gun and then unsheathes a long knife. Although hand to hand combat and intense physical violence were largely banned from Fascist screens, we see him and Luciano writhe together on the ground, locked in mortal combat, before Luciano takes out his own Legion-issued dagger and stabs him to death (fig. 4). The vision of the knife plunges the viewer back into the realm of squadrist memory. As Laura Marks writes, such screen objects gain their force for the spectator precisely because of «the unresolved traumas embedded in them [and] the history of material interactions that they encode». This standard-issue dagger (*pugnale di marcia*) evokes the bodily and other memories associated with the national past, in this case the quotidian acts of violence committed by Balbo and other squadrists in the metropole, before and after the Militia was formed. At the same time, the knife prepares Luciano's own fadeout from Fascist history. He too has been fatally wounded, and in any case this new Italy has no place for him. But here it is not only his tainted past as a neglectful father and emigrant that determines his fate, but his rogue mentality. His death is the death of a squadrism that refused integration into the Militia, of crimes committed outside the battleground and outside orders of the state, of all those who were flight risks, in all the senses of the term.

The double path walked by the film with respect to this vexed history of Fascist violence registered in the film's critical reception and publicity. To many, Luciano seemed a plausible representative of «Italians' most recent history», both as an abject and misguided emigrant and as a re-nationalized soldier in Africa. Indeed, it is precisely through this conversion that the male protagonist of Fascist empire films gains his dramatic and ideological leverage, and Nazzari's virility, even in his

[31] S. BELLASSAI, *The Masculine Mystique. Antimodernism and Virility in Fascist Italy*, in «Journal of Modern Italian Studies», September 2005, p. 323.

Figure 4. Luciano Serra stabs the Ethiopian adversary (source: Still from G. ALESSANDRINI, *Luciano Serra pilota*).

pathos, allowed him to be seen as a positive and emblematic figure. The extensive location shooting and use of real Italian and African soldiers also aided *Luciano Serra pilota*'s claims to historical authenticity. It seemed to offer «a truer reality» than had been seen before, with both Nazzari's performance and the film's way of narrating its story more «genuine and direct». Part of this authenticity, however, lay in its complex and layered presentation of that story, in its use of ellipses and evocations of particularly charged national moments. Tellingly, the critic Sandro De Feo noted that the film concealed as much as it revealed about the history it presented: «the discourse is often indirect», with the history «subtly veiled behind the case of the protagonist ...». A kind of «modesty» with respect to historical representation meant that «the zone of history's allusive second level is fused and assimilated»[32].

[32] *Film di questi giorni*, in «Cinema», November 10, 1938; F. SACCHI, review in «Corriere della sera», August 29, 1938, S. DE FEO, review in «Il Messaggero», August 29, 1938.

And in that zone lay the violence that could not be represented and yet had to be evoked to present the Ethiopian invasion as an extension of the Fascist revolution.

The film's marketing displayed greater transparency, sometimes playing up the squadrist ethos behind the film. *Luciano Serra pilota*, is «the film of Italian daring» («Il film dell'ardimento italiano») trumpeted one poster, referring to the *arditi* shock troops who were a nucleus and mobilizing myth of squadrism. Alessandrini, too, advertised his film's «daring and heroic atmosphere» («atmosfera ardita e eroica»), a framing to which the paramilitary discourse surrounding its production also contributed. Thus did an enthusiastic young critic such as Antonioni view *Luciano Serra pilota* as «a work that sums up the ideals and passions, the torment and the spirit of this Fascist era, of this Italian era»[33]. And it was precisely in the slippage between Italian and Fascist history, picked up by Antonioni, that the film spoke to its target audience, proclaiming that under Mussolini a family story is also a collective story; the private is always also public; and state has the right to control both spheres of life. Luciano's death sends the message that even fathers can be expendable, if they are not in tune with the regime's collective institutions and goals, with Fascist military encampments becoming the new hearth, and the colonies the new home, for their sons' generation. The scene of colonial violence is thus also the scene of the nation's violence against its internal enemies, not only those of the squadrist past but those of the Fascist present. Luciano did live on in the paratextual realm, reuniting with his son in a *cineromanzo* (serialized comic-book) version of the story. Nazzari's rise to most popular male actor in Italy after this film was yet another kind of afterlife, with his later military roles existing in relation to his iconic star turn here. But, as befits a doppelgänger, Luciano's first «death» in flight presaged Balbo's own, in the course of a 1941 air mission Claudio Segrè has characterized as ill-advised[34].

Created at the very center of the regime, with a huge budget, heavily orchestrated publicity, and Italy's most famous male star, *Luciano Serra*

[33] M. ANTONIONI, *Luciano Serra Italianissimo Pilota*, in «Corriere padano», October 26, 1938; G. ALESSANDRINI, interviewed in M. DOLETTI, *Dal cielo di Campoformido al cielo d'Etiopia*, in «Cinema», November 25, 1937.

[34] Information on Nazzari's popularity in Italy from G. GUBITOSI, *Amedeo Nazzari. Uno divo italiano per il cinema italiano*, Bologna 1998, p. 9. On the *cineromanzo*, see R. DE BERTI, *Dallo schermo alla carta*, pp. 96-108. Segrè writes: «The manner of his death

pilota provides a case study of the intertwinings of the culture industry and war, in this case cinema and the cause of imperial conquest. As we have seen, those intertwinings are achieved not only at the level of the film's content, but in its marketing as a martial event in its own right, through its filming in the colonies. Alessandrini's film also builds on the multiple uses of aviation in Fascist propaganda, not only as an instrument of destruction and battle, but as a means of binding an Italian population dispersed throughout the world. Like the movie camera and the radio, the airplane collapsed distances, facilitating affective connections as well as the diffusion of ideologies. Balbo's flights across the Atlantic and the Mediterranean played on both elements: it is no accident that their destinations (Rio de Janeiro, Chicago, and New York) all boasted large Italian communities. As an Italian military aviator wrote in 1937, «aviation is the eye, the arm, the immediate means through which empires are conquered and held [and] the tie that binds those close by with those far away ...»[35]. Both of these aspects of aviation culture came together in the conquest of Ethiopia, which called emigrants «home» from the Americas, placing them at the service of the regime, and introducing them (or re-habituating them) to the culture of violence that was at the very foundation of Fascism. Here the narration of war takes place on several levels: the histories of conquest told on screen, those involved in the film's production; and a recall, told through ellipses and moments flashed on screen, to earlier wars that took place among Italians. The conquest of Ethiopia thus takes its place in a history of Fascist aggression that would be continued with Italy's entry into World War Two in 1940. The loss of Italian East Africa early in that conflict (1941) marked the beginning of a virtual zone of silence among Italians about the abuses and terror tactics of those occupations, with other arenas of that war (the Resistance, the German occupation) dominating the visual, and written, narrative fields for many decades to come.

mirrored his way of life: courageous, generous, romantic, but also reckless, despotic, impulsive», C. SEGRÈ, *Italo Balbo*, p. 392.

[35] Captain G. CANNONIERI, *La mia avventura fra gli Arussi*, Milan 1937, pp. 94-95, cited in G. STEFANI, *Colonia per maschi*, pp. 62-63.

The Story of the War on the Eastern Front in Italy and Germany

by *Gustavo Corni*

1. *Memory of the War and the Cold War in the two Germanies*

In the spring of 1945, Germany and Italy were two defeated countries, even though in different ways and with dissimilar consequences. Both countries had to deal with the need to legitimize the war. This was particularly necessary with regard to the war against the Soviet Union, which had certainly been the most involving war experience for Germany. Both countries also came to be engaged in new international setups: Germany, frontier of the Cold War, was divided while, in Italy, a very strong Communist Party was operating. In the East, the «first state of workers and peasants on German soil» cast the responsibility for the war on the other Germany. Hence, an official memory of antifascist Germany, which had fought with the support of the Soviet Union against fascism, was created[1]. The past was never dealt with. The blame was put on the bunch of industrialists, landholders, and generals who had brought Hitler to power and who now governed in Bonn.

A memory was built with hierarchies among the victims: the Jews disappeared to the «advantage» of the antifascist fighters (i.e. the communists)[2]. The dominating literature exalted the role of the Soviet Union and the Red Army for having freed Germany and Europe from fascism. «This interpretation of history practically absolved the new political, cultural and social elites in the GDR of any political, personal or moral respon-

Translation by Irene Diamond

[1] See J. KAPPNER, *Erstarrte Geschichte. Faschismus und Holocaust im Spiegel der Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtspropaganda der DDR*, Hamburg 1999. The topics treated in this essay make reference to my monograph, *Raccontare la guerra. La memoria organizzata*, Milano 2012.

[2] See T.C. FOX, *Stated Memory. East Germany and the Holocaust*, Rochester NY 1999.

sibility»[3]. The concept of «victims» also included the dead soldiers on the eastern front and the prisoners of whom there was no news: «In the official memory, death seemed to make all men equal»[4]. The repatriates, whether civilians from eastern areas or ex-prisoners of war, had to be supervised and re-educated because they could be potentially hostile to the new regime. Despite the dominant conformism and censorship, a private memory of the war remained alive.

In the western areas of occupation, at the end of the war, the economic and social problems persuaded the winners to modify their penalizing attitude. This was also due to the realization that the educational effect of the measures and cleansings was having the opposite outcome of what had been expected.

In this context, the memory of the crimes carried out during the war was set aside. The tendency to look ahead prevailed. Up until the middle of the 50s,

> «a public conscience had been imposed that ascribed the responsibility for the shameful crimes committed by the Third Reich only to Hitler and to a small group of the principal war criminals, while the Germans in their entirety were conceded the status of political 'circuits'»[5].

The government of Bonn had to deal with a nationalistic unrest, steeped in anticommunism, and instigated by the associations of the refugees from the ex-eastern provinces. If one makes a comparison with the evolution of the veteran movements after the First World War, which was hostile towards the parliamentary republic, the difference is obvious: after 1945 the movement assumed an apolitical attitude and was anxious to obtain pecuniary recognition for the ex-soldiers. Moreover, the same leading figures of the majority, who promoted the *ex-combattentismo*, supported the newborn republic. Such an evolution was made possible

[3] C. MORINA, *Instructed Silence, Constructed Memory. The SED and the Return of German Prisoners of War as «War Criminals» from the Soviet Union to East Germany 1950-1956*, in «Contemporary European History», 13, 1994, 3, p. 327.

[4] J. ECHTERNKAMP, *Von Opfern, Helden und Verbrechern. Anmerkungen zur Bedeutung des Zweiten Weltkrieges in den Erinnerungskulturen der Deutschen 1945-1955*, in J. HILLMANN - J. ZIMMERMANN (eds), *1945. Kriegsende in Deutschland*, München 2002, p. 314.

[5] N. FREI, *Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit*, München 1999, p. 405.

also because of the predominating de-socialisation and personalisation of the memory of the war and because, after 1945 (unlike after 1918), the soldiers who returned from the front were not heroes, but disappointed and frustrated victims, just like the majority of the civilians[6]. Instead, stress was laid on the prisoners. They were martyr figures, set up as the incarnation of the «eternal German values ... ideal citizens»[7].

It is schematic to maintain—as has been done[8]—that in the Adenauer era, a thick veil of silence was thrown over the recent past, thereby wiping out public memory. All one has to consider are the discussions about the question of the statute-barring of crimes committed during the war, or the establishment in 1958 of an office for war crimes. Obviously, in a society devoted to reconstruction and to consumerism, the «ghosts of the past faded and the traits of Hitler's dictatorship, initially demonized, were dispelled»[9].

Within the context of the Cold War, both German states had to address the problem of rearmament. The military hierarchies, who had made a career during the years of the Third Reich, tried to «take up a new position»[10]. A «self-victimization» prevailed[11], capable of arousing emotions and support. «The guilty people and the aggressors were presented (and presented themselves) as victims and defenders», playing on the premise of camaraderie[12]. The maneuver was favored by the prevailing story of an innocent Wehrmacht, which had fought a 'clean'

6 See the accurate reconstruction by J. DIEHL, *The Thanks of the Fatherland. German Veterans after the Second World War*, Chapel Hill NC - London 1993.

7 F. BIESS, *Männer des Wiederaufbaus – Wiederaufbau der Männer. Kriegsheimkehrer in Ost- und Westdeutschland 1945-1955*, in K. HAGEMANN - S. SCHÜLER-SPRINGORUM (ed.), *Heimat – Front. Militär und Geschlechtsverhältnisse im Zeitalter der Weltkriege*, Frankfurt a.M. - New York 2002, pp. 352 f.

8 R. GIORDANO, *Die zweite Schuld, oder Von der Last Deutscher zu sein*, Köln 1987 has spoken of a «second fault», that of silence, that was added to the one linked to the crimes committed.

9 P. REICHEL, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland*, München 2001, p.19.

10 J. ECHTERNKAMP, *Von Opfern, Helden und Verbrechern*, p. 310.

11 O. VON WROCHEM, *E. von Manstein: Vernichtungskrieg und Geschichtspolitik*, Paderborn 2006, p. 389.

12 T. KÜHNE, *Kameradschaft. Die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 2006, p. 231.

war which in the final phase of the conflict was aimed at defending the fatherland from the Soviet threat. The body of the main ex-combatant movement extolled «the German soldiers who, without the possibility of success, had fought until the end in 1945 against the Bolshevism that was pushing towards the west»[13]. The publications and the public initiatives of the *Traditionsverbände*, the ex-combatant associations, show how the story of the clean war and of the virtues of the armed forces is interwoven with the request for a painless solution to the question of the alleged «war criminals». In order to have an efficient Bundeswehr, capable of contributing to the defense of the West, it was necessary to solve the question of the so-called «criminals»—the *Traditionsverbände* agency of Baden-Württemberg writes[14]. In the East, it was the so-called «Stalingrader», prisoners who had gone through the antifascist schools and the *Nationalkommittee Freies Deutschland*, who acted as promoters of rearmament in defense of the people and socialism.

The story of a war carried out also against the Soviet Union in an honorable way became functional to rearmament and to the re-legitimization of the armed forces within the western German society. There is an example from the memories of Marshal Kesselring:

«The German people and the other populations of the western world must be told that, even though the job of the war is so bloody, the German soldiers, from human, cultural and economic points of view, allowed themselves, to be led in a way that is absolutely rare in wars of this size»[15].

It is a story mediated by the narration of numerous stories of war, where technical ability, courage and heroism were placed in the foreground; it was popularized in the widely-diffused pamphlets of the so-called «Landserhefte»[16], tip of the iceberg of a vast entertainment literature which contributed to «a suppression of the problem of the war»[17]. However, one should not forget certain works of success such

[13] «Deutsche Soldatenzeitung», 2, 1952, no. 4.

[14] «Alte Kameraden», 4, 1956, no. 9.

[15] Cited in R.D. MÜLLER - H.E. VOLKMANN (eds), *Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realität*, München 1999, p. 15.

[16] *Landser*, a slang term that could be translated as a «rascal of a soldier», with its popular-like implications, is a key element in the post-war literature.

[17] W. KLOSE, *Deutsche Kriegsliteratur zu zwei Weltkriegen*, Stuttgart 1984, p. 93.

as that by Marshal von Manstein, significantly dedicated to the «lost victories»[18] of the Wehrmacht.

2. *Italy winner/defeated and forgetful*

The problem of how to legitimize the war, which had just ended, was posed in Italy in different ways, even though there were some analogies. The main difference consisted in the fact that after the war, the Italian public opinion on the whole (even though with deep internal rifts)[19] was able to identify itself in the Resistance movement. It was a resistance 'of the people' that was strong enough to redeem the Italians from the shame of the fascist regime. The most important analogy is with the context of the Cold War: in Italy there was a strong communist party, which had been the backbone of the Resistance.

This is not the place to analyze the tortuous paths along which the memory of the fight for freedom imposed its supremacy on a political, historiographic and cultural level[20]. However, one should remember the persistence and, in certain ways, the escalation of divergences within the post-war Italian society, which culminated in the political elections in 1948 fought and won by the Christian Democrats against the left. Not everyone had personally experienced the process of freedom through the Resistance. As is known, the post-war period began much earlier in the southern regions where, in a situation of deep economic, social and moral crisis, the *Pax Americana* was asserted.

Times and aspects of the post-war period were also different for the ex-servicemen. Many of them became ex-servicemen or ex-fighters in 1943. For others, the war fought extended—on opposite fronts—until the spring of 1945. Then, of course, there were the prisoners who came back in 1946 or 1947. According to Guido Crainz:

«They bring with them frustration and desperation, the breakdown of any sense of discipline, a blind hostility towards a State created from the defeat. With inevitable

[18] *Verlorene Siege*, first edition published in 1954, translated into various languages and reprinted several times.

[19] See A. VENTRONE (ed.), *L'ossessione del nemico. Memorie divise nella storia della repubblica*, Roma 2006.

[20] Cf. recent research in F. FOCARDI, *La guerra della memoria*, Roma 2005.

anger, they live the difficulties of integration, the humiliation of the makeshift camps, the incomprehensible difficulty of an anomalous and ungrateful 'after-war' period»[21].

«This after-war plurality causes social tensions and social behavior that are different from those of the period just immediately after the war, and this was a phenomenon that was not completely understood by the union movement»[22].

The problems of the ex-servicemen after 1945 increased due to the difficult economic and social situation. There was an extremely high rate of unemployment, and this made the war among the poor even worse: the ex-servicemen who were asking to be socially reintegrated and, on the other hand, the impoverished masses especially in the South. «On these bases, there are alternations between competition and solidarity, between moments of detachment and of search for alliance, both within the organisations and at an individual level»[23]. After the first moments of strong associational militancy (like after 1918), which were based on the belief that the veterans had the right to act as moral aggregation for the whole nation, there followed deep disenchantment.

«What contributed to their drawing into themselves, in silence, in bitterness, and in the memory of those who had been killed, was the burden of the defeat and the attitude of the political class. There was no victory to be claimed; in fact, the defeat was endured traumatically and what weighed on the soldiers was that they had fought in a war that 'the general conscience regarded as lucky to have been lost'»[24].

The example of the ex-IMI, of their many decades of silence, is instructive[25]. To this silence should be added the one concerning the dramatic exodus from the regions of Istria and Dalmatia, under the pressure of the Yugoslav communist regime. This was an exodus, preceded by the violence of 1943-1945, that lasted almost a decade. Apart from the people directly involved, this exodus did not leave great signs until recent years.

The public memory of the resistance continues to dominate the collective memory, whereas the preceding period, that of the 'monarchic-fascist'

[21] G. Crainz, *L'ombra della guerra. Il 1945, l'Italia*, Roma 2007, p. 23.

[22] A. Bistarelli, *La storia del ritorno*, Torino 2007, p. 90.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 198.

[25] B. Mantelli, *Lavoratori forzati, deportati, internati militari*, in G. Corni (ed.), *La seconda guerra mondiale nella costruzione della memoria europea*, Trento 2007.

war from June 1940 to September 1943 remains mute. At the cinema, the attention towards the two phases of the war is unbalanced, in favor of the second one. The main exponents of neo-realism dedicated particular attention to the period of the German occupation. «The neorealist cinema starts with the resistance and ends when the ideal and emotional stimulus that sustained it fades»[26].

The cinema paid decidedly less attention to the previous war period[27]. Apart from modest attempts to imitate the triumphant American cinema of war, the Italian cinema, in the first two decades after the war, seems to shun the responsibility of placing the war within its historical context, specifying the faults of the regime. The films concentrate on individual heroic or romantic figures and emphasize the tones of sentimental melodrama, or resort to the trump card of the «Italian-style comedy».

The war remains in the background; it is proposed as an inevitable cataclysm that causes suffering and bereavement without a precise historical definition. One can catch some critical hints in *Italiani brava gente* (*Attack and Retreat*) (1963) by Giuseppe De Santis. This film brings to light certain aspects of the troops on the Russian front, without slipping into the prevailing clichés. Another film is the more intense one, *Carica eroica* (*Heroic Charge*) (1952), by Francesco De Robertis, which concentrates on exalting the traditions of the cavalry corps. The cinema has neglected entire aspects of the story of the Italians in war.

3. *The stories: themes, authors, publishers, styles, the public*

We will turn our attention now to the literary production, in particular to the memory genre regarding the war. Here, too, the disparity between the literary production concerning the resistance and that regarding the previous three-year period, when the Italians fought alongside national-socialist Germany, is evident both in quantity and quality. The resistance, often recounted through its contradictions, had those writers who sang

[26] G. CASADIO, *La guerra al cinema: i film di guerra nel cinema italiano dal 1944 al 1996*, Ravenna 1998, p. 180.

[27] In general E.G. LAURA, *Fotogrammi di guerra, frammenti di cinema. L'immagine della guerra in cento anni di cinema italiano*, Roma 1995; P.M. DE SANTI, *Cinema e Storia: II Guerra Mondiale*, vol. 1, Roma 1990.

its praises, like Italo Calvino, Beppe Fenoglio, Luigi Meneghello, Cesare Pavese and Elio Vittorini[28]. The «monarchic-fascist» war presents a more desolate picture, with the sole exception of Mario Rigoni Stern, with his *Il Sergente nella neve* (*The Sergeant in the Snow*) (1953). Entire pages of that war event, which lacked preparation and was intertwined with defeat, have been wiped out of the writings. The above-mentioned is particularly true for the first two decades after 1945. Two events, which left their mark on the public memory, are a partial exception. I am referring, on the one hand, to the campaign in Northern Africa and, on the other, to the Russian campaign. As regards the former, the issue that attention was paid to, both at a memory and a literary level, is the battle of El Alamein, and, especially, the role of the parachute units of the *Folgore*. At El Alamein, a village about a hundred kilometers from Alexandria, in June 1942, the offensive force of the Italian-German troops, led by Marshall Erwin Rommel, petered out. A few months later, the 8th British Army, much stronger because it had twice as many men, pieces of artillery and tanks (and three times as many aircraft), launched the counter offensive. The battle lasted from 23 October to 4 November, and ended with the defeat of the Italian-German army, forced into a hasty retreat. «El Alamein was the turning point of the Italian war, the place where the illusions of victory ended»[29].

The battle broke up into a series of localized attacks, in which the defensive abilities of some units were able to emerge. This was particularly the case for the paratroopers, around whom, from that moment onwards, a rich literature became established. The specialty of the paratroopers was a recent formation and, everywhere, the moral and physical talents of the officers and soldiers enlisted (the majority of them voluntarily) in the emerging paratrooper units, rose to celebrity level. The *Folgore* division, drilled for the attack on the fortified island of Malta, was sent to the North African front in June 1942, and marshaled into the desert.

In El Alamein, the paratroopers were the heroes of an extraordinary defensive test. This contributed to consolidating the myth of an «indomitable» division. It was a myth steeped in anger towards those in command who had sacrificed the paratroopers in a defensive battle

[28] See M. Isnenghi, *Le guerre degli italiani 1848-1945. Parole, immagini, ricordi*, Milano 1989, pp. 256 f.

[29] G. Rochat, *Le guerre italiane 1935-1943*, Torino 2005, p. 355.

for which they were not prepared. Even during the war years, the first memory books were published, in which the virtues of the paratroopers and their patriotism were exalted with rhetorical tones. It is interesting to observe that memory works written decades later preserve the same contents[30]. Some examples are as follows: «The paratrooper is like an ancient knight who has strong arms and an indomitable heart»[31]; «The most beautiful division in the world ... A band of heroes of Greek myth»[32]. Twenty years later: «The most beautiful division in the world ... that, without arms, had broken the soul of the enemy tanks themselves»[33]; «The best blood of our race»[34]; and again «The myth of the Folgore is being built in the blood! ... The enemies are making a slaughter of our boys, but they are not passing through»[35]. It should also be noted that the memory works on the paratroopers, though full of anger for the betrayal suffered, never consider the responsibilities of the fascist regime.

The myth of the paratroopers was re-assimilated within a more balanced patriotic memory in the successful books of Paolo Caccia Dominioni, officer of the corps aggregated to the *Folgore*. After the war, Dominioni appointed himself guardian of the corpses of the soldiers killed in battle, and he managed to have a shrine built in memory of all the fallen soldiers: Italians, Germans, the British, and those from the Commonwealth. His book[36] is imbued with patriotism and *pietas* for the fallen soldiers; the political and ideological context is omitted. It is a sort of melancholic elegy about the lost Italian military virtues: «The ineptitude of the leaders and the rulers had managed to cover with shame a crowd of four hundred thousand Italians who did not

[30] U. Bruzzese, *Arditi del cielo*, Milano - Roma 1944; A. Bechi Luserna, *I ragazzi della Folgore*, Milano 1956; G. Scantamburlo, *Il loro nome era Folgore*, Roma 1965.

[31] U. Bruzzese, *Arditi del cielo*, p. 149.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[33] G. Scantamburlo, *Il loro nome era Folgore*, p. 83. The memory writer had been military chaplain in the division.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

[36] P. Caccia Dominioni, *Alamein 1933-1962*, Milano 1963, winner of the «Premio Bancarella», conferred by a panel of readers.

deserve it and who, in other hands, would have honorably faced their situation»[37].

The other event that provoked a substantial literary and memory reworking, concerns the Russian campaign. In the memory of the campaign, there prevails a strong imprint of corps, that of the *Alpini* (alpine troops), that inserts itself in a wider corpus of memories (largely romanticized). The myth of the *Alpini*, a corps established in 1872, had been deployed during the First World War, and immediately after the war; thanks to the foundation of the ANA (Associazione Nazionale Alpini / Association of the Italian Alpine Soldiers), the myth of the corps, consisting of simple men, coarse but loyal, capable of tolerating all kinds of labor and devoted to the fatherland, to religion and to the family, persists even today[38]. The events on the Greek-Albanese front (1940/41) and on the eastern one, characterized by defeats without fault[39], exalted it.

Stories and memories begin to be published on the spot, starting in 1943/44. Egisto Corradi, a well-known journalist and a young officer himself, estimates that more than 50 books of a memory or diary character were published between 1943 and 1964[40]. This estimate is lower than the number actually published, and it may well be that some local and private publications were left out in the bibliographies[41]. Many witnesses, mostly officers belonging to the *Alpini*, write on the spur of the moment. The contribution of soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and also of those belonging to other corps present in Russia, is minimal. Also many chaplains—unlike in the German case—write,

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 36. The reference is to the first Italian offensive in December, 1940.

[38] C. De Marco, *Il mito degli alpini*, vol. 1: *Dalle origini alla Grande Guerra*, Udine 2004; L. Scroccaro, *A come alpino. Il mito degli alpini nei libri di lettura della scuola elementare*, Treviso 2001. In particular, M. Mondini, *Alpini. Parole e immagini di un mito guerriero*, Roma 2008.

[39] An alpine memory writer talks about an «undeserved exodus»; Manus (Enzo Manusardi), *Crepuscolo sul Don*, Milano 1955, p. 130.

[40] E. Corradi, *La ritirata di Russia*, Milano 1965.

[41] Recently, G. Rochat, *Le guerre italiane 1935-1943*, Torino 2005, p. 397, estimated that there are about two hundred works in the memory writing corpus on the campaign of Russia. The same author is one of the few who has studied this rich corpus of sources: *Memorialistica e storiografia sulla campagna italiana di Russia 1941-1943*, in *Gli italiani sul fronte russo*, Bari 1982.

anxious to stress their mission on communist ground. The aim of the majority of their works is to bear witness, without literary or historical claims; there are also professional historians, like Aldo Valori, and well-known journalists like the already-mentioned Corradi, Giancarlo Fusco, and Cesco Tomaselli, war correspondent for the newspaper, «Corriere della Sera». Also General Messe (commander of the first Expeditionary Corps in 1941) intervenes, worried about defending the valor of his soldiers as well as his own military integrity. «From the immense catastrophe that has overpowered us, what has emerged intact is the honor of the Italian soldier, his unquestionable qualities of bravery and self-denial and his great sense of humanity and justice»[42].

It is declared that what is desired is «to recount only, and not to recount in order to judge»[43]. A chaplain claims to write «the absolute truth»[44]; the person writing the preface to another memory work written by another chaplain states: «Father Leoni did not write literary or historical books, or apologias. He simply wanted to come clean»[45]. Others declare that they want to exalt the sacrifice made by these forgotten heroes: «If they had been employed in a better way, their heroism would have been more fruitful»[46]. «In the lineage of Rome, there were great heroes—another memory writer stresses—and in the Italian one, which is the real continuation, their heroic acts has been repeated over time»[47]. In other cases, the underlying reason is the desire to pay homage to the soldiers killed in battle: «Shadows of the companions of misfortune»[48]. Something that is less common is political motivation, like that of Major Tolloy who, starting already in the autumn

[42] G. Messe, *La guerra sul fronte russo*, Milano 2005, p. 13. The General is reticent about mentioning the faults of the fascist regime and writes generically about «people in charge of the political leadership», p. 14.

[43] L. Palmieri, *Davai*, Roma 1948, p. 4.

[44] M. D'Auria, *La mia Russia. Cappellano - combattente - prigioniero*, Pompei 1967, p. 10.

[45] P. Bargellini, *Introduzione*, in the reprint of the book by P. Leoni, *Spia del Vaticano!*, Roma 1959, p. 6.

[46] S. Dotti, *Ritirata in Russia*, Bologna 1956, p. X.

[47] D. Gallorini, *Dall'Italia alla Siberia*, Milano 1958, p. 25.

[48] M. Francesconi, *Siamo tornati insieme*, Udine 1955, p. 7.

of 1942, has his reports filtered into Italy, and distributed secretly by the Resistence[49]. Only indirectly political, but not less incisive, is the motivation of Revelli, who goes among the ex-servicemen, collecting their statements: «All of them have a deep hidden mark. They are sick, tired, and old; they are collapsing»[50].

The books are published, in general, by small publishers and have limited circulation. In 1963, the first real bestseller about the war, which greatly influenced the public opinion, was published: the novel *Centomila gavette di ghiaccio* [A hundred thousand ice-filled mess kits] by Giulio Bedeschi. Three years later, he published the follow-up, entitled *Il peso dello zaino*. Both books were ignored by the critics; the little analysis stresses «the linear structure of the story»[51] capable of orchestrating individual wounds and general historical events, and constructed «with a Hollywood-like technique»[52]. As for Carlo Bo, he laid the emphasis on the role of Italians as victims: «Theirs is an interminable series of victims that only God can condemn and save»[53]. Since then, the two books have had an extraordinary publishing success, exceeding three million copies sold in countless reprints.

Bedeschi had enlisted as a volunteer, working as a medical officer at first in the Greek-Albanese campaign and then in the Russian one[54]. When he returned to civilian life, Bedeschi, like many others, felt the need to write. The manuscript, written there and then in 1946, had a vexed publishing path; it was refused by various publishers—like the contemporary work of Primo Levi—and was finally published by Mursia[55].

[49] See the editorial note to G. TOLLOY, *Con l'armata italiana in Russia*, Milano 1968.

[50] N. REVELLI, *La strada del Davai*, Torino 1966, p. XIV.

[51] E. ELLI, *La «guerra dei poveri». Gli Alpini in Russia, nelle testimonianze di Giulio Bedeschi e Nuto Revelli*, in M. ARDIZZONE (ed.), *Scrittori in divisa. Memoria epica e valori umani*, Brescia 2000, p. 140.

[52] G. ROCHAT, *Le guerre*, p. 399.

[53] Introduction placed in various editions from the 70s onwards, pp. 8, 11.

[54] The participation of Bedeschi in a unit of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana particularly active in the fight against the partisans, is unclear; the subject, which would have damaged the image of the humanist and Christian writer has still to be thrashed out.

[55] On the work and the biographic route, see I.A. RIBALDI, *Come leggere 'La neve, la pace, la guerra' di Giulio Bodeschi*, Milano 1979.

During the years afterwards, drawing also from letters received from ex-servicemen, Bedeschi produced a series of publications, again for Mursia; the general title was *C'ero anch'io* [I was there too], and nine volumes of short personal statements regarding the main fronts were published. The series was quite successful. From the late 60's, Bedeschi became the official promoter of the myth of the *Alpini*[56]. Some years before, Nuto Revelli, who had been a lieutenant in the *Alpini* in Russia, and then, a partisan and on-the-spot author of a moving memory about that campaign, had convinced the people involved to recount their stories[57]. From 1960 onwards, Revelli, within his impassioned work of reconstruction of the life of the humble people, collected about forty declarations from soldiers belonging to the division he had been part of, the *Cuneense*. The comparison between the tones of the story of the 1960's by Revelli and those collected by Bedeschi two decades later, shows how time had eased the feeling of frustration and senselessness that predominates in the stories gathered in the heat of the moment, by Revelli[58].

It is with Bedeschi's very fortunate book and the subsequent series, *C'ero anch'io*, that the veil of silence seems to have lifted. However, maybe because Bedeschi had saturated the market, the memory production greatly declined in the decades afterwards and its publishing fortune does not seem to be comparable in any way to the successes of Bedeschi or of Rigoni Stern. Many of the works are reprints[59] or publications edited by small local publishers[60]. This was a development, which was parallel to what happened in West Germany, showing that the strongest pressure for writing (and reading) came from people who had personally lived through those events.

[56] As well as the material collected in the private archive, deposited in the Biblioteca Bertoliana in Vicenza, see M. MONDINI, *Alpini*, pp. 197 f.

[57] N. REVELLI, *Mai tardi*, Cuneo 1943. Widely reshaped, the diary was republished by Einaudi in 1962 with the title, *La guerra dei poveri.*

[58] N. REVELLI, *La strada del Davai.*

[59] The publishing house Il Mulino republished the memories of C. MOSCIONI NEGRI, *I lunghi fucili. Ricordo della guerra di Russia*, Bologna 2005, originally published in 1956.

[60] The resurgence of interest in the Russian campaign after 1991 could be due to the fact that, starting from that year, the soviet lists of the dead and missing were published; see M.T. GIUSTI, *I prigionieri italiani in Russia*, Bologna 2003, p. 13.

Memory literature, though rich and many-sided, is characterized by some main features that are repeated. First of all, one should note that memory writers seldom reveal the reasons why they write; in a few cases, the desire to be objective is mentioned while, in others, the political motivation is evident. One memory author writes: «Very few people spend words on the innocent victims, on the madness of such a venture, on the betrayal, on the baseness of some who, even today, dare to show their faces in the public life of the country»[61]. However, there is a complete absence of the desire to show the responsibility of fascism and the monarchy, which are rarely mentioned.

If we go through the memory writings in chronological order again, the first point that emerges is that the period prior to the disastrous rout on the Don front, in the freezing winter of 1942/43, takes up very little space; Mario Isnenghi has efficiently written: «The same mechanism of the eastern front and of the retreat from Russia: we never attacked, but just came away. Our real history begins when we have no longer any wish to make history»[62]. In this way, the role of the Italian soldiers as victims is emphasized. In general, alongside the dominant themes of the courage and heroism of the soldiers, completely averse to ideological and political suggestions, the «good Russian» is paired with the «good Italian». In contrast to the German writings, the Italian ones give prominence to the civilians and to the relationships of understanding and reciprocal help established with the Italian troops, even though there is also, especially in the army chaplains, the anticommunist and missionary theme regarding an atheistic people.

We now come to the writings concerning the Russian front in the two Germanies. In the communists ones, the stories about the war were filtered by the political power, which needed to favor a legitimization of the conflict: without running down the majority of the fighters, it was necessary to condemn the Hitler regime and, in mirror-like fashion, to stress the positive aspects of the Soviet victory for maintaining the peace. The very work of Theodor Pliever on Stalingrad, which was immediately very successful, was the fruit of commissioning by the communist authorities. During the years afterwards, memory and fiction works were banned for a long time. What circulated most were translations from Russian that

[61] F. Serio, *La steppa accusa!*, Milano 1948, p. 6.

[62] M. Isnenghi, *Le guerre degli italiani*, p. 51.

exalted the equation between the war victory of the Soviet Union and the definite triumph of communism. It is only from the middle of the fifties that memory books begin to be published, books written mostly by officials of the regime, in many cases ex-officers in the Wehrmacht, who give evidence of their 'conversion' to communism precisely in the light of their experiences in war and in prison.

In the Federal Republic, the memory works were intense right from the start. During the first two decades after the war, more than two hundred books[63] were published by people who took part in the conflict, and two-thirds of these were about the eastern front. Most of the writers are officers, with a high percentage of staff generals and officers. The majority of the works, often in diary-form, and thus of a strong immediacy, dwell upon the war events in the strict sense, leaving the issue of the responsibility for the war in the background. The ideological tones are left out. According to Düsterberg, this memory work is so saturated with patriotism and duty, with an awareness of having fought with dedication and honor, that discordant actions, like desertion, are branded with negative terms[64]. Von Wrochem speaks about «a masculine and heroic community experience ... The Wehrmacht was presented as a patriotic organization»[65]. In the majority of cases, the memory works had a small circulation. There was much more success to be had with fiction on the war, which—as we have seen in Pliever's case—takes off on the spot. In addition, in this case, we have dozens of authors, many of whom specialize in books on war. Many had great success with these works; we can name Plievier, Josef Martin Bauer (author of the most important story on imprisonment or, in fact, on the heroic escape of prisoners)[66], Heinz G. Konsalik, skilful mixer of patriotism, drama, and eroticism[67]. However, other books stopped at the first edition. In

[63] See R. DÜSTERBERG, *Soldat und Kriegserlebnis. Deutsche militärische Erinnerungsliteratur (1945-1961) zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Motive, Begriffe, Wertungen*, Tübingen 2000.

[64] T. KRAFT, *Fahnenflucht und Kriegsneurose. Gegenbilder zur Ideologie des Kampfes in der deutschsprachigen Literatur nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Würzburg 1994, pp. 130 f.

[65] O. VON WROCHEM, *E. von Manstein*, p. 300.

[66] *So weit die Füße tragen*, München 1954. Some years later, a screenplay, based on this, was written for television, and it was very successful.

[67] H.G. KONSALIK, *Der Arzt von Stalingrad*, München 1956: bestseller on imprisonment, followed by the equally-successful *Das Herz der 6. Armee*, München 1964.

the majority of cases, commemorative and heroic tones predominate, which are centred on camaraderie, courage, and spirit of sacrifice. The greater part is impolitic and shrinks from «historical explanations, philosophical reflections, and political evaluations»[68]. In some instances, «the solitude, emptiness, doubt, fatigue and fear of the servicemen»[69] prevail, with moralizing tones. The military events are carried out in a sort of «contextual void», and the human aspect of the behavior of the soldiers, closed within small circles of comrades, is privileged. The subject of the crimes committed by the soldiers is absent, with the noteworthy exception of the story by Fühmann *Kameraden*[70].

The genre of novels that have doctors as protagonists (one by Bamm and two by Konsalik) is particularly interesting. In these novels, the gifts of humanity and the technical abilities of the Germans can best shine. There is little mention of the civilian population but, when this happens, the tones of compassion predominate over the racist ones. There are strong reasons for anti-Slavism and for opposition to communism; anti-Semitism is practically absent. However, also the motherland is largely absent from the landscape of the writers.

There are works that are appreciated by the critics: for a long time, Pliever's novel was considered the best of the after-war period in Germany, alongside *Doktor Faustus* by Thomas Mann[71] and, of course, there is no doubt about the success of Bauer's work. Others, like Konsalik's, sold in millions of copies throughout the world, have been ignored, or judged simply «fascist»[72]. The incidence of literary fiction sets the German case apart from the Italian one, in which there are very few really true narrators, and only a couple have had a positive

[68] J. PFEIFER, *Der deutsche Kriegsroman 1945-1960. Ein Versuch zur Vermittlung von Literatur und Sozialgeschichte*, Königstein i.Ts. 1981, p. 77.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

[70] Berlin 1955. However, the author lives in East Germany. The nationalist-socialists characters present in the stories, or the men of the SS, were depicted as «pathological cases»; see J. PFEIFER, *Der deutsche Kriegsroman*, p. 120.

[71] J. EBERT, *Stalingrad. Eine deutsche Legende. Zeugen einer verdrängten Niederlage*, Reinbek 1992, p. 94.

[72] G. BAHR, *Defensive Kompensation; P. Bamm, «Die unsichtbare Flagge» (1952) und H.G. Konsalik, «Der Arzt von Stalingrad» (1956)*, in H. WAGENER, *Von Böll bis Buchheim. Deutsche Kriegsprosa nach 1945*, Amsterdam 1997, p. 204.

reaction from the public. Most of the German professional writers, who wrote novels set on the Russian front, took part in that theatre of war, but the experience does not seem to have influenced them in their writing. A third, important, genre of war writing, flourishing in Germany, but inexistent in Italy, is that concerning stories of single units, which occasionally concentrated on specific wartime moments. The difference between the two countries (we are talking about Western Germany here) lies in the evident fact that, during the military campaign, German units were on the offensive for a long time and were able to collect many victories, unlike the Italians. These writings bring to the foreground the gap between the abstract war machine and the individual fighters, «victims of predominant situations»; in this way, the aim is to arouse «understanding, partiality and compassion»[73] in the reader. The regime is remote, «something else» (in his intense novel, Bamm defines the national-socialist characters as «the Others»); the context of the war is absent: civilians and Russian soldiers are almost completely absent and the methods of the occupation are omitted.

A fourth genre, in which the adventurous aspect is in the foreground, is that of the *Landserhefte*, booklets published by specialized publishing houses from the beginning of the 50s. In these, the eastern front plays a prevalent part. This successful genre contains adventure and heroic narratives that are the parallel of cowboy stories and claimed to recount what had happened with precision. They were overwhelmingly successful: the circulation of the nimble notebooks (together with photographs and illustrations that exalted both the heroism of the fighters and the technique of the weapons) was about half a million copies, but this number fell markedly from the 70s onwards. According to a general estimate, until the present time, these publications, with a wide working-class readership, reached a thousand titles, with an overall circulation of more than a hundred million copies[74]. The illustrated magazines, which became a great success, tell about a war «without blood, without sufferance ... Something clean»; German soldiers and civilians are the victims, while strong criticism is directed towards the allies for the air raids[75].

[73] J. PFEIFER, *Der deutsche Kriegsroman*, p. 60.

[74] T. KÜHNE, *Kameradschaft*, p. 246.

[75] See the monograph by M. SCHORNSTHEIMER, *Die leuchtenden Augen der Frontsoldaten. Nationalsozialismus und Krieg in den Illustriertenromane der fünfziger Jahre*, Berlin 1995.

A reference to the authors allows one to make another distinction with respect to the Italian case: many authors came from the rank of the national-socialist propaganda apparactus—which only happened in Italy in isolated cases—and yet, like Bredel and Weinert, worked as propagandists on the other side, serving the Red Army. In the war-literature genre, expert people of letters put themselves to the test, but also new writers who would leave a mark on the history of post-war German literature: people like Andersch, Kluge and Fühmann. In the Italian case, the much lower incidence of fiction meant that important authors of the new post-war literature were not interested in the war, as we have seen. In communist Germany, the authors are leading figures of the regime, or orthodox intellectuals. In general, «the novels of war drew the picture of the German soldier who, sooner or later, realized he could fight for the real interests of the fatherland only by deserting and passing over to the side of the Red Army»[76].

As in the case of Italy, where the attention is concentrated on the dramatic withdrawal from the Don in January 1943, similarly, in the German narration, particular criticism is reserved towards Stalingrad, towards the «sufferings and the almost inhuman commitment ... to the point of provoking compassion for the soldier, who can absolutely not influence his own condition»[77]. In all the cases, the role of the soldiers and officers as victims is emphasized. To tell the truth, we can spot a clear difference between the two patterns: in the German case, the stories concern specific events, particular moments (like Stalingrad, or imprisonment) taken from the experience the protagonists had of the war. This is also because this war experience was prolonged and it took place in different contexts. In the case of the Italian writings, it appears more compact: the stories, even though privileging particularly dramatic moments (withdrawal, imprisonment) tend to recount the whole period of the war event: from the departure for the front to the return to the fatherland as a sort of voyage.

The sixties represent a turning point that reflects a decisive change of political culture. The theme of memory, which previously people had tried to neutralize, returns to the center of attention, both within the 1968 student movement and in other circles of cultural and political

[76] J. Echternkamp, *Von Opfern, Helden und Verbrechern*, p. 309.

[77] J. Ebert, *Stalingrad*, p. 147.

life. In the revolt against the fathers, a characteristic of the movements that rotate around 1968, the Germans add criticism towards what their own parents had done, or not done during the dictatorship. In the circle of the war literature, we can mention literates like Günther Grass and Heinrich Böll. In addition, the trials against the torturers, beginning with the one held in Frankfurt against a group of SS from the Auschwitz concentration camp (1963/64), had heavy consequences. The victims were no longer the Germans, civilians and soldiers, but those who had suffered the policies of genocide and of the occupation pursued by the Third Reich. On a political level, one should remember the impact, also within the media, of the *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt's social-liberal government; one instance that stands out is the gesture of the chancellor, on 7 December 1970, to kneel on the steps of the monument to the Warsaw ghetto insurrection: «Germany was becoming a different place»[78].

There was an epoch-making break in the self-critical deliberation that did not take place in Italy. Also, after 1945, the transition of the memories of the war from the fascist regime to the democratic republic took place without commotion and, likewise in the 60s, it was not so much the war that provoked criticism or self-criticism but, once again, the «betrayed» resistance. Only in more recent years has the role played by Italy in the World War taken on greater importance at a historiographic level. This has happened with the questioning of the myth of «Italians, good people» in new studies on the colonial wars and on the policies of occupation in 1940-1943[79].

[78] K.H. JARAUSCH - M. GEYER, *Shattered Past. Reconstructing German Histories*, Princeton NJ 2003, p. 9.

[79] For a reconstruction, see my *Fascismo. Condanne e revisioni*, Roma 2011, and recently F. FOCARDI, *Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano*, Roma 2013.

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Finito di stampare nel mese di ottobre 2013
dalle Arti Grafiche Editoriali Srl, Urbino